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Internationale organisaties (IO's), traditioneel beschouwd als door de overheid geleide 
en niet erg autonome instellingen, ondergaan momenteel een doorbraak door meerdere 
actoren, die op verschillende beleidsniveaus handelen, te betrekken bij kwesties en 
nieuwe rollen te delegeren en op zich te nemen. Zelfs als IO's al lang bestaan, zijn de 
diplomatieke mechanismen om andere actoren zonder dwang te laten doen wat de IO's 
willen, over het algemeen een onderbelicht gebied. In die zin staat orkestratie centraal 
als het proces waarbij IO's op vrijwillige basis intermediairs met vergelijkbare doelen 
inschakelen waarmee uitwisselingsmateriaal of ideële middelen worden gebruikt om 
hun gemeenschappelijke doelen na te streven (Abbott et al. 2015). Dit onderzoek 
verkent iets dat nog niet eerder in de orkestratietheorie is beschreven. Ik heb nagedacht 
over de concrete causale trajecten van hoe orkestratie bij internationale organisaties 
met een medium bestuurscapaciteit werkt. Dit proefschrift is verdeeld in drie delen. Ten 
eerste onderscheidt het de twee belangrijkste IO-orkestratiebenaderingen, namelijk 
overtuiging en sociale invloed. Ten tweede bespreekt het de noodzaak om een 
onderscheid te maken tussen orkestratie door multifunctionele ondernemersorganisaties 
die zich bezighouden met sociale invloed door middel van particuliere intermediaire 
actoren en orkestratie die wordt gedelegeerd aan   verdragssecretariaten die zich 
bezighouden met overtuiging via openbare intermediaire actoren. Bovendien biedt het 
de tools die nodig zijn om de invloeden van orkestratie op het gebied van “Global 
environmental governance” (GEG) te beoordelen. Ten slotte wordt een grondig 
empirisch onderzoek uitgevoerd met als doel de algemene orkestratie van IO in GEG en 
















International organizations (IOs), traditionally assessed as government-led and not very 
autonomous institutions, are currently undergoing a breakthrough by engaging 
multiple actors, acting at different policy levels, across issues and undertaking and 
delegating new roles. Even if IOs have been there for a long time, the diplomatic 
mechanisms to get other actors do what IOs intend without the use of force is, by and 
large, an underresearched area. In this sense, orchestration as the process whereby IOs 
enlist on voluntary basis intermediaries with similar objectives with which exchange 
material or ideational resources to pursue their common goals (Abbott et al. 2015) is 
central. This research explores something not previously described in orchestration 
theory. I have thought about the concrete causal pathways of how orchestration works 
with IOs with medium governance capacity. This thesis is divided into three parts. First, 
it distinguishes the two main IO orchestration approaches, namely persuasion and social 
leverage. Second, it discusses the need to differentiate between orchestration by 
entrepreneurial multipurpose organizations that engage in social leverage through 
private intermediary actors and orchestration delegated to treaty secretariats that 
engage in persuasion through public intermediary actors. Besides, it provides the tools 
needed to assess orchestration influence in the field of global environmental governance 
(GEG). Last, a thorough empirical research for the purpose of strengthening IO 
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Actors are individuals, organizations and networks that participate in decision-making 
processes (Biermann et al. 2010: 283). 
Accountability facilitators are agents that provide a public forum for stakeholders to 
demand and generate accountability by providing accurate information about one’s 
activities or behavior, evaluating that behaviour with reference to certain standards, rules 
or expectations; thereby recognising one’s obligations and accepting responsibility for 
one’s actions (Steets 2010: 15). 
Agents are actors who have the ability to prescribe behavior and to obtain the consent of 
the governed (Biermann et al. 2010: 283). 
Approaches to orchestration are the causal pathways used by IOs to address 
orchestration, namely persuasion (see glossary) and social leverage (see glossary). 
Authority is the power to influence or command thought, opinion, or behavior. IOs draw 
on expert, capacity-building, principled-based sources of authority (Avant, Finnemore, 
and Sell 2010) as well as rational-legal authority (Barnett and Finnemore 2004c) to gain 
legitimacy from intermediaries and targets. 
Autonomy is the quality or state of being self-governing. 
Coercion is the act, process, or power of coercing, which is to cause to do or occur an act 
or choice by overwhelming pressure. 
Conditionality involves the use of conditions – change of behavior – attached to the 
provision of benefits – material incentives − such as a loan, debt relief or bilateral aid, 
typically employed by international financial institutions. 
Coral reef governance concerns the way in which organizations or countries manage 
coral reefs at the highest political level. As a cross-cutting issue of global environmental 
politics, coral reef governance deals with biodiversity and natural heritage (Mauerhofer 
and Nyacuru 2014), pollution and management of oceans and seas (Mitchell 1993, Jacques 
2014), fisheries (Peterson 1993, DeSombre 2014) and climate change (Cinner et al. 2012). 
Decision-making is the act or process of deciding something especially with a group of 
people. 
Delegation is the action of empowering to act for another. Particularly, in the context of 
orchestration, it refers to the process of empowering IOs to act on behalf of states, which 
have initiated the orchestration process (Abbott et al. 2015b). 
Diplomacy is the skill in handling affairs without arousing hostility. 
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Discourse-coalition builders are able to set-up links between different actors in order 
to generate a discourse-coalition, which is understood as “the ensemble of a set of story 
lines, the actors that utter these story lines, and the practices that conform to these story 
lines, all organized around a discourse” (Hajer 1993: 47). 
Discursive outputs involve the emergence of new discourses generated during the 
interaction of the IO with orchestration intermediaries that result in the coordination of 
new areas of research, recognition of new emergencies with the endorsement of scientific 
reports, appointment of authoritative panel of experts, the celebration of international 
conferences where new crises are given visibility and new perspectives that contrast with 
the existing ways of dealing with current environmental sustainability challenges. 
Entrepreneurship is the quality of organizing, managing, and assuming the risks of an 
enterprise, which in this research context refers to the process of orchestration initiated 
by IOs (Abbott et al. 2015b). Additionally, Boesson and Huitema refer to climate 
governance entrepreneurship, which is understood as the acts performed by actors 
seeking to “punch above their weight” (Boasson and Huitema 2017). 
Entrepreneurial agency is the quality of a person or organization that exerts its capacity 
to initiate actions to exert influence and achieve an end. 
Environmental sustainability is the ability to maintain the balance of an ecosystem, at a 
steady level, without exhausting natural resources or causing ecological damage. 
Ex-ante state oversight concerns regulatory state supervision, based on assumptions and 
predictions, which are essentially subjective and estimative. 
Ex-post state oversight concerns regulatory state supervision, based on the knowledge 
and retrospection, which are essentially objective and factual. 
Franchise is authority granted to an individual or group. 
Focality (IO) is the state or condition of being located at or around a focus or the state or 
condition of being a focal point. For instance, the United Nations Environment 
Programme is considered a focal point for environmental issues. 
Formal orchestration is the process in which an IO is delegated with orchestration 
functions by states. Therefore, the initiative to orchestrate lays in states. 
Goal divergence involves the differences between the ends towards which orchestration 
actors’ efforts are directed. 
Goal convergence involves the coincidences between the ends towards which 
orchestration actors’ efforts are directed. 
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Governance deficits (IO) are the gaps in performance to be addressed by the IO or 
redundancies between different international institutions (Haas 2004). 
Highly legalized institutions are the statutes or regulations in highly developed 
national legal systems that are generally taken as the prototype of hard legalization 
(Abbott et al. 2000: 18). 
Governance capacity (IO) is the ability of IOs to implement policies aligned with their 
overall objectives. 
Influence (orchestration) is the capacity to use soft resources and get somebody do 
something without the use of force or intimidation. In this study, it refers to the 
dependent variable that consists of visible outputs – organizational, policy-based, 
discursive and voluntary− evaluated on their capacity to involve new actors and ability to 
legitimize new roles through procedural resources – trust, neutrality, respect and 
participation. 
Informal orchestration is the process in which an IO orchestrates entrepreneurially. 
Intermediaries are the actors enrolled by IOs in order to influence targets in 
orchestration processes. 
International organization is an agency set up by governments or other public actors 
with some degree of permanence and coherence and beyond formal direct control of 
single national governments that acts in the international arena to pursue a policy 
(Biermann et al. 2009: 37). IOs have agency, agenda-setting influence and potentially 
important socializing influences (Simmons and Martin 2002: 193). 
Knowledge brokers are “intermediaries between the original researchers and producers 
of knowledge, and the policy makers who consume that knowledge, but lack the time and 
training necessary to absorb the original knowledge” (Litfin 1994: 4). 
Legitimacy deficit concerns the fairness gaps in governance procedures, such as trust, 
neutrality, respect and participation. 
Low governance capacity (IO) involves the limited IO capability for implementing 
policies aligned with the objectives of IOs. 
Mandate is the authorization to act given to a representative. 
Median describes the numeric value of a finite list of numbers that can be found in 
statistics by, arranging all the observations from lowest value to highest value and picking 
the middle one. 
Membership describes the body of individuals composing a group. Particularly, in the 
case of orchestration, it refers to the group composed of the IO and its intermediaries. 
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Multipurpose organizations (MPOs) are those organizations that deal with more than 
one specific issue area and that exert influence in several policy subjects. In this study, the 
United Nations Environment Programme and the World Bank are considered 
multipurpose organizations. 
Neutrality is the quality or state of not saying or doing anything that would encourage or 
help any of the groups involved in an argument or war. Particularly, in the context of IO 
orchestration, it is conceived as the capacity to frame issues by establishing an overall 
balance between the three pillars of sustainable development, so as to generate positive 
synergies between social, economic and environmental issues. 
Norm entrepreneurs are those actors that by “advocating a minority position, use 
international norms to strengthen their position in domestic debates” (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998: 893). 
Orchestrator-Intermediary-Target (O-I-T) framework recognizes the exchange of 
material or ideational resources between the orchestrator and the intermediary to pursue 
international organizations’ goals (Abbott et al. 2015b). 
Orchestration defines the process by which international organizations enlist 
intermediaries with similar objectives on a voluntary basis with which exchange material 
or ideational resources in order to pursue their common goals (Abbott et al. 2015a). 
Outputs are devised as the observable effects of IOs’ orchestration. The identification of 
outputs is conducted as part of the assessment of orchestration influence. 
Organizational outputs involve the delivery of orchestration activities for the provision 
of direct policy advice and financial support to intermediaries in order to create new 
organizations or departments in target states, businesses or organizations for the 
implementation of environmental policies. 
Participation involves taking part or having a part or share in something. In the specific 
context of IO orchestration, it is defined as the capacity of involving non-state actors, 
both profit, such as businesses, and non-for-profit, such as NGOs, in orchestration 
activities. 
Persuasion implies changing minds, opinions, and attitudes about causality and affect, 
identity, in light of new evidence or other reasons excluding overtly material or mental 
coercion (Johnston 2001: 489-495). Similar to diplomacy, it entails convincing the others 
with axiomatic and unquestioned arguments. 
Policy-based outputs involve the delivery of new public or private rules, laws, budget 
design, and consultative advisory groups enacted through IO’s orchestration such as, 
budget reallocation or national sustainable development strategies. 
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Polycentricism involves having more than one center as of development or control. In 
contemporary global environmental politics, authority becomes polycentric, diffusing 
across multiple venues and through a variety of actors (Green 2014: 9). 
Procedural resources in civil regulation studies refer to trust, neutrality, respect and 
participation. Concretely, in orchestration describe the capacity to involve new actors 
operationalized through the indicators of, private actors, local, traditional knowledge and 
southern experts and affected people; and, the competence to legitimize new roles for 
actors with the provision of new environmental frames of reference, new interlinkages 
between welfare, equity and environmental degradation and social accountability. 
Respect is an act of giving particular attention. In the specific context of IO 
orchestration, it is defined as the capacity of involving holders of traditional knowledge, 
Southern science experts and affected people. 
Shadow of hierarchy is understood as a soft threat or “long shadow casted” by potential 
binding regulation. 
Social leverage implies that the actor changes her/his behavior in response to social 
rewards and punishments (Johnston 2001-495). 
Socialization is understood as the adaptation to social needs or uses. In the context of 
orchestration, persuasion and social leverage contribute to socialization by acting as 
causal pathways that can lead to compliance, both from a constructivist as well as a 
rationalist redistribution of resources approach (Börzel 2002: 168-169). 
Soft political resources involve the debates on cultural values, dialogues on ideology, 
the good example and appeal to commonly accepted human values used for diplomacy 
and the dissemination of information, analysis, propaganda and cultural programming to 
achieve political ends (Nye Jr. 2004). 
Sources of agency are problem-solving, expertise or moral arguments that enable IOs to 
exercise power with legitimacy, which can be delegated to IOs from states or be granted 
by non-state actors (Dellas, Pattberg, and Betsill 2011: 87-88). 
Sovereignty cost is the reduction in states’ autonomy associated with ceding authority 
over their territory to international institutions. 
State oversight is described in Principal-Agent theory as the regulatory supervision 
conducted on IOs as agents from states, which act as IO principals. 
Treaty secretariats (TSCs) are the administrative departments of governmental agencies 
that support an agreement or arrangement made by negotiation between two or more 
political authorities, formally signed by representatives duly authorized and usually 
ratified by the lawmaking authority of the state. 
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Social accountability entails the provision of public platforms and mechanisms where all 
orchestration stakeholders involved − with opposing or similar interests − can openly 
express their opinions and ask for accountability of procedures. 
Trust describes the assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of 
someone or something. In the context of IO orchestration, it is defined as the capacity to 
generate social accountability (see def.). 
Voluntary compliance involves conforming, submitting or adapting − as to a regulation 
or to another's wishes − as required or requested without coercive mesures. Voluntary 
compliance is linked to the legitimacy of the authority that surveils rule compliance, 
whose legitimacy is linked to judgements about the fairness of procedures (Tyler 1997). 
Voluntary outputs can be classified into four groups that include; first, institutional with 
the constitution of new private institutions, or new institutional agreements of public or 
private; second, normative outputs that consist of the adoption of new guidelines, codes of 
conduct, certification schemes or new methodologies; three, reporting outputs include 
new reporting activities of corporate social and environmental responsibility; and finally, 
fund-raising outputs involve the creation of new mechanisms to generate financial 
resources that support the IO’s objectives. 
World polity is constituted by a distinct culture – a set of fundamental principles and 
models, mainly ontological and cognitive in character, defining the nature and purposes 
of social actors and action (Boli and Thomas 1999b). The world polity provides a set of 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The changing role of international organizations in sustainability politics 
Leading international organizations (IOs) influence government decisions on foreign 
policy in the absence of economic sanctions or military coercion. Differently from the 
limited number of organizations such as the European Union (EU) able to exert 
sanctioning power, most IOs have limited governance tools to impose its policies. This 
is particularly the case for global environmental governance. In spite of the lack of 
sanctioning measures, IOs convince or may pressure states to adopt policy 
recommendations. As a matter of illustration, climate change, a major environmental 
challenge of our times, is administered by the secretariat to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Interestingly, the climate 
secretariat with limited workforce, material resources and legal status is able to 
administer this challenging convention (Lövbrand, Hjerpe, and Linnér 2017). Precisely, 
this secretariat avails less than five times the workforce of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) office or less than six times the total budget of administration of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). Notwithstanding its limitations, the climate 
secretariat has contributed to the entry into force of the Paris Agreement in November 
2016, an unprecedented effort that prompts all nations to undertake ambitious efforts in 
order to combat climate change and adapt to its effects. 
Table 1.1 Employees and total budget for 3 international agencies 
 
Interestingly, the High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) on sustainable development is 
a central element in the emerging governance architecture for sustainable development. 
Established at the 2012 United Nations (UN) Conference on Sustainable Development, 
the HLPF has a dauntingly expansive mandate – including setting the sustainable 
development agenda; enhancing integration, coordination and coherence across the UN 
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system; and following up all sustainable development goals and commitments. Yet, it 
has been granted limited authority and constrained material resources. Under these 
circumstances, the HLPF must rely on the governance strategy of “orchestration”: 
working indirectly through intermediary organizations, and using soft modes of 
influence to support and guide their actions. 
More generally, environmental IOs influence target actors, such as governments, 
companies and other organizations in global environmental governance (Bauer, Busch, 
and Siebenhüner 2009, Jinnah 2014, Van der Lugt and Dingwerth 2015). States respond 
to the increasing demands for international environmental cooperation, and 
consequently delegate functions to IOs in order to achieve both domestic and foreign 
policy goals (Green and Colgan 2013). Accordingly, IOs created by states are more than 
the sum of the interests of states. IOs, unlike individual governments, represent the 
broader regional or global community affected by the managed activities; and, unlike 
transnational actors, they can bring together those who wield political power and 
authority to provide an institutional infrastructure within which private activity and 
governance can occur (Peterson 1997: 150). Hence, IOs are defined as “agencies that 
have been set up by governments or other public actors with some degree of 
permanence and coherence and beyond formal direct control of single national 
governments and that act in the international arena to pursue a policy” (Biermann et al. 
2009: 37).  
IOs perform functions that go far beyond administering and overseeing meetings, 
decisions, procedures and agreements on the most relevant issue areas in world politics1. 
In fact, IOs deserve attention because they have agency, agenda-setting influence and 
potentially important socializing influences (Simmons and Martin 2002: 193). IOs are 
indeed not a new issue. Significantly, Keohane and Nye (1974) rightly indicated, in the 
seventies of the past century, the rarely optimal efficiency of IOs, and yet the 
impossibility to live without them. However, most studies on IOs at that time qualified 
as taxonomic exercises that centered on governance issues, history, stakeholders, 
mandates and policies (Dijkzeul 1997). For this reason, they defended the need for a 
renewed type of attention upon them (Keohane and Nye 1974: 62), which appears to still 
be applicable today. 
Because IOs provide services that would cost more if states produced them 
individually, member states delegate tasks and accept that this gives IOs2 a certain 
degree of policy discretion (Reinalda and Verbeek 2004: 244). Therefore, states tend to 
                                                 
1 Some issue areas lack an international organization due to failed intergovernmental negotiations in 
the set up of an international frawework convention. Forests and chemicals issue areas are cases in 
point. 
2 Reinalda and Verbeek used the word bureaucracies instead of IOs. 
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frequently delegate functions to IOs that imply the minimum reduction of state 
autonomy3, such as implementation and monitoring. In the same way, states rarely 
delegate rule making and enforcement functions (Green and Colgan 2013). Yet, the 
urgent need to make progress in global environmental governance has led to calls for 
IOs to become more efficient and improve international cooperation. IOs respond to a 
rapidly changing landscape of global governance and counterbalance criticism for their 
alleged ineffectiveness and the growing institutional competition (Betts 2013). 
Interestingly, an increasing number of studies not only acknowledge IO influence in 
implementation (Bexell 2013, Graham and Thompson 2015) and in international 
negotiations (Jinnah 2012), but also find evidence for rule-making functions in 
decentralized norm-setting institutions (Baccaro 2015, Van der Lugt and Dingwerth 
2015). Consequently, to the assumed informational, forum and operational functions of 
IOs, it adds some functions that limit the autonomy of states without coercive 
mechanisms. In addition to gathering, analyzing, disseminating data, providing place 
for exchange of views and decision-making, allocating resources and providing technical 
assistance, IOs may also limit the autonomy of states. IO activities include normative, 
rule creation and supervisory functions, such as defining standards of behavior, drafting 
legally binding treaties, monitoring compliance with rules, settling disputes and taking 
enforcement measures (Karns and Mingst 2004, Abbott 2012a). 
In reference to the question of how IOs manage to influence international politics, 
the orchestration theory has stipulated that IOs enlist intermediaries with similar 
objectives on a voluntary basis with which material or ideational resources are 
exchanged with the purpose of pursuing their common goals (Abbott et al. 2015a). 
Orchestration is pervasive as states often allow or even initiate orchestration as 
achieving governance without creating strong institutions (Abbott 2015, Widerberg 
2017). In contemporary global environmental politics, where authority becomes 
polycentric, diffusing across multiple venues and through a variety of actors (Green 
2014: 9), orchestration is widely used and applied across different issue areas and policy 
settings (Hale and Roger 2014, Graham and Thompson 2015, Van der Lugt and 
Dingwerth 2015). In this new scenario, academics and policy-makers are struggling to 
determine what makes some IOs better orchestrators than others, what yardstick 
should be used in order to assess IOs’ performance in orchestrating environmental 
sustainability and the extent to which IOs should systematically engage in orchestration 
and, if so, which intermediaries are best to enlist. In this context, this thesis addresses 
the approaches taken by IOs to orchestrate, the framework for the assessment of IOs’ 
                                                 
3 The reduction in state autonomy associated with the ceding of authority to international institutions 
is the definition of the so-called sovereignty cost (Bradley and Kelley 2007). 
22 
 
influence and the consolidation of global environmental governance through IO 
orchestration. 
1.2  Exploring orchestration approaches, IO influence and the strengthening 
of environmental sustainability governance 
The changing role of IOs in sustainability politics is subject to at least three academic 
debates. First, scholars have convincingly specified why IOs and their intermediaries 
engage in orchestration, for example, due to their mutual gains (Abbott et al. 2015b). 
Yet, studies have remained silent about why target actors follow the orchestration goals 
of IOs and their intermediaries. In this sense, IOs are agents, defined as actors 
participating in decision-making processes, who have the ability to prescribe behavior 
and to obtain the consent of the governed (Biermann et al. 2010: 283). Empirical studies 
have found that orchestration is pervasive, especially since states often welcome IO 
orchestration as achieving governance without setting up powerful institutions (Abbott 
et al. 2015c)4. The scarcity of research on non-coercive influence mechanisms by IOs in 
orchestration is problematic for two reasons. On the one hand, by leaving IOs’ 
orchestration approaches outside the debate on future global governance, we disregard 
–at least partially− the soft influence that IOs exert on other actors (Brühl and 
Rittberger 2001: 5, Stripple and Hannes 2013). Between governance without governments 
and global governance based on the UN system falls an array of mechanisms that share 
a trend towards deepening institutional relationships between IOs, transnational 
corporations and civil society. We run the risk of underestimating the work of IOs by 
not assessing their full influence with the current lack of research that explores the 
variety of orchestration approaches. IOs become increasingly involved in on the ground 
activities5 and their opportunities to engage other actors in orchestration must not be 
underestimated. On the other hand, a lack of studies differentiating and making visible 
IOs’ orchestration approaches contributes to rendering IOs less accountable. 
Second, analyses on the emergence of orchestration should problematize the 
influence of different orchestration mechanisms and should not take for granted the 
“goodness” of IOs’ orchestration effects. Some authors have raised their concerns with 
reference to the proclivity of IOs to fall into an uncritical self-expansion of its mandate 
and their recurring liberal and even pathological behavior (Barnett and Finnemore 
                                                 
4 For instance, in the case of climate change governance, analysts suggest that its institutional 
complexity could be increased and costs reduced through nonhierarchical “orchestration” in which 
international organizations or other appropriate authorities support and steer transnational schemes 
that further global public interests (Abbott 2012b). 
5 Oversight from the principals (i.e. member states) on its agents (i.e. international organizations) may 




2005). IOs in orchestration approaches require voluntary compliance as they lack any 
enforcement mechanism. In this sense, empirical research in social studies has found 
that voluntary compliance is linked to the legitimacy of the authority that surveils rule 
compliance (Abbott and Hale 2014). More specifically, studies on public views show that 
the perceived legitimacy of the authority is correlated with judgments of procedural 
justice (Tyler 1997). Organizations, despite having existed for many years, adapt their 
legitimacy claims as they seek legitimacy from new audiences (Symons 2011) and 
questions about “audiences” of legitimation are salient (Bexell 2014). So far, scholars 
struggle to address what legitimacy resources IOs rely on to get compliance from 
targets. At most, the aspects of governance considered by the literature in International 
Relations include the institutional, delegated, expert, principled, and problem-solving 
aspects (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). For instance, studies on market-based 
cooperation strategies between the United Nations and large business companies in the 
realm of global public health show how the capacity to solve problems increases, 
although the modes of representation, accountability and global equity issues have not 
evolved sufficiently (Holzinger and Kütting 2012, Bexell 2013). 
Third, academics in environmental politics discuss how to strengthen the role of IOs 
(Reinalda and Verbeek 1998, Barnett and Finnemore 2004d, Tarrow 2001, Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004a, Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009). A significant “orchestration 
deficit” provides real opportunities for IOs (Abbott and Snidal 2010) that play an 
orchestration facilitative role (Abbott and Snidal 2009). Yet, this debate has so far not 
examined in detail how different orchestration processes differ depending on the 
resources interchanged with intermediaries in the case of the sustainability realm. To 
keep this research effort focused, this study centers both theoretically and empirically 
on the study of environmental sustainability politics (Biermann and Pattberg 2008, 
Bauer, Andresen, and Biermann 2012, Adams and Pingeot 2013).  
The field of environmental sustainability is helpful for two reasons: on the one hand, 
it has been a rising policy area in international politics in the last forty years. On the 
other hand, the implementation of international environmental agreements involves a 
complex web of international, transgovernmental, transnational and national -both 
public and private - interactions, therefore, management tasks must take considerations 
at all these levels (Hanf and Underdal 1998: 168). Consequently, the environmental 
policy realm and IOs dealing with it are open to new modes of governance, such as 
orchestration. However, the influence of IOs in world politics has been largely measured 
against a limited yardstick, that of changing the behavior of states (Finnemore 1993). 
Illustrative is that even studies on IOs’ capacity building projects involving non-state 
actors have strictly centered on assessing the capacity built upon states only. Traditional 
strategies for capacity-development projects for ecological conservation are 
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government-led (Baumgartner 2001: 31). Thus, we lack a framework of assessment to 
evaluate the influence of IOs’ orchestration that can be applied to different targets, not 
only states. As put by Andonova and Levy, the assets of transnational partnerships over 
intergovernmental structures remain unclear, as well as their interaction and combined 
effectiveness (2003: 30). Orchestration by IOs can contribute to bridging the gap 
between state failure due to lack of regulation and the market failure of decentralized 
norm-setting institutions (Abbott and Snidal 2010, Dellas, Pattberg, and Betsill 2011, 
Green 2014). This thesis is embedded in the three research themes on the orchestration 
approaches by IOs outlined above, the development of a framework to assess IO 
orchestration influence and strengthening the role of IOs as orchestrators for global 
environmental governance. Chapter 2 elaborates on each of these three themes, 
outlining the latest research developments and identifying major knowledge gaps. 
The rest of this chapter introduces (1) the research questions, the expected 
contribution to the literature and a brief presentation of the area of empirical research; 
(2) a description of the research methodology and; finally, (3) an overview of the book’s 
structure is outlined. 
1.3 Key research questions and contribution 
The overarching objective of this thesis is to explore the orchestration approaches taken 
by IOs and discuss when orchestration by IOs is influential in terms of strengthening 
environmental sustainability governance. It aims to develop new strategies for analyzing 
these themes and help improve the empirical and theoretical understanding of the 
linkages between IOs and the rest of political agents in global governance and 
environmental governance in particular. The thesis has three specific objectives. The 
first is to describe and classify current IO approaches to orchestration, based on the 
intermediaries enlisted to reach IO targets. The second is to define a framework to 
assess IO orchestration influence for environmental sustainability, in terms of the 
orchestration outputs and procedural resources that involve new actors and that 
legitimate new roles for the actors involved. The third is to evaluate the merits and 
possible flaws of each orchestration approach for environmental sustainability 
governance. The objectives lead to the following three research questions: 
1.  How do IOs influence world politics? Are there different IO approaches to 
orchestration? How can different orchestration approaches be distinguished? 
(Chapter 2) 
2.  When is IO orchestration influential for environmental sustainability governance? 
How can IO orchestration influence be assessed? (Chapter 3) 
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3.  Do different types of orchestration approaches matter for IO influence? To what 
extent are different IO orchestration approaches influential for sustainability 
governance in general and for coral reef governance in particular? (Chapters 4 to 7) 
1.4 Research approach, data, methodology and case selection 
The research approach in this thesis primarily draws on the elements and concepts 
found in the orchestration theory from International Relations (IR). Orchestration 
considers IOs as agents embedded in regime complexes that enlist intermediaries to 
pursue its goals (Abbott et al. 2015a). The concept of orchestration structures the study 
of different approaches, neither fully intergovernmental nor transnational, followed by 
IOs to influence targets. To account for the variability of IOs’ performance, this research 
develops the concept of orchestration approach – as an independent variable. This thesis 
also draws insights from a wide range of IR theory strands, such as sociological 
institutionalism (Finnemore 1996b), which considers the liberalist, and sometimes 
pathological, behavior of IOs (Barnett and Finnemore 2005, Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 
2010); the constraining behavior of regime outputs from the liberal institutionalist 
school of thinking (Simmons and Martin 2002); the power to exert social pressure from 
advocacy network studies and the concept of “procedural justice” taken from psychology 
and law studies (Tyler 1997). 
The thesis relies on four sources of data. First, an expert survey conducts a broad 
and general gathering of information on the views of more than a hundred experts on 
the influence of nine IOs in global environmental politics, ranging from well-established 
IOs to smaller treaty secretariats. Expert views include scholars, government, NGOs and 
business representatives, from both industrialized and non-industrialized countries, 
namely, Mexico, India, Germany and the United States. Experts were identified through 
the official websites of IOs. From a total number of six hundred experts addressed, a 
hundred and forty-five answered the survey, representing roughly a twenty-five percent 
response rate, which is the average response rate. The expert survey is based on the 
questionnaire methods developed by Simsek and Veiga (2001) for Internet 
organizational surveys. It consists of an online questionnaire with largely closed 
questions. The respondent first rated the perceived relevance of each of the nine listed 
environmental IOs. The respondents then chose the IO most relevant for their work and 
were required to answer further questions and provide information on the respondent’s 
background. The electronic format of the standardized survey generated direct 
comparable data for the analysis6.  
                                                 
6 The anonymity of the respondents was guaranteed. Answers from non-targeted respondents were 
avoided by making the survey invisible to Internet search engines. The survey program did not allow 
the filling in of the survey more than once by the same person. 
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Second, the examination of primary sources – such as internal and published 
documents from IOs, their respective initiatives and websites available at the time of 
writing – and the analysis of secondary sources, such as academic studies and technical 
reports – including grey literature such as magazines, newspapers and electronic 
publications – complemented the information of the case studies.  
Third, more data is compiled through in-depth case studies, in order to scrutinize 
the orchestration approaches in global environmental governance in general, and coral 
reef governance, in particular. In-depth case studies have largely benefited from field 
visits to the project offices, through internal documents, a series of personal interviews 
and participatory observation. Additional interviews were also conducted with project 
partners in the region. Overall, 46 one-to-one semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with key actors. The interviews have followed a half–standardized interview 
method that allows for data collection that is both restrictive, which enables 
comparability across cases, and open so that more information is gathered in order to 
avoid preconceptions, which facilitates specific conclusions about different cases.  
Last, observational data was gathered from project meetings. In fact, not only IOs 
members of staff but also local project partners – intermediaries and targets – have 
provided a wealth of relevant information. 
The methodology for the thesis can best be described as a mixed methods approach, 
bringing together qualitative and quantitative methodologies, to compensate for each 
other’s weaknesses. Similar to sociological institutionalism7 and studies on advocacy 
networks, this work has a firm grounding on empirical research. This study combines a 
quantitative research method – through the statistical data analysis of the on-line expert 
survey on IO performance in environmental sustainability politics – and a qualitative 
research method – through in-depth case studies on coral reef governance.  
Chapter 3 develops an analytical framework in order to qualitatively assess the 
influence of IO orchestration. The analytical framework takes into account two 
approaches. From a positivist stand, the study includes a set of output indicators. The 
idea is that orchestration generates observable effects that can be measured. Besides, 
from a normative stand, the framework assumes that voluntary compliance is not 
possible in the absence of fair orchestration procedures. It is normative in the sense that 
it focuses on the ways in which the prevailing global arrangements impact on 
individuals, that is, how their life-styles, living standards, health, culture, chances to 
                                                 
7 From a methodological point of view, the recognition of the socializing role of international 
organizations in sociological institutionalism is an asset compared to the state-centered approaches 
such as realism or rational institutionalism that do not take into account international organizations as 
actors in their own right (cf. Bauer et al. 2009: 22). 
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progress are or might be curtailed by the practices and institutions through which their 
lives are governed (Rosenau 1992: 10-11).  
Chapter 4 has surveyed the relevance of nine IOs through an expert survey. On the 
one hand, the survey provides the view from a wide range of experts on the performance 
of IOs that is less biased than the IO self-assessments obtained from primary and 
secondary literature. On the other hand, it tests the assumption on performance 
variability across different orchestration approaches. In fact, for comparability reasons, 
IOs are classified based on their capability to engage specific intermediaries. Treaty 
secretariats mainly engage public intermediaries to orchestrate. By contrast, 
multipurpose organizations can also engage private intermediaries to orchestrate. While 
the survey results in Chapter 4 confirm the relevance of several IOs for sustainability 
governance, it provides mixed results with regard to which type of orchestration 
approach generates more influence. Put differently, neither secretariats nor 
multipurpose organizations present a higher competitive advantage according to the 
survey. For this reason, the in-depth case studies from chapters 5 to 7 compare the 
merits of each orchestration approach. Single case qualitative studies in sociological 
institutionalism contributed to linking the change in the behavior of states back to the 
influence of IOs (Finnemore 1996a). Yet, this study departs methodologically from 
sociological institutionalism because it uses the comparative analysis in order to 
advance knowledge and provide critical assessments on the IO orchestration results. 
Thus, to gain insights from each orchestration approach, this study consistently applies 
the same analytical framework across two empirical cases. The qualitative small-n cases 
allow collecting data to reconstruct the steps taken by the orchestrators, intermediaries 
and targets that account for the orchestration influence and that are difficult to trace 
from big-N studies. 
The case selection for this research is based on the independent variable – 
orchestration approaches – contributing to avoid any bias with regard to the dependent 
variable8. Besides, to control the variables that are not researched, case selection is based 
on projects with comparable orchestrators – namely two multipurpose organizations 
with the same issue area, similar objectives and the same geographical area. Through 
web-based searches and primary sources of information, I came across two projects that 
differ in their orchestration approach. Both projects are South-driven, differently from 
past research on partnerships for environmental governance, such as the Great Apes 
Survival Project (Glasbergen 2012) and the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund 
(Visseren-Hamakers 2012). Specifically, the World Bank led one project and involved 
                                                 
8 This builds on King, Keohane, Verba (1994) who have set scientific standards for social inquire 




public intermediaries for orchestrating coral reef governance. The other project led by 
UNEP enlisted private intermediaries instead. It was puzzling that different 
organizations were working with different methodologies in the same region. I thought 
it was a good opportunity to learn how IOs with different approaches get targets to do 
what they pursue voluntarily. The two initiatives deal with coral reef governance, and 
more concretely, with the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef, the biggest coral reef of the 
Northern Hemisphere.  
The strength of the case study approach also suggests a corresponding weakness, 
namely representativeness – the degree to which causal relationships evidenced by that 
single unit may be assumed to be true for a large set of units (Gerring 2004: 348). For 
this reason, the quantitative data collection from the expert survey compensates for the 
in-depth case study’s weakness. The strengths of one method compensate for the 
weaknesses of another (Bennett 2004: 47-48).  
Last, the absence of strong regulatory power for global environmental governance 
makes plausible the co-existence of different orchestration approaches not only for coral 
reef governance but also for other issue areas, such as maritime shipping (Lister, 
Poulsen, and Ponte 2015), biofuel governance (Schleifer 2013) and beyond the 
environment, as it is the case of global human rights governance (Pegram 2014). 
Therefore, the generalization of study results is subject to further research across 
different fields in environmental politics and different orchestrators, such as non-states 
or cities (Gordon and Johnson 2017) and issue areas of global governance where 
systematic experimentation is needed (Abbott 2017). 
1.5 General overview and argument 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 sets the stage by briefly introducing 
the topic and outlining the research objectives, followed by the methodology and 
research approach. Chapter 2 first delves deeper into the theoretical and conceptual 
foundations of the thesis, introducing the reader to the gaps in knowledge that this 
thesis aims to fill. Specifically, it develops some criteria to different IO orchestration 
approaches. IOs may use persuasion in order to approach target actors through public 
intermediaries or social leverage through private intermediaries. Last, it proposes 
orchestration influence as the key concept to evaluate the capacity of IO orchestration 
approaches to obtain voluntary compliance in global environmental governance. 
Chapter 3 operationalizes the orchestration influence in terms of both outputs and 
procedural resources – that is, the capacity to legitimize new roles for actors and 
competency to involve new actors. Chapter 4 contains an expert survey that applies the 
analytical framework developed in the previous chapter. The performance of nine IOs in 
global environmental governance is assessed in terms of the orchestration approach 
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taken. The survey first provides empirical results by exploring the performance of both 
treaty secretariats and multipurpose organizations. Since the survey results are not 
conclusive, a more nuanced picture of how influence is delivered in each orchestration 
approach is required of the detailed qualitative case studies. Chapter 5 introduces the 
empirical research context for the qualitative in-depth case studies, namely coral reef 
governance in Mesoamerica. Chapter 6 assesses the orchestration approach taken by 
IOs that engage public actors as the main intermediaries to persuade. Chapter 7 
assesses the orchestration approach taken by IOs that engage private actors as the main 
intermediaries for social leverage. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the thesis, summarizing 
the key conclusions and answers to the research questions, as well as suggesting future 























2. How IOs Influence Target Actors in Orchestration:  
Persuasion versus Social Leverage 
The duties and responsibilities of IOs are manifold depending on the organization. They 
help find solutions for the complex problems faced by the different member countries, 
such as human rights, food securities, humanitarian reliefs, sustainable development 
etc. IOs foster cooperation among member states by conducting meetings where the 
representatives of the countries involved have a common platform to discuss and 
formulate solutions for many contemporary issues. Yet, seven decades after its 
establishment, the United Nations (UN), one of the most prominent IOs at the 
international level, and its system of related organizations and programs are perpetually 
in crisis (Weiss 2016). In fact, some critics complain for example about the executive 
capacity of the UN and claim that the most severe action the UN can do to countries 
that do not abide by international norms is to send them a warning letter. By contrast, 
in the words of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations at 
the State Department: “[u]ltimately, it’s about shared responses to shared challenges… 
working with international organizations is fundamentally essential to modern 
diplomacy. International organizations are places where nations can find common 
solutions to complex problems” (Bird 2011). Furthermore, in Weiss’ unambiguous words 
“[t]here is a desperate need to reinvigorate and update rather than jettison the UN in 
responding to threats from climate change to pandemics, from proliferation to 
terrorism” (Weiss 2018). 
This chapter argues that explaining the puzzle of calling for a strengthened UN 
through its sometimes undesired outcomes requires new ways of theorizing how IOs 
engage in orchestration and of considering the effects of enlisting different 
intermediaries. Besides, the current frameworks seeking to analyze the IO influence are 
insufficient for understanding the effects that the IO orchestration generates on target 
actors. It thus suggests new ways of conceptualizing IO influence and proposes a two-
tier assessment framework. Assessing IO influence requires not only assessing the 
orchestration outputs but also the procedural resources generated during the 
orchestration process. In this context, it is argued that the procedural resources relating 
to trust, neutrality, respect and participation facilitate influential orchestration. Finally, 
this chapter contends that the IO approaches to orchestration seeking to influence 
target actors can be grouped into two categories, namely persuasion and social leverage. 
Dimensions, such as membership, mandate and IO autonomy for orchestration, help 
discern between those two different orchestration approaches. 
The chapter starts with a brief introduction to the types of effects attributed to IOs 
according to different perspectives in IR literature. It moves from coercion to softer 
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modes of influence and introduces the concept orchestration, which describes the 
mechanism used by IOs in order to enlist intermediaries and influence target actors. 
The subsequent sections discuss the theoretical approaches to assessing influence in 
international relations, which include changing beliefs, changing interests, the 
acknowledgement of rational-legal authority and the delivery of fair procedures for 
voluntary compliance. Finally, the chapter presents two approaches to get target actors 
to cooperate through IOs. While IOs will engage in persuasion to influence through 
changing beliefs, exerting social leverage serves IOs in the purpose of changing the 
interests of the target actors. 
2.1 What accounts for the influence of IOs? From coercion to orchestration 
This research contributes to the debate about how IOs currently influence global 
politics in general and, in particular, how to strengthen the role of IOs in GEG. Similarly 
to nation states and non-state actors that redefine their roles in world politics (Brühl 
and Rittberger 2001), IOs as institutional innovators (Haas 1990) evolve and improve 
(Rochester 1986). In this section, I review four approaches that conceptualize IO 
influence in world politics: the coercive power approach, the soft resources approach, 
the Principal-Agent approach and the orchestration approach. 
2.1.1 Coercive approach 
According to the Merriam Webster dictionary, coercion entails the act, process, or 
power of coercing, which means compel – cause to do or occur by overwhelming 
pressure – to an act or choice. More the exception than the rule, IOs are equipped with 
legal instruments that empower them to interact directly to impose policies and 
condition actors towards IOs’ goals (Grieco 1988, Mearsheimer 1995, Waltz 1979, Abbott 
et al. 2000). Fully legalized institutions bind states through law, demonstrate a high 
degree of precision and legal agreements delegate broad authority to a neutral entity for 
the implementation of agreed rules (Goldstein et al. 2000). Yet, IOs with both a high 
governance capacity and a strong mandate do not abound because they are created by 
states that avoid sovereignty costs, which entails the reduction in state autonomy 
associated with ceding authority to IOs (Bradley and Kelley 2007). In other words, only 
a limited number of IOs benefit from a high governance capacity and can exert 
coercion. In fact, states rarely transfer their sovereignty to international organizations in 
transnational and global issue areas, such as the environment (O'Neill 2014b), human 
rights and social and economic welfare. Besides, critical theorists conceptualize IOs as 
contingent on dominant material and ideological structures, that mediate between the 
centers and peripheries in the international system and thus with only modest 
autonomous agency (Bauer et al. 2009: 20). Moreover, international environmental 
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agreements and sustainability politics, the object of this research, do not generally fit in 
such definition of highly legalized institutions and are instead often subject to soft law 
procedures. 
2.1.2 Soft resources approach 
If we agree that state interests can be changed through normative influence and 
interaction with global discourses and normative frameworks, then soft power resources 
and the actors that possess them become relevant in the study of international relations 
(Keohane and Nye 1974, Haas 2002, Bauer et al. 2009: 22). Influence, as it is used in this 
study, refers to the capacity to use soft resources to get somebody to do something 
without the use of force or intimidation. By soft resources Joseph Nye refers to debates 
on cultural values, dialogues on ideology, good examples, and the appeal to commonly 
accepted human values used for diplomacy, dissemination of information, analysis, 
propaganda, and cultural programming to achieve political ends (Nye Jr. 2004). 
Conversely, power resources refer to military might and economic assets. Because IOs 
have soft power resources, such as legitimacy or credibility, sociological institutionalism 
has substantiated the relevant role of IOs in norm dynamics. 
2.1.3 Principal-Agent approach 
The Principal-Agent approach is a contribution from new institutional economics that 
can be applied to the study of IOs. This approach maintains that IOs are able to develop 
autonomy from its principals and thereby need to be conceptualized as actors in their 
own right (Bauer et al. 2009: 26). States create IOs to garner information about states 
and to disseminate it. Yet, IOs are self-interested bodies predominantly interested in 
increasing their resources and competences (Gutner 2005). While IOs can benefit from 
information asymmetries due to their better knowledge of the issue dealt in the 
international institution, governments retain the final decision about the usage of their 
financial resources and can bestow and revoke authority from their agents, namely IOs 
(Pollack 1997). Consequently, national governments can only partly control the behavior 
of an agent whom they entrusted with particular tasks. 
2.1.4 Orchestration approach 
Current debates on the capacity of international organizations to implement their 
mandates focus on orchestration (Abbott and Snidal 2010). Through the non-coercive 
mechanism of orchestration, IOs enroll different actors with similar goals as 
intermediaries on a voluntary basis in order to influence other target actors (Abbott et 
al. 2013). Orchestration emerges from the voluntary mutually beneficial relationship 
between the orchestrator and its intermediaries. Therefore, legal, material or mental 
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coercion play no role in the definition of orchestration, where compliance is the result 
of voluntary actions. IOs9 act as orchestrators when they enlist intermediary actors on a 
voluntary basis by providing them with ideational and material support in order to 
achieve governance goals with respect to target actors (Abbott et al. 2015a). 
Orchestration refers to “an indirect and soft mode of governance to be distinguished 
from traditional governance by hierarchy, which addresses the targets of governance 
directly through hard governance instruments. Orchestration is also different from 
governance by collaboration (which is soft, but direct), and governance through 
delegation (which is indirect, but hard)” (Abbott et al. 2015c: 349-350). Thus, 
orchestration must be differentiated from regulatory cooperation, in which IOs engage 
directly with business firms, industry groups and other target actors, influencing them 
to adopt, for instance, more environmentally sustainable behaviors10. In orchestration 
by contrast, organizations engage with intermediary actors, such as multi-stakeholder 
private governance schemes, catalyzing, supporting and steering them as they seek to 
influence the ultimate targets of policy (Abbott 2012a, Adams and Pingeot 2013). 
Public or private actors benefit from the good reputation associated with IOs and 
their mandates, as they are regarded as honest-brokers (Abbott 2012a). While so doing 
they can, for instance, lobby members of national delegations if they are NGO 
participants and have inside information on the different positions of states or become 
members of state delegations in meetings of international multilateral regimes (Kanie 
and Haas 2004: 10). When non-states relate with IOs informally, the former benefit from 
interpreting UN documents, feedback on position papers, insights into country 
delegation position and political context, insights into other UN agencies and 
personnel, consideration when opportunities arise, information regarding other 
organizations with similar projects, funding opportunities and inside “privileged” 
positions (Schaefer Caniglia 2002: 167).  
In turn, two main reasons lead IOs to enlist other actors as intermediaries on a 
voluntary basis to pursue its objectives. First, states frequently lack the willingness to 
strengthen intergovernmental cooperation and thus delegate orchestration functions to 
IOs. Orchestration provides social proof for states of the willingness to make 
international commitments with the expected minimum sovereignty costs. In the case 
of GEG, orchestration contributes to the recognition by powerful states to accept that 
                                                 
9 Abbot and colleagues refer to international organizations as IGOs, the acronym for 
intergovernmental organizations. 
10 An example is the initiative of the UN Global Compact supported by four UN agencies(Kell and 
Levin 2003, Tsutsui and Lim 2015) that seeks to encourage learning and best practice among 7,000 
participating companies who have all committed to existing international standards on human rights 
and environmental protection. 
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only the voluntarily adhering to a common approach can solve environmental problems 
(Pettenger 2014). Second, IOs lack the sufficient resources to conduct the activities of an 
expanding mandate, such as for instance sustainable development politics. IOs are not 
normally equipped with limitless resources to implement their mandates. In fact, the 
increasing budgetary constraints of IOs, such as the UN, lead IOs to cooperate with 
other private or public actors, such as national development agencies or private 
foundations, within the framework of international implementation projects, in order to 
compensate for decreasing or delayed replenishment payments. IOs have higher 
incentives to consider enrolling non-state actors as implementation partners that 
provide valuable technical expertise, country-specific insights and contact inputs to 
enhance their performance. In fact, as Ruhlman rightly points, IOs and states that 
compose them systematically pursue their interests when granting participation rights 
to non-state actors (Ruhlman 2015).  
In orchestration, states control IOs’ authority. Orchestration entails higher state 
coordination without increasing IO authority. Therefore, states do not see their 
autonomy reduced by ceding authority to IOs for orchestration. For instance, states 
preferred the effective but non-intrusive orchestration of setting up the G20 to 
increasing IMF authority (Abbott et al. 2015c). The role of the state, in many instances 
undervalued, helps explain current global environmental politics (Biermann and 
Dingwerth 2004, Hawkins et al. 2006, Green and Colgan 2013) and much of the 
orchestration theory (Abbott et al. 2015a), which highlights the “paradoxical centrality” 
of states (Tallberg et al. 2013).  
In fact, the orchestration theory tells us when orchestration is more likely to emerge. 
It has been shown that orchestration is likely to emerge when the goal divergence11 
among states is low, yet state consensus is not strong enough to enable agreement on 
hard regulation (Abbott et al. 2015c)12. When goal divergence is low and state oversight13 
is high, states initiate orchestration and delegate processes to IOs that will find 
intermediaries to orchestrate and pursue its mandate. In addition, orchestration is also 
feasible when goal divergence is high but it is combined with a lack of strict oversight by 
states (Abbott et al. 2015c). Hence, where states solely exercise ex post oversight, an IO 
is free to initiate orchestration, because states do not readily overturn its actions, and 
                                                 
11 Goal divergence refers to the level of agreement or disagreement that several states have upon an 
issue. 
12 For instance, G20 states emerge as a relatively effective but non-intrusive mode of governance 
instead of mandating the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to regulate financial institutions, which 
would have significantly increased its authority.  




goal divergence among states then gives it greater leeway (Abbott et al. 2015c). At the 
same time, bureaucratic complexity undermining strong state oversight and 
professional expert specialization are assets for IOs’ entrepreneurship to overcome the 
political “brakes” that prevent orchestration. Entrepreneurship is understood similarly 
to Boesson and Huitema (2017) as activities performed by actors aiming to “punch above 
their weight” and thus not merely performing what is expected from them. Last, because 
advocacy actors exert increasing public pressure and scrutiny upon IOs, these have 
incentives to further cooperate and overcome goal divergences from the states. 
Applying the concept of orchestration provides three vantage points. Orchestration 
serves as a concept umbrella that acknowledges that states are not the only target actors 
of IO activities. Most of the past research anticipated states as the only targets of IO 
policies. Sociological institutionalism research relies in delegation, from states to IOs, of 
persuasion activities (Finnemore 1993); or advocacy network studies center on IO 
enlisting NGOs to influence state actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998); and, finally, 
development studies concentrate on state capacity-building to improve government 
performance through the training of civil servants by IOs particularly in developing 
states (Bøås and McNeill 2004).  
Differently from past research, this study systematically compares different 
orchestration processes by IOs for which states do not need to be the (only) target 
actors. Second, the orchestration concept widens the research frame to include the 
agency of IOs that goes far beyond administering and overseeing meetings, decisions, 
procedures and agreements on international issue areas, such as environmental politics. 
IOs motivate the creation of new organizations, the adoption of policy measures and 
best practices, the spread of new discourses and the setup of partnerships that 
transcend government departments, structures and activities. Under the orchestration 
perspective, IOs do not only acquire agency through formal delegation by states as 
described in the Principal-Agent theory (Gutner 2005). They also gain entrepreneurial 
agency as outlined in the Orchestrator-Intermediary-Target framework that recognizes 
the exchange of material or ideational resources to pursue IOs’ goals (Abbott et al. 
2015b). Last, orchestration as a political process is also fit for environments where the 
level of legalization is low, which means that it builds on binding intergovernmental 
agreements and also soft law mechanisms with voluntary and non-binding agreements. 
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Table 2.1 International organizations’ governance mechanisms 
 
IOs’ governance capacity is the ability of an IO to implement policies aligned with 
its own objectives. A high governance capacity is exerted through coercion, 
implementing the international binding law and it is only available to a very limited 
number of IOs. By contrast, IOs that rely on orchestration enlist intermediaries to 
pursue their mandate because they have low to medium governance capacity to force 
other actors to abide by its rules. Most IOs fall into this category. Orchestration is used 
to implement soft law because no binding legal mechanisms are devised to implement 
IO objectives. 
2.2 Assessing IOs’ influence: From changing state behavior to facilitating 
procedural fairness 
Prior to the emergence of sociological institutionalist approaches, state-centrism has 
dominated the rationalist strand of institutionalism in IR research (Bauer et al. 2009). 
The assessment of IO’s effects in IR has truly started with the acknowledgement of IOs’ 
autonomy. Such autonomy grants agency to IOs, which are thus considered actors in 
their own right (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). Because IOs are actors in their own right, 
this study centers on the research of their influence. The use of the word influence here 
cannot be interchanged with effectiveness. Influence in this context is understood as 
legitimate effectiveness, since an action can be assessed as effective but not necessarily 
as legitimate. From here, if the action is not assessed as legitimate it cannot be thus 
considered influential. Accordingly, the following sections introduce and critically 
discuss the different approaches used in IR research to assess IO influence. 
2.2.1 Influence through change of interests 
While realism and rational institutionalism come close in their state-centric 
understanding of IOs as outcomes of interstate cooperation, the rational institutionalist 
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understanding of IOs differs from realism inasmuch as it expects states to be able to 
cooperate through international institutions (Bauer et al. 2009: 21). Rational 
institutionalism accounts for state behavior change because of the rationalist interest-
based “logic of consequentiality”. Rational institutionalists see the nation-state with 
fixed interests in global institution building. Overall, rational institutionalists are 
interested in the conditions under which states will delegate administrative tasks to IOs. 
In particular it has been pointed out that IOs must not be ignored (Young 1994) and 
that they have been identified as influential in the research on regime effectiveness 
(Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997). In order to assess influence, the regime 
literature in international environmental governance distinguishes between outputs, as 
accords, outcomes as the change of behavior by target actors14 and impact, as the change 
in the actual environment (Young 1994). This study builds on the notion that evaluating 
what has caused the change in the behavior of actors – outcome – is rather intricate to 
be able to attribute it to a single factor(s). Besides, what specific change in behavior has 
directly caused a positive or negative impact on the environment – impact – is beyond 
the scope of this research. Rational liberalist approaches focused on improving the 
effectiveness of environmental political institutions through instrumental goals, namely, 
the increase of governmental concern, the enhancement of a contractual environment 
and the consolidation of national capacities (Levy, Keohane, and Haas 1993). Therefore, 
all efforts by IOs are directed towards the state as main actors in world politics. A case 
in point is how capacity building projects by IOs are addressed mainly to states 
(Weidner and Jänicke 2002, UNEP 2002a). 
2.2.2 Influence through change of beliefs 
Sociological institutionalism challenges the failure of former approaches, particularly 
rationalism, to account for the persistence and emergence of more institutions in a 
world already replete with institutions (Bauer et al. 2009). It seeks to supplement rather 
than replace explanatory categories of interest through the integration of norms and 
ideas, with the normative “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989). As 
increased attention for normative considerations requires regarding actors other than 
states then actors with soft power resources such as legitimacy, credibility, knowledge 
and the like become relevant actors. Similar to the rational institutionalist approach 
another strand of literature that aims at changing state behavior are studies on 
transnational advocacy groups. What is new about transnational advocacy groups’ 
literature is that it includes non-state actors in their analysis. IOs can act as norm 
entrepreneurs that may contribute to norm emergence, norm cascade and 
                                                 
14 It also distinguishes influence (natural responses to change of human behavior) in order to assess the 
environmental regime influence. 
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internalization with the help of non-state actors (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895). Yet 
non-state actors act as political agents that predominantly target states for behavioral 
change (Keck and Sikkink 1998). By contrast, the present research goes beyond the 
traditional focus on state-to-state relations and it considers not only states but also non-
state actors and other IOs’ as possible target actors of orchestration. 
2.2.3 Influence through rational legal authority 
Barnett and Finnemore see a basis for understanding organizational autonomy in the 
way they “organize the world” (2004a). According to this view, IOs’ influence does not 
solely stem from their rational legal authority – from Max Weber’s theory – that entails 
a form of leadership in which the authority of an organization is largely tied to legal 
rationality, legal legitimacy and bureaucracy. Most importantly, IOs’ influence is 
undergirded by delegated authority, moral authority and expert authority (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004c: 22). Those different sources of authority contribute to tracing three 
causal pathways of IO influence (Barnett and Finnemore 2004c: 31-34): first, IOs classify 
and organize information and knowledge, create categories of problems, actors and 
action; second, IOs have the ability to fix the meanings of the social world by naming, 
classifying and labeling the social context; last, having established rules and norms, IOs 
are eager to spread the benefits of their expertise and act as “conveyor belts for the 
transmission of norms and models of good behavior”. At the same time, these authors 
warn that IOs are double-edge swords. IOs may also engage in undesirable behavior as a 
result of bureaucratic pathologies (Barnett and Finnemore 1999).  
Nonetheless, the present study departs from the sociological institutionalist view 
that conceives IOs as bureaucracies rather impermeable to external demands. This 
research builds on the conception that IOs are entities that increasingly adapt to 
evolving contexts. IO fairness should neither be taken for granted nor should the IO 
pathological behavior be presumed, as fairness in IO processes is mainly an empirical 
matter. For this reason, it is imperative to evaluate IO performance and assess the 
attainment of desirable IO influence to constrain potential IO pathological behavior. 
2.2.4 Influence through fairness of procedures 
Attention in this work is placed on the fairness of procedures to reach orchestration 
outputs. This is not new, in fact, some voices have called for studies on IOs that 
contribute to the effectiveness of informal ordering mechanisms through transparency 
creation, focusing on the legitimacy struggle, and devising future regime agendas 
(Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 775). Yet in practice, these procedural goals have not 
received sufficient consideration by scholars up to this point. To date, studies on new 
modes of governance focus on one issue mainly, either democratic legitimacy 
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(Dingwerth 2007, Bäckstrand 2006, Bäckstrand et al. 2012) or institutional effectiveness 
(Reinicke 1998, Biermann et al. 2007, Pattberg and Widerberg 2016)15. At best, they are 
both treated in isolation, analyzing deficits in governance on the one hand and 
environmental problem solving on the other (Biermann et al. 2007) or even as trade-offs 
(Steets 2010, Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2007). Some exceptions to the rule obviously 
exist (Beisheim and Dingwerth 2008), yet no comparative studies have been conducted 
with the purpose of evaluating IO influence through different orchestration processes in 
general, and in relation to global sustainability governance in particular. 
According to civil regulation studies, voluntary compliance is linked to the 
legitimacy of the authority that surveils rule compliance, whose legitimacy is linked to 
judgements about the fairness of procedures (Tyler 1997). A highly relevant component 
of the effective and legitimate exercise of influence involves procedural resources, which 
refers to the manner in which authorities treat stakeholders. Research on civil 
regulation has found that legal agreements or resolutions are abided by without 
contestation even if the outcomes do not favor one’s position (Tyler 1997). Besides, rule 
takers are much more willing to accept those rules, if the people feel, by this order, that 
the authorities establishing and enforcing those rules are “trying to be fair” to them and 
are justifying decisions so that trust is gained. Second, it enhances the feelings of 
fairness and the interpersonal respect they experience through their treatment by 
authorities. Third, people are also influenced by assessments of impartiality and the use 
of facts instead of personal opinions in decision-making. Finally, people feel that they 
are treated more fairly if they are allowed to participate in shaping decisions, which 
affect the resolution of their problems or conflicts. According to studies on voluntary 
compliance, reaffirming people’s sense of their standing in the community can be more 
important than solving the problem. This is interesting as most studies on compliance 
center on problem solving. People value the opportunity to express their views to 
decision-makers. In fact, people are satisfied even when they lose so long as they have 
had suitable opportunities to express what they think the problem is and how it should 
be handled (Tyler 1997). The affected people want to be involved in the solution of their 
cases. An additional benefit of this process is to hear the views of other participants, 
who might have opposite claims. 
Consequently, procedural legitimacy is the basis for influential orchestration by IOs. 
The procedural basis for legitimacy can be summarized with these four concepts: 
                                                 
15 For instance, half of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) partnerships do not 
address concrete and measurable targets but relate to capacity building, education and information for 
decision-making (Biermann et al. 2007), that concern procedural aspects, such as information and 
knowledge sharing. Thus, they should be evaluated in reference to how far they contribute to a 
favorable context for the problem solving capacity. 
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trustworthiness, respect, neutrality and participation. In line with this, empirical studies 
on personal transformation in multistakeholder environmental partnerships 
recommend to give attention to the process-oriented aspects of multistakeholder 
collaboration that provides both direct and indirect benefits toward achieving long-term 
environmental goals (Poncelet 2001: 295-296). Specifically, studies on participatory 
planning approaches to protected areas tell us that a good facilitator has no particular 
interests – neutrality – in the area where facilitation is required. Moreover, recognition – 
trustworthiness – and respect by the local actors of its area of expertise is also required 
(Windevoxhel 2001: 22). In order to develop a framework for the assessment of the IO 
orchestration influence, I use the aforementioned key procedural resources in relation 
to voluntary compliance. Procedural resources refer to the trust, neutrality, respect, and 
participation required for voluntary compliance (Tyler 1997, 2011). In chapter 3, section 
3.4, these procedural resources are operationalized for the study of orchestration in the 
field of GEG. 
IOs stand in a privileged position for conducting influential orchestration. One 
competitive advantage that IOs have in the orchestration processes stems from what 
they represent. More specifically, IOs benefit from three strengths (Jacobson 1979: 136-
138) that can foster orchestration. First, decisions made within IOs tend to be more 
open to public scrutiny than they would if they were the result of traditional diplomacy. 
Second, positions not associated with any nation-state or national association can be 
introduced in the decisional processes within IOs. Last, small, weak, and poor states 
have greater influence in IOs than they do outside of these institutions16. As Lipschutz 
puts it, “[g]lobal environmental change is a social process. (…) Change can come about 
only through a process of renegotiating the rules, roles and relationships that constitute 
them” (Lipschutz 1996: 47). Liberal approaches to institutionalism talk about outputs, 
outcomes (Rittberger 1995) and impact (Levy, Young, and Zürn 1995, Miles et al. 2002) 
in order to describe the effective implementation of international regimes. Yet, those 
approaches omit the procedural resources that enable that outputs, as legal and 
administrative measures required for achieving the policy goal, are observed. Without 
procedural resources, outputs may neither be achieved nor observed. Finally, without 
outcomes, impacts – understood as the effect of the policy on the socioeconomic 
environment (Börzel 2002: 160-161) – cannot follow. 
 
 
                                                 
16 A case in point is the negotiations on the GEF restructure. Despite the fact that industrialized 
countries controlled the financial resources at stake, developing countries could prevail on governance 
issues when they were united among themselves and when they were allied with Northern NGOs and 
the industrialized countries were divided (Porter and Welsh Brown 1996c: 144). 
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2.2.5 IO influence assessment: Conclusion 
Beyond the fixed-interest rational institutionalist approach, sociological institutionalism 
is the IR approach more ready for the assessment of IO influence. It has acknowledged 
influence through both change of beliefs and rational legal authority. Yet, five main 
empirical observations point to the methodological shortcomings of sociological 
institutionalism for the assessment of IO influence. First, IOs do not focus exclusively 
on states as their main targets. IOs through entrepreneurship may develop activities 
that go beyond convening a wide range of member states in international negotiations 
(Dimitrov 2014). Therefore, by considering states as the main target for IOs we run the 
risk of oversimplification. For instance, IOs may engage in norm-development directly 
with private actors not necessarily through orchestration but through regulatory 
cooperation (Abbott and Snidal 2010).  
Second, IOs increasingly become engaged in activities with other actors and they are 
not isolated bureaucracies that fall into pathologic behavior. IOs facilitate the contact 
with local public actors, NGOs and other private actors. Consequently, IOs search for 
new ways of collaboration with both public and private actors, as intermediators, to 
which they delegate relevant tasks such as monitoring (Downie 2014a).  
Third, IOs do not exclusively rely on convincing actors to change their behavior. 
Instead, they influence by exerting social pressure on targets in collaboration with 
private actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  
Fourth, IOs may be formally delegated with orchestration by states. Yet, IOs can also 
initiate orchestration. The relationship between states and IOs is complex and requires 
that the conceptual framework considers both the Principal-Agent model and an 
Orchestrator-Intermediary-Target theoretical approach more akin to orchestration 
(Abbott et al. 2015a).  
Last, sociological institutionalism assumes a global and universal culture (Boli and 
Thomas 1999a, Schofer et al. 2012) and as such no comparative studies are undertaken to 
account for variation. Sociological institutionalism treats the world polity as “cultural 
dumbs” (Wiener 2004), when it is clear that, even some human rights norms, are not 
universally accepted. Differently from the sociological institutionalist approach based 
on single case study research, the empirical research here includes the comparison of in-
depth individual cases. From all the above, it may be inferred that there is a need to 
distinguish, define, and classify different orchestration approaches. The next section 
introduces two types of orchestration approaches, persuasion and social leverage. 
2.3 How Do IOs Influence Target Actors? Persuasion versus Social Leverage 
The orchestration theory accounts for the cooperation between IOs and their 
intermediaries to achieve their goals. The concept of orchestration explains why 
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intermediaries engage in orchestration. Yet research to date has not clarified how 
orchestration actors interact with the target actors. It remains thus silent on the link 
between orchestrators and intermediaries with their target actors. Therefore, it does not 
account for why target actors follow the guidance of IOs and their intermediaries. How 
do IOs manage to get target actors to follow their recommendations? Being unable to 
answer such questions is problematic as we fail to assess when IO orchestration is 
influential and through which causal pathway. Consequently, this section discusses the 
approaches that IOs have at their disposal to motivate target actors to follow their 
prescriptions. 
On what basis do IOs and their intermediaries manage to influence target actors? If 
the term actors refers to individuals, organizations and networks that participate in 
decision-making processes, and agents are actors who have the ability to prescribe 
behavior and to obtain the consent of the governed (Biermann et al. 2010: 283), what 
causal pathways turn IOs from actors to agents? It is interesting to see how under-
theorized non-coercive governance mechanisms are in much of the IR literature, given 
that the goal of diplomacy is often the non-coercive influence of the “changing minds” 
of others, of persuading, cajoling, or shaming them to accept, and hopefully internalize, 
new facts, figures, arguments, norms, and causal understandings about particular issues 
(Johnston 2001: 489, Dimitrov 2012). Non-coercive modes to influence rely on changing 
beliefs, knowledge provision and exerting social pressure for pursuing IOs’ goals.  
By “paying attention to studies in psychology, particularly work on the roles of 
affect, empathy, conformity, and esteem [that] (…) have been swept under the carpet” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 916), two processes can shed light on the influence of IOs. 
Largely, IOs make use of two different approaches to reach targets through voluntary 
intermediaries. The first, defined as persuasion, involves changing minds, opinions, and 
attitudes about causality and affect, identity, in light of new evidence or other reasons 
excluding overtly material or mental coercion. The second is referred to as social 
leverage and implies that the actor changes her/his behavior in response to social 
rewards and punishments (Johnston 2001: 489-495). In line with the orchestration 
framework, both approaches are indirect. The two approaches discussed here enlist 
intermediaries, whose goals are in agreement with those of the IOs seeking to reach 
target actors. The voluntary character of orchestration forbids any type of material or 
coercive pressure on target actors. Certainly, persuasion and social leverage do not make 
use of any material (dis-)incentives to exert pressure on targets. This is most suitable for 
the case of environmental sustainability politics that lacks highly legalized institutions17, 
                                                 
17 This view is reinforced by a lack of perspective for strengthening green global governance through a 
World Environment Organisation (Biermann 2002). 
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meaning that it lacks significant levels of precision or delegation to exert sanctions 
(Abbott et al. 2000). 
2.3.1 Persuasion 
IOs that engage in persuasion attract target actors that are both newcomers to an issue 
area and uncertain about their interests and identities. The IO enlists intermediaries 
that enjoy some authority from target actors. The information that is provided by the IO 
is considered for the target actor from an in-group, which is more convincing than that 
from out-groups. Intermediaries will engage with target actors and thus more cognitive-
processing abilities and stronger attitudes are developed through personal experience 
than if based on hearsay or indirect experience. In addition, an attitude associated with 
an explicit behavioral commitment made earlier will be more resistant to change later 
because actors experience discomfort at being viewed as hypocritical and inconsistent. 
Thus, the target actor holds a deeply internalized desire to avoid appearing inconsistent 
to the group (Johnston 2001-499, Risse 2000: 33, Checkel 2001: 563).  
The justification given by target actors in persuasion mechanisms includes (Johnston 
2001: 495) the degree to which an actor identifies with the group, identification; the 
degree to which the norm and its sponsor are seen as legitimate, authority; essentially 
mimicking of a valued in-group behavior, social proof; and, where defection from group 
norms carries costs of self-esteem for the target, voluntary membership. In general, the 
most common processes cited in IR literature are all related to the acquisition of some 
kind of identification with or affective attachment to a group. In persuasion18, target 
actors identify with the IO and its intermediaries and follow its recommendations. 
Persuasion relies on the cognitive process where the IO and its intermediaries convince 
target actors. In persuasion, IOs enlist actors – may also be other IOs – that generate 
consensus around them and generate the necessary consent for target actors to abide by 
orchestration goals. Target actors change their minds, opinions, and attitudes about 
causality and effect in light of new evidence and in the absence of material or mental 
coercion. Similar to diplomacy that entails convincing the others with axiomatic and 
unquestioned arguments, persuasion refers to the process whereby individual actors’ 
preferences endogenously change and material constraints stay the same. 
Persuasion by IOs has been widely described in sociological institutionalist studies 
(Finnemore 1993, 1996a, Finnemore and Toope 2001, Barnett and Finnemore 2005). 
Persuasion entails the active assessment of the content of a particular message to lead 
targets to change their minds, opinions, and attitudes in the absence of coercion. 
                                                 
18 For the application of the concept of persuasion in the case of private agents see Green (2014), who 




Therefore, persuasion is less likely to be spontaneous than promoted. IOs enlist 
intermediaries, which in light of new knowledge influence the beliefs of state 
representatives (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). IOs persuade through so-called 
organizational fields when government representatives meet and develop their opinions 
and strategies. Government coalitions, in favor of specific policies, develop in the 
political platform provided by IOs. International elites as intermediaries in those 
coalitions facilitate that other states adopt the policies outlined by IOs. Those serve as 
organizational fields where the interaction with potential intermediaries, such as 
domestic elites, occurs and favors social learning (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, DiMaggio 
1991).  
Within the constructivist branch, the sociological institutionalism literature 
specifies the unobstructed access of IOs to state elites through their rational-legal 
authority (Barnett and Finnemore 2004b). IOs also rely on other sources of authority, 
such as institutional, delegated, expert, principled and capacity-based sources (Avant, 
Finnemore, and Sell 2010). This approach assumes that the preferences of states may be 
influenced by the work of IOs. For instance, the EU Commission regularly enlists 
networks of national regulators to help it prepare draft legislation, generate consensus 
among political decision-makers for support and ensure implementation after adoption. 
As a result, the European Commission draws on transgovernmental networks to partly 
compensate for the incomplete delegation of the implementation and enforcement 
powers to EU institutions (Rittberger, Zangl, and Kruck 2011). Another case in point is 
the promotion of the international standards code by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) as a common basis for national regulations to overcome trade barriers. The 
WTO enlists the services of another IO the International Standards Organization (ISO) 
to set up a global standards information network (Abbott et al. 2013). Other examples 
include UNESCO that influenced the creation of state science bureaucracies, the Red 
Cross that put forward the Geneva Conventions, or how the World Bank redefined the 
notion of economic development as a goal of states (Finnemore 1996a) and finally, how 
the UN has defined the establishment of national human rights institutions as a 
valuable goal and has equipped states to create them (Cardenas 2003). 
The pursuit of persuasion is associated with identities more than with interests, and 
with the selection of rules more than with individual anticipated consequences (March 
and Olsen 1989: 951). Therefore, target actors need to follow norms and rules in line 
with IOs to see their social status recognized within the group of international states. 
Target actors follow norms understood as “shared expectations about appropriate 
behavior held by a collectivity of actors” (Checkel 1999: 84). The benefit of accepting 
rules and changing behavior is calculated in abstract social terms rather than concrete 
consequential terms. Concretely, X is the right thing to do or X is consistent with my 
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social category, identity or beliefs. The next heuristic model shows how, through 
persuasion, orchestrators affect a target actor’s beliefs. Influencing a target actor’s 
beliefs bolsters the shaping of their interests and preferences. IOs and intermediaries 
shape the target actor’s action, which involves evoking an identity or beliefs and 
matching the obligations of that identity or beliefs to a specific situation. In addition, 
the model shows how outcomes feedback the beliefs of target actors and reinforce their 
perception of group belonging. 
 
Figure 2.1 Orchestration through persuasion 
According to sociological institutionalist tenets though, norms are virtually diffused 
automatically in the world polity (Meyer et al. 1997), which leaves no room for neither 
variation in the degree of rule adoption across units nor contestation (Johnston 2001: 
492). Similarly, sociological institutionalist approaches fall short to account why some 
target actors engage in orchestration, when they are not novel targets and have no 
material incentive to analyze counter attitudinal information. 
2.3.2 Social leverage 
Social leverage lies in between the two basic logics of action by which human behavior 
is interpreted. On the one hand, there are those who see action as led by the logic of 
anticipated consequences, cost/benefit analysis, and prior preferences. On the other 
hand, there are those who see action as led by a logic of appropriateness and senses of 
identity (March and Olsen 1989, 1998: 949). Based on institutionalist approaches that 
rely on rationalism to account for cooperation, social leverage draws from a social-based 
approach to rationalism. What motivates change and constrains behavior in social 
leverage is social rewards and punishments. Differently from Friman (2015) who defines 
the “politics of leverage” as naming, shaming and sanctioning, the use of sanctioning is 
not envisaged in the concept of social leverage due to the lack of sanctioning power of 
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most environmental IOs. Instead, social leverage stands a way in between 
constructivism that considers the actor’s preferences as not fixed across time and, 
rationality’s logic of consequences where expected consequences lead action. Thus, 
social leverage includes a constructivist-based normative consensus about what good 
behavior is in response to rationality-based social pressure. Consequently, arguments 
from target actors that justify participation in social leverage stress image benefits and 
opprobrium costs with the absence of material side-payments or threats of sanctions. 
According to Johnston, three conditions favor social leverage by IOs (2001). First, the 
target actor has prior identification with a relevant reference group. In social leverage, 
target actors identify and care about the opinions of the group. Second, making real or 
imagined group pressure, specifically, initial bargaining positions isolate the actor from 
the cooperating audience or reference group. Cooperation due to social pressure is a 
social effect only, as it would not exist without the interaction with a group. Third, 
rewards and punishments are social because only groups can provide them, and only 
groups the actor believes share some level of identification. The strength of social 
rewards and punishments depends on which group the target identifies as a high-status 
actor, as this is the group the target actor likes to show behavior conformity. Besides, 
only high status-actors become legitimate observers of behavior able to grant social 
rewards and punishments. Governance due to social leverage is a social effect only, as it 
would not exist without interaction with a group. For instance, a company that 
identifies with the “club of sustainable businesses” may not pay attention to the critics 
of some small local NGOs. However, target actors will be more sensible to the same 
critics coming from a high-status international advocacy network that has more 
capacity to exert social opprobrium by denouncing their practices. Target actors change 
their behavior and their beliefs remain the same. In social leverage, the reward from 
conforming to social or group pressure is the psychological wellbeing from back patting, 
gaining status and personal accomplishment (Barnett and Finnemore 2004d: 157, 
Johnston 2001: 499-501), while the punishment is psychological anxiety from disgrace. 
Three types of social rewards avail orchestrators for social leverage. First, a sense of 
belonging, and the impression of content derived from conformity with role 
expectations. An increased willingness to comply comes from the sense of comfort 
associated to the interaction with others with whom she/he is perceived to share traits. 
In addition, the positive moods to being viewed as consistent with one’s self-professed 
role lead people to respond by greater conformist behavior. In contrast, discomfort 
associated with perceived divergence from group norms triggers strong internal 
pressures to conform by affecting the actor’s self-esteem. The punishment is 
psychological anxiety from opprobrium shaming, shunning, exclusion, and demeaning, 
or dissonance derived from actions inconsistent with a role. Second, targets maximize 
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status, as an instrument, good image that can encourage actors to engage in other 
arenas and helps build trust. Compliance in response to social pressure is the desire to 
maximize honor, prestige and avoid humiliation. For instance, companies seek to 
engage in social corporate reporting to avoid boycott campaigns that damage their 
brand. Last, retaining social status is considered good in and of itself, to achieve a sense 
of personal accomplishment by engaging in activities exhibiting qualities that are 
defined by the society as meritorious (Hatch 1989: 349, cited in Johnston 2001: 501). 
Scholars have argued that the desire of governments to acquire and maintain a 
reputation as a “good” or “reliable” member of the international community provides 
significant leverage to induce compliance with international regimes (Peterson 1997: 
130). 
The next model shows how social leverage works at a different level than persuasion. 
While persuasion affects beliefs, social leverage affects target interests and preferences 
that in turn affect their outputs. Thus, orchestration through social rewards and 
punishments only affects target actors’ interests and entails a change of behavior but 
not of beliefs. It works on interests, a shallower level than beliefs. 
 
Figure 2.2 Orchestration through social leverage 
Consequently, social leverage is not as direct as persuasion. In social leverage, the IO 
has to orchestrate a change in an actor’s understanding of the normative preferences. It 
therefore requires consensus about what socially valuable behavior looks like and the 
need of a forum or institution that makes acting a particular way public and observable. 
The forum could be something loose as a voluntary reporting, where defectors receive a 
“wakeup call” by either not submitting a report or not fulfilling reporting quality 
standards. The logic of action in this case is integrative. Social rewards and punishments 
represent the combination of mechanisms for compliance, socialization from the 
constructivist approach as well as a rationalist redistribution of resources (Börzel 2002: 
168-169). Social leverage assumes the combination of ideas and interests to account for 
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both the behavioral model of absolute gains maximizers and of role-players as described 




3. Studying the influence of IO orchestration for GEG: A 
conceptual framework 
IOs do not act in isolation. They shape and are shaped by different actors through 
orchestration. Moreover, IOs can be more or less influential depending on the way they 
manage orchestration processes. This chapter aims at distinguishing formal from 
informal orchestration in GEG by considering the type of intermediaries – public or 
private – that shapes orchestration approaches, particularly, persuasion and social 
leverage. Secondly, this chapter establishes the meaning of influence in the case of IO 
orchestration. In this context, an analytical framework is developed to assess IO 
influence in orchestration for GEG. In short, IO influence can be defined as the sum of 
orchestration outputs plus procedural resources, which are both specified and 
operationalized in subsequent sections. Finally, the last section presents a table 
summarizing the analytical framework. 
3.1 How do IOs orchestrate for GEG? Formal and informal orchestration 
The orchestration process may be initiated by states or by IOs (Abbott et al. 2015b). It 
can be inferred from this that IOs rely on different sources of agency in orchestration, 
namely delegation − in the case that states initiate the orchestration process − or 
entrepreneurship − when organizations take the lead for orchestration. From here, the 
ability to exercise some influencing power with legitimacy can be delegated to IOs from 
states – delegation − or, instead, be granted by non-state actors as independent agents – 
entrepreneurs − that claim legitimacy from problem-solving, expertise or moral 
arguments (Dellas, Pattberg, and Betsill 2011: 87-88). The concept of delegation 
originates from the Principal-Agent theory and represents a formal consent of 
legitimacy, which particularly emanates from states. In addition, an informal 
recognition of legitimacy consists of the social consent granted by non-states. Both 
sources of agency are not conflicting or mutually exclusive. In fact, IOs may conflate 
formal delegation and informal recognition. Therefore, determining whether the source 
of agency that prevails in a given context is either formal delegation or informal 
recognition is an empirical question. Accordingly, the underlying assumptions made for 
orchestration approaches are based on the Principal-Agent and orchestration theories. 
It is plausible that delegation of orchestration by states to IOs, combined with high 
oversight by states, prompts IOs to enroll public intermediaries in order to persuade 
target actors. Consequently, IOs enlist public actors to persuade individuals with the 
purpose of changing their beliefs, with arguments, in light of new evidence. Conversely, 
in informal orchestration, IOs dealing with divergence of goals among states and low 




Different from past literature, this study pays attention to the relation between the 
initial orchestration process and IO performance. This book explores how the two types 
of orchestration initiators have an effect on orchestration results and which 
orchestration approach is more influential. In other words, the question that arises is, 
are IOs more influential acting as orchestration entrepreneurs or, instead, acting as 
delegated agents from states? Then the next question is, how can we explain the 
variability of IO influence observed in orchestration processes? In contrast to coercion 
that compels compliance with the rules through threats, both delegated and informal 
orchestration rely on authoritative prescriptions. Moreover, what makes orchestration 
processes different is the orchestration initiator. 
Orchestration approaches can be grouped into two categories according to the 
orchestration initiator(s), namely states or IOs. Furthermore, this study assumes that 
this variable influences the type of interaction established between the IOs and its 
intermediaries and targets. Specifically, the orchestration initiator influences not only 
the type of intermediaries enlisted by the IO in orchestration, but also the type of 
interaction established between the IO and its target actors. For this reason, this section 
focuses on the description of the type of interaction established between the IOs and its 
target actors in each orchestration approach. Consequently, it is necessary to focus on 
the initiator of the process in order to differentiate between formal and informal 
orchestration. Particularly, each orchestration approach, namely − formal orchestration 
delegated by a state to an IO − and − informal orchestration with an IO as initiator, has 
its own specific way to interact with its target actors. This framework assumes two 
different types of interaction between IOs with its targets depending on who the 
orchestration initiator is. On the one hand, state-initiated orchestration engages public 
intermediaries in persuasion. On the other hand, informal orchestration enlists private 
intermediaries for social leverage. Thus, the two orchestration approaches differ in terms 
of the way targets are influenced in order to obtain their consent to orchestration goals. 
Consequently, this study differentiates between persuasion (Andresen 2012, Dimitrov 
2012, Selin 2012) where intermediaries are public actors and social leverage (Levy 2012, 
Park 2012) with private actors as intermediaries. 
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Table 3.1. Conceptual map on IOs’ governance mechanisms 
 
The table 3.1 shows IOs’ governance mechanisms other than orchestration, namely 
hierarchy and collaboration. The governance types, particularly, direct and indirect, are 
the main difference between hierarchy and collaboration on the one side and 
orchestration on other other side. Direct governance does not require the use of 
intermediaries. By contrast, in orchestration, as an indirect governance type, the 
intermediaries play a governance role between IOs and their targets. Additionally, in the 
hierarchical type of governance, IOs use coercion as a way of interaction with targets. 
Moreover, in collaboration, IOs directly enroll private actors as targets and engage in a 
corporatist way of interaction (Ottaway 2001). 
Reference may be made to formal orchestration or delegation to IOs as stand-alone 
“actors in their own right” (Finnemore 1993, Abbott et al. 2015b, Barnett and Finnemore 
2004a, Hawkins et al. 2006, Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009, Bauer, Andresen, and 
Biermann 2012). Moreover, the engagement of IOs’ in informal orchestration, with the 
help of non-state intermediaries, has hardly been studied (exceptions include: Wright 
2009, Abbott 2012a, Abbott et al. 2015a). Accordingly, an analytical framework to assess 
the influence of each orchestration approach is developed in this thesis. 
The persuasion and the social leverage are two causal pathways to engage target 
actors in abiding by IOs’ objectives. The orchestration theory refers to the relevance of 
some key dimensions such as IO focality, which is the quality to be considered the 
central IO dealing with a certain topic, and state oversight in order to account for 
orchestration emergence (Abbott et al. 2015c). At the same time, consideration must be 
given to additional dimensions. The reason for this is that dimensions such as 
membership help distinguish persuasion from social leverage (Johnston 2001). In 
addition, reference may be made to other dimensions related to membership such as 
franchise – to describe the authority of the orchestration members−, decision-making, 
mandate of the initiative and the autonomy to orchestratre granted by states and 
cooperating actors to the IO, which are introduced later. By making use of these 
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variables, persuasion and social leverage approaches for GEG are presented in the 
following sections. 
3.1.1 Formal orchestration: Public intermediaries and persuasion 
One way states respond to demands for cooperation is through delegatation to IOs and 
private actors. In fact, Green and Colgan have shown that delegation for the 
management of environmental problems is a persistent phenomenon that facilitates the 
implementation of states' preferences (Green and Colgan 2013). Concretely, rather than 
focusing on regulatory cooperation between states and private actors, this research 
instead centers on the delegation of orchestration to IOs. Goal convergence may 
facilitate hard, direct governance by IOs, but states often prefer orchestration because it 
implies that states feel less threatened by the potential loss of sovereignty associated 
with ceding authority to international institutions (Abbott et al. 2015c). Yet, 
orchestration in some instances may evolve towards harder and direct modes of 
governance, such is the case of GEF and climate adaptation (Graham and Thompson 
2015). Generally, though, strong and wide consensus among states is not reached in 
order to facilitate agreement on hard regulation. Thus, orchestration enables delegation 
from states of both the functions to be transferred to IOs and the limited autonomy for 
IOs. In formal orchestration, IOs focus on the influence over target actors through 
public addressees. States seek to delegate in order to reduce transaction costs and 
establish credible commitments. Consequently, states become orchestration actors by 
allowing or even initiating IO’s orchestration (Abbott et al. 2015c). However, states 
make this decision with care. When states exercise ex ante oversight and delegate 
orchestration to an IO, then this organization is very limited in its ability to take the 
initiative while orchestrating (Abbott et al. 2015c). In fact, states tend to delegate 
functions, which are deemed to pose less of a threat to state sovereignty, such as 
implementation and monitoring, and at the same time states rarely delegate rule 
making and enforcement functions. Particularly, the persuasion in orchestration 
generates compliance of IOs’ goals by target actors through public intermediaries. 
Persuasion, as the causal pathway of formal orchestration, is described according to five 
dimensions in the following sections. 
3.1.1.1 Membership 
In the case of persuasion, the membership dimension refers to the enlisting of a small 
and exclusive group of intermediaries from the public sector. IOs are formally delegated 
with orchestration and therefore closely supervised. In fact, the close relationships 
developed during UN conferences and other contexts serve Strange (1998) to prove why 
IOs never die, even if states do. That is because of the symbiotic relationships between 
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IOs and national bureaucrats that influence states’ decisions. In the case of 
environmental governance, the celebration of UN environmental conferences has 
helped educate governmental elites and expose them to new agendas and discourses in 
order to pursue sustainable development (Haas 2002: 88). Those public intermediaries 
are closely monitored by those states supervising orchestration. Interestingly, a network 
with a small number of members and insulated in private settings is considered to be 
more conducive to changing actors’ beliefs (Checkel 2001). The interaction between the 
intermediary and the target occurs in camera negotiations that are more insulated and 
less politicized. For instance, persuasion in global conferences is more likely to occur 
during bilateral contacts than speeches for a wide audience. First and foremost, 
persuasion is favored if the intermediary is a highly authoritative member of a small, 
intimate, high-affect in-group to which the target also belongs or wants to belong such 
as the community of high developed countries. The information from culturally 
recognized authorities such as IOs, community of advanced states or from sources that 
are liked is more convincing than that from less authoritative sources or from sources 
that are disliked. For this reason, IOs employ internationally renowned experts to 
influence national or subnational officials through the design and implementation of 
international projects. 
3.1.1.2 Franchise 
In persuasion, franchise is characterized by the selection of a small group of actors, 
specifically those with high technical expertise, capacity-based and institutional 
authority, for instance donor organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank Group. 
In fact, Jasanoff and Long Martello (2004: 335) warn us that, “[i]nstitutionalized 
expertise is one of the most powerful instruments for creating boundaries between 
global and local governance arrangements for the environment. Who counts as expert, 
whose knowledge is deemed relevant, and who participates in advisory and negotiating 
bodies are all critically important choices in the development of environmental 
regimes”. Persuasion takes place when the target actor is highly cognitively motivated to 
analyze counter attitudinal information because it is uncertain about the situation in 
which finds itself. The context of persuasion could be one in which the target actor is 
uncertain about its interests and identities. In other words, the target actor has few 
prior, ingrained attitudes that are inconsistent with the counter attitudinal message sent 
by the intermediary. For instance, when the target actor is a novice or an inductee in a 
new social group and it is exposed to counter attitudinal information repeatedly over 
time. A new member to a group, with no ingrained opinions about the political agenda 
discussed, is more receptive and open to be convinced. In short, if target actors are 
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newcomers to the specific issue area, are more prone to be persuaded by those actors 
holding highly specialized expertise. 
3.1.1.3 Decision-making 
Consensus is the main decision-making process in formal orchestration. IOs and 
intermediaries engage in orchestration in order to deliver consensual policy-measures 
and guidelines, which contribute to changing target beliefs and accepting policies 
through reasoned deliberation. The target will be mostly persuaded because of its 
relation of congeniality with the intermediary. In addition, as a result of the targets’ 
desire for social proofing, the agreed principles from a valued group, such as a 
community of leading actors, will be more convincing and accepted by target actors 
than if the group is divided about how to interpret the message. 
3.1.1.4 Mandate 
In formal orchestration, novel target actors seek to become part of the in-group they 
value. For this purpose, target actors embrace the goals and mandate shared by IOs and 
public intermediaries. In addition, states are vigilant of their sovereignty and will allow 
the transfer of some functions only, such as implementation and monitoring functions, 
to the orchestrator. However, even when it is difficult, orchestrators may attempt to 
expand their mandates for rule-making and enforcement functions. Consequently, IOs 
may pursue the creation of binding agreements from governments, as one of their 
orchestration goals, by enlisting intermediaries that have a central role in a given policy 
issue. 
3.1.1.5 Autonomy 
The members included in formal orchestration are often focal actors that hold technical 
expertise in key areas that bear relation to the subject dealt with. In persuasion 
processes, although members share similar goals, the close oversight of states acting as 
principals, prevent orchestrators from reaching any binding agreements. Yet, IOs 
benefit from some autonomy, acting as a window of opportunity, when the issue dealt 
with is highly technical and requires a significant degree of specialized expertise from 
IOs. IOs obtain different sources of autonomy from the states, including the 
bureaucratic complexity that undermines the strong state oversight or, professional and 
specialized expertise. There are, however, some exceptions to this rule. The hierarchical 
and bureaucratic culture that characterizes the IMF, for instance, hinders orchestration 
(Viola 2015). By contrast, G20’s lack of entrenched bureaucratic apparatus enables 
entrepreneurship (Abbott et al. 2015a). By and large, for the reasons described above, 
the autonomy of the IOs as orchestrator in persuasion may be considered as medium. 
56 
 
3.1.2 Informal orchestration: Private intermediaries and social leverage 
Stalled negotiations in a disputed international policy area may prompt IOs to initiate 
orchestration in adjacent areas that are subject to weaker state oversight. 
Heterogeneous preferences among states increase the likelihood of informal 
orchestration if state oversight is low. This can explain why states with high goal 
divergence allow the emergence of informal orchestration, with ex post − and low − 
oversight. In this case, goal divergence provides a greater leeway for IOs (Abbott et al. 
2015c). IOs enroll private intermediaries and contribute to unblocking the political 
process from a different policy perspective. IOs enlist non-states as intermediaries to 
implement some objectives and bypass states. Consequently, in informal orchestration, 
states exercise ex post oversight, which means that the IO has some leeway to 
orchestrate because states cannot readily overturn IO actions. In social leverage, the IOs 
take advantage of its greater latitude from the states in order to enlist private 
intermediaries. Those private intermediaries may exert social rewards and punishments 
on target actors that need not necessarily be states. Therefore, orchestration makes it 
easier for the IOs to award target actors with either social recognition or social 
punishment with disapproval. 
What brings about behavioral change, in this case, is the social recognition or 
isolation from the group the target actor identifies with. Consequently, it is not about 
pursuing personal preferences or interests from a rational frame (March and Olsen 1989: 
949). For this reason, it is necessary that targets recognize themselves its belonging and 
membership in orchestration. In that sense, the recognition by target actors of the 
orchestrator’s “good standing” prompts the effectiveness of social pressure for 
conformation. Thus, social leverage for compliance can encourage behavioral change of 
target actors. Concretely, the social leverage in orchestration generates compliance of 
IOs’ goals by target actors through private intermediaries. Social leverage, as the causal 
pathway of informal orchestration, is described according to five dimensions in the 
following sections. 
3.1.2.1 Membership 
In social leverage, IOs enlist a large and inclusive membership group that includes 
private intermediaries. Large membership in a network of cooperators strengthens IOs’ 
influence (Johnston 2001). Specifically, IOs act as a platform where actors can exchange 
opinions and defend their positions. Morevoer, IO orchestration provides 
intermediaries with a wider audience in order to impact on public opinion. For this 
reason, the bigger the audience for back patting and opprobrium, the more influential 
this forum of social interaction will become in order to uncover potential free-riding 
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practices. Consequently, as the size of the audience increases, so does the capacity of the 
intermediaries to provide the social rewards and sanctions (Johnston 2001). 
3.1.2.2 Franchise 
In social leverage, IOs enlist a large group of intermediaries. In this case, franchise tends 
to be equally shared. Moreover, because the relationship between public and private 
authority is not a zero-sum relationship, the loci of authority are expanding and 
increasingly overlapping at once (Green 2014: 11). Thus, each partner provides some 
complementary capacity to the others, such as providing the legal and the political 
expertise, acting as a rapporteur for public information, performing a watch-dog role 
and coordinating national responses to global problems (Smith 1999: 185). Specifically, 
IOs legitimize actors such as international NGOs that monitor other actors in order to 
provide social punishments, or social rewards, accordingly. IOs enlist a wide range of 
actors from NGO activists to private company’s representatives and scientific experts to 
watchdog. This enables the IO to establish a public forum for monitoring norms and 
rules and generate pressure19. In this way, IOs legitimate new actors to perform 
governance tasks, which may be as varied as human rights monitoring, assisting in 
technical missions or peacekeeping operations (Barnett and Finnemore 2004d). In the 
case of environmental sustainability, key partners are environmental NGOs that exploit 
not only transnational linkages but also inject scientific and earth-centered concerns 
and thus transform politics by redefining what constitutes its subject matter (Princen, 
Finger, and Manno 1994: 232). 
3.1.2.3 Decision-making 
IOs, in social leverage approaches, require majorities in decision-making to be effective. 
Generally, decision-making takes place on the strategic actions and the managerial 
activities that influence social rewards or social punishments. Although decision-
making is based on majorities, the final authority rests with IOs, particularly, in the case 
of confronted views among intermediaries. IOs enlist intermediaries that can monitor 
and make public information on the target actors’ practices. The target may be 
vulnerable to majority decision-making, for example, if the majority of its reference 
group, such as consumers, decides not to buy a product of the target actor, a for-profit 
company. Eventually, consumers may learn about the lack of environmentally-
responsible business practices of a given company after an intermediaries’ discredit 
campaign. In this case, the social pressure is exerted by intermediaries through the 
                                                 
19 In addition, IOs may be subject to social leverage. For instance, after being censured by its dams 
funding policy, the World Bank enlisted non-profits to set up a process for genereating 
recommendations for big dam building. 
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potential public boycott of some of the target’s products. Informed consumers become, 
in the aggregate, a majority that may decide to reward or punish a target company. 
Therefore, the targets’ motivation for changing behavior and observing IOs’ goals lies in 
the targets’ necessity to build its good reputation. 
3.1.2.4 Mandate 
In social leverage, the IOs’ mandate aims at delivering information that help exert social 
pressure on target actors. The social leverage seeks to put pressure on targets through a 
public forum that monitors practices and discusses the consequences of specific target 
activities. The targets are sensitive to shaming and rewarding as its reference group 
discovers hidden benefits or disadvantages caused by them. Thus, information provision 
and benchmarking of best practices are at the core of the social leverage. Informal 
orchestration may enhance the involvement of the industry, which can gain good 
reputation and a stronger brand name while pushing the government into the 
background (Haufler 2001). For this reason, IOs can contribute to the learning and 
consensus building required for agreeing in best practices and deciding how to best 
implement them. The principles of voluntarism, such as non-binding goals, soft law, 
subsidiarity − delegation of decision-making competencies to private actors − and 
inclusion − participation of all relevant actors in the decision-making process − 
contribute to private involvement (Héritier 2002, Koutalakis 2008). In addition, the 
efforts by the private sector may potentially raise the standards internationally. 
However, this has the potential to reduce the ability of poorer countries to participate in 
international trade or to attract foreign investment (Haufler 1998, 2016). In a sense, IOs 
may be able to assist developing governments by taking an active role in setting social 
goals and upholding the freedom of civil society actors to organize and mobilize 
(Graham and Woods 2006). 
3.1.2.5 Autonomy 
IOs’ autonomy in social leverage may be considered low, due to the fact that IOs in 
social leverage rely on more intermediaries than in persuasion and franchise is equally 
shared among the wide range of intermediaries. Besides, the IO lacks a formal mandate 
from states to undertake orchestration functions. IOs coordinate among the multiple 
actors that hold the key information and expertise on the subject dealt with. A case in 
point is the Mediterranean Action Plan launched by UNEP that depended heavily on 
epistemic communities (Nicholson 1998). The ex-post state oversight that characterizes 
informal orchestration allows IOs to engage in social leverage. Therefore, IOs have a 
relatively low profile. In addition, IOs may be competing with other orchestration 
processes for the set-up of best practices. This may generate fragmentation and 
competition for the rule-takers and require more coordination efforts (Green 2014). 
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At the same time, the strong oversight by national environmental ministries may 
contribute to the IO’s mission creep into other issue areas, for instance, socially 
responsible investment, such as the case of UNEP’s Principles of Responsible 
Investiment (PRI) (Van der Lugt and Dingwerth 2015) and the Equator Principles of the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC). The private sector lending arm of the World 
Bank Group has facilitated and endorsed the emergence a voluntary code of conduct 
that stipulates how financial institutions should incorporate environmental and social 
concerns into project lending. While not originally an orchestration process, the 
Equator Principles programme has created a policy space for civil society groups to 
contest commercial project financing, which puts pressure on other financial 
institutions to engage (van Putten 2008, Wright 2012). A change in the organization’s 
focality provides the IO with a greater leeway for orchestration activities with private 
intermediaries. Such soft modes of governance stay ‘below the radar’ of member states 
avoiding activities that would trigger formal consent procedures (Abbott et al. 2015c). 
Interestingly enough, before the IFC –as part of the World Bank Group − could ever 
endorse any process for environmental sustainability politics, the World Bank Group as 
a whole had been through a process of norm contestation with member states, 
environmental groups and commercial banks that contributed to a reconfiguration of 
the group. Therefore IOs are not only ‘greening’ other actors, but are also part and 
parcel of an ongoing global environmental governance project that affects their 
identities also (O'Brien et al. 2000, Park 2010). 
3.1.3 Summary: Persuasion versus Social leverage 
The table below includes the main characteristics of the two orchestration approaches 
previously described. In the case of formal orchestration, IOs persuade through public 
actors: the membership is exclusive, the franchise is concentrated among a few actors, 
decision-rule making is consensual, mandate is agreeing on binding commitments and 
autonomy of the IO is medium as IOs have been delegated by states with orchestration 
functions, yet, with close oversight from states. By contrast, in the case of informal 
orchestration, IOs engage in social leverage through private actors: the membership is 
inclusive, the franchise is equally shared among several actors, the decision-making 
procedures are by majority vote, the mandate is informative and the IO’s autonomy is 
low, as orchestrators deal with a wide group of intermediaries with equal franchise and 
are not formally mandated by states to orchestrate and require to keep a low profile to 
prevent close oversight from states.  
Figure 3.1 below shows how the two variables, namely the type of intermediaries – 
public vs. private − and the type ouputs – soft vs. hard, influence a wide spectrum of 
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governance mechanisms, including the two orchestration approaches – persuasion and 
social leverage. 
 
Figure 3.1 The graphic representation of governance approaches according to two 





Table 3.2 How to distinguish between persuasion and social leverage? 
 
 
3.2 Assessing orchestration influence for GEG: Procedural resources and 
outputs 
Influence is an intangible quality, which cannot be physically and objectively measured 
as temperature or distance. Because of its subjectivity, it is a concept that requires an 
analytical framework that needs to be consistently applied in order to qualitatively 
assess and help discuss influence. For this reason, I assume that while influence cannot 
be assessed in absolute terms, it can, though, be assessed in comparative terms. 
Influential orchestrators refers to those actors that are competent to facilitate the 
involvement of new actors, which include individuals, organizations and networks that 
participate in decision-making processes (Biermann et al. 2010), as well as those that 
have the capacity to legitimize new roles for actors, such as intermediaries or targets. 
Therefore, the orchestrator’s influence in environmental goverance is understood as the 
capacity to involve new actors and the ability to legitimize new roles for actors. 
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Additionally, the influence on target actors depends not only on the orchestrator, 
but also on the targets themselves. In fact, influence is a relational concept. Those who 
grant the authority of influencers are target actors, which are then prompted to follow 
the influencer’s prescriptions. Regardless of who acts as the intermediary, authority is a 
necessary condition for orchestration. Fairness in orchestration procedures, as 
presented in the chapter 2, is required to gain IO authority from its target actors. 
Furthermore, IOs need to generate fair procedural resources in order to produce 
influential orchestration outputs. Those fair procedural resources are necessary if 
targets are to voluntarily abide by orchestration. We have seen in chapter 2 that the 
assets associated with conformity relate to the following four concepts: trust, neutrality, 
respect and participation. Consequently, the analytical framework developed here 
assumes that outputs to be influential depend on procedural resources, and vice versa, 
fair procedural resources require the materialization of outputs to unleash their 
potential. Thus, outputs cannot be effective unless they are achieved through fair 
procedural resources. Similarly, a fair process requires concrete outputs to be 
implemented. 
Moreover, when assessing influence, both concepts – outputs and procedural 
resources − cannot be assessed separately, but in relation to each other. In my view, the 
study of sustainability governance entails that the legitimacy deficits and environmental 
problem-solving need to be treated in conjunction, as one indissoluble unit. For this 
reason, the analytical framework developed here treats the concept of influence as a 
two-tier concept that consists of both orchestration outputs and procedural resources. 
The two notions inform each other and thus need to be examined in connection with 
one another. Both are mutually supportive concepts. Outputs are dependent on 
procedural resources in order to gain effectiveness. Similarly, procedural resources 
require outputs to materialize governance, if not, then they remain as potentialities. In 
this sense, a reference may be made to the case of the World Bank’s Operations 
Evaluation Department. Because only about one-third of all operations completed by 
the World Bank were reaching their major relevant goals, the Director-General of the 
World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department suggested that a new evaluation tool 
would place the emphasis on “listening” and would actively involve project beneficiaries 
in decision-making (Horta 1996: 146). Procedural resources, such as participation in 
decision-making and listening, are supportive of effective project results. Consequently, 




Figure 3.2 Orchestration approach shapes influence 
On that account, the assessment unfolds through two stages: first, the framework 
involves a number of dimensions that operationalize the procedural resources with their 
corresponding indicators. Procedural resources concern the competence to involve the 
participation and respect of new actors − operationalized through private actors, local or 
traditional knowledge and southern experts as well as affected people indicators. In 
addition, procedural resources are assessed in terms of their capacity to legitimize new 
roles for actors by generating trust and neutrality – operationalized through the 
provision of new environmental frames of reference and new interlinkages between 
welfare, equity and environmental degradation as well as social accountability. 
Secondly, the analytical framework operationalizes the orchestration outputs as 
organizational, policy, discourse and voluntary outputs. To sum up, orchestration 
influence is the dependent variable that consists of “material” outputs, which are 
evaluated – according to procedural resources − on their capacity to involve new actors 
and their ability to legitimize new roles for actors. 
3.3 Outputs 
Outputs are devised as the observable effects of IOs’ orchestration. Thus, the 
identification of outputs is part of the assessment of orchestration influence. Yet, 
outputs have influence only if procedural resources are obtained during the 
orchestration process. Then, if IOs have benefited from their procedural resources, 
influence materializes in concrete orchestration outputs. In this sense, outputs are a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for orchestration influence. The purpose of 
describing different type of outputs responds to the need of identifying the broadest 
number of results and facilitating comparability across orchestration cases. The 
analytical framework concerns identifying the outputs, which are later evaluated in their 
capability to involve new actors and to legitimize new roles for actors in orchestration. 







IOs offer direct policy advice and even financial support to intermediaries for the 
creation of new organizations or departments in target states, business or organizations 
in order to implement environmental policies. Therefore, examples for organizational 
outputs may refer to the creation of national advisory boards on sustainable 
development, research institutions or environmental bureaucracies, such as ministries 
or environmental departments. When procedural resources have played a role during 
the orchestration process, then the organizational outputs will last longer even if the 
flow of material resources stop. 
The indicator-question about organizational outputs is as follows, 
 Has the IO facilitated the creation of new institutions in your country, such as 
research institutions, governmental agencies, environmental departments in 
private organizations and the like? 
3.3.2 Discursive 
Discursive outputs refer to the emergence of new discourses generated through the 
interaction between the IO and the orchestration intermediaries, which may result in 
the coordination of new areas of research, international recognition of new emergencies 
with the endorsement of scientific reports, appointment of authoritative panel of 
experts for a specific subject, the call and celebration of international conferences where 
new crises are given visibility and new perspectives that contrast with the existing ways 
of dealing with current challenges. 
The indicator-question about discursive outputs is as follows, 
 Have experts of your organization participated in skills-oriented training-
programs, workshops and demonstration projects provided by the IO? 
3.3.3 Policy-based 
IOs engage intermediaries to assist countries directly in their effort to implement 
international agreements. Policy-based outputs refer to new public or private rules, 
laws, budget design and consultative advisory groups enacted through IOs’ 
orchestration, such as budget reallocation or national sustainable development 
strategies. IOs engage with intermediaries in public debates or mass media on newly 
generated or synthesized scientific or technical knowledge that may influence rule-
making. Training programs by IOs propagate ideas (Bøås and McNeill 2004), concepts 
and policies and become, thus, diffusion-agents of national polices and technologies. 
Both IOs and intermediaries act as communication agents for the exchange of 
information at a national level through workshops, skills-oriented training programs, 
65 
 
demonstration projects and transnational partnerships that affect both the adoption or 
reformulation of new laws and programs by governments and rules for private actors. 
The indicator-questions about policy-based outputs include, 
 Has the IO facilitated the adoption or reformulation of new rules, laws, policy 
programs, policy instruments, and new practices to regulate economic and social 
activity adversely affecting the environment? 
 Has the IO influenced the amount or allocation of resources in your 
organization? Do environmental issues benefit from the new budget? 
3.3.4 Voluntary 
Environmental standards addressed in international treaties or advocated by networks 
are not directly enforced by legal actions or sanctions. Attempts to impose statutory 
regulation through agreement in the UN in field areas such as the environment, that 
may impose specific enforceable legal obligations on states or multinational 
corporations, remain some way from fruition. In fact, delegation of rule-making and 
enforcement functions from states to IOs entails some rather high sovereignty costs that 
states are not willing to pay. As voluntary outputs can be diverse, they can be grouped 
into four categories that include: first, the constitution of new institutions of private 
institutions, such as an association or foundation, or new institutional agreements of 
public or private institutions, such as a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU); 
secondly, normative outputs refer to the adoption of new guidelines, codes of conduct, 
certification schemes or a new working methodology in new collaborative initiatives; 
thirdly, reporting outputs refer to joining new reporting activities of corporate social and 
environmental responsibility; and finally, fund-raising outputs concern the creation of 
new mechanisms to generate financial resources for conducting activities that support 
the IOs’ objectives. 
The indiacator-questions about voluntary outputs include, 
 Have members of your organization and the IO cooperated in new alliances 
for norm development and/or provision of financial support that contribute 
to monitoring or reporting? 
 Have members of your organization participated in joint programs for 
technology transfer facilitated through fund-raising by the IO? 
3.4 Procedural resources 
Influential orchestration is founded on principles for voluntary compliance, specifically, 
without resort to traditional direct and hierarchical modes of governance. Therefore, 
this study assumes that the procedural resources generated by the IO foster the 
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opp0rtunities of reaching their stated goals for environmental sustainability. According 
to social studies, as introduced in the chapter 2, trust and neutrality are the two core 
procedural resources for voluntary compliance, followed by respect and participation. 
Those four procedural resources for orchestration concern two dimensions, namely the 
capacity to involve new actors20 and the competence to legitimize new roles21 for actors in 
orchestration. All of the procedural resources are operationalized through six indicators. 
Therefore, the procedural dimension of legitimizing new roles for actors refers to 
generating trust through (1) social accountability and generation of neutrality through 
(2) new framing of issues and (3) new interlinkages. The procedural dimension of 
involving new actors for orchestration refers to the generation of respect by involving 
(4) Southern science and (5) affected actors and participation through the involvement 
of (6) non-state actors. 
The following sections operationalize the procedural resources’ indicators in the case 
of orchestration for sustainability politics, which is the focus of the empirical research. 
The indicator–questions developed for the analysis of procedural resources are issue-
specific for the case of environmental governance22. 
3.4.1 The legitimation of new roles: IOs as knowledge brokers and accountability 
facilitators 
As presented in chapter 2, two core dimensions contribute to fairness in procedures for 
voluntary compliance, namely trust and neutrality (Tyler 1997). Studies in GEG make 
referrence to the need for a process of building trust through accountability (Steets 
2010, Gupta, Lövbrand, et al. 2012, Buntaine 2014). Moreover the lack of neutrality with 
the politization in the framing of issues (Shafer and Murphy 1998, Barnett and 
Finnemore 1999, Bøås and McNeill 2004) and the unbalance between welfare and 
economic issues over environmental policy (Connelly 2007, Glasbergen 2012, Kannan 
2014) are also raised as relevant issues. In this framework, trust is operationalized as 
social accountability, which entails the provision of public platforms and mechanisms 
where all stakeholders involved, particularly those with opposing interests, can express 
                                                 
20 Huitema et al. (2011) claim the need of a meta-analysis of policy evaluations by acknoweledging the 
inherent complexity of the issue, which requires to be reflexive in the questioning official policy goals 
and to be participatory. 
21 A role being defined as “(…) the attitudinal and behavioral expectations that those who relate to its 
occupant have of the occupant and the expectations that the occupant has of himself or herself in the 
role. Some of the expectations are formally defined in the system’s rules and laws, while others develop 
informally and operate as implicit norms and procedures” (Rosenau 1990: 212). 
22 This analytical framework is not particularly concerned with addressing environmental effectiveness, 
exclusively, and it does not scrutinize regulatory structures, economic structures, science and time as 
performed in critical global environmental politics (Kütting 2001). 
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their opinions openly and ask for accountability of its procedures. In addition, neutrality 
is operationalized as the way to address the interlinkages between different policy areas, 
such as welfare, equity and environmental policies, and the new framing of existing 
environmental issues23. Consequently, IOs generate trust and neutrality procedural 
resources by fostering the public spaces where new roles for actors may develop for 
social accountability, as well as strengthening interlinkages and new framing of issues. 
3.4.1.1  Trust as the legitimation of social accountability: IOs as accountability 
facilitators 
The building of trust in orchestration is essential for voluntary compliance (Tyler 1997). 
The contrasting interests of some orchestration partners may suggest, at first, an 
adversarial or distrustful relationship between different orchestration actors. 
Consequently, it is imperative that participants are given the opportunity to exchange 
views in a collaborative context that may lead to cooperative arrangements (Glasbergen 
2011: 4). Arguably, hand-in-hand with trust goes justification. Consequently, the 
building of relationships based on trust require justification of behavior and actions, 
namely, accountability is necessary. IOs may become accountability facilitators by 
providing a public forum for stakeholders in order to demand and generate 
accountability. Accountability refers to the administration of accurate information 
about one’s activities or behaviour; it implies evaluating the behaviour with reference to 
certain standards, rules or expectations; thereby, recognising one’s obligations and 
accepting responsibility for one’s actions (Steets 2010: 15). 
Surely, the orchestrator deserving trust is subject to accountability. In essence, IOs 
need to generate an atmosphere of trust and make use of their authority on a given 
subject in order also to demand accountability from their intermediaries and target 
actors. Indeed, research has found that relationships built on trust are more capable to 
hold accountability from target actors (Tyler 1997). By and large, IOs draw on expert, 
capacity-building, principled-based sources of authority (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 
2010), as well as, rational-legal authority in order to gain trust from their collaborators 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004c). Reference may be made to the IOs’ efforts to achieve 
accountability by both delegating monitoring measures of binding commitments in case 
of states, as well as, constituting a public forum to make target actors’ behavior visible 
for voluntary pledges. Soft agreements do not carry the full force of international 
agreements, as they do not impose binding obligations, such as setting concrete 
objectives with deadlines and sanctions, in case goals are not met. Yet, IOs act as public 
                                                 
23 Generally, the capacity-building guidelines provided by experts and practioners for environmental 
sustainability recommend setting up conservation goals, which remain at the ecological level (Groves 
et al. 2000). There is a need to combine social, economic and ecological goals. 
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fora where both the behavior of targets is made visible and the lack of opportunities to 
give account on activities to the rest of the orchestration participants is overcome. For 
this reason, voluntary agreements should specify the targets they expect to reach, as 
well as the name of a contact person, which would contribute to overcoming the lack of 
screening and monitoring (Pattberg and Mert 2013). 
Yet, accountability is a sensitive issue in GEG. Indeed, empirical research on 
partnerships for sustainable development confirms that UN institutions have large room 
for improvement in building trust, particularly in the case of corporate accountability. 
Efforts have not yet been matched with broad business participation. Even if 
partnerships are sponsored by IOs and a handful of industrialized countries, they lack 
private sector leadership (Bäckstrand 2006: 489, Pattberg and Mert 2013). This is even 
more pronounced in the case of implementation for sustainable development in 
Southern countries (Najam 2014). The South may regard IOs with much suspicion. 
Moreover, orchestration in non-industrialized countries faces an extra challenge when 
compared to industrialized nations, which makes accountability even more relevant. In 
developed economies, governments have adapted to regulate the growing activities of 
multinational corporations. The goals of regulation have been both to facilitate 
competitive markets and to uphold widely valued social and public goals. Yet, serious 
gaps exist in non-industrialized countries, where governments have far less capacity to 
regulate. Weak rule of law, the absence of government administrative capacity and the 
weak bargaining power vis-à-vis Northern-based multinational corporations wielding 
vast resources of financial capital, technology and employment have hindered 
appropriate and influential regulatory institutions. In some cases, investors in non-
industrialized countries have increasingly sought to use UN resolutions not only to 
guarantee against unlawful expropriation but also equally against any government 
policies which affect their profitability, such as environmental regulation (Graham and 
Woods 2006). For this reason, there is a need of public and private dialog in order to 
address this general context of mistrust, where states are still necessary (Compagnon, 
Chan, and Mert 2012). Consequently, IOs can help reverse such dynamic. 
IOs as orchestrators delegate monitoring tasks to the relevant actors in order to 
bring about accountability. The regular back-up of monitoring by local non-profit 
organizations, research centers and volunteers is necessary in the environmental policy 
area. Soft law, such as international conventions and commitments for global 
environmental governance, does not create robust and enforceable rights. Similarly, 
orchestration by IOs may provide a context conducive to developing concrete and 
measurable targets and timetables. Such initiatives contribute to social accountability 
by developing guidelines, indicators and benchmarking that are later watchdogged. 
During the orchestration process, the IO establishes a public forum and delegates to 
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intermediaries the roles and functions for reporting on orchestration objectives. The 
disclosure of information may contribute to learning by, revising and updating previous 
objectives and searching for further goals and timetables. 
Indicator question(s) on the capacity of IOs to create trust-based resources with 
social accountability are the following: 
 Does the orchestrator legitimize the intermediaries and target actors in order to set-
up measurable targets and deadlines? 
 Does the orchestrator legitimize the monitoring and follow-up functions of activities 
by intermediaries and target actors? 
 Does the orchestrator publicize monitoring reports that feed fora for public 
consultation during the orchestration process and after, for a “post-orchestration” 
scenario? 
 How frequently do intermediaries and target actors exchange information on the 
environment with the orchestrator? 
 How frequently do decision-makers draw on annual reports, thematic studies, 
databases, and scientific publications, personal contacts produced by the orchestrator 
and their intermediaries? 
 Does the media coverage of environmental issues increase due to orchestration by 
the IO? 
 Does the orchestrator influence public opinion on environmental issues? 
3.4.1.2  Neutrality as the legitimation of new frames and interlinkages: IOs as 
knowledge brokers 
A playing field can be described as neutral as long as no actor is unfairly advantaged and 
it fosters voluntary compliance. When it is unclear for target actors what would be an 
appropriate outcome, they focus on neutrality (Tyler 1997). For this reason, IO programs 
should aim to benefit all stakeholders and should be careful not to contribute to any 
political biases. Impartiality applied to the case of orchestration for environmental 
sustainability politics refers to two items, first, on how issues are framed and secondly, 
how welfare, equity and environmental degradation issue areas interact so that none is 
advantaged in detriment of others. A context of neutrality for orchestration is fostered 
through the way that IOs both create linkages between economic, social and 
environmental issues, as well as, frame environmental issues. The interaction between 
actors, which deal with sustainability in an integrated fashion, facilitates a neutral 
orchestration context. Furthermore, as scientists are perceived as more neutral than 
politicians, the help of epistemic communities contributes to building consensus 
around the best approach to frame issues in order to solve them (Cross 2013). Related to 
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this, IOs’ officials can act as knowledge brokers, namely “intermediaries between the 
original researchers and producers of knowledge and the policy-makers who consume 
that knowledge but lack the time and training necessary to absorb the original 
knowledge” (Litfin 1994: 4). 
To begin with, the framing of environmental issues by IO orchestration can generate 
neutrality. Crises in sustainability politics require a global perspective and coordinated 
action between different levels of governance. Analysts describe a world that is closely 
interconnected in a physical sense. Environmental problems previously circumscribed 
to local, national or at most transboundary areas are now environmental problems that 
have gained a global dimension. This inevitably requires an increasing cooperation 
between states in international institutions. The political map of states dominates the 
general overarching frames of reference in IOs. State representatives and interests play a 
dominant role in their activities. It is the map of states more than any other map that 
put the spatial frame of reference to decision-making within IOs, which are also the 
result of interstate negotiations. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that IOs share a 
state-based emphasis in dealing with global issues. Yet, this focus on the state is, at 
least, questionable when it comes to dealing with global issues. In fact, the so-called 
problem of fit refers to the number of mismatches between ecosystem properties and 
institutional attributes (Young 2002a: 82). In other words, the size and scope of 
institutions should match the size and scope of problems, in this case, democracy across 
the boundary with nature (Dryzek 2000: 156). Moreover, IOs’ activities need to be 
consistent, in order to be relevant, with the priorities of multilateral institutions, which 
consist by definition of three or more nations (Hale and Mauzerall 2004). Therefore, 
when collaborating with multilateral institutions, IOs may need to overcome a 
framework of action based on interstate cooperation, which is sometimes too narrow to 
deal with environmental issues. 
Nonetheless, IOs have taken decisive steps that go beyond state-dominated 
conceptions, by increasingly recognizing the transboundary nature of ecosystem 
processes. However, these developments are doomed to fail if spatial conceptions 
continue to be subordinated to the political-territorial priorities dictated by 
conventional notions of sovereignty. For instance, territorial assumptions that give 
primacy to a particular spatial configuration of the world necessarily structure social, 
political, and institutional discourse in particular spatial terms, and thus influence the 
conceptual frameworks we develop for understanding and addressing environmental 
issues (Shafer and Murphy 1998: 262). In this sense, a focus on (bio-)regions is 
sometimes proposed in international fora to overcome problems of fit. For instance, 
bioregionalism begins with the rejection of ecologically arbitrary political units, such as 
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counties, provinces, states and nation-states24. Instead, boundaries are defined by 
watersheds, topography, or species composition of ecosystems (Dryzek 2000: 156-157). 
With the emergence of regions as a new unit with shared conceptions of environmental 
problems, new functionally defined areas may emerge (VanDeveer 2004). Another case 
in point is the management of marine resources from an ecosystem-based approach 
(Worm et al. 2006), which is not centered in preserving particular species but, instead, 
in protecting the habitats and biodiversity. 
Indicator question(s) on the generation of neutrality-based resources with the new 
framing of environmental issues in orchestration include: 
 Does the orchestrator discuss and take into account their intermediaries’ definition 
of the main challenges that we face for environmental sustainability? And do those 
definitions use the political map − counties, provinces, states and nation states − or the 
geographic map – ecological boundaries of endemism, topography and watersheds – to 
delimit the subject addressed? 
 To what extent do orchestration outputs develop a framework for action that is 
bioregional and not strictly political-territorial? 
 Is the issue-framing provided by the IO for a given subject perceived as politically 
neutral by the rest of the orchestration actors? 
 Is the IO a recognized orchestrator for the generation and identification for domestic 
information or acting as a clearinghouse on new environmental issues? 
 Is the framing of issues by IOs based on assessments by recognized sources of 
expertise? 
Additionally, a reference may be made to the appropriate territorial frameworks for 
effectively addressing environmental issues. These concern the reassessment of the 
relationships between economic, social, and ecological spaces, which are embedded 
within sustainability politics. In the past half-century, the practice and the study of 
global environmental politics have been dramatically rescaled. They have become 
increasingly complex and interconnected with reference to, the level – between local 
and global – at which they take place, the range of actors engaged in them and the 
linkages between them and nominally non-environmental issues (Andonova and 
Mitchell 2010). Global environmental governance is characterized by an increasing 
segmentation and fragmentation of the governance system across levels and functional 
spheres (Biermann and Pattberg 2008). IOs may contribute to bridging the gap between 
the state failure of lack of regulation and the market failure of decentralized norm-
setting institutions that contribute to fragmentation. Orchestration processes should 
                                                 
24 On the bioregional approach to adaptive (co-)management see Huitema et al. (2009). 
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not only link environmental and economic issues, but also, social and political concerns 
that are normally pushed into the background. 
Indicator question(s) to assess whether IOs foster neutrality-based resources with 
the creation of interlinkages between areas of sustainability politics include: 
 Does the IO embrace the principles of international or regional treaties supporting 
the three pillars of sustainable development, which have been signed by target actors? 
 Has the IO legitimized new synergies between intermediaries and/or target actors, 
who did not previously relate to one another, that reinforce welfare, equity and 
environmental governance for sustainability politics? 
 Does the IO endorse a balanced discourse that considers environmental, economic 
and social aspects of sustainability politics equally important? Or is there an area that 
receives more attention and support in detriment of the rest? 
 Does the IO envisage any correcting mechanisms that may address potential 
negative impacts of orchestration activities affecting some of the pillars of sustainable 
development – economic, environmental or social? 
 Is the IO recognized to contribute to discussions on media coverage, public debate, 
and policy agendas related to the issue(s) on environmental sustainability that 
addresses? 
 Does the IO provide relevant information to its different intermediaries and target 
actors on environmental, equity and welfare issues? 
3.4.2  Involving new actors: IOs as discourse-coalition builders and norm 
entrepreneurs 
A reference may be made to the other two dimensions that contribute to fairness in 
processes for voluntary compliance − introduced in chapter 2 − namely, respect and 
participation (Tyler 1997). Studies in GEG refer to the need of generating respect 
through the involvement of Southern science (Biermann 2001, Gupta, Andresen, et al. 
2012), traditional knowledge actors (Bäckstrand 2003, Long Martello and Jasanoff 2004, 
Crabbe 2012) and affected actors (Stiles 1998, Coombes, Johnson, and Howitt 2012, 
Misiedjan and Gupta 2014). Moreover, some GEG studies point out the need of 
providing participation through the involvement of private actors (Downie 2014a, Green 
2014). Respect is operationalized as the involvement of Southern experts, holders of 
traditional or local knowledge, as well as, affected actors, so that the aforementioned 
become active agents in orchestration processes. The orchestration process has the 
potential to move disadvantaged actors away from being passive recipients of IO 
prescriptions and towards becoming actively engaged actors. In addition, participation 
is operationalized as the involvement of private actors − both for-profit and non-profit, 
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beyond those already enlisted as orchestration intermediaries. Consequently, IOs can 
generate respect and participation procedural resources by fostering the active 
participation of actors that are normally marginalized or by actively seeking that non-
states become meaningfully engaged in orchestration. 
3.4.2.1   Respect as the involvement of South science, traditional knowledge and affected 
actors: IOs as discourse-coalition builders 
The generation of respect in orchestration is a key procedural resource for voluntary 
compliance (Tyler 1997). IOs by linking previously unconnected actors build discourse 
coalitions, understood as, “the ensemble of a set of story lines, the actors that utters 
these story lines, and the practices that conform to these story lines, all organized 
around a discourse” (Hajer 1993: 47) and thus become discourse-coalition builders. South 
science, traditional knowledge holders and those affected actors that are not politically 
organized bring their story lines that reinforce one another and become coalition with a 
structured and coherent discourse. 
Orchestration should be open not only to “big science” or well-organized actors25. It 
is imperative to ensure that every stakeholder has the possibility to engage in 
sustainability politics. First of all, Southern experts and traditional knowledge holders 
should be included in orchestration processes. Science networks are conceptualized as 
participatory and inclusive processes. Science is not only objective but negotiated 
(Gupta, Andresen, et al. 2012). Modern information technologies in policy networks 
offer the potential of improved environmental governance through results-based 
legitimacy and potential broader public participation (Esty and Ivanova 2012). 
Furthermore, the traditional model of expertise used in international institutions faces 
three main shortcomings. 
First of all, only Northern countries control information technologies. “Big science” 
and satellite technologies from the North provide the raw data that needs to be 
transformed into knowledge for environmental governance (Litfin 1998b: 211). Moreover, 
the view about the institutional malignancy or benignancy of a given environmental 
problem is ultimately affected by who is involved in the definition and interpretation of 
such problem (Hajer 1995). Consequently, a balance between specialized expert 
knowledge and broader public participation in science is advisable (Bäckstrand 2006). 
The participation of volunteers and citizen scientists, from both developed and 
developing countries, forges links that can assist in data collection and analysis and, 
ultimately, in ecosystem management and policy development (Crabbe 2012). Therefore, 
                                                 
25 As put by Drori and Meyer, “modern organizations that create massive inequalities are legitimated 
through scientization, yet the same scientific analysis serves to criticize them” (2006: 52). 
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both southern expertise and traditional knowledge may help contrast and correct 
inaccurate data generated by Northern experts. In fact, beyond issues of reduced 
research capacity of developing countries and attempts to strengthen Southern 
participation in global environmental assessments, there is a call for a fundamental 
reform of the way in which science in the North and South is conducted (Biermann 
2000: 21-22, 2001: 300-302). Although states recognize the importance of transferring 
scientific information from developed to developing countries, Northern states are 
viewed, however, as the only science providers and administrators. In practice then, the 
only information providers are Northern states and the only recipients are Southern 
states. For instance, little attention is given to intended audiences − in developing 
countries − of scientific assessments for climate science (Lahsen 2007: 189). In fact, 
international projects could draw on positive experiences, such as the scientific advisory 
bodies set-up by IOs, namely the Global Environmental Assessments (GEAs). Those 
have provided the opportunity for Southern scientists to express and partially address 
their differences about how policy science is conducted (Siebenhüner 2003, 2008, 
Gupta, Andresen, et al. 2012). 
Secondly, there is a general disregard of traditional knowledge, which plays an 
important role in non-industrialized countries. The information required for the 
sustainable use of resources is frequently available as some form of “local knowledge 
and practice” and who controls resources and dispenses gifts in a community is an 
important bit of knowledge that cannot be measured by any technical or scientific 
means (Lipschutz 1996: 42). According to Hobart, as cited by Escobar, “local knowledge 
is considered as a practical, situated activity, constituted by a past, but changing, history 
of practices” (Escobar 1998: 63). Although, by definition, IOs will neither produce nor 
possess such situated knowledge, they can act as a clearinghouse and as a repository of 
such knowledge, which can gain legitimacy and be shared among all stakeholders. As 
put by Jasanoff and Long Martello (2004), knowledge gained from historical experience, 
ancestral myths, long-established social practices, and lay experimentation are not the 
same as knowledge acquired through lab experiments, formal models or 
methodologically disciplined empirical observation. Obviously, lay or indigenous 
knowledge are not better than science. However, “it is the complementarity of diverse 
ways of knowing that provides richness and offers safeguards against the perils of a too 
enthusiastic scientific reductionism” (Jasanoff and Long Martello 2004: 348). 
Finally, as summarized by Lipschutz, [s]cience, by itself, cannot provide a 
community with values; only politics can do that (1996: 44). Science is contested and its 
interpretation context-dependent and, therefore, a common or global understanding of 
what constitutes legitimate difference and how much flexibility ought to be retained for 
local perspectives remains a continuing challenge (Gupta 2004: 143). This is all the more 
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so now, with the proliferation of private organizations whose primary goal is to devise 
transnational rules (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009) based on technical international 
standards in an ever more globalized world. Global policy elites should take local 
complexity seriously and compensate the global gaze constructs that marginalize and 
induce resistance of local actors, by systematically connecting local actors with 
governmental policy makers (Fogel 2004: 122). The diversity of discourses in the South 
embraces from the third world perspectives that question the ‘globalocentric discourse’ 
of biodiversity treaties (Eddy 2005: 96-98) to the progressive Southern NGOs that put 
the emphasis on the consumption habits of the North as main threat to biodiversity 
(Escobar 1998: 59-60), which cast doubt on the notion of individual self-realization 
through exploitation of private property (Eckersley 2005: 178). Consequently, some 
social movements − with access not only to modern technology but also to the language 
of the holders of power (Williams 2000: 253) – may build bridges and engage with 
groups that challenge orthodox environmental governance by keeping a radical message 
of ecology and social justice (Ford 2003: 132-133). 
Indicator question(s) on the creation of respect-based resources with the 
involvement of Southern expertise as well as local and traditional knowledge holders in 
orchestration include: 
 Do IOs make use of local and traditional knowledge as well as Southern expertise for 
project analysis and implementation? 
 Do IOs engage anthropologists or sociologists who take into account the view from 
local social movements and organizations, or only hard scientists and highly 
specialized experts, in project design and development? 
 Do IOs take the subjects raised by southern experts and holders of traditional and 
local knowledge as central problems to be dealt with in orchestration? 
 Do IOs engage the southern experts and holders of traditional and local knowledge in 
international political processes? 
Moreover, local actors – affected by orchestration activities and potential policies − 
are generally marginalized in the implementation of orchestration processes (Wade 
1997, Park 2012). Groups and individuals who are affected by orchestration activities 
should have a voice in the decision-making process. In fact, the IOs that involve such 
affected groups obtain more respect-based resources in orchestration. In the same vein, 
some critical perspectives on global environmental politics – such as eco-socialism and 
green politics – consider that the political responses to environmental challenges must 
be regarded not only as effective and efficient but also need to be considered equitable. 
Those perspectives consider that there remain many inequalities in environmental 
politics. Consequently, as stipulated in the perspective of so-called deep ecology, 
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grassroots resistance is required to create decentralized egalitarian self-reliant 
communities (Paterson 2000: 5). Therefore, in order to ensure equitable access and use, 
the management schemes and decisions must be inclusive and participatory. 
Nonetheless, some concerns have been raised over the limitations of using a discourse 
of participation that is too narrowly defined. For instance, a neoliberal approach to 
conservation in developing countries understands biodiversity as a commodity that 
favors a market citizenship and at the same time reduces the fulfilling of participation to 
only one’s ability to pay (Ervine 2010). Therefore, attention must be paid to giving voice 
to affected actors of IO orchestration for GEG. Thus, any attempts to change the rules 
and roles addressed in orchestration will require the efforts and cooperation of all the 
affected actors in order to avoid defections. Consequently, political solidarity and the 
creation of mutual social obligations among stakeholders is needed (Lipschutz 1996: 43). 
In the last few decades only, has the discourse on the participation of affected 
people entered the global environmental agenda. In addition, further actions aimed at 
bolstering the principle of participation are still required. In fact, the violations of 
indigenous peoples’ rights remain among the most frequent causes of conflict over IOs’ 
development projects. For instance, in the case of Mexico, only a tiny fraction of the 
World Bank’s vast indigenous-related portfolio can be considered to have even 
nominally applied the key operational directive 4.20 mandate for “informed 
participation” by beneficiaries in all phases of the project cycle (Fox and Brown 1998: 
519). In fact, some concerns have been expressed by human geographers who recognize 
the diversity of motivations within the category of “indigenous movements”. In fact, 
some movements avoid being conflated with those that consider indigenous and local as 
tantamount, and thus, stereotypes them as victims of environmental management. 
According to the view, indigenous groups engage in complex negotiations to access 
their rights, which reinforces the recognition of their diversity (Coombes, Johnson, and 
Howitt 2012). Thus, existing positive experiences that include sometimes marginalized 
groups, such as women, youth, and indigenous people, can serve as a starting point for 
improvement and streamlining. 
Indicator question(s) to assess whether IOs foster respect-based resources with the 
inclusion of affected targets in orchestration include: 
 Do IOs reinforce the principle of sovereignty for the benefit of a powerful minority or 
an exclusive commercial group of multinationals? 
 Do IOs pay attention to the claims of affected target actors by including them in the 
project design and development of orchestration? 
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 Do IOs ensure the launch of a forum where affected target actors can communicate 
and exchange views with other relevant actors and influence the orchestration 
process? 
 How has the participation of orchestration intermediaries and target actors evolved 
in international negotiations, public-private partnerships, international conferences, 
international fora and lobbying activities? 
3.4.2.2 Participation as the involvement of non-states: IOs as norm entrepreneurs 
The generation of a participative context in orchestration is key for voluntary 
compliance (Tyler 1997). It is necessary that both profit and non-profit actors are able to 
engage in orchestration for sustainability politics. Norm entrepreneurs are those actors 
that “advocating a minority position use international norms to strengthen their 
position in domestic debates” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 893). In this case, IOs 
advocate the minority position of actors such as not-for-profit organizations. 
The direct participation of civil society enhances the institutional legitimacy, the 
deliberation and the effectiveness of orchestration for sustainability politics. Thus, it is 
not surprising that participatory models are increasingly adopted as a global response 
for climate change and other pressing challenges (Abbott and Gartner 2012). In fact, 
NGOs are distinctive entities with important skills and resources to deploy in the 
process of orchestration. Non-states can be classified into two categories, namely non-
profit organizations, such as NGOs and philanthropic foundations; and for-profit 
organizations such as corporations (Tienhaara 2014). According to Reinalda (2001: 37), 
non-state actors play three main roles. First, as pressure groups, non-state actors strive 
for interest representation through lobbying and consultation. Secondly, as private 
actors, non-states ensure that ignored issues are put on the agenda and ensure 
implementation of international policies. Finally, as social movements, non-state actors 
remain agents of transformation. Rather than undermining state sovereignty, active 
NGO participation enhances the abilities of (Northern) states to regulate globally 
(Raustiala 1997).  
An important point in relation to NGO participation is that, in many international 
institutions, an imbalanced representation of civil society by NGOs is prevalent as most 
NGOs that can afford to participate in international decision-making processes are 
based in northern, OECD countries (Oberthür et al. 2003: 12). This reality also 
reproduces in the local contexts, where civil society is not so well organized. 
Consequently, as Woods has pointed out, a reference must be made to the need for a 
more universal set of members when opening up IOs for non-state actors’ participation, 
otherwise the risk that institutions will simply increase access to representatives of US-
based and European-based NGO groups exists (1999). In addition, as there are cultural 
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and ideological differences among the environmentalists that coordinate global actions, 
it is therefore crucial that the United Nations system becomes a vehicle for 
strengthening the diverse voices of environmentalism (Conca 1996: 116-117). A significant 
cooperation for environmental management is found between multinational companies 
and their countries of origin, specifically, in the case of North-Western Europe 
(Zoeteman and Harkink 2012). However, in the case for Southern countries, a 
“countervailing power” exercised by environmental civil-society organizations is 
necessary to enhance the performance of national environmental policies. In developing 
countries, curbing the negative aspects of economic globalization needs to be addressed 
through context-specific approaches, as well as, developing efforts towards sustainable 
development and poverty alleviation (Opschoor 2012). In Southern countries, leaving 
industrialization to private enterprise is tantamount to leaving it in the hands of foreign 
enterprise. In such countries, the state is primarily the instrument of the elites (Evans 
1970: 341). Then, state actions that evidence the interests of the general population may 
have to rely on cooperation with IOs and NGOs. 
Furthermore, initiatives involving for-profits as target actors cover a wide range of 
policy processes, such as voluntary accords, standard setting, benchmarking, peer 
review, informal agreements and certification schemes. In voluntary agreements, NGOs 
assume a relatively high level of reputational risk when cooperating with businesses, 
particularly, when outputs do not rely on the external and independent verification 
(Tully 2004). In spite of that, one study indicates that the for-profits that take part in 
such initiatives are at a higher risk of becoming targets of NGO campaigns than those 
for-profits that do not (King and McDonnell 2015). For this reason, IOs should 
contribute to putting the light on those for-profits that are not still “under-the-radar” 
and thus they are not yet subject to public scrutiny. However, it is no easy task for IOs, 
acting as orchestrators, to engage for-profits in cooperation. In fact, as stated by 
Andonova and Levy, “[o]ne tangible sign of how inhospitable the constellation of 
interests may be can be observed by looking at the large number of industry-led 
initiatives that opted not to associate with the formal WSSD process [in Johannesburg 
2002] process at all. [Instead] [u]nder the auspices of the Business Action for Sustainable 
Development, 95 partnership initiatives were announced in the lead up to the WSSD.” 
(2003: 30). For-profits, acting as target actors, provide orchestration with the expertise 
for regulation26, the minimization of resistance from decision-makers and 
implementation actors and, the stability across time of norm implementation in case 
that legislative power changes (Héritier 2002). The participation of industry can be 
strengthened through IO orchestration in cooperation with other non-state actors. As 
                                                 
26 Non-states represent what is labeled as private authority (Pattberg 2007). 
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companies become more proactive rather than defensive, they move beyond the 
compliance stage and go from a policy-taker role only to also embrace a policy-
developer role. Some have referred to this evolution in terms of a shift from 
environmental protection to resource management (Utting 2002, 2015). 
Indicator question(s) to assess whether IOs bolster participation-based resources 
with the inclusion of non-state actors in orchestration include: 
 Do IOs include and make use of the expertise from non-profit and for-profits in 
orchestration? 
 Do IOs facilitate the participation of private actors − both profit and non-profit − in 
decision-making processes, such as the set up of objectives, the assessment and the 
monitoring?  
 Do IOs encourage the cooperation between governmental actors and non-states 
actors for joint policy-making? 
 How has the participation of actors, such as environmental NGOs, business 
associations, and private corporations evolved in orchestration due to the work of 
the IO? 
3.5 Assessing the influence of orchestration: Conclusions and summary 
This chapter has classified orchestration approaches into two categories − in terms of 
who is the orchestration initiator, namely delegated orchestration from states to IOs – 
persuasion − and informal orchestration that is entrepreneurially started by IOs − social 
leverage, and has developed the framework to assess the influence of the two 
approaches of IOs’ orchestration for GEG. 
The following table summarizes the different orchestration approaches for GEG27. 
                                                 
27 High or low goal divergence is a heuristic distinction. Empirical evidence shows that we can find 
medium goal divergence, which is a term not used by Abbott and colleagues (2015b). 
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Table 3.3 Relevant differences across orchestration approaches28 
 
In order to assess IOs’ influence, a two-step evaluation process is followed. First of all, it 
is necessary to identify the orchestration outputs by IOs, namely organizational, policy-
based, discursive and voluntary outputs. IOs draw from procedural resources to 
generate orchestration outputs. Both procedural resources and outputs serve for the 
assessment of IO orchestration influence. This research assesses the influence on target 
actors rather than the change in the behavior of states. Thus, the concept of influence is 
far more encompassing than outcome as change of behavior. The framework developed 
in this chapter 3 allows for research parsimony, as it operationalizes influence as outputs 
– organizational, policy-based, discursive and voluntary − and procedural resources 
through the ability to legitimize new roles for orchestration actors – such as social 
accountability, new issue-framing and interlinkages − and the capacity to involve new 
orchestration actors − such as affected actors, southern experts and traditional 
knowledge holders as well as non-state actors. This study assumes that procedural 
resources are a necessary condition for the delivery of visible outputs in orchestration. 
The next table 3.4 presents a summary of the analytical framework and it summarizes 
the criteria, dimensions and corresponding indicator-questions used for its 
development that refer to the particular case of environmental sustainability politics. 
                                                 
28 Own elaboration based on Abbott and colleagues (2015b). Medium goal divergence is a term not 
used by Abbott and colleagues (2015b). This term refers to orchestration processes that may arise 
originally from state-initiated orchestration processes, yet goal divergence evolves from low to medium 
in at least a subset of states, then an IO-initiated orchestration process may emerge and coincide with 
a previous state-initiated orchestration process. 
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4. Persuasion vs. social leverage in sustainability politics: 
Assessing orchestration influence through an expert survey 
This chapter tests the influence of orchestration approaches by IOs introduced in 
chapters 2 and 3. This survey builds on the assumption that treaty secretariats (TSCs), 
tightly overseen by states, primarily engage in orchestration through delegation and 
enlisted public intermediaries. By contrast, a multipurpose organization (MPO) due its 
institutional set-up – a medium to large bureaucracy with diverse competencies – can 
gain more leeway from states to endorse private intermediaries for social leverage. 
While some organizations are capable to enroll in both approaches – such as MPOs 
– some rely only on persuasion – TSCs. The underlying assumption is that different 
orchestration approaches affect IO influence. Therefore, this survey addresses TSCs’ 
influence that rely on public partners as intermediaries and, MPOs’ influence that 
engage with private intermediaries in broader collaborative arrangements. Thus, this 
study differentiates between IOs that join in one, or instead, more than one 
orchestration approach. As broad membership initiatives are, by and large, praised for 
providing more legitimate results in environmental sustainability politics (Pattberg and 
Widerberg 2016), it is plausible to expect that MPOs capable of engaging a wider set of 
actors, both public and private, will be more valued by experts. Besides, as states in 
traditional intergovernmental politics can easily block the process through their veto 
power, it is considered that governance by IOs is more effective when engaging a wider 
group of stakeholders including non-states as intermediaries (Ruggie 2007, Abbott et al. 
2015a, Tsutsui and Lim 2015). If it is assumed that orchestration through private 
intermediaries – social leverage – is more influential, then surveyed MPOs should 
receive better assessments than TSCs. 
Nevertheless, evidence cautions against simple generalizations about the positive or 
negative outcomes of new forms of collaborative governance (Utting 2014). Inclusive 
and broad membership initiatives may be hard to steer and ineffective when 
accountability standards are high, such as implementation partnerships (Steets 2010); or 
conversely, when these are criticized for their low accountability (Wolf 2002, 
Soederberg 2007, Costa, Botelho, and Costa 2013). In that event, since there is no 
conclusive data that confirms or rejects those statements, conducting such a survey 
becomes fundamental. The expert survey applies the research framework from chapter 
3. The sample includes an approximately equal number of both TSCs and MPOs, which 
are evaluated in reference to their capacity to generate outputs and procedural 
resources. This chapter includes an analysis of the best-assessed organizations and 
discusses if there is empirical evidence of an a priori potential competitive advantage of 
environmmental MPOs over environmental TSCs. 
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The next section introduces TSCs and MPOs in a general sense and briefly outlines 
the characteristics of the nine surveyed agencies. Following this, the expert survey 
methodology and results are presented and discussed in comparative terms – TSCs 
versus MPOs, MPO versus MPO and, TSC versus TSC. The last section presents a 
summary of the results. 
4.1 IOs in global sustainability politics: Surveyed agencies 
This section presents international agencies, namely, TSCs and MPOs, as the object of 
the expert survey29. 
4.1.1 Persuaders for global sustainability politics: Treaty secretariats 
Empirical evidence supports that not all IOs have similar resources and autonomy from 
states (Bauer, Busch, and Siebenhüner 2009). This study assumes that treaty secretariats 
(TSCs) are those agencies that due to their institutional set-up predominantly have 
access to formal orchestration and persuasion as their main orchestration approach. 
4.1.1.1 Membership 
First, when states delegate orchestration functions to TSCs, these enlist a small and 
exclusive membership group of intermediaries that are tightly overseen by states. TSCs 
engage civil servants in specific ministries or transgovernmental networks and other IOs 
that contribute to persuasion. Elite representatives in key ministries or 
transgovernmental networks are often brokered by TSCs as a shortcut to the 
top‐echelons of the national government. These networks are usually composed of 
policy experts that command important governance resources such as technical 
expertise and access to top national decision‐makers. The persuader contributes to 
modifying target aspirations in issue areas where those targets are generally newcomers. 
TSCs gather and organize data to be published as a list that classifies leaders and 
laggards among countries for issues of the IO’s interest (Barnett and Finnemore 2004c: 
31-34). Persuasion takes place when the TSC’s reports highlight the best-classified states, 
which act as the group of reference. What the TSC defines as a modern, democratic and 
economically efficient public sector becomes a driving force for domestic elites’ 
willingness to adopt the policies suggested by persuaders. IOs – and particularly TSCs’ 
activities – provide visibility for that reference group of national bureaucrats that 
support norm diffusion (March and Olsen 1998: 961). Hence, target actors adopt – by 
voluntary membership – the prescribed policy to become part of the “civilized 
international society” even in the case that it is not regarded as necessary (Finnemore 
                                                 
29The organizations’ object of the survey are the ones studied in the MANUS Project (cf. Biermann et 
al. 2009); all nine are internationally recognized organizations. 
85 
 
1993, Busch 2009b). For instance, TSCs support developing countries during the 
creation of environmental administrations (Bauer, Andresen, and Biermann 2012)30 and 
development of environmental reports diffused across different countries (Busch 
2009b). 
4.1.1.2 Franchise 
In formal orchestration for global environmental politics, franchise lies primarily on 
public actors providing and exchanging expertise. Capacity building projects organized 
by environmental TSCs to states involves workshops and training programs. Only a 
small number of external accredited experts by the TSC provide the expertise in such 
missions as a way of outsourcing authority (Cooley 2010). The officers deployed by the 
international agency for the implementation of international agreements are introduced 
as international experts. In the formal orchestration initiated by states and implemented 
by TSCs, the emphasis remains on lending to individual states and therefore the design 
of implementation projects is subject to privileging political geography (Shafer and 
Murphy 1998: 263). An illustrative case in point is a technical paper on biological 
diversity, informed by the biodiversity secretariat,  that defines species endemism as 
“the existence of species unique to a single country” (Shafer and Murphy 1998; italics 
added). This definition posits thus species endemism in political rather than ecological 
terms, applying authority ineffectively (Gutner 2010).  
4.1.1.3 Decision-making 
Delegating orchestration to TSCs entails previous consensus on orchestration action 
and plans. Persuasion through state elites involves providing prescriptive rather than 
analytical data to argue for adopting decisions. TSCs engage transgovernmental 
networks (Slaughter and Hale 2011) that intermediate with their respective states to 
develop institutions considered desirable in their domestic contexts. Thus, as way of 
social proof, states set up a given policy and mimic the behavior of a valued in-group. 
Because reaching consensus among different actors is not an easy task, TSCs facilitate 
that science participates actively in environmental negotiations, for reasons of either 
expertise or high transaction costs. Specifically, epistemic communities contribute to 
consensual knowledge for international cooperation (Haas 1992, Cross 2013). From the 
early times of the first UN environmental conferences, science has been granted a 
prominent role in sustainability politics. A current case is climate change, with its 
prominent scientific advisory body, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
In spite of that, for some analysts, the role of science and technologies has taken so 
                                                 
30The UN offers and promotes a blueprint to establish environmental sustainability commissions by 
creating the UN Commission on Environmental Sustainability. 
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much relevance to the point that mega-science contributes to green governmentality 
(Litfin 1998a, Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006). Technology-based programs by TSCs 
contribute to monitoring the environment and feed institutions, such as the IPCC. Such 
expert organizations have demonstrated they can evolve in the face of international 
divisions and external criticisms to allocate statements of epistemic authority that 
contribute to the democratization of global environmental expertise (Beck and Forsyth 
2015). 
4.1.1.4 Mandate 
As orchestrators, TSCs are eager to disseminate the benefits of their expertise and act as 
conveyor belts for the transmission of norms and models of good political behavior31. 
The TSC’s mandate consists in putting forward policy-related and binding outcomes 
while states tightly oversee the process. Through technical assistance, TSCs engage 
national officials and persuade states to change their policies, their laws, and their 
regional arrangements, thus helping to constitute state interests and policies (Barnett 
and Finnemore 2004d: 164, Gutner 2012). Besides, TSCs provide assistance to state elites 
on how to implement the treaty at the national level by the publication of best practice 
examples, guidelines and compilations of existing political and legal responses and 
administrative practices. In this way, TSCs orchestrate missions and workshops that 
offer strong suggestions about the types of technical tools and needs for governments to 
understand and manage the environmental issues to be addressed. An example is the 
setup of “ozone units” for the implementation of the ozone regime (Bauer 2009b). 
Likewise, TSCs have supported key actors in the convention by developing adequate 
implementation procedures and systems (Siebenhüner 2009). In the case of climate 
change, the TSC has developed the methodologies for greenhouse gas emission 
inventories, has designed a computer-based registry and transaction log to make the 
emissions trading system work, and has helped the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) executive board to create feasible assessment procedures (Busch 2009a). 
4.1.1.5 Autonomy 
The autonomy of TSCs is medium in formal orchestration processes, as TSCs’ mandates 
are directly delegated from states. States agree on delegating functions to orchestrators 
especially when goal divergence is low, then states exert ex ante oversight. TSCs use 
their autonomy through public intermediaries in order to promote policy commitments. 
In the absence of formal obligations, TSCs are able to specify time frames and establish 
supervision mechanisms, two important elements of hard law but still qualifying as a 
                                                 
31Officials in international organizations often stress that part of their mission is to spread, inculcate, 
and enforce global values and norms (Barnett and Finnemore 2004b). 
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voluntary mechanism. The autonomy enjoyed by the United Nations secretariat in the 
General Assembly has made it possible to set a UN declaration with a specified time 
frame and to establish supervisory mechanisms in the spread of national environmental 
strategies (Busch and Jörgens 2005). Besides, the introduction of third party monitoring 
in multilateral agreements and, the setting up of programs with long-implementation 
periods has allowed TSCs to develop mechanisms to gain some autonomy from states. 
The procedural components for environmental assessment and monitoring are routinely 
included in virtually all multilateral environmental agreements (Bauer 2009c: 184-185). 
Finally, TSCs mainly orchestrate through persuasion. Yet, exceptions reflect the cases of 
long-established environmental conventions that monitor the compliance of mainly 
Southern states (Tallberg et al. 2013). 
4.1.2 Treaty secretariats surveyed 
The four following TSCs are included in the survey and are here briefly introduced: 
ozone secretariat, climate secretariat, biodiversity secretariat and desertification 
secretariat. 
The ozone secretariat32 within the United Nations Environment Programme, is the 
secretariat considered to be one of the major successes in international environmental 
politics (Bauer 2009b: 225, Downie 2014b). Despite its small size, the secretariat has 
contributed to the overall performance of the regime, given the technical specificity of 
the ozone problem and the advanced institutional arrangements that result from it. The 
ozone secretariat makes a difference in dealing with expert knowledge in a manner that 
affects the international ozone discourse (Bauer 2009b: 226). Even if considered a 
success, new reported emissions evidence that ozone-depleting substances contrary to 
the intentions behind the Montreal Protocol need to be dealt with (Laube et al. 2014) as 
well as contradictions between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols (Oberthür, Dupont, 
and Matsumoto 2011). 
The climate secretariat33 deals with one of the most ambitious treaties ever adopted, 
whose ultimate objective is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system (Busch 
2009a: 245). In 1992, governments adopted the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (climate convention), in 1997 the Kyoto protocol, which specifies the 
legally binding reduction targets for greenhouse emissions in developed countries with 
the 2001 Marrakech Accords that lay down the implementation rules for the Kyoto 
                                                 
32Formally, the secretariat of the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and 
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. 
33Formally, named the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
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Protocol (Busch 2009a: 245) and finally the Paris Agreement that entered into force in 
2016 to keep a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above 
pre-industrial levels. The secretariat supports cooperative action by states to combat 
climate change and its influence on humanity and ecosystems, which is a rather 
fragmented and complex institutional regime (Stripple and Pattberg 2010, van Asselt 
2011, Faure and Lefevere 2014, Betsill 2014). Besides, next to intergovernmental 
negotiations, a wide array of new mechanisms have been built (Bulkeley et al. 2014, 
Widerberg and Pattberg 2015) that impact the climate governance architecture. 
The biodiversity secretariat34 administers the Convention that entered into force in 
1993 and addresses the challenges of the massive human induced loss of biodiversity35. 
Its creation is considered one of the major achievements of the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This convention pioneers the 
integration of nature conservation and economic use of biodiversity. For that reason, 
parties to the convention not only commit to the sustainable use of biological diversity 
but also to the fair and equitable share of the benefits arising from genetic resources 
(Siebenhüner 2009: 265-266, Rosendal 2014). The secretariat provides support for 
implementation by facilitating negotiations, granting information, and monitoring 
(Siebenhüner 2009: 266), in addition to managing regime conflicts (Jungcurt 2011) and 
synergies. In fact, this secretariat has strategically managed the link between 
biodiversity and climate change issues (Jinnah 2011, 2014). At the same time, the 
secretariat has not made provisions for emerging issues including the biophysical 
impacts of the rapid expansion of biofuels such as land-use change to become part of 
the regime (Galaz et al. 2012). 
The desertification secretariat36 has its origin in 1977 with UNEP’s call up for the UN 
Conference on Desertification in response to the major drought and subsequent famine 
that hit the Sahel in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Bauer 2009a: 293-294). The 
secretariat is eager to promote the desertification convention as “the sustainable 
development convention” and thus to consider it a development convention and an 
instrument to fight poverty in the developing world (Bauer 2009a: 293, Kannan 2014). 
Such complex task is reflected in the institutional setting of the desertification regime 
that involves various UN agencies, regional institutions and a diverse set of banks 
(Bauer 2009a; 293-295). The desertification convention has not fully developed its 
implementation potential. The fact that the secretariat’s agenda has focused 
                                                 
34Formally, named the Secretariat of the 1992 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. 
35Loss that exceeds the natural rate by about fifty to one hundred times over the past decades (Pimm et 
al 1995, cited in Siebenhüner 2009: 265). 
36Formally, named the Secretariat of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in 
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa. 
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disproportionately on linkages to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) has not helped either (Conliffe 2011). 
4.1.3 Social leveragers for global sustainability politics: Multipurpose organizations 
Multipurpose organizations (MPOs) refer to those organizations that due to their 
institutional set-up have access to formal and informal orchestration approaches. They 
are also called “super-orchestrators” (Abbott and Hale 2014). 
4.1.3.1 Mandate 
Social leverage is the approach used by an MPO that draws on entrepreneurial agency. 
First, the MPO enlists for social leverage a large and inclusive membership group of 
private actors. The control by states is less constraining – ex post – than in persuasion 
and the goal divergence among states opens windows of opportunities for MPOs. When 
MPOs engage in orchestration for environmental governance, without previous 
delegation of functions by states, the process is best described with the social leverage 
approach. Partnerships seek to break areas of stalled intergovernmental cooperation 
into more manageable pieces. In this way, MPOs involve the resources and expertise of 
state and non-state actors, that build from narrow to flexible and expandable policy 
coalitions (Andonova 2017), such as transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 
1998). The MPO as a social leverager provides a public forum where targets’ behavior is 
made visible to the public opinion. Target actors identify with a reference group and 
comply because social rewards and punishments come from a recognized authority. 
Thus, MPOs in social leverage grant social rewards and punishments to strive for their 
objectives. MPOs enlist non-governmental organizations, transnational partnerships 
and business actors that contribute as intermediaries to social leverage. The relationship 
between IOs and private actors has evolved to the point that for instance UN 
organizations have engaged active non-state actors such as INGOs for monitoring 
functions and implementation (Tamiotti and Finger 2001). Moreover, nongovernmental 
meetings have been celebrated immediately preceding or coterminous often with those 
strictly governmental international summmits (Caldwell 1996: 63). In fact, 
entrepreneurial orchestration often exists in tandem with other public arrangements 
(Green 2014). The Johannesburg 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD), contributed to the search of new mechanisms about voluntary non-binding 
implementation mechanisms that do not center on national governments as main 
cooperation partners (Biermann et al. 2007, Andonova 2009)37. More recently, Rio+20 
has proved the most numerous mega summit with more than 44 000 participants 
                                                 
37The projects dealt with one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) or one of the WEHAB 
areas (water, energy, health, agriculture and biodiversity). 
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(Biermann 2013), which has established an “inclusive and transparent intergovernmental 
process on sustainable development goals that is open to all stakeholders to be agreed 
by the General Assembly” (para. 248 The Future We Want). Numerous “voluntary 
commitments” and additional public–private partnerships are some of the most 
remarkable outcomes of Rio+20 (Pattberg and Mert 2013). For instance, in areas such as 
climate and water governance (Gupta 2012, Misiedjan and Gupta 2014) the importance 
of involving indigenous communities for successfully implementing sustainable 
development projects has been shown. 
4.1.3.2 Franchise 
In informal orchestration for environmental governance, enlisted intermediaries hold 
knowledge in some area that becomes valuable franchise for the initiative. The social 
leverage approach in global environmental politics calls for influential and equitable 
burden-sharing imperatives by increasing transparency and civic participation in 
international project implementation. Target actors perceive intermediaries, such as 
domestic NGOs, to be less intrusive than an MPO, needless to say, than a state. This 
may facilitate the acceptance of voluntary self-reporting on the MPO objectives 
monitored by intermediaries. Hence, not-for-profit actors play a key intermediary role 
for orchestration in environmental sustainability politics (Tamiotti and Finger 2001, 
Andonova and Levy 2003, Biermann and Pattberg 2012). Non-profits share with MPOs 
the concern for independence from state control and at the same time control key 
governance resources that international organizations lack. MPOs not only enlist actors 
with different expertise, but also intermediaries that share different views of what the 
problem is to analyze the context. This requires to bear in mind that “[t]he best 
organizations for developing regulations are those whose activities caused the harm in 
the first place. A focus must be placed on those organizations that have direct links to 
desired actions and outcomes” (Underdal 1994: 159). In fact, while the overwhelming 
majority of some 60,000 multinationals are based in the advanced economies of 
developed countries, developing countries play host to the operational activities of these 
firms and receive the ecological consequences of those and their some 500,000 
subsidiaries (Graham and Woods 2006: 868). Then, MPOs contribute to environmental 
governance through the call and organization of partnerships with new perspectives. 
4.1.3.3 Decision-making 
MPOs enlist non-profits that start activities to pressure target actors to conform. 
Intermediaries become empowered by MPOs who amplify the public attention received 
through orchestration. Getting the public attention, and thus integrating a wider 
audience to participate, allows intermediaries to influence the decisions of target actors. 
Social leverage by MPOs is an alternative to intergovernmental diplomacy in global 
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environmental politics that is at the expense of Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration. Principle 21 on state sovereignty over resources is considered the 
foundational norm of international environmental law38. This in practice means that 
states can put the brakes for binding regulation when they consider that conflicting 
interests for environmental issues arise. Instead, through orchestration target actors – 
not necessarily states – may change their behavior in response to the indirect effects, for 
instance, bad reputation. Due to the information provided by orchestrators, a majority 
of citizens may think of penalizing the bad-reputed target actor. Therefore, 
orchestration may influence the behavior of citizens in a globalized setting (Spaargaren 
and Mol 2012). In turn, citizen social pressure influences target actors. Decision-making 
procedures relate in this case to majority voting as opposed to consensus building. 
Consumers may “exercise their vote” by not buying a certain product of the targeted 
actor. Therefore, the target actor’s bad reputation entails social pressure to conform. 
While businesses seem less beholden to state control, they have become more 
concerned with brand, image and reputation as assets to gain customer loyalty, 
stakeholder support and regulatory freedom (Meyer, Pope, and Isaacson 2015). 
Reputation as an asset has meant that for-profits have become more committed to 
impression management tactics, such as philanthropic activity and improving firm 
environmental standards. All this contributes to gaining stakeholder approval, which 
brings them to engage in partnerships to escape future activist targeting, while also 
benefiting from the shine of prosocial actions (King and McDonnell 2015).  
4.1.3.4 Mandate 
Fourth, MPOs are responsible for setting agendas, making rules, implementation, 
enforcement, as well as evaluating and monitoring (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). In 
the case of global environmental governance, MPOs’ mandate for informal orchestration 
entails information sharing, benchmarking activities and best-practice implementation. 
Largely, MPOs as initiators and their non-profit intermediaries do not rely on achieving 
binding regulation, but on generating social rewards and punishments for target actors. 
Even if the outputs for social leverage are not binding, voluntary commitments can 
present some features of binding agreements. Voluntary commitments deliver 
measurable objectives – at least one being tangible, with an assigned budget, that 
provides accessible transparent information for its follow-up and with an estimated 
timeline for completion (UNCSD 2012). Non-binding policy recommendations that have 
been formulated and adopted in the form of political declarations and internationally 
agreed principles, lack any sanctioning mechanisms or deadlines. Yet they can be used 
                                                 
38Besides, Principle 23 of the Stockholm Declaration leaves no doubt that country interests and values 
may not be constrained by international institutions with a special mention made to developing states. 
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to unfold influence on national environmental policies. MPOs together with domestic 
interest groups may exert normative pressure on national governments to comply 
(Busch and Jörgens 2005). Besides, non-binding agreements may contribute that other 
initiatives emerge at the margin of intergovernmental processes.  
MPOs, as social leveragers, orchestrate the development and release of studies, 
identify best practices and make target activities visible in a public forum, so that 
intermediaries can grant social rewards or punishments accordingly. For instance, the 
creation of departments in private businesses for corporate social reporting is in some 
cases a consequence of the endorsement by MPOs such as UNEP and CERES (Coalition 
for Environmentally Responsible Economies) of initiatives including the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) (Szejnwald Brown, de Jong, and Lessidrenska 2009, Szejnwald 
Brown 2011) or the Equator Principles (Andonova 2009). Those initiatives are an 
example of how MPOs have gained some soft and indirect regulatory control over 
subnational private actors and public actors (Abbott et al. 2013). Despite the above, 
there are firms that fly under-the-radar, which are not the centers of activist boycotts. 
Thus, they have fewer incentives to engage in corporate social responsibility. Therefore, 
social leveragers should share information on those firms and prompt them to engage in 
desirable objectives so that they do not go away with irresponsible behavior. In those 
cases, private actors are encouraged to engage in such mechanisms because: first, 
indirect economic material benefits are involved – market access, price premiums, 
second, because of moral suasion – the right thing to do – or last, because it has become 
an accepted and understandable practice (Cashore 2002: 511). 
4.1.3.5 Autonomy 
Last, even if entrepreneurial MPOs start informal orchestration, MPO autonomy is 
limited. Social leverage by MPOs depends on a wide spectrum of private intermediaries. 
MPOs as social leveragers are beholden to their private intermediaries. Orchestrators 
have to consider non-profit intermediaries and respond to, if they want to enlist them in 
orchestration. By contrast, persuasion is more direct as it depends on a limited number 
of public intermediaries. In fact, MPOs are subject to critics from non-profits that may 
turn intermediaries for orchestration. For instance, the so-called Bretton Woods 
institutions have been under-the-radar of activist organizations39. Many infrastructure 
projects financed by the World Bank Group have social and environmental implications 
and non-state criticism has centered on the ethical issues of funding such projects. As a 
                                                 
39 A “cultural change” should precede changes toward the new desired goals of some MPOs. For 
instance, “[A]s long as meeting lending targets – that is, approving large amounts of money speedily, 
which is the yardstick for advancing careers at the World Bank- the well-intentioned, competent and 
sometimes brave World Bank staff who work hard to implement the Bank’s stated goals of poverty 
reduction and environmental protection, will remain at a definite disadvantage” (Horta 1996: 146-147). 
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response to the concerns raised, the World Bank has created an environmental 
department, which has contributed to the change of identity of some departments 
within the World Bank Group (Park 2012). Other examples include the UNEP that has 
moved in recent times to the direction of becoming more an implementing MPO in 
global environmental governance after state and non-state interactions (Bauer 2009c: 
177). To the challenge of having a limited autonomy – because MPOs are not formally 
entitled by states to orchestrate – adds the pursuit of attracting and dealing with many 
diverse stakeholders and interests as evidenced in the North-South divide. 
4.1.4 Multipurpose organizations surveyed 
Five MPOs are included in the survey and briefly introduced: The World Bank, the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF), the environment directorate of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 
The World Bank in its formal mandate is not an environmental organization as such 
although it represents a prominent case of an international organization active in 
environmental politics (Freestone 2013). The World Bank includes the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development 
Association (IDA). Not to be confused with the World Bank Group that comprises those 
two aforementioned plus the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). Established at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, the 
World Bank is one of the largest international organizations today with 8,800 staff 
located in Washington DC or in one of the more than one hundred offices worldwide, 
whose mandate is to assist with the reconstruction and development in regions less 
developed or disrupted by war (Marschinski and Behrle 2009: 101). Environmental 
sustainability and environmental protection became a policy goal for this organization 
in 1987 with the establishment of the environment department shortly along with the 
launch of “core” environment projects “to prevent and mitigate undue harm to people 
and their environment in the development process” (Marschinski and Behrle 2009: 101-
102, Buntaine 2014). 
The World Bank is an organization with 10,00040 members of staff with an annual 
administrative budget of one billion USD (Marschinski and Behrle 2009: 101). At first 
sight, the ability to issue loans of around USD 20 billion per year may seem to provide 
the World Bank with an incomparable position to influence its clients. However, the 
green environmental projects of the World Bank are mostly funded by relatively small 
                                                 
40 Staff based in either Washington DC or in one of the more than 100 country offices. 
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grants (Marschinski and Behrle 2009: 119). Nonetheless, the World Bank’s financial 
influence spills directly over the investment decisions of other financers that complete 
the partial funding provided after the World Bank’s project approval. This organization 
cooperates regularly on the ground with governments as a capacity-builder, as it 
influences national policies through advisory activities related to the development of 
legal and institutional capacities. The World Bank has also contributed to the 
development of best practices that may turn into standard setting for private lending 
institutions, closer to the social leverage approach, as it is the case of the Equator 
Principles (Marschinski and Behrle 2009: 111-114). Finally, the World Bank has also used 
mechanisms different from orchestration that rely on material incentives to directly 
influence targets. Some conditionality to receive soft loans has implied developing 
National and Environmental Action Plans and, environmental and human rights 
safeguard policies to which the borrower must agree to obtain the funding41.  
The United Nations Environment Programmed (UNEP) is one of the main outputs of 
the first United Nations Conference on the Environment celebrated in Stockholm in 
1972. Legally, it is not an international organization as it is a subordinate entity of the 
considerably larger United Nations Organization. This obviously translates into a lower 
degree of autonomy compared to other organizations (Ivanova 2010). This specifically 
affects the capacity for the organization to collect funds that rely on member states’ 
voluntary contributions. UNEP was established in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1973 as an anchor 
institution within the UN family to coordinate global environmental governance 
architecture (Ivanova 2012). UNEP’s role consists in the systematic implementation of 
environmental accords as a leading global environmental authority that sets the global 
environmental agenda, to promote coherent implementation and to advocate for the 
environment (Bauer 2009c: 169). UNEP has played a chief role in the facilitation of a 
number of multilateral environmental agreements, in the promotion of international 
environmental law and general awareness and knowledge on environmental issues 
(Bauer 2009c: 169). In 2012, following the Rio+20 meeting, the UN General Assembly has 
upgraded and strengthened the UNEP Governing Council from 58 to 193 member states 
with the promise of enhanced funding (O'Neill 2014a: 32-33). 
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is a multilateral funding mechanism that 
serves as the financial mechanism for four environmental conventions: the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, and the UN Convention to Combat 
Desertification. It was established in the early 1990s to assist developing countries to 
                                                 
41 Conditionalities are not considered for the sake of this study as an orchestration approach as the 
motivation for abiding by a norm relies in a direct exchange of a financial compensation. 
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address global environmental problems, and restructured in 1994 after criticisms from 
nongovernmental organizations and developing countries on its centralized structure 
and closeness to the World Bank. The GEF receives its funds from countries committed 
to assist developing countries and then channels funds to eligible projects, which are 
designed and executed by the three implementing agencies, namely, the UN 
Development Programme, the UN Environment Programme and the World Bank 
(Andler 2009: 203). GEF is lauded as an example of cooperation among international 
agencies, due to its capability to learn and adapt, to give recipient countries significant 
voice in its decision-making processes and to incorporate NGOs. Precisely, GEF’s Small 
Grants Programme has benefited civil society and community-based organizations 
through an amount of USD 653,2 million (O'Neill 2014a: 34). 
The environment directorate of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) was created in 1971 when no organization had institutionally 
responded to environmental challenges yet (Busch 2009b: 75). The OECD was created 
ten years before to support the thirty mostly developed countries in the development of 
policies that sustain economic growth and prosperity and it was the first 
intergovernmental organization to have a separate environmental division, the 
Environment Directorate. The main topics addressed in the organization are the 
promotion of trade and competition, and additionally, development, education and 
agriculture policies or cross-cutting issue areas, such as testing and the registration of 
chemical products (Visser 2012). The main task of the environment directorate is to 
provide knowledge, ideas, concepts, and arguments, which generates through research, 
introduces into committees, and publishes in reports or official documents (Busch 
2009b: 76). In fact, it was this organization that put forward the worldwide extended 
and recognized “polluter pays principle” or the introduction of market mechanisms for 
fisheries management (Alcock 2011). 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the UN specialized agency 
responsible for shipping safety and the prevention of marine pollution from ships. 
Founded in 1948, marine environment protection was added to the IMO’s mandate in 
1967. In fact, reflecting the growing importance for maritime safety and marine 
pollution, the organization’s name was changed in 1982 from the Inter-Governmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization to the current International Maritime Organization 
(Campe 2009: 143). The IMO is considered an influential actor regarding the provision 
of technical expertise on ship design and construction (Campe 2009: 143). Yet, its 
capacity to provide effective solutions for the enforcement of the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) to halt pollution 
from ships is challenged (Rakestraw 2012). Besides, new challenges for the organization 
are the control of ship emissions that contribute to climate change as sea transport is 
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predicted to continue growing significantly in line with the world trade (Chrysostomou 
and Vågslid 2012). Last, growing concerns about ocean acidification are expressed within 
IMO. Yet, measures, such as creating a specific multilateral environmental agreement 
have not been pioneered by the organization to date (Kim 2012). 
The next section introduces the questions addressed in the survey that are taken out 
of the analytical framework developed in chapter 3. 
4.2 Questions addressed 
The survey includes seventeen questions to assess the degree of influence of the 
different IOs according to experts. In line with the framework developed in chapter 3, 
outputs and procedural orchestration resources are assessed. The questionnaire covered 
two areas, on the one hand it referred to questions that deal with organizational, policy-
based, discourse-based and voluntary-based outputs that assess the orchestration results 
by IOs, while other questions referred to the procedural resources, which cover trust-, 
neutrality-, respect- and participation-based resources. Indicator questions for 
procedural resources cover thus both the capacity to legitimize new roles to actors – 
social accountability, environmental issue framing and sustainability politics 
interlinkages – and the competency to involve Southern experts as well as local and 
traditional knowledge holders, affected targets and non-state actors in decision-making. 
First, the indicator questions developed in chapter 3 that characterize the outputs of 
IOs are included in the survey. Questions regarding organizational outputs covered the 
creation of new national institutions; policy-based indicators referred to the adoption of 
new laws, policies, instruments or practices to regulate economic or social activity 
affecting the environment and resource allocation; discourse-based questions assessed 
workshops skills-oriented training programs, and demonstration projects questions; and 
finally, voluntary-based outputs gauged the participation in joint programs for 
technology transfer, partnerships and the provision of financial support. 
Second, the questions addressed include procedural resources, namely, building 
trust among orchestration actors, orchestrating through neutral networking, showing 
respect for orchestration targets and increasing the participation of new orchestration 
actors. On trust, the questionnaire included the following questions; whether experts 
believed that the media coverage of the environmental issues had increased due to the 
IO’s work, on the frequency of information exchange between the IO and experts, and 
the frequency decision-makers draw on information provided by the international 
agency. On neutrality, the questions referred to the IOs’ influence on discussions and 
media coverage, the relevance of the information that experts draw from IOs, and the 
domestic influence of the information provided by the international agency on the 
generation of scientific knowledge, on the public awareness of environmental issues and 
97 
 
on the identification of new environmental issues. In addition, it also asked for the 
perceived political neutrality and scientific credibility of the information provided by 
the IO. On respect, the survey covered questions on the capacity of organizations to 
encourage experts from non-industrialized countries to engage in international political 
processes, and on the evolution of actor participation in the following international 
policy processes; international negotiations, public-private partnerships, international 
conferences, international fora and lobbying. Finally, on participation-based resources 
the survey copes with how the work of the surveyed agencies has influenced the 
evolution in the participation of different actors, not only from national governments 
and from local governments, but most importantly covers environmental non-
governmental organizations, business associations, and private corporations in 
international policy processes. 






The next section introduces the methodology followed for this survey.  
4.3 Survey methodology 
An online expert survey is a cost-effective way to obtain a broad view of the 
orchestration influence by different IOs. The primary sources for contacts for the survey 
were the IOs’ official websites containing published on-line data with expert details. 
When no contacts were provided on the website, those were directly inquired via 
electronic mail communication to IOs officials. A third strategy consisted of an explicit 
written request to already identified experts, and fourth, Internet search engines with 
selected key words were also used. This last approach avoided relying on IOs sources 
only. Information coming from experts can tell us a lot in terms of IOs orchestration. 
IOs deal with an array of actors that have been targeted for the survey, namely, 
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governmental representatives, not-for-profit organizations, as well as research 
institutions42 in four different countries, Germany, the United States, Mexico and India. 
Forty-two completed surveys were received from Germany, twenty-two from the United 
States, seventeen from Mexico, twenty-seven from India and thirty-seven came from 
other countries or international headquarters. In order to obtain comparable results, a 
single standardized survey was provided to all experts. The results obtained provide a 
snapshot of the experts’ opinion on IOs as orchestrators43. The expert survey is based on 
the methods developed by Simsek and Veiga (2001) for internet organizational surveys 
and consist of an on-line questionnaire with largely closed-ended questions, that is, 
questions with defined answer alternatives similar to multiple-choice questions. The 
principal advantage of using a standardized survey is that it generates direct comparable 
data for analysis purposes. This implies that questions cannot be topic or organization-
specific and still need to remain particular and reader-friendly. The on-line platform 
allowed the survey to be both user-friendly and facilitated its accessibility. Furthermore, 
the electronic format granted a reliable computerized treatment of the incoming data. 
From a total number of six hundred contacts addressed, one hundred and forty-seven 
answered our survey, accounting for a response rate of approximately twenty-five 
percent, which adjusts to the typical response rate (Simsek and Veiga 2001). 
                                                 
42 Forty-three answers were received from government delegates, sixty-four answers from 
nongovernmental organizations and thirty-two from research institutions and six from business 
associations. 
43 International organizations as learning agents (cf. Siebenhüner 2008) are subject to change over 
time and  expert assessments on them. 
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Table 4.2 Number of survey respondents for each agency and country 
 
The survey design was to meet the following requirements: on the one hand, it was 
intended to cover the areas where IOs have influence and, on the other, to keep the 
questionnaire as brief as possible. With both considerations in mind, single questions 
were formulated combining multiple choice and matrix types of questions. The 
questionnaire was modified to reflect the suggestions of the pre-test participants. Both a 
web and a paper version of the finalized questionnaire were prepared and used to 
collect data. A statement at the beginning of the questionnaire guaranteed respondents’ 
anonymity. Answers from non-targeted respondents were avoided by making our survey 
invisible to Internet search engines. Experts were mainly contacted via electronic 
mailing and the survey program did not allow the same person to fill in the 
questionnaire more than once. The next section identifies the subgroup of best-assessed 
organizations – from the nine surveyed – that center the detailed results’ examination. 
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4.4 The most relevant IOs 
The survey consisted of three sections. First, the questionnaire asked experts to rate the 
relevance of all nine listed IOs along a five-level scale, from highly relevant to not 
relevant44. Next, the respondent chose from the nine listed IOs the agency she/he 
perceived as the most relevant for her work and to which the rest of the questionnaire 
referred. Last, the survey requested information about the respondent’s organization, 
such as, the respondent’s name (optional), and the organization’s name (optional), the 
country of origin, the expert group, namely, government, environmental non-
governmental organizations, research institution and business corporations and size. 
The aggregated answers to the first question provide a picture of the relative relevance 
of all environmental IOs surveyed. These results are presented graphically as a ranking 
below in Fig. 4.1. The first thing that catches your eye in such figure is the variability of 
relevance across agencies. 
From here, the survey moves to question two45 where experts are asked to choose 
the most relevant agency for them (Fig. 4.2). From here, survey questions46 start 
referring specifically to the organization chosen in question 2. Thus, the organization(s) 
considered most relevant by respondents have obtained more completed survey 
assessments overall than the rest. The word relevance/relevant is used in this survey as a 
quasi-synonym for influence/influential. Yet, while assessing relevance is a subjective 
exercise undertaken by each respondent, influence in this study refers to the IO 
orchestration effects composed of outputs and procedural resources. Thus, while 
relevance is a perception subject to the expert’s own parameters, with the concept of 
influence we refer to a structured, coherent and traceable set of comparable indicators. 
                                                 
44 Leaving also the possibility to fill in an open text box for other relevant organizations. 
45 Answers for question two (Fig. 4.2) have a similar but not identical pattern to those in question one 
(Fig. 4.1). 




Figure 4.1 Relevance of international agencies in percentages 
The four more relevant IOs considered are those for which more answers and 
positive assessments have been received and are the following: 1. The United Nations 
Environment Programme47 (UNEP) with thirty-five answers; 2. The secretariat to the 
Convention on Climate Change48 (climate secretariat) with twenty-nine answers; 3. The 
secretariat to the Biodiversity Convention49 (biodiversity secretariat) with twenty-two 
answers; and, 4. The World Bank 50 with twenty answers. 
Question two confirms and increases the differences in relevance found in question 
one for the surveyed agencies. A significant difference when comparing Figs. 4.1 and 4.2 
is that the biodiversity secretariat and the GEF swap their positions, so that biodiversity 
upgrades to the third best valued organization position and the GEF pulls back a couple 
of positions. Consequently, two MPOs and two TSCs count among the four most 
relevant organizations for experts. Question two provides the four international 
agencies in which the analysis centers. Comparability reasons, particularly, the 
similarity of organizations and the number of completed surveys, justifies that the 
analysis of results focuses in these four best-assessed organizations. The MPOs UNEP 
                                                 
47 For a case study on the relevance of the secretariat of the United Nations Environment Programme 
see Bauer (2009c). 
48 For a case study on the relevance of the climate secretariat see Busch (2009a). 
49 For a case study on the relevance of the biodiversity secretariat see Siebenhüner (2009). 
50 For a case study on the relevance of the environmental department of the World Bank see 
Marschinski and Berhle (2009). 
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and World Bank have obtained thirty-five and twenty completed surveys, respectively. 
Besides, TSCs, climate and biodiversity secretariats, have received twenty-nine and 
twenty-two responses, respectively. 
Figure 4.2 Comparative bar chart of the relevance of international organizations 
Fig. 4.3 below depicts the four best-assessed organizations and maps the distribution 
of both outputs and procedural resources. In particular, procedural resources in front of 
outputs hold more explanatory power to account for IO relevance. In particular, trust- 
and neutrality-based resources in front of respect- and participation-based resources 
account for UNEP’s higher relevance, which is the most relevant organization of all. For 
this survey in general, and concretely the percentages in Fig. 4.3, represent the 
proportion of questions that have reached at least the median for all the surveyed 
organizations in a specific question. A median describes the numeric value separating 
the higher half of a sample from the lower half. The median of a finite list of numbers 
can be found by arranging all the observations from lowest value to highest value and 
picking the middle one. If there is an even number of observations, the median is then 
defined as the mean of the two middle values. The next sections 4.5 and 4.6 present the 
results for MPOs and TSCs separately. Following this, a discussion of the results is 




Figure 4.3 Outputs and procedural resources by UNEP, WB, climate sec and biodiversity 
sec. 
4.5 Multipurpose organizations 
This section presents survey results for the two better-assessed MPOs, the UNEP and 
the World Bank. Following the analytical framework of chapter 3 to assess orchestration 
influence, the output results are introduced as along with the procedural resources. 
4.5.1 Outputs 
Both UNEP and the World Bank are well assessed in terms of output indicators. Yet, the 
World Bank is overall better assessed when comparing the aggregate results. Survey 
answers indicate that both MPOs obtain all possible types of outputs. More specifically, 
the two organizations have similar positive results with reference to the organizational 
and discourse outputs. Yet, there are differences with regard to the policy-based – with 
the UNEP and the World Bank standing out in different areas - and voluntary outputs 
for which the World Bank in this case obtains better assessments. On the aggregate for 
all the questions on outputs, in twenty-five percent of the questions, from 51 to 90 
percent of the respondents have granted positive assessments to the UNEP. In other 
words, twenty-five per cent of answers referring to the outputs for UNEP have reached 
at least the median that results from comparing the positive assessments of all 
organizations surveyed. Therefore, the biggest portion of the pie chart on the outputs 
for UNEP corresponds to the fifty-eight percent of the questions, which cover the range 
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between eleven to fifty percent of answers that reach the median of positive assessments 
(Fig. 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4 UNEP’s outputs assessment 
In front of the twenty-five percent achieved by UNEP, Fig. 4.5 shows how the World 
Bank in forty-two percent of the aggregate for the questions on outputs obtains the 
median on positive answers for at least the fifty-one percent of the cases. Experts agree 
in assigning the World Bank with the capability to generate the highest proportion of 
orchestration outputs. In fact, a high number of respondents, between sixty to seventy 
percent have granted positive assessments to the World Bank in four – out of the twelve 
– questions on output indicators (Table 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.5 World Bank’s outputs assessment 
Concretely, some differences and similarities on the specific type of outputs can be 
outlined when comparing the two MPOs. There is no major variability on organizational 
outputs for MPOs. 
According to experts, a slight percentage gives the UNEP an advantage over the 
World Bank in the support for the creation of new national environmental institutions. 
On policy outputs, the UNEP scores better in three out of the five question indicators, 
namely for the adoption and reformulation of new laws and decrees, policy programs 
and policy instruments. Specifically, to the question of whether UNEP has facilitated the 
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adoption of new policy programs - technological, educational - sixty-eight percent of 
experts have responded affirmatively. Yet the World Bank’s policy-based outputs 
outstand for two indicators, namely, for the allocation of resources and the adoption of 
new practices. More concretely, seventy-four percent of the experts asserted that the 
World Bank has facilitated the adoption of new practices, such as energy audits, 
pollution abatement technology and procurement (see Table 4.3) and an additional 
sixty-three percent confirmed that the World Bank has influenced the amount and 
allocation of resources in the expert’s organization (Table 4.3). On discourse outputs, a 
similar amount of sixty-seven percent have benefited from the skills-oriented training 
programs organized by UNEP, and an additional fifty-eight have participated in UNEP’s 
workshops. The numbers for the World Bank are in the same range, thus no major 
variability exists in this area for the two MPOs. Yet, on voluntary-based outputs, there is 
variability between the two organizations. The World Bank stands out with its 
cooperation in partnerships, joint programs for technology transfer and other 
interactions of the experts with organizations. In fact, the World Bank receives positive 
assessments from between eleven to fifty-two percent of experts in the questions for 
voluntary outputs, while for the UNEP, the range goes from zero to thirty percent (see 
Table 4.3). Overall, both MPOs generate output results, yet the World Bank outstands 
especially in voluntary- and to some extent policy-based outputs. 
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Table 4.3 Output indicator questions UNEP vs. the World Bank 
 
4.5.2 Procedural resources 
Both MPOs generate procedural resources. Yet, while the World Bank gets better 
assessments than UNEP of its competency to involve new actors, the latter is better 
assessed for its capacity to legitimize new roles. Specifically, the UNEP stands out for its 
neutrality-based resources. In the case of the World Bank, there are participation-based 
resources that grant this organization its competency to involve new actors. Therefore, 
according to the results, some MPOs stand out for their neutrality-based and 
participation-based resources for orchestration. 
4.5.2.1 Trust- and neutrality-based resources 
UNEP is better assessed than the World Bank in its capacity to obtain trust- and 
neutrality-based resources. Answers on UNEP in more than fifty percent of the 
questions on trust- and neutrality-based resources exceed the median and, in the rest, 
around forty-three percent, answers approximate to the median. In ten out of fourteen 
questions, UNEP receives at least forty to more than sixty percent of positive 
assessments, while for the World Bank, a similar percentage is only achieved in six 




Figure 4.6 UNEP’s assessment on trust- and neutrality-based resources 
Even if inconspicuously, the World Bank is considered capable to obtain trust- and 
neutrality-based resources from intermediaries. Yet, the World Bank’s profile in this 
area is low. In most of the questions, seventy-nine per cent, the median of positive 
answers does not reach over fifty-percent of positive assessments, which means that in 
only twenty-one percent of the questions experts agreed chiefly to identify the World 
Bank’s competency in this area (Table 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.7 World Bank’s assessment on trust- and neutrality-based resources 
Specifically, the UNEP is perceived to generate more neutral-based orchestration 
resources than the World Bank. In particular, in more than eighty percent of 
assessments, UNEP is considered as politically neutral; in the case of the World Bank, 
this is less than forty percent. Besides, more than sixty percent consider UNEP’s 
information as scientifically credible; in the World Bank’s case, this is twenty percent. 
Sixty-three percent of the respondents agree that the domestic influence of the 
information provided by UNEP for the identification of new environmental issues has 
been somewhat positive, for only thirty-two percent for the World Bank (Table 4.4). 
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Table 4.4 Trust- and neutrality-based resources of UNEP vs. the World Bank 
 
Besides, more than eighty percent consider UNEP’s information to be relevant, for 
around sixty percent for the World Bank. Yet, the World Bank is according to forty-
seven percent of all answers more influential in media and public debate than UNEP, 
which is positively assessed in thirty-one percent of answers. In addition, UNEP is the 
organization that generates more trust-based resources from the two MPOs. Yet, 
differences for trust-based resources between these two organizations are not as big as 
in the case of neutrality-based resources. Sixty-two percent make regular use of the 
UNEP’s scientific publications, an additional fifty-eight percent use UNEP’s annual 
reports regularly and fifty-four percent of experts hold personal contacts frequently with 
the organization for only thirty-seven percent for the World Bank. Around half of the 
respondents – forty-nine percent – confirm that UNEP has influenced the increase of 
environmental issues in media coverage in front of the thirty-seven of the World Bank. 
At the same time though, the World Bank scores better than UNEP on the regular use of 




4.5.2.2 Respect- and participation-based resources 
Overall, the World Bank gets better assessments for its participation-based resources 
than UNEP. Yet, due to engaging especially experts from the South, the UNEP is better 
evaluated than the World Bank for respect-based resources. 
Figure 4.8 UNEP’s assessment on respect- and participation-based resources 
UNEP’s experts agree only in thirty-three percent of the questions that this 
organization has significantly contributed to bolstering the active participation of new 
actors in environmental governance. This sharply contrasts with the eighty-nine percent 
of questions referring to the World Bank, where experts assert that this organization has 
influenced the participation of new actors in environmental politics. 
Figure 4.9 World Bank’s assessment on respect- and participation-based resources 
UNEP is assessed more positively than the World Bank, only for one question. Sixty-
seven percent of the respondents agree that the work of UNEP has encouraged experts 
from both industrialized and non-industrialized countries to engage in international 
political processes (Table 4.5), which contrasts with the only fifty-eight percent by the 
World Bank. Thus, except for the respect-based resources from the involvement of 
Southern experts by UNEP, the World Bank scores better in all the indicators for the 
involvement affected actors in the case of international neg0tiations, public-private 
partnerships and, international conferences and fora. 
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Table 4.5 Respect- and participation-based resources of UNEP vs. the World Bank 
 
At the same time, the World Bank holds a competitive advantage over UNEP on 
participation-based sources. In sixty-eight percent of the answers, experts declare that 
the participation of non-governmental organizations has increased due to the work of 
UNEP, which is clearly improved by the World Bank that accrues eighty-two per cent 
with positive answers. Besides, seventy-five percent of the experts asserted that business 
associations’ participation in international policy processes has increased due to the 
work of the World Bank and this has been later reiterated by fifty-six percent in the case 
of private corporations (Table 4.5). 
4.5.3 Discussing MPO orchestration influence 
The next two sections discuss the capacity of surveyed MPOs to legitimize new roles 
and the competence to involve new actors. 
4.5.3.1 Capacity to legitimize new roles 
There are obvious institutional differences between the UNEP and the World Bank. The 
World Bank obtains better assessments on outputs than UNEP, which has no operative 
mandate and was never designed to undergo implementing activities, with the 
exception of capacity building in environmental law (Bauer 2009c: 177). On the other 
hand, the World Bank has a broad environmental output that includes an annual one 
hundred environmentally relevant projects, one hundred analytical and technical 
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assistance products and USD 10 million worth of training days on environmental and 
sustainable development (Marschinski and Behrle 2009: 106). 
The answers from the surveyed experts describe the UNEP as an orchestrator that 
enjoys both trust and neutrality-based procedural resources. Yet, the comparative 
advantage of UNEP over the World Bank comes concretely from its neutrality-based 
resources, specifically, from its capacity in new environmental issue framing. 
Authoritative in-house expertise on the state of the world environment and 
international environmental law is one of the strongest sources of political influence of 
UNEP (Bauer 2009c: 184), which contributes to framing issues on environmental terms. 
UNEP shows its leadership by generating and diffusing knowledge that does not 
exclusively rely on the map of states as the main unit of analysis. UNEP as a 
predominantly intergovernmental organization in global environmental politics has 
pioneered in taking a broader perspective in international environmental issues and for 
that has catalyzed scientific assessments and made extensive use of new technologies 
such as satellite imagery or climate science. This type of information obtained through 
satellite technology is labeled by Karen Litfin as “sovereign knowledge”, that refers to 
knowledge with supreme authority and great technocratic potential (Litfin 1998b: 209). 
Besides, the UNEP secretariat has introduced environmental assessment and 
monitoring through nonstate actors as current standards, which are routinely included 
in virtually all multilateral environmental agreements (Bauer 2009c: 184-185). 
All core expert and flagship publications by UNEP on data generated through 
satellite technology and remote sensing devices have been prepared in collaboration 
with research centers and other nonstate actors, which favors the interlinkage of 
different issue areas and overlap management. In fact, UNEP environmental 
assessments draw from a broad network of collaborative research centers51. UNEP 
functions less as a unilateral effort than as a coordinative, interactive mechanism among 
many actors. On behalf of the encompassing goal of international environmental 
protection, UNEP is an established institution within the UN system that has to some 
extent alleviated north-south tensions in which the environment and future 
development appear as conflicting values (Caldwell 1996: 64). This accounts for UNEP’s 
scientific assessments to become a primary tool for environmental information (Ivanova 
2010). The collaborative assessments coordinated by UNEP not only exert domestic 
effects, but also turn UNEP into a trustworthy source of information. Scholarly 
literature considers that UNEP’s environmental assessments have acted as catalyzers of 
early deliberations on international environmental regimes that transcend state 
                                                 
51 Some examples are the UNEP Global Resources Information Database and the UNEP World 
Conservation Monitoring Centre (Bauer 2009c). 
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boundaries such as, ozone, biodiversity, chemical pollutions, hazardous wastes, 
desertification, marine pollution and climate change, the latter in cooperation with the 
World Meteorological Organization (Bauer 2009c: 174-175).  
UNEP’s entrepreneurship (Young 1991) is illustrated by the setup of the Global 
Resources Information Database (GRID) and the Global Environment Monitoring 
System (GEMS), together with the Global Environment Outlook, a standard reference 
for domestic policy makers considered the environmentalist equivalent to the World 
Development Report of the World Bank (Bauer 2009c: 173, 185). Data on the economic, 
environmental and social indicators contained in such assessments contribute not only 
to downplaying state boundaries when analyzing international environmental problems 
but also to explaining the interlinkages between economic, social and environmental 
interests. Survey results support the idea that UNEP has become a trustworthy 
consultation and discussion platform on a wide array of issues that exceed national 
borders. The UNEP is perceived as a neutral actor, which contributes with its work to 
putting environmental issues that affect people in specific environmental areas or at a 
global scale on the agenda. 
In contrast to UNEP, the World Bank is poorly assessed in its capacity to generate 
new issue framing for environmental sustainability. In fact, the core environmental 
projects for the World Bank heavily rely on state-based third party-financed grants from 
the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). The GEF finances almost all of the World 
Bank’s cross-boundary environmental projects (Marschinski and Behrle 2009: 119), 
which illustrates the national focus of the World Bank on environmental projects. 
Clients are national governments, which limits a desirable more direct involvement of 
the local stakeholders (Marschinski and Behrle 2009: 121). The country level constitutes 
the World Bank’s main focus and regional activities still play a marginal role 
(Marschinski and Behrle 2009: 110-111). A source of hierarchical form of governance for 
the World Bank is conditionality and safeguard policies in national projects 
(Marschinski and Behrle 2009: 131). Thus, the World Bank’s influence is hampered by 
the limitation that this organization faces. It has to center on country-focused projects 
when most environmental issues are to be scaled at the regional level. This may impinge 
on World Bank’s capacity to draw on more neutrality-based resources. In addition, the 
World Bank was mainly constituted as an economic institution and has only started to 
deal with the environment after 1987. 
IOs such as the World Bank are, as we know from organizational theory, path 
dependent (March and Olsen 1989). It is not surprising therefore that an organization 
created to contribute to the reconstruction of post-World War II Europe, nowadays 
mainly relies on the geographical underlying assumptions of the map of sovereign states 
and on economic indicators for the cross-country comparative analysis. As Shafer and 
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Murphy stated: “the environmental activities of IGOs are fundamentally shaped by their 
underlying geographical ideas and assumptions” (1998: 268). Consequently, the World 
Bank avails of environmental expertise but mainly concentrates around the 
environment department with limited influence on projects on the ground (Marschinski 
and Behrle 2009: 132). Since few natural scientists count among their staff, the World 
Bank has to strongly rely on external consultants52 (Marschinski and Behrle 2009: 123-
124), which hinders the consolidation of a trust relationship with local targets if 
international organizations rely on experts contracted on an ad-hoc basis as 
intermediaries. 
Having said that, the World Bank’s assessments and economic indicators provide 
valuable data on environmental problems even if the assumptions about the frames of 
reference are country-based53. The World Bank draws on neutrality-based resources by 
providing solutions that generate interlinkages between environmental, social and 
especially economic issues for dealing with sustainability. Involving economists for 
problem-solution provides economic instruments of specific environmental issues such 
as climate market mechanisms, certification and emissions trading54 (Marschinski and 
Behrle 2009: 115). The Bank focuses on green accounting and studies that combine the 
valuation of environmental services, cost-benefit analysis and interventions based on 
market instruments. 
At the same time, the World Bank’s use of economic academic discourses to frame 
policies that are later pursued by the same institution (Bøås and McNeill 2004, McNeill 
and St. Clair 2011) may politicize sustainability issues. Similarly, the World Bank with 
the set up and finance of research networks, such as the Global Development Network, 
mobilizes a certain type of knowledge, which is a particular way of looking and 
interpreting the world and the best practices as determined by financial institutions, 
corporations and world-leading governments (Stone 2003). This is the case of the 
diffusion of concepts for environmental management, such as Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIA) or environmental services (Gutner 2002, Gutner 2012), helping to 
frame policies in developing countries later implemented with Bank’s assistance. The 
World Bank staff produced more than 4000 scientific articles in peer-reviewed journals 
from 1995 to date; 10 percent thereof relate to environmental issues, which mostly test 
theories developed elsewhere on green accounting, a particular thrust area of the World 
                                                 
52 External consultants are considered to issue biased environmental assessment reports (Marschinski 
and Behrle 2009: 123-124). 
53 On the problem of fit, scale and interplay that characterises transboundary environmental problems 
see Young (2002a). 
54 Focus on those issues comes at the expense of other important issues such as transboundary 
freshwater bodies or desertification (Marschinski and Behrle 2009: 115). 
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Bank55. The influence of the Chicago School of Economics in the World Bank’s academic 
discourse may account for the modest neutrality-based resources attributed by surveyed 
experts to the World Bank’s environmental issue framing. 
4.5.3.2 Competence to involve new actors 
The competence of UNEP to convene new actors in global environmental governance is 
based on its authority as a focal international institution in the UN for environmental 
issues, the delegated authority by states and, its capacity to contribute to solving 
environmental problems as a catalyzer of international normative processes. The skill of 
UNEP to draw on participative resources may be less spectacular now than at the outset 
of international environmental politics in the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, as multilateral 
environmental negotiations become more complex, UNEP provides the institutional 
memory in the form of services and expertise necessary to keep processes going (Bauer 
2009c: 190-191). By contrast, the approach popularized by the World Bank of “making 
the business case towards the environment” has presumably helped in enrolling new 
actors such as non-state actors more than any other international organization surveyed 
(Table 4.5). There has been an increased involvement of civil society in World Bank’s 
activities encouraged by President Wolfensohn (Marschinski and Behrle 2009: 130). 
Moreover, the widely documented negative effects of some of the World Bank’s projects 
have attracted the attention and active participation of stakeholders in environmental 
politics in the past, principally from environmental activists. From there, the World 
Bank has moved from a reactive approach to environmental issues to an increasing 
proactive role. It has evolved and developed capacities from designing “do-not-harm” to 
“do-good” environmental projects, yet not always avoiding criticism. For instance, the 
World Bank took a considerable risk and acted ahead of other players by launching a 
series of emission reduction projects and the creation of the at the time pioneering 
Prototype Carbon Fund back in year 2000 (Marschinski and Behrle 2009: 109) or the 
more recent Carbon Partnership Facility (CPF), which is one of the World Bank’s major 
new carbon finance instruments. Two factors converge at the Bank’s convening power: a 
high level government access and the ability to provide its own financing (Marschinski 
and Behrle 2009: 132).  
4.6 Treaty secretariats 
This section presents the survey results for the two better-assessed TSCs, the climate 
and the biodiversity secretariats. Following the analytical framework of chapter 3 to 
assess orchestration influence, the output results as well as the procedural resources are 
introduced. 
                                                 




Two environmental TSCs have come out of the survey as some of the most relevant 
organizations in sustainability politics, ahead from other larger organizations such as 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF) or the environmental directorate of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The climate and 
the biodiversity secretariats are, compared to MPOs, smaller organizations, in terms of 
the number of employees and core budget. The climate secretariat employs around 450 
staff and its core budget in 2018-19 is 56.8 million USD, the biodiversity secretariat 
employs 116 personnel and its core budget in 2018 was 25.1 million USD, whereas UNEP 
employs 1263 employees and has a core of voluntary contributions of around 300 million 
USD. Most importantly, small TSCs are closely scrutinized by member states (Bauer, 
Busch, and Siebenhüner 2009) and tend to be less autonomous than larger MPOs. Yet, 
the experts surveyed grant positive assessments on the output indicators for the 
aforementioned secretariats. 
 
Figure 4.10 Climate secretariat’s output assessment 
Survey results show that both agencies obtain all the different types of outputs 
described in this study. More specifically, the two TSCs score more positively for 
organizational, policy-based and discourse outputs, and only to a lesser extent for 
voluntary-based outputs. In most cases, the climate secretariat is better assessed than 
the biodiversity secretariat. Answers to around forty percent of the questions on outputs 
for the climate secretariat – five questions out of twelve – have reached at least the fifty 
to ninety percent of the median of positive assessments. By contrast, only two questions 
for the case of the biodiversity secretariat have reached at least the median from fifty 
percent of respondents (Table 4.6). Yet, there are two exceptions for which the 
biodiversity secretariat stands out. The biodiversity secretariat generates more outputs 
with regard to the adoption of policy programs – technological, educational – and, 




Figure 4.11 Biodiversity secretariat’s output assessment 
On organizational outputs, fifty-seven percent of the answers confirm that the 
climate secretariat has facilitated both the creation of new institutions in the expert’s 
country such as new government agencies or research institutions and thirty-seven 
percent in the case of the biodiversity secretariat. 
On policy-based outputs, seventy-five percent of the experts’ answers assert that the 
climate secretariat has facilitated the adoption of market-based, command-and-control 
and voluntary policy instruments to regulate economic and social activity. Another fifty-
seven percent confirm the secretariat’s contribution to the adoption of technological, 
educational policy instruments to regulate economic and social activity. Seventy-four 
percent of the experts that answered for the biodiversity secretariat noted its assistance 
in the advancing of new technological and educational policy programs (Table 4.6). On 
discourse outputs, sixty-five percent of experts for the climate secretariat and sixty-one 
percent for the biodiversity secretariat acknowledge to have benefited from workshops. 
Another fifty-seven percent of responses for the climate secretariat confirm experts’ 
participation in the skills oriented training programs organized by the agency and forty-
seven percent for the biodiversity secretariat. On voluntary-based outputs, the 
assessments for both TSCs is generally rather poor with the exception of the facilitation 
of joint programs to support technology transfer56 in the case of the biodiversity 
secretariat in which forty-seven percent of the respondents have participated and a 
modest twenty-eight percent for the climate secretariat. 
                                                 
56 Though, commentators point that the lack of clear quantifiable targets hinders the biennal report on 
the domestic implementation of the Biodiversity convention from turning into a more enforceable tool 
(Siebenhüner 2009: 276-277). 
118 
 
Table 4.6 Output indicator questions climate sec. vs. biodiversity sec. 
 
4.6.2 Procedural resources 
Both TSCs generate procedural resources. Yet, TSCs are better assessed in their 
obtaining respect- and participation-based resources than trust- or neutrality-based 
resources. Specifically, both TSCs obtain good assessments on respect-based resources. 
4.6.2.1 Trust- and neutrality-based resources 
TSCs obtain positive assessments on trust- and neutrality-based resources, yet 





Figure 4.12 Climate secretariat’s assessment on trust- and neutrality-based resources 
Fifty percent or more of the experts’ answers in five out of the fourteen questions 
(around thirty-five percent of the questions) make positive evaluations for the climate 
secretariat on trust- and neutrality-based resources (see Table 4.7). By contrast, the 
biodiversity secretariat receives positive assessments from over fifty percent of the 
experts in only two out of a total of fourteen questions (around fourteen percent) (see 
Fig. 4.13 and Table 4.7). 
Figure 4.13 Biodiversity secretariat’s assessment on trust- and neutrality-based resources 
While TSCs are granted with both neutrality and trust-based resources, overall, 
TSCs are better assessed at neutrality-based resources. 
Still, the climate secretariat is perceived as a trustworthier agency compared to the 
biodiversity secretariat. Sixty-two percent of the experts have confirmed that the climate 
secretariat has triggered an increase of the media coverage on global climate change. 
Half of the respondents work regularly with the climate secretariats databases and a 
similar percentage, forty-seven, use the climate secretariat’s scientific publications on a 
regular basis (Table 4.7). While to a lower degree, the biodiversity secretariat is still 
perceived as trustworthy since experts use several of the biodiversity secretariat’s 
publications. Forty-two percent of the respondents have regularly used annual reports 
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by the biodiversity secretariat, while a thirty-seven percent of experts, exchange 
information with the secretariat on a regular basis, and an extra thirty-seven percent 
make regular use of secretariat’s databases and personal contacts (Table 4.7). 
Then again, the climate secretariat is viewed as a more neutral agency than 
biodiversity. More than eighty percent of respondents consider the climate secretariat’s 
information as scientifically credible and around sixty percent regard its information as 
politically neutral. In contrast, thirty-seven percent consider the biodiversity 
secretariat’s information as politically neutral and fifty-three percent regard it as 
scientifically credible. While forty-three percent assert that the domestic influence of 
the information provided by the climate secretariat for the generation of scientific 
knowledge is positive, only eleven percent of respondents agree for the biodiversity 
secretariat. In eighty-two percent of the answers for the climate secretariat experts agree 
that the secretariat’s output is relevant for their work, for only forty-seven percent in the 
case of the biodiversity secretariat (Table 4.7). The contribution of both secretariats to 
the media and public debate is limited to thirty-one percent for the climate secretariat 
and twenty-four percent in the case of biodiversity. Yet, the biodiversity secretariat is 
widely acknowledged for its domestic contribution to the identification of new 
environmental issues with seventy-four percent of the biodiversity experts agreeing on 
this as opposed to only thirty-two percent in the case of the climate secretariat. 
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Table 4.7 Trust- and neutrality-based resources climate sec. vs. biodiversity sec. 
 
4.6.2.2 Respect- and participation-based resources 
Both TSCs obtain positive assessments of their respect- and participation-based 
resources. The answers to fifty-six percent of the questions for the biodiversity 
secretariat and sixty-seven percent of the questions for the climate secretariat reach at 




Figure 4.14 Climate secretariat’s assessment on respect- and participation-based 
resources 
Both secretariats according to experts have attracted non-governmental actors and, 
especially in the case of the climate secretariat, also for-profit actors. Both TSCs enjoy 
the capacity to draw from respect-based resources. Seventy-eight percent of the experts’ 
answers confirmed that the work of the climate secretariat has encouraged their own 
organization to engage in international political processes, for a similar sixty-eight 
percent for the biodiversity secretariat (Table 4.8). In addition, both secretariats have 
contributed to include stakeholder participation especially in international negotiations 
with sixty-three percent and seventy-four percent for international conferences, in the 
case of the climate secretariat. In the case of the biodiversity secretariat, it is a fifty-
three percent for international negotiations and sixty-eight percent in international 
conferences. 
Specifically, the climate secretariat obtains participative-based resources as experts 
in eighty-one percent of answers acknowledge that the increase of non-governmental 
organizations’ participation in international policy processes is due to the work of this 
secretariat (Table 4.8). Similarly, climate experts agree in sixty-three percent of the total 
number of answers that business associations have joined international policy processes 
and another fifty-nine percent in the case of private corporations due to the work of the 
climate secretariat. For the biodiversity secretariat, participative-based resources come 
mainly from non-profits. Seventy-four percent of the total number of answers grant this 
agency the increase in participation of non-governmental organizations. At the same 
time, biodiversity experts consider the secretariat less responsible for the increase of 
business associations’ and private corporations’ participation, with only twenty-one and 




Figure 4.15 Biodiversity secretariat’s respect- and participation-based resources 
Table 4.8 Respect- and participation-based resources climate sec. vs. biodiversity sec. 
 
4.6.3 Discussing TSCs orchestration influence 
The next two sections discuss the capacity of surveyed TSCs to legitimize new roles and 
the competence to involve new actors. 
4.6.3.1 Capacity to legitimize new roles 
The variability in output assessments for the TSCs in favor of the climate secretariat can 
presumably be the direct effect of the secretariat’s direct support to the parties of the 
convention. The climate secretariat develops adequate implementation procedures and 
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systems, such as methodologies for inventories, computer-based registry and 
transaction log to make emissions trading systems work. Besides it supports the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) executive board that creates feasible assessment 
procedures and workshops to build capacities on reporting methodologies (Busch 
2009a: 250). The climate secretariat as a treaty secretariat contributes to international 
negotiations with the publication of scientific information on climate change for 
decision-making devoid of any judgment so it is perceived by states as a neutral 
arbitrator. The compilation and synthesis of the information must not involve any 
criticizing political assessments or policy recommendations (Busch 2009a: 255). 
Politicized secretariats will not be able to draw from neutrality- and trust-based 
orchestration resources to enroll public intermediaries, which will affect their capacity 
to influence. The climate secretariat sees itself as a provider of facts, that is, information 
devoid of any particular bias. References to political or policy-sensitive implications are 
all avoided and staff members are committed to cleansing all information from making 
any evaluation on state terms. This is for sure and paradoxically a necessary premise to 
promote successful negotiations and implementation (Busch 2009a: 257-258). Therefore, 
the secretariat draws on its trust- and neutrality-based resources through the provision 
of databases and scientific publications, which facilitate the organization of mega 
conferences for states and to increase the media coverage on climate change without 
appearing as an advocacy actor but rather as a nonpartisan platform for state 
negotiation. 
The climate secretariat is considered the main authoritative voice with information 
on the legal, procedural and technical issues of the regime. The opportunity to prepare 
and disseminate information such as the highly valued database on climate friendly 
technologies (Busch 2009a: 247) or collecting and disseminating information from 
scientific sources such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) or 
liaising with the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) 
underlines the capacity of the secretariat to address sensitive issues that contribute to 
contrasting discourses. In fact, the climate secretariat has rallied support for a new post-
Kyoto protocol international binding agreement for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. It was agreed upon at the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) 21 the 
Paris Agreement that came into force in 2016, which includes main polluters, such as the 
US and emerging economies. 
In political and scientific assessments and related discourses, policy makers, 
negotiators, media science and civil society often draw information from the secretariat 
(Busch 2009a: 247). The use of the climate secretariat’s website underscores this with 2 
million downloads on average for each climate change conference, and 110,856 videos 
streamed live and on demand from the secretariat’s website (UNFCCC 2014). One of the 
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main competences of the climate secretariat is the provision of technical and analytical 
knowledge. As a matter of example, the climate secretariat’s database on greenhouse 
inventories is the most comprehensive, reliable and up-to-date source of information on 
greenhouse gases (Busch 2009a: 259). Because of the co-existence of several 
environmental discourses to implement climate change policy, climate change 
negotiations benefit from the climate secretariat’s skill in developing balanced and 
impartial input influence. Environmental discourses for climate change would not be 
feasible if the climate secretariat would not administer and disseminate official 
documents related to the negotiation and implementation of the regime so that all 
actors interested can draw on from them. The existence of competing environmental 
discourses for the implementation of a climate change policy echoes the competing 
political sensitivities of the climate regime that the secretariat administers through 
neutrality-based resources. Any of the above would not be possible without the 
neutrality of the climate secretariat as perceived by its stakeholders, which is one of its 
strengths as competing climate discourses emerge. Treaty secretariats require trust- and 
neutrality-based resources especially because they rely on public intermediaries to 
orchestrate. 
The climate secretariat is immersed in a regime where different discourses coexist. 
Interlinkages between the environment, economics and social issues are differently 
intertwined in each discourse. The green governmentality discourse has centered the 
discourse on negotiations by portraying forests as sinks and reservoirs of carbon. In 
addition, the ecological modernization discourse with its cost-influence and flexible 
environmental problem solving argument has acted as a legitimizing discourse 
(Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006: 54-67). In contrast, the civic environmentalist discourse 
contests the two previous mainstream environmental discourses with the argument that 
technocratic conceptualizations of forest ecosystems as carbon sinks downplay the 
complex ecological, cultural and social functions of forests (ibid.: 68). Different 
discourses also converge into the discussions and assessments of the latest approaches 
to mitigation of climate change. REDD+ is one of the largest experiments in Payments 
for Ecosystem Services that promotes the commodification of ecosystems’ carbon 
storage and sequestration functions on a global scale consistent with market-based 
conservation approaches. This approach is taken to address both deforestation and 
climate change helping developed countries through cost-effective measures and 
developing countries by channeling resources to them. However, the secretariat has to 
deal with criticism on their effectiveness and the supposed benefits for local 
communities. Besides, more accountability mechanisms for the measuring, reporting 
and verification systems of REDD+ are required in order to overcome current critical 
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inadequacies (Gupta, Lövbrand, et al. 2012) if the secretariat wants to benefit from trust-
based orchestration resources. 
In contrast to the climate secretariat, the biodiversity secretariat obtains less 
neutrality and fewer trust-based orchestration resources. It is fair to acknowledge that 
the biodiversity secretariat presents a handicap in front of the climate secretariat. The 
biodiversity regime is hardly visible and it enjoys less public interest in comparison to 
the more publicized climate change debate. Plausibly for this reason, the biodiversity 
secretariat has successfully attempted to draw sustainability interlinkages across 
environmental regimes. The biodiversity secretariat has used its agency to advance 
some overlap management with climate issues (Jinnah 2011). Interestingly, the framing 
of issues by the secretariat, similarly to the World Bank, relies on state boundaries, 
which may plausibly explain the generation of fewer neutrality-based resources from 
environmental issue framing. The secretariat maintains well-established collaborative 
relations with governments through national focal points (Siebenhüner 2009: 280). The 
scientific information on biodiversity conservation as well as on administrative, social, 
legal and economic aspects gathered by the biodiversity secretariat is presented mostly 
to representatives of national governments through preparatory documents, websites, 
reports and newsletters (Siebenhüner 2009: 269). In fact, two topics that touch upon 
national and international policies on global trade and North/South conflicts, namely 
the Cartagena protocol on biosafety and the Nagoya protocol on access to genetic 
resources and fair and equitable sharing of benefits have centered most of the attention. 
These highly sensitive issues have caused controversies between developing and 
developed countries (Siebenhüner 2009: 275). The sustainability issue-interlinkages and 
synergies are outlined for economic aspects and not so much on social equity matters. 
Conservation efforts that take such approach sometimes succeeded in meeting 
environmental goals yet at the expense of equity considerations. 
The secretariat works together with states so that both economic and environmental 
concerns are safeguarded. The biodiversity convention has found a discourse that allows 
managing genetic resources in a way that does not predominantly challenge 
international institutions based on the sovereignty norm. The biodiversity regime 
reinforces the sovereign system of states since developing countries get an economic 
incentive in return to conserving the natural resources contained in their national 
territories. In short, in the biodiversity discourse administrated by the secretariat, 
economic interests of developing states run in line with the conservation of genetic 
resources. Policies advanced in the biodiversity regime provide a role for states since the 
relationship between particular Northern environmental concerns and particular 
Southern development interests is framed as a win-win solution reinforcing the role of 
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the state. As already pointed by Litfin, “ecological integrity and state sovereignty are not 
necessarily in opposition” (1998a). 
Through its secretariat, the Convention of Biological Diversity has reached notable 
achievements in their own right with the integration of conservation and economic uses 
of biodiversity (Siebenhüner 2007, Rosendal 2014). In the first place, the secretariat 
draws on neutrality-based resources through environmental issue framing that 
acknowledges the sovereign rights of nation states over their genetic resources together 
with the recognition for both the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from 
genetic resources. On the other hand, the secretariat facilitates sustainability issue 
interlinkages across policy areas and gains neutrality-based resources by facilitating the 
access and conservation of genetic resources in exchange of technology transfer, 
opposed at first by the biotech industry. Finally, the biodiversity secretariat is granted 
trust-based resources through the provision of knowledge on how to implement the 
biodiversity convention at a national level with the publication of best practice 
examples, guidelines and workshops on issues such as the monetization of biodiversity 
(Siebenhüner 2009: 274). Furthermore, the secretariat commissions reports on the 
status of the convention – Global Biodiversity Outlook – and has participated in the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Siebenhüner 2009: 270). Notwithstanding its 
distinctive role in biodiversity politics, the secretariat for all its capacity-building and 
implementation activities is highly dependent on collaboration and support by member 
states. A case in point is when the secretariat developed a monitoring scheme for 
national reports to include more quantifiable measures that was welcomed as an 
initiative by the parties but that they finally refused to adopt it (Siebenhüner 2009: 278). 
To compensate this, the Aichi Biodiversity Targets have been developed as a battery of 
20 targets to be reached by 2020. Those are organized along five strategic goals that deal 
with underlying causes of biodiversity, reduce direct pressures on biodiversity, 
safeguarding ecosystems, species and genetic diversity, enhance benefits to all from 
biodiversity and enhance implementation through participatory planning, knowledge 
management and capacity building (Rosendal 2014, CBD 2014). 
4.6.3.2 Competence to involve new actors 
The main difference between the climate and the biodiversity secretariat refers to the 
type of stakeholders involved. Whereas the climate regime is characterized as involving 
a wide range of non-state actors, the biodiversity regime is stronger in enrolling affected 
actors such as Southern states and Southern experts. The climate secretariat obtains 
optimal assessments in terms of its capacity to involve non-states, Southern experts and 
affected actors. Since negotiations involve a great deal of delegates and stakeholders, as 
well as private actors (Levy 2005), the climate secretariat has contributed to state 
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negotiations by providing logistics (Busch 2009a: 248-250) but also by providing useful 
technical advice, which in some instances has proved indispensable and has been 
received positively by the majority of parties for ensuring a good organization and 
management of negotiations. However, as TSCs they can only directly engage with 
public intermediaries to orchestrate as close state oversight is upon them. 
Survey results convey that the biodiversity secretariat draws from participative-
based resources mainly by drawing governments into international processes. Half of 
the positive answers from biodiversity experts actually came from governmental 
sources. This is in line with an assessment on the role of the biodiversity secretariat that 
identifies international cooperation and the support for negotiations and meetings as its 
most obvious influence (Siebenhüner 2009: 271). All conferences of the Parties, the 
Subsidiary body for scientific, technical and technological advice (SBSTTA) in addition 
to the working group meetings are prepared, organized and documented by the 
secretariat (Siebenhüner 2009: 269). Nonetheless, non-profits and for profits have also 
increased their participation in biodiversity processes and international negotiations 
(Bled 2007, Falkner 2008, Tienhaara, Orsini, and Falkner 2012). The secretariat’s 
continuous efforts in facilitating dialogues between different groups and negotiations 
that have led to the adoption of the Biosafety and Nagoya protocol on the access and 
benefit provisions of the biodiversity convention (Siebenhüner 2009: 271). According to 
the survey, participation-based orchestration resources by the biodiversity secretariat 
mainly come from non-profits’ participation. 
4.7 Discussion of survey results 
Based on the assumption that TSCs primarily engage in formal orchestration and MPOs 
engage in both formal and informal orchestration, the next section compares TSCs 
versus MPOs results and discusses whether there is an orchestration approach that 
obtains better assessments. 
4.7.1 Treaty secretariat or multipurpose organization: Which is more influential? 
According to the survey results, the IOs considered most relevant – two MPOs, UNEP 
and the World Bank, as well as two TSCs, the climate and biodiversity secretariats – 
stand out for both their outputs and their procedural resources. The analysis has taken 
MPOs as proxies for informal orchestration and TSCs as proxies for formal 
orchestration. This section argues that as MPOs and TSCs obtain different assessments, 




The climate secretariat obtains the best assessments for orchestration outputs and the 
World Bank follows it. Consequently, there is no clear advantage for either informal or 
formal orchestration in the outputs side. Overall, Fig. 4.16 shows that discursive outputs 
are the most common in both MPOs and TSCs followed by policy-based outputs. 
Exceptionally, the climate secretariat is most effective in delivering organizational 
outputs. At the same time, the World Bank is clearly the organization that has the most 
significant impact on the voluntary-based outputs (Fig. 4.17). Therefore, it can be 
generally concluded that MPOs have more effects on the discourse and policy-based 
outputs and occasionally on voluntary-based outputs, while TSCs exert more outputs on 
the organizational and discourse areas. 
 
Figure 4.16 Averages in the percentage of answers on outputs for each international 
agency 
Curiously enough, the MPOs analyzed, namely UNEP and the World Bank, do not 
bolster more outputs than TSCs according to the experts surveyed. In fact, the climate 
secretariat, according to the results, orchestrates more outputs than the rest. Probably 
not coincidentally, the climate and biodiversity secretariats are the most advanced 
treaties with a burgeoning body of legal outputs and implementation activities. Except 
for voluntary-based outputs, MPOs even if capable of drawing from two orchestration 
approaches, still generate fewer outputs than the climate secretariat (Fig. 4.17). Thus, in 
light of the survey results, informal orchestration does not provide a competitive 




Figure 4.17 Comparison of average in percentage of answers for each output area 
Notwithstanding the lack of competitive advantage by MPOs in generating outputs, 
the MPO UNEP is considered to be the most relevant organization of all overall. 
Specifically, UNEP obtains a lower number of outputs in some areas. Therefore, this 
survey confirms the assumption that IOs’ influence does not exclusively depend on the 
number of outputs produced. This confirms what has been presumed in our analytical 
framework: outputs alone cannot account for the overall orchestration influence. As 
defined in this study, outputs indicate the concrete materialization of orchestration. 
Yet, the influence assessment is the overall analysis of procedural resources with 
orchestration outputs that give as a result the competency to involve new actors and the 
capacity to legitimize new roles. Therefore, producing outputs is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition to be influential. The IOs considered the most relevant are not 
necessarily those with a higher number of outputs. Orchestration resources hold part of 
the explanatory power to account for IOs’ influence. As a result, the fewer outputs 
ascribed to the MPO UNEP in conjunction with UNEP’s procedural resources are 
considered more influential by experts than the more numerous outputs ascribed to the 
climate change secretariat. For this reason, in order to understand the results to 
questions number one and two of the survey on the overall relevance of environmental 
IOs, it is necessary to look into procedural resources. 
4.7.1.2 Procedural resources 
From the overall influence assessments, the MPO UNEP and the TSC climate secretariat 
receive the best assessments from all surveyed agencies (Fig. 4.18). Yet, the World Bank 
is close to some of these organizations’ assessments. In any case, the survey illustrates 
that both orchestration approaches, the ones initiated by states and represented by 
TSCs and the ones started by MPOs, not only generate outputs but most importantly 
draw, albeit variability exists, on different types of procedural resources. By and large, 
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the procedural resources harvested to a greater extent by the international agencies for 
sustainability politics are respect-based resources – namely by involving experts from 
the South as well as local or traditional knowledge holders and affected actors – and 
participation-based orchestration resources associated with the capacity of international 
organizations to involve new non-state actors. In fact, the area most impacted by both 
TSCs and MPOs is the inclusion of new experts from the South with three organizations 
that reach at least the sixty percent, UNEP, the climate and biodiversity secretariats. 
Besides, the World Bank achieves more than fifty percent of average answers with the 
median. Hence, independently from the type of organization, all of them draw on the 
respect-based resources. On the other hand, some major differences are identified 
between MPOs and TSCs. Particularly, TSCs rely more on brokering non-states, 
Southern experts and affected actors than on dealing with resources related to 
sustainability interlinkages, environmental issue framing or social accountability. In the 
case of MPOs, data results are not conclusive since the UNEP is the only organization 
that shows a balance between the two types of procedural resources. In fact, UNEP57 is 
the only organization among the four agencies that exhibits a higher trend in 
legitimizing new roles to actors than to involving new actors for decision-making 
processes. 
Figure 4.18 Comparison of the average in the percentages of the procedural orchestration 
resources 
UNEP is, according to survey results, the organization most capable of legitimizing 
the delegation of functions to other actors58. For instance, UNEP is the only 
organization that surpasses the fifty percent average for generating neutrality-based 
procedural resources (Fig. 4.18). Remarkably, nine out of fourteen questions on the 
capacity to legitimize new functions reach the median, which means that in nine 
indicators at least fifty percent of the experts agree on granting positive influence. From 
                                                 
57 UNEP is the only international organization that has four peaks above sixty percent for procedural 
resources related to legitimizing new roles for orchestration. 
58 More answers from NGOs have been received than from any other expert group. 
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here, it can be deduced that trust- and neutrality-based resources are better valued by 
experts than participation and respect-based resources, as the UNEP, the agency 
considered most relevant is best assessed on such resources. At the same time, the MPO 
World Bank is the only organization able to involve not the highest number of actors 
but the most different types of stakeholders in sustainability politics, concretely, non-
governmental organizations and business actors. Only for southern experts and 
traditional knowledge holders’ involvement, the climate secretariat and UNEP get better 
assessments with over sixty percent of average responses reaching the median. In 
addition, the climate secretariat is the second best rated for its contribution to the 
involvement of new actors. Finally, the UNEP and the biodiversity secretariat receive 
similar evaluations. Yet, while the UNEP is more influential in terms of involving 
experts from the South for sustainability politics, the biodiversity secretariat is 
particularly influential in terms of introducing affected governmental actors to 
international processes. Accordingly, while TSCs seem to have a competitive advantage 
in the production of outputs, MPOs exhibit some more muscle in their capability to 
generate procedural resources, which eventually translate into an increased capacity to 
legitimate new roles and competency to involve new actors. 
Figure 4.19 Average in percentages of the procedural resources for each organization 
Specifically, to a higher degree, the MPO UNEP, followed by the climate treaty 
secretariat, are the two organizations that hold better assessments in their capability to 
delegate new roles to actors. In fact, the ability to legitimize functions to be conducted 
by new actors is the aspect that differentiates the two best-assessed agencies in 
comparison to the third- and fourth-best. From here, two main conclusions can be 
drawn. First, survey experts consider more relevant those procedural resources that 
relate to the capability of legitimizing new roles for actors than those that relate to the 
competence of involving new actors. Second, the capacity to legitimize new roles is not 
an exclusive ability of MPOs. Instead, both TSCs and MPOs broker procedural resources 
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relate to the legitimation of new roles. From here, some of the most valued procedural 
resources namely, trust- and respect-based resources, (Tyler 1997), are the ones that 
environmental IOs in general draw less from. Interestingly, UNEP is the organization 
that receives the best assessments on trust-based resources, as nearly fifty percent of the 
answers on average reach the median. This can plausibly indicate why UNEP is 
perceived as the most relevant organization for all respondents in accordance with the 
analytical framework developed in chapter three. Being the most appreciated procedural 
resource as confirmed by this survey, trust-based resources are generally speaking the 
least developed among all IOs. 
One of the most relevant procedural resources obtained is neutrality-based, in 
particular the framing of environmental issues. UNEP surpasses the sixty percent while 
the second best, the climate secretariat, exceeds fifty percent. At the same time, the 
World Bank obtains the worst assessment of all four for its capacity to generate 
neutrality-based resources from environmental issue framing. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the World Bank has invested important human and economic resources in 
becoming the “Knowledge Bank” (Stone 2002, 2003), it is generally considered a “source 
and proselytizer of ideas” in terms of economic, social, and environmental development 
(Gavin and Rodrick 1995: 332, cited in Marschinski and Behrle 2009: 101). Experts grant 
considerably fewer neutrality-based resources to this MPO in comparison to all the 
other agencies surveyed. Yet, the World Bank receives similar positive results to UNEP 
and the climate secretariat for the neutrality-based resources coming from 
environmental sustainability interlinkages. UNEP scores comparatively high in the 
competence to legitimize new roles for actors. The climate secretariat stands out for its 
competency to involve new actors. Thus, as the legitimization of new roles and actors is 
according to the framework here developed equally important, the survey does not 
provide concluding evidence of a potential competitive advantage of informal over 
formal orchestration. 
4.8 Expert survey: Summary 
This chapter has applied the concepts and the framework for evaluating the influence of 
IOs in GEG of chapter 3. The IOs best assessed by experts include, two MPOs and two 
TSCs, by this order: UNEP, the climate secretariat, the biodiversity secretariat and the 
World Bank from a sample of nine IOs. The survey confirms that the IOs considered 
most relevant generate both outputs and are positively assessed for their procedural 
resources. As MPOs and TSCs obtain different assessments for their orchestration 
influence, it can be inferred that orchestration approaches matter. However, this survey 
has shown inconclusive evidence of a potential competitive advantage of one 
orchestration approach over the other. The underlying assumption of this research is 
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that organizations that have the possibility to engage with both formal and informal 
orchestration approaches could hold a competitive advantage over those organizations 
that only have access to formal orchestration.  
Since UNEP is the best-assessed IO and does not generate more outputs than the 
rest, this implies −as expected− that outputs alone cannot account for IO influence. In 
particular, procedural resources in front of outputs hold more explanatory power to 
account for IO relevance. More specifically, neutrality- and trust-based resources 
account for UNEP’s higher relevance as the most relevant IO of all. UNEP is the only 
organization that exhibits a higher trend in legitimizing new roles than involving new 
actors. Consequently, experts value legitimizing new roles more (trust- and neutrality-
based resources) as opposed to being capable of involving new actors for orchestration 
(respect- and participation-based resources). This is illustrated in Table 4.9 that sheds 
light on how the capacity to legitimize new roles for actors is more crucial in defining an 
influential orchestrator. Moreover, the climate secretariat is the second-best IO assessed 
in involving new actors for orchestration. TSCs seem to have a competitive advantage in 
the production of outputs. Instead, MPOs exhibit some more muscle in their capability 
to generate procedural resources, which translates into an increased capacity to 
legitimate new roles and involve new actors. Yet, the capacity to legitimize new roles is 
not an exclusive feature by MPOs. TSCs broker procedural resources, which relate to the 
legitimation of new roles. One of the best assessed procedural resources is neutrality-, in 
particular, the framing of environmental issues. In contrast, trust-based resources that 
according to theory (Tyler 1997) are one of the most important sources of procedural 
fairness are in turn one of the worst assessed even though the UNEP receives the best 
assessments from all IOs surveyed.  
Table 4.9 Summary of procedural resources by UNEP, WB, climate sec. and biodiversity sec. 
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Overall, MPOs generate more discourse and policy-based, and occasionally, 
voluntary-based outputs. In contrast, TSCs obtain more organizational and discourse-
based outputs according to experts. All IOs exert positive results on respect-based 
resources mostly coming from Southern expertise and local or traditional knowledge. 
Points worth highlighting include that the MPO World Bank gets better assessments on 
the involvement of new actors and its participation-based resources, while UNEP stands 
out for its neutrality-based resources. The TSC climate secretariat generally obtains a 
better assessment on outputs compared to the other TSC, the biodiversity secretariat. 
Yet, the biodiversity secretariat stands out for its outputs such as policy programs and 
joint programs for technology transfer. Other notable features are that TSCs are better 
assessed in obtaining respect- and participation-based resources and that the climate 
secretariat is perceived as trustworthier and more neutral as opposed to the biodiversity 
secretariat. Thus, survey results do not confirm that MPOs engaging in social leverage 
hold a competitive advantage over TSCs. Detailed comparative case studies in the 





5. Coral reef governance and the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef: 
Introducing the research context 
Hard coral cover in the Caribbean is already gone in a proportion of 80 percent (Jackson 
et al. 2014) and, unfortunately, this is not a localized problem. There have been many 
reports in recent years warning of the problems affecting the Great Barrier Reef in 
Australia, the largest barrier reef in the world. In 2016, there was a major bleaching, 
entirely unanticipated and unprecedented, which differed from previous mass bleaching 
events because it was primarily driven by human-induced climate warming. This is the 
fourth time the Great Barrier Reef has bleached severely — in 1998, 2002, 2016 and now 
in 2017 (Pappas 2017). Therefore, it is a pressing and relevant social issue the challenge 
of coral reef protection. This chapter describes the importance of coral reefs and it 
features the general causes of their decline, specifically for the geographical context of 
the Mesoamerican region. 
The following sections present the research context where the two case studies on 
orchestration are based. Specifically, the geographical and institutional framework for 
coral reef governance in the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef region, the biggest 
transboundary coral reef system in the world (Arrivillaga and Arreola 2016), an 
ecosystem that stretches over the coast of four countries, Mexico, Belize, Guatemala and 
Honduras, is outlined.  
Coral reef governance touches upon seemingly disconnected issues that are 
intimately connected, which renders their management complex in both environmental 
and political terms (Jackson et al. 2014, UNEP 2015a, 2015b). Coral reef governance as a 
cross-cutting issue of global environmental politics relates to several topics, namely, 
biodiversity and natural heritage (Mauerhofer and Nyacuru 2014), pollution and 
management of oceans and seas (Mitchell 1993, Jacques 2014), fisheries (Peterson 1993, 
DeSombre 2014) and climate change (Cinner et al. 2012). The conservation of coral reefs 
entails a myriad of sectors, actors and levels that is best grasped from a conceptual 
standpoint using the notion of coral reef governance. The word governance thus 
facilitates the comparison between political arrangements at the national, regional and 
global levels and determines the suitability of specific governance mechanisms across 
subsectors and levels (Krahmann 2003). 
Over one-half of the world’s population live within 100 kilometers of the world’s 
coastlines and two out of three of the world’s cities with over 2.5 million inhabitants are 
located in coastal regions (Jellinek, Ebro, and Archer 2004). The pressures and 
transformations on these lands and seascapes are unprecedented in history, which 
affects marine ecosystems, such as coral reefs. The Global Coral Reef Monitoring 
Network (GCRMN) estimates that twenty percent of the world’s coral reefs have been 
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destroyed (Wilkinson 2004) and most Caribbean coral reefs may disappear by 2025 
(McField 2006, WRI 2005) as only one sixth of the original coral cover is left. Yet, coral 
reef governance is an international issue area that lacks a specific formal international 
regime. 
5.1  Introduction: What are coral reefs and why are they important both 
globally and locally? 
Coral is a polyp –understood as the sessile form of cnidarian (group of symmetrical, 
aquatic and invertebrate animals including jellyfish and sea anemones) typically having 
a hollow cylindrical body closed and attached at one end and opening at the other by a 
central mouth surrounded by tentacles usually armed with venomous organelles− or 
polyp colony together with its membranes and skeleton. Coral reef ecosystems have the 
largest biodiversity per unit of area on Earth (Dimitrov 2006) and are considered, along 
with rainforests, the most biologically diverse habitats with spectacular coral reefs, 
teeming with fish, coral, lobsters, conch, turtles and other marine life (Spalding, 
Ravilious, and Green 2001). Many reefs are about 8000 years old and some 2,5 million 
years old. Their labyrinthine structures provide habitat for a vast number of marine 
organisms. As one of the most complex ecosystems on Earth, an estimated 4000 species 
of coral reef fish (a quarter of all marine fish species) are comparable to the variety of 
birds found in rainforests. The total number of species of animals and plants found in 
coral reefs is estimated between 600.000 and 9 million (Sheppard, Davy, and Pilling 
2009). Scientists estimate that there may be another 1 to 8 million undiscovered species 
of organisms living in and around reefs (Reaka-Kudla 1997). 
Corals as a biological order are found in Earth’s oceans from the tropics to the Polar 
Regions at depths sometimes greater than thirty meters. Corals can be found both in the 
cold waters of the oceanic depth and in the shallows of warm tropical seas. Individual 
corals found in both cold and warm water are capable of depositing calcium carbonate. 
By coral reefs, a narrower category as opposed to cold-water coral reefs (Freiwald et al. 
2004), we refer to communities of stony coral species that develop in clear tropical and 
subtropical waters (Dimitrov 2006). One hundred countries have coral reefs, but over 
half of all coral reefs are under the jurisdiction of six states, namely, Australia, Fiji, 
Indonesia, Maldives, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines. Thirty-five percent are in 
Australia and Indonesia combined (Dimitrov 2011). Four factors limit reef building: first, 
temperature, light and depth, second, sedimentation, third, salinity, and last low tide 
and exposure to air. Reefs build from 180 to maximum 300 Celsius. Sedimentation 
prevents reef formation as fine mud prevents coral larval to fix themselves and smothers 
coral colonies. Corals do not form where rivers discharge, as corals require salinity. 
Finally, exposure to air is a limit to coral reef development. Climate related bleaching 
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corals expel most of the algae and thus lose their own supply on nutrients (Dimitrov 
2006).  
As storehouses of immense biological wealth, reefs also provide economic and 
environmental services to millions of people. Coral reefs provide goods and services 
worth $375 billion each year, which is an amazing figure for an environment that covers 
less than 1 percent of the Earth’s surface (Costanza et al. 1997). Reefs are the major 
source of income and food, that is, fishing and tourism, to these coastal communities, 
and afford shoreline protection from forces of the ocean. In developing countries, coral 
reefs contribute about one-quarter of the total fish catch, providing critical food 
resources for tens of millions of people (Jameson, McManus, and Spalding 1995). The 
commercial value of U.S. fisheries from coral reefs is over $100 million (NMFS/NOAA, 
2001). In addition, the annual value of reef-dependent recreational fisheries probably 
exceeds $100 million per year. Globally, half a billion people are estimated to live within 
100 kilometers of a coral reef and benefit from its production and protection. Besides, 
many drugs are being developed from coral reef animals and plants as possible cures for 
cancer, arthritis, human bacterial infections, viruses, and other diseases (NOAA 2008). 
Concretely, the Caribbean is home to nine percent of the world’s coral reefs. 
Caribbean reefs, spanning a total of thirty-eight countries, are vital to the region’s 
economy (Spalding and Ravilious 2004). They generate more than USD three billion 
annually from tourism and fisheries and over a hundred times more in other goods and 
services, on which more than forty-three million people depend (IUCN 2014). 
Specifically, the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef system (MBRS) is a globally important coral 
reef ecosystem, which includes both World Heritage and Ramsar sites within its 
boundaries. It stretches over six hundred and twenty-five miles of coastline from the 
Contoy Island north of the Yucatan Peninsula in Mexico down to the Bay Islands in 
Honduras spanning the eastern coasts of Mexico, Belize, Guatemala and Honduras in 
Central America. The Mesoamerican Reef waters are home to sixty-six species of corals 
and more than four hundred species of reef fish. The Mesoamerican barrier reef houses 
spiny lobsters, pink snails, white turtles, sea turtles, large turtles, crocodiles, dolphins 
and whale sharks among others (Pérez Ojeda 2004: 14). It is the largest reef in the 
Western Hemisphere and the second largest barrier reef in the world.  
5.2 Causes of decline: The Mesoamerican Barrier Reef context 
The factors contributing to coral reef decline can be grouped in three categories, 
natural, indirect human and direct human causes. Different scientific assessments give 
conflicting rankings of the causes of reef degradation, with a general shift away from 
local causes and toward regional and global factors (Dimitrov 2006). The report Global 
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Reefs at Risk has found59 that nearly sixty percent of the Earth’s coral reefs are 
threatened by human activity ranging from coastal development and overfishing, 
mining, to inland and marine pollution, putting much of the world’s marine biodiversity 
at risk (Burke et al. 1998, Burke et al. 2011). It adds the threats of coral bleaching and 
associated coral diseases as well as increases the recurrence of storms and hurricanes 
due to climate change (Pérez Ojeda 2004: 15). Specifically, the Mesoamerican Reef 
(MAR) is widely treated as a limitless open resource, but evidence indicates that it is 
under severe natural and human induced threat (ICRAN 2003: 2).  
While a report of the Global Task Team on the Implications of Climate Change on 
Coral Reefs established in 1992 by UNEP, IOC (Indian Ocean Commission) and IUCN 
stated that the main threats to reefs are directly anthropogenic, in subsequent reports, 
climate change in particular is given a prominent place as cause of degradation. In this 
vein, a scientific report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
stresses the existing risk on coral reefs and emphasizes both human activities and 
climate change as agents that negatively affect coral reefs (IPCC 2014b). If extreme sea 
surface temperatures are to continue, the projections of current scenarios indicate that 
it is possible that the Mesoamerican coral reef will collapse by mid-century (between 
2050 and 2070), causing major economic losses (WB 2009: 53, PIK 2012: 73). Extreme 
high sea surface temperatures have been increasingly documented in the western 
Caribbean near the coast of Central America and have resulted in frequent bleaching 
events of the Mesoamerican coral reef (Eakin 2010). There is a mounting sense that 
tropical coral reefs will be the first major ecosystem to be destroyed because of climate 
change. Any such loss would have a significant impact on many of the poorest nations 
(Souter and Lindén 2000). 
First, natural disasters refer to hurricanes, typhoons, underwater earthquakes and 
diseases for which corals need ten to twenty years to recover (Almada-Villela et al. 
2002). Even remote areas such as the Belize atolls can be periodically affected 
(Andréfouët et al. 2002). Besides, ocean warming through natural occurrences such as El 
Niño and storm events have intensified over the past several years leading to massive 
bleaching and die off of the coral reef (ICRAN 2007a, Baker, Glynn, and Riegl 2008, 
Carpenter et al. 2008). Second, quasi-natural causes with human influence refer to 
changing ocean chemistry, global warming and sea level rise. Last, multilateral scientific 
assessments point to anthropogenic factors, which are chronic and gradually lead to a 
steady decline. Four categories fall into this classification: coastal development; 
overexploitation of marine resources; inland pollution and erosion; and, marine-based 
                                                 
59 Reefs at Risk is a threat-based indicator of the world’s coral reefs, and uses the power of a 
Geographic Information System to model risk factors. 
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pollution. Examples abound: coral reef mining for construction materials; pollution 
from passing ships; anchoring and dredging of harbors from existing and future port 
operations and both port and tourism infrastructure development (GEF 2003: 63); 
anchoring from artisanal fisheries as well as from tourism to conduct their activities; 
destructive fishing practices such as blast fishing or poison fishing and overfishing in 
the region is conducted both artisanally and commercially but it is not governed by 
regional agreements and no national quotas have been established (GEF 2003: 88); 
marine collections for export purposes; cutting trees that release sediments, industrial 
toxic effluents, hot-water power plants and mine runoff that change the clarity of water 
and affect corals or nutrient-rich pond effluents from shrimp farming threaten coral 
reefs and seagrass beds and also; land-based pollution −one of the most significant 
sources of contamination in the region is untreated wastewater− that stimulates algae 
growth that shade corals. This state of affairs is primarily avoided through intensive 
grazing on the algae by fish and sea urchins. Removing such species can therefore have 
disastrous consequences (Spalding, Ravilious, and Green 2001, Sheppard, Davy, and 
Pilling 2009). 
In the Mesoamerican region specifically, the main risks are land and ship-based. 
Land-based risks are mainly two, agriculture and deforestation. Ship-based risks refer to 
port maintenance, ballast water, ship collision, vessel standards, vessel discharges and 
hazardous cargo transport and handling that count among the most dangerous threats 
to corals in the Gulf of Honduras (GEF 2003: 108). From all those, agriculture has been 
identified as the greatest land-based source of pollution in the Gulf of Honduras 
watershed. In fact, an estimated seventy-five to eighty percent of marine pollution 
originates from land-based sources, among which the most important are persistent 
organic pollutants such as pesticides (Paarlberg 1993).  
However, international agreements to reduce marine pollution have focused on 
direct ocean dumping and ship-based pollution rather than on land-based sources 
(Porter and Welsh Brown 1996b: 159-161). The main crops in Belize are bananas, citrus, 
corn, rice, cassavas, mangoes and cocoa (GEF 2003: 93). Logging is a major industry in 
Guatemala and in Honduras (GEF 2003: 96). Overfishing, habitat pollution and 
destruction, and the invasion of species combine synergistically exacerbating negative 
effects on biodiversity and the delivery of ecosystem services (Guarderas et al., 2008; 
Halpern et al., 2008). This is the case of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System 
(Almada-Villela et al. 2002) with the combination of sedimentation, tourism 
development, destructive and unregulated fishing practices, over-fishing and, land-
based pollution from agricultural and urban run-off (ICRANMAR 2003: 9). Both 
pollution and overfishing count for the loss of grazers in the Caribbean, that is 
parrotfish and sea urchins, which breaks the ecological equilibrium that triggers the 
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proliferation of algae that smother coral reefs in the region. Importantly, diving and 
coastal tourism has been identified as one of the most important socioeconomic 
activities in the majority of sites in the area (INEGI 1998, 289-298). The Roatán Reef in 
Honduras can receive up to 400 passengers in just one day (Doiron and Weissenberger 
2014). The tourism industry has experienced a rapid and chaotic growth along the 
corridor from Cancun to Chetumal in Quintana Roo, in the Bay Islands of Honduras, 
and on many of the cays along the Belize Barrier Reef. Many marine protected areas 
(MPAs) exist only on paper (see Annex II) (WB 2001: 8). 
 









Figure 5.2 Picture from SAM Programa de Monitoreo Sinóptico (SAM 2002: 3) 
Inappropriate inland land use and coastal development count among the main 
threats to the coral reefs of Belize, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico (FAO 2000). These 
threats arise as a result of the increased deposition of sediments, which severely affect 
organisms associated with coral reefs, including the corals themselves (Spalding, 
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Ravilious, and Green 2001). Besides, impacts of land use change are not only 
environmental but also social. In the past decades, the expansion of corporate sugarcane 
and oil palm plantations in some regions such as northern Guatemala has encroached 
on the lands of Maya Q’eqchi’ indigenous people. These plantations have already 
displaced hundreds of families, even entire communities, leading to increased poverty, 
hunger, unemployment, and landlessness in the region60 that relocate to coastline areas, 
which increases the pressure on coastal resources.  
5.3  Coral reef governance and the Mesoamerican Reef: National and 
international frameworks 
Pollution, climate change, industrial fishing, tourism and agribusiness count among the 
most important risks to coral reefs, and thus causal relationships are complex to 
establish and, leading to diluted responsibility among different agents. In coral reef 
governance, there is no clear leadership or institutional guide that provides a forum for 
cooperation as it happens with climate or biodiversity governance. Most actions are 
taken at a regional or state level. A case in point is a voluntary international initiative for 
coral reefs, called the International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI), which includes the 
countries neighboring coral reefs, which have a regional framework for action. In 
addition, several international agreements acknowledge the decline of coral reefs, yet 
not as a central concern or core issue or focal area. Existing coral reef governance 
initiatives can be distinguished along the orchestration strategies discussed in chapter 
two. On the one hand, formal initiatives under state leadership are delegated to 
international organizations, while informal ones have their origin in entrepreneurial 
action by international organizations. 
5.3.1 Government-led environmental initiatives in Mesoamerica 
Global coral reef governance relies on loosely coordinated voluntary action without 
formal international policy agreement (Dimitrov 2002, 2006). The coral policy realm is 
quiet and generally invisible at the international level with few actors other than 
scientists and environmentalists becoming engaged (Dimitrov 2011). Consequently, 
norms and rules to safeguard coral ecosystems, if existing, come primarily from national 
policy-making. Some efforts have been made toward the implementation of an 
ecological and regional approach to projects, though not with a focus on coral reefs but 
on biodiversity in general. Even if the Mesoamerican reef consists of a Large Marine 
Ecosystem (LME), which includes both World Heritage and Ramsar sites within its 
boundaries, contributions toward the ecological integrity and continued productivity of 
                                                 
60 Companies controlled by European-descendent Guatemalan oligarchs benefit from rising global 
commodity prices for food, animal feed, and fuel i.e. biodiesel and ethanol. 
144 
 
the coral reef in the area have been made from a national perspective through support 
from multilateral or bi-lateral cooperation organizations. A case in point is the Country 
Assistance Strategies (CAS) fostered by the World Bank, which formulate 
environmental, economic and social objectives pursued by countries individually. Even 
if individual countries neighboring the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef share common sector 
goals (World Bank 2001: 3), regional environmental cooperation among countries has 
not been pursued. 
In June 2008, the Environmental Ministers of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama signed the Campeche 
Declaration (2008), which shaped the Mesoamerican Strategy for Environmental 
Sustainability (Estrategia Mesoamericana de Sustentabilidad Ambiental, EMSA) through 
which, the regions’ Ministers of the Environment cooperate in the strategic areas of 
biodiversity, forests, climate change and business sustainability. However, it was not 
until 2013 that the work under EMSA had been reactivated to discuss issues such as the 
EMSA Action Plan as well as the managerial plan of the Mesoamerican Biological 
Corridor 2020. 
In addition, various projects in the Mesoamerican region with a national focus have 
been financed through, inter alia, bi- and multilateral organizations in support of the 
conservation of coastal and marine resources (World Bank 2001: 18). A relevant example 
in Mexico is the southern Quintana Roo Integrated Coastal Zone Management Project 
that resulted in the successful designation of the Xcalak Marine Park (Bezaury Creel 
1997) in the northern transboundary area between the state of Quintana Roo, Mexico 
and northern Belize. 
At the same time, some regional-level resource conservation and environmental 
sustainability projects by international organizations have been initiated (ICRAN 2003: 
4, Cortés Rodríguez 2011). An example is the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC). 
Just over a decade later, and with more than US$500 million invested; many have judged 
the MBC to be a failure (Álvarez 2005). Yet the Central American Commission for 
Environment and Development (CCAD for its acronym in Spanish) has retained MBC as 
a component in its most recent regional environmental strategy, and portions of the 
original MBC persist (Holland 2012) and are being reinforced. In fact, the Biodiversity 
Partnership Mesoamerica has been established in 2012 as part of the framework of the 
Mesoamerican Biological Corridor 2020 supported by the Estrategia Mesoamericana de 
Sustentabilidad Ambiental (EMSA), which is a project commissioned by the German 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) led by the 
Secretary General of the Central American Integration System (SG-SICA) with the 
cooperation of private businesses, such as retailer REWE, global business Chiquita and 
Costa Rican Corporación Bananera Nacional (Corbana), acting as a regional platform 
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that supports reforestation, the establishment of wildlife corridors and power 
generation from biomass. 
SICA is the institutional framework of Regional Integration in Central America, 
created by the States of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Panama. Subsequently, Belize joined afterwards as a full member in 2000. The 
Mesoamerican barrier reef is an ecological unit shared by different countries that belong 
to the Central American Integration System (SICA for its acronym in Spanish) as full 
members with the exception of Mexico that is a regional observer. The CCAD is the 
authority of SICA responsible of the regional environmental agenda. The CCAD, which 
consists of the Council of Ministers of the Environment for Central American countries, 
is a leading public authority for putting in place potential regional environmental 
projects for Mesoamerican coral reef governance. To achieve its objectives, the CCAD 
counts on the Central American Region Environmental Plan (PARCA for its acronym in 
Spanish) whose objective is to specify the benefit of regional environmental 
management. 
5.3.2 International organization-led initiatives for coral reef governance 
The main international coral reef governance mechanism is the International Coral Reef 
Initiative (ICRI) a multistakeholder partnership, where major countries have taken 
political leadership in its set-up (Kenchington 1998), that facilitates coral reef protection 
through awareness-raising and scientific research (Dimitrov 2011). ICRI is a loose 
partnership of governments, international development banks, nongovernmental 
organizations, scientific associations and the private sector, which strives to preserve 
coral reefs and related ecosystems around the world (Mieremet 1995). Founding 
members include Australia, France, Japan, Jamaica, the Philippines, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States of America. ICRI is made up of more than eighty 
governments as well as international organizations such as the World Bank, UNEP, 
UNDP, UNESCO and IUCN. 
Since 1994, partners have been working together through the informal global 
partnership ICRI (ICRAN 2007a). The overarching goal is to implement chapter 17 of 
Agenda 21 that calls on states to identify marine ecosystems with high diversity and 
provide necessary limitations on their uses. As a loose institution is an informal network 
of interested parties, an open forum for like-minded political actors to discuss coral reef 
issues, share information, promote research, identify priorities and facilitate policy 
action through decisions and resolutions that range from aquarium fish trade or 
seagrass monitoring by requesting information from partners, undertaking studies and 
reporting to ICRI meetings. Its secretariat with no permanent staff is hosted and funded 
on a voluntary basis by partner countries for two-year periods. The ICRI expresses 
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skepticism toward the effectiveness of intergovernmental policy-making and relies on 
stakeholders to link the local to national and international structures (Grigg 1994, Dight 
and Sherl 1997). ICRI rallies both public supports for reef preservation, which is 
relatively easy because of the highly visual beauty of coral reefs and because of the 
industry support from pharmaceutical and tourist ventures that have vested interests in 
reef preservation. 
ICRI recognized the need for a coordination of research and management efforts 
across all relevant institutions. In 1999, ICRI established the International Coral Reef 
Action Network (ICRAN) in order to halt and reverse the decline in the health on the 
world’s coral reefs. In 2001, ICRAN, whose mandate is to assist capacity building for reef 
management in developing countries, through a five USD million grant by the UN 
Foundation establishes demonstration conservation sites. Specific sites have been 
selected to serve as demonstration sites based on their proved ability to influentially 
manage their coral reefs (ICRAN 2007a). These sites share local knowledge and 
successful management practices with other coral reef managers and communities. 
Target sites are sites where the best practices implemented at the demonstration sites 
can be adopted. These sites have been initially selected in four coral reef regions: The 
Caribbean Region, Eastern Africa, East Asia and South Pacific. Among the Caribbean 
Region demonstration sites count areas of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef such as the 
Hol Chan Marine Reserve (Belize) and the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve (Mexico), the 
most important protected nature site from Mexico (González de Castejón and Martos 
2003: 138). 
The ICRAN was set up as a public-private response to the Call to Action by the 
founding partners: The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the 
WorldFish Center, the World Resources Institute (WRI), the UNEP-World Conservation 
Monitoring Center (WCMC), the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network (GCRMN), the 
International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI) Secretariat, and the Coral Reef Alliance 
(CORAL). ICRAN has played a major role in the implementation of the ICRI Call to 
Action and Framework for Action (UNEP 2015a). Since 2012, the Partnership for 
Ecosystem-based Coral Reef Management in the world's Regional Seas has taken up the 
work of ICRAN activities. The development by UNEP and Regional Seas capitalizes on 
experiences from ICRAN and assumes some of its key functions (UNEP 2015b) – with 
the following partners, UNEP; Regional Seas Conventions and Action Plans; UNEP-
WCMC and GRID-Arendal; International Coral Reef Initiative; technical partners 
including national agencies and NGOs. 
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5.4  Opportunities and threats for the sustainable development of the 
Mesoamerican Barrier Reef 
This section discusses the main opportunities and threats for sustainable development 
within the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef, following a short introduction of the concept of 
sustainable development. Sustainable development has come to mean all things to all 
people. Indeed, the sustainable development concept is not just ambiguous but 
contested (Connelly 2007: 273). For instance, the setup of Type II outcomes or 
partnerships for sustainable development in the WSSD can be considered an “act to 
create institutions from incompatible discourses” (Mert 2009: 120). Yet, since the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, we are less impressed with the 
use of the word sustainable development and more concerned with the quality of praxis. 
In this process, normative claims associated with sustainable development have 
migrated to global institutions and demands of accountability (Morgera 2004), 
responsibility and transparency to the private sector have spread out (Doran 2002). In 
line with this, the suggested strengthening of the Commission on Sustainable 
Development by upgrading it to a Council of Sustainable Development to be higher in 
the international hierarchy (Biermann 2012), has finally taken the form of the High-
Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (Abbott and Bernstein 2015). 
Orchestration by international organizations for coral reef governance contributes to 
shaping the sustainable development concept in practice. Within this process, the 
different conceptions of sustainable development coexist, differentiated in how they 
address limits to growth, environmental protection, equity and participation (Jacobs 
1999), one concern being whether the environmental agenda would benefit if it did not 
attempt to encompass the interlocking goals of development, social justice and 
environmental protection. Nonetheless, the widespread support for an end to 
environmentally unfriendly subsidies in a variety of UN programs and agreements 
reflects how interlinkages between the three pillars are taken into account.  
5.4.1 Opportunities 
Coral reefs count on several opportunities that can enhance efforts for their protection, 
namely, the setup of legal frameworks to halt the decline in biodiversity, the designation 
of World Heritage sites and marine protected areas (MPAs), and finally, the valuation of 
the ecological services provided by reefs as well as the recognition of both the cultural 
and economic impact of coral reefs. 
First, in the absence of a multilateral agreement that copes with coral reef decline 
(Dimitrov 2002) or ocean acidification (Kim 2012), concerns on corals ecosystems have 
been expressed in various international fora, namely the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on 
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International Trade of Endangered Species and the Global Conference on Sustainable 
Development of Small Island Developing States (ICRI 1997). States in the Mesoamerican 
region are members of international agreements for the protection of the environment 
that relate to marine resources generally (Haughton 2011) and coral reef protection 
specifically (Davidson 2002). The Global Environment Facility (GEF) finances all those 
environmental treaties that crosscut coral reef governance implemented through the 
World Bank, UNDP or UNEP. 
Table 5 below shows that several international agreements that support coral reef 
protection have been ratified by the countries that border the Mesoamerican barrier 
reef such as the biodiversity convention, protocol on biosafety, CITES on trade of 
endangered species, RAMSAR convention on wetlands, MARPOL on the prevention of 
pollution from ships, the protocol on climate change and the Wider Caribbean Regional 
Seas Programme. Despite the Convention on Biological Diversity’s set up in 1992, the 
earlier sectoral conventions, namely the RAMSAR Convention and the World Heritage 
Convention, remain highly relevant and must sometimes be recognized as the leading 
international governance regimes for the conservation of wildlife and habitats, with 
coral reefs being a case in point (Wilkinson 2006). Specifically, the World Heritage 
Convention has listed the Belize Barrier Reserve System as a World Heritage in Danger 
as well as the Honduran Rio Plátano Biosphere Reserve that slops down to the 
Caribbean coast close the barrier reef. In the case of Mexico, the Sian Ka’an biosphere 
reserve that includes de Mexican Barrier Reef is also listed as World Heritage (Vales et 
al. 2000:39-40). 
The SPAW Protocol in the Wider Caribbean Region is the only region-wide 
environmental treaty that protects critical marine and coastal ecosystems, while 
promoting regional cooperation and sustainable development. Consequently, some 
commentator would argue that a bespoke convention for coral reefs would be necessary 
to strengthen coral reef governance (Dimitrov 2006). Yet to other analysts, it is virtually 
impossible to imagine that the negotiations for such a treaty would include mitigation 











Table 5.1 Status of coral reef-related governance agreements in the Mesoamerican region 
(1) Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife / (2) Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (3) Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter /  
(4) International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 
 
Second, some opportunities draw from the designation of marine protected areas 
(MPAs) and of World Heritage sites, which recognize the importance of these 
biodiversity hotspots for marine ecosystems. Experience in creating and financing 
protected areas and developing marine ecosystem-based management in the Caribbean 
exists (PNUMA and TNC 2001, Fanning, Mahon, and Mc Conney 2011). In MPAs there 
are examples of fisheries’ co-management, a form of a participatory process involving 
local fishermen communities, government, academia and NGOs, which were reported 
to favor a balance between the conservation of marine fisheries, coral reefs and 
mangroves on the one hand (Francini-Filho and de Moura 2008), and the improvement 
of livelihoods, as well as the cultural survival of traditional populations on the other (de 
Moura et al. 2009, Hastings 2011). These actions, including the creation of marine 
reserves to protect from overfishing, improvement of watershed management, and 
protection or replanting of coastal mangroves, are proven tools to improve ecosystem 
functioning (Barber and Pratt 1998). In Mesoamerican reefs, Carilli found out that such 
actions may also increase the thermal tolerance of corals to bleaching stress and thus 
the associated likelihood of surviving future warming (Carrillo et al. 2009). Yet, this 
protected area cover is insufficient to preserve important habitats or connectivity 
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among populations at large biogeographic scales (Guarderas, Hacker, and Lubchenco 
2008). In fact, marine protected areas must overcome some challenges such as small 
size and low management capacity in order to achieve its objectives (Jameson, Tupper, 
and Ridley 2002). 
The third of the outlined opportunities refers to the Mesoamerican reef’s 
socioeconomic relevance. The results of the studies commissioned on the economic 
valuation of the ecosystem services provided by coral reefs support the need for their 
management and protection (Burke et al. 2011). From this anthropocentric view, reefs 
are providers of different types of services, that is, environmental, economic, social and 
cultural (on a critical view on utilitarian biodiversity conservation see Hufty 2012). Reef 
but also mangrove ecosystems are estimated to greatly contribute to goods and services 
in economic terms. In Belize, for example, this amount is approximately USD395-
USD559 million annually, primarily through marine-based tourism, fisheries and coastal 
protection (Cooper et al. 2008). Finally, another environmental service by coral reefs 
consists in carbon removal from the oceans contributing to climate change mitigation. 
Concretely, the MBRS with coral reefs, mangroves, fisheries, and other benthic marine 
corals remove about 700 billion kg of carbon per year contributing to mitigating climate 
change (WB 2001). 
5.4.2 Threats 
The negative impacts on the reefs (Wilkinson and Salvat 1998) lead to significant 
challenges and costs for societies, particularly in developing countries (Hoegh-Guldberg 
and Bruno 2010). For instance, the Ocean Health Index (Halpern 2012) that measures 
how healthy the coupling of the human-ocean system is for every coastal country 
indicates that Central American countries rank amongst the lowest values. 
Coral reef governance in the Mesoamerican region faces several threats that need to 
be addressed (Burke and Maidens 2004). Those challenges can be summarized in five 
categories: first, gaps in national environmental legislation; second, virtually 
nonexistent knowledge about the global and transboundary effects of human activities 
on the coral reef ecosystem to justify international obligations (Dimitrov 2006); third, 
the need to balance competing industry interests with the development, 
implementation, monitoring and verification of norms that reverse current practice that 
include inadequate aquatic tourism practices, urban development and tourism, the lack 
of means by indigenous communities for controlling the highly industrialized and 
armed fishing fleets (Sandner 2003: 294), and navigation (Arrivillaga and Windevoxhel 




First, gaps in the national environmental legislation in the region manifest through 
(WB 2001: 27) a decline in traditional economic activities. There is no national strategy 
to protect coral reefs. Coral reef protection is strongly dependent on international aid 
and national and international philanthropy (Estebanéz et al. 2004). National 
management programs only map the existence of coral reefs but no specific policies are 
dedicated thereto (CONANP 2003). In addition, the evaluation and monitoring of 
management programs are propositions of intentions that turn them into paper tigers. 
In the case of fishing, a widespread disparity exists between the fishing legislation of the 
four countries neighboring the Mesoamerican reef (UFL 2005). The global coral reef 
conservation community is diverse and operates through more than twenty-five 
international and intergovernmental conventions and organizations, and more than one 
hundred and fifty non-governmental organizations (ICRI 2013). Besides, the main 
convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the 
Wider Caribbean Region (Cartagena Convention) (UNEP-CAR/RCU 2001) is only signed 
by Belize (UNEP 2015c). At the global level, 660 marine protected areas that contain 
coral reefs are designed as “paper parks” that only exist in theory (Dimitrov 2006: 134). 
Second, another challenge identified is the need to generate knowledge of 
transboundary effects for increased international cooperation. Reefs are among the least 
monitored and protected natural habitats in the world. In fact, existing global 
assessments represent some first steps towards more complete studies that do not rely 
on research assumptions to cover existing information gaps. Virtually no socioeconomic 
groups other than scientists and environmentalists push the agenda for action 
(Dimitrov 2006: 148). In fact, there is a lack of regional perspective. Only Belize has 
applied to get the Belize Barrier Reef Reserve System listed as a World Heritage Site “in 
danger”, which is only a section of the barrier reef (E-LAW 2004, UNESCO 2009). The 
lack of information on sources and sites of development impact downstream 
contributes to the absence of uniform standards with regard to effluent and receiving 
water quality. This situation may be described as an analogy of a patient being told by 
doctors in the form of a sophisticated diagnosis that the condition is becoming worse 
without any mitigation treatment being implemented (Kenchington 1998). 
Third, a central challenge is to acknowledge the effects that the important industries 
of agribusiness and fishing have on the extremely sensible and important tourism 
industry sector. Tourism is one of the largest industries in the world and is the fastest 
growing industry in the region defined by the Caribbean Sea (ICRANMAR 2003: 24). The 
Caribbean has the largest proportion of people employed in this sector (25%), and the 
highest GDP gained from this sector (29.6%) (UNWTO 2015). In Central America, the 
main drivers of mangrove loss are deforestation and land conversion to agriculture and 
shrimp ponds (FAO 2000, Gamboa 2002: 3). Operating companies such as Dole and 
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Chiquita develop intensive agriculture activities in the area. Yet, only a limited portion 
of the revenues from such companies ever reached producing countries, much less 
farmers and workers (Lipschutz 2004: 2). Additionally, when falling commodity prices 
are combined with debt burdens and protectionism, indebted countries increase the 
volume of commodity exports (Porter and Welsh Brown 1996c: 108-111). 
Fourth, cultural challenges are also faced in the region. Corruption is a transversal 
challenge that needs to be faced for project development in affected countries. 
Specifically, IUCN has reported global fisheries (IUCN 2008) as a policy area where 
corruption is not rare, which compounds with the devastating effects of overfishing. 
Scientists’ evidence is not being taken into consideration when it comes to management 
decisions on fisheries and quotas. Species may be mislabeled and some products are 
falsely marked “ecofish”, which undermines sustainable seafood campaigns.  
While Mexico is placed in the best position for environmental policy-making and 
nationally sustainable development strategies (Swanson et al. 2004), it is handicapped 
by its overly centralized administrative tradition that fails to deliver resources to field 
offices where they are needed for monitoring and compliance mechanisms (Sale et al. 
2000: 67). In the case of Mexico, the second largest economy in Latin America (WB 
2016), economic progress has come at a high price in environmental degradation 
(Mumme and Lybecker 2002: 311, González de Castejón and Martos 2003: 96-97). In the 
case of Guatemala (DoS 2016), according to the World Bank & IFC Investment Climate 
Assessment, a significant number of companies report having to pay bribes in return for 
environmental permits needed for business operations in the country (GAN 2016). 
Global Integrity 2010 further states that environmental regulations are not always 
enforced uniformly or in an even-handed manner, and that political influence and lack 
of funds are some of the serious impediments hampering the effectiveness of the 
Ministry of Environment (GI 2010). Belize is a high-crime country in Central America 
(OSAC 2013). Yet, tourism is a staple of the Belizean economy, and each year hundreds 
of thousands of tourists visit Belize. Honduras is among the poorest and most violent 
countries in the world (TI 2013). Shrimp farms have been extensively constructed along 
the Fonseca Gulf, which turns this country into the second biggest producer and 
exporter after Ecuador. Such farms generate severe ecological problems, such as the 
destruction of mangroves, that are both a natural defense barrier against hurricanes, 
and the home to various fish species (UNEP 2010). 
Finally, socio-economic factors play a challenging role for the orchestrators of coral 
reef governance in the Central American region. Even if orchestration processes, such as 
norm development and implementation were smooth, it is realistic to assume that 
objectives would not be fully accomplished. The countries involved, are unstable 
politically, where power and Internet cuts are frequent, in some instances taxes raise by 
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300% and orchestration processes will be affected and will need to adapt to such extra 
challenges61. 
5.5 Orchestration actors: Orchestrators, intermediaries and targets 
The two organizations that center major orchestration activities for coral reef 
governance in the Mesoamerican region are the World Bank and the UNEP. 
Both the World Bank and UNEP, through its Regional Seas Programme, have a 
record on biodiversity policy management in the area of the Yucatan peninsula. The 
expert survey from chapter four has shown that both international organizations are 
considered relevant according to experts, albeit with some differences. While UNEP is 
the most appreciated of all organizations surveyed, for its neutrality and trust-based 
resources, the World Bank exerts more outputs on voluntary initiatives and catches the 
eye for its participation-based resources. 
The World Bank has been instrumental in turning a number of paper national parks 
in Mexico into operational ones. Mexico’s government had established national parks 
but no members of staff were assigned to take care of them. This changed in 1992 with 
World Bank’s donation operationalized through a GEF project that allowed for seventy 
areas to be protected by staff62. A sum of twenty-five million dollars donated to Mexico 
by GEF and the World Bank has been used as a trust fund whose interests serve in 
perpetuity - rules on the use of the fund remain the same even if there is a change of 
government (Fondo Mexicano para la Conservación International). According to the 
Director General of Conservation Management of the National Commission of Protected 
Areas, such donation became a catalyst for starting environmental policies at the 
natural protected areas of Mexico at a federal level. 
The UNEP has proved influential with regard to conservation in the Yucatan area. 
UNEP was very active in the run-up to the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) 2003 Durban World Parks Congress held in South Africa. UNEP financed 
a prominent academic and activist that had served to the secretary of the environment 
in Mexico to conduct a comparative study on the state of the parks in the Latin-
American and Caribbean region whose results were presented at the World congress. 
The recommendations formulated during the meeting were discussed at the 2004 
Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and were subsequently approved as binding 
recommendations for states to comply with63. 
                                                 
61 Personal interview with a CONANP director, February 2005. 
62 Personal interview with a CONANP director, February 2005. 
63 Personal interview with a CONANP director, Mexico City, February 2005. 
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Accordingly, the following chapters deal with two empirical cases where 
international organizations play the orchestrator role. The World Bank orchestrates a 
formal process born from the initiative of four neighboring Southern states financed by 
a multilateral organization. Instead, UNEP orchestrates an informal multistakeholder 
partnership. Specifically, both processes have the same objective, which is to influence 
coral reef governance and sustainable development in the Mesoamerican region. The 
World Bank’s persuasion aims at setting policies to be adopted by the four countries in 
the region, while UNEP’s social leverage approach strives for informal standard setting 
and information sharing. 
5.5.1 Governments 
Leadership by governments is needed to pass on regulation that protects coral reefs and 
harmonizes normative approaches to a sustainable model of coral reef management. 
Belize, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico are the four countries bordering the MBRS, 
which may use environmental diplomacy to advance regional economic integration 
objectives under the cooperation umbrella of the Central American System of 
Integration (Sistema de Integración Centroamericano-SICA). 
5.5.2 Businesses 
Several industries play a role in coral reef governance. Most importantly, economic 
activities exert impacts on the environment and the state of the environment also 
affects industry activities. The key industries identified related to coral reef governance 
are tourism, agribusiness, fishing and shipping. The agribusiness and shipping industry 
affect the environment in a negative manner. Other businesses, such as the nature-
based and ecotourism industry and the fishing industry rely on healthy reefs, for 
recreational activities and fish breeding, respectively. At the same time, the tourism 
industry does not always contribute to coral reef conservation in a positive manner. In 
fact, tourism and fishing may harm coral reefs. Yet, some positive synergies between 
those activities and coral reef conservation can be established. The private sector, 
including the nature-based tourism and fishing industry may benefit through study 
tours in best practice, regional environmental certification programs, and discussion 
fora with industry counterparts in the region, agribusiness, cruise ship industries and 
shipping industry. 
5.5.3 Local and regional NGOs 
Non-state organizations, both local and international have a role since they are the 
watchdogs of the environmental status of coral reefs. The range of their activities goes 
from networking, public awareness and education, and project management, to 
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scientific research, advocacy and funding. NGOs such as TIDES, the Belize Audubon 
Society, Green Reef, BELPO, Fundación Mario Dary (FUNDARY), FUNDAECO, the 
Honduras Coral Reef Fund, PROLANSATE, BICA, Amigos de Sian Ka’an, ECOSUR profit 
as recipients of equipment, information and training64. Non-governmental actors 
provide with both capacities and some caveats (lack of capacity, of institutional 
structures, resources or governance mechanisms that ignore contributions by 
stakeholders to the policy process) as shown by the case of fisheries management in the 
Wider Caribbean (Potter and Parsram 2011). 
5.5.4 Indigenous communities and minorities 
Local communities involved in co-management of marine protected areas, fishing and 
sustainable tourism, are an asset for coral reef management. Local populations currently 
dependent on the resources of the MBRS, and those whose livelihoods may be affected 
by the creation of marine-protected areas include indigenous groups, such as the 
Garifuna folk along the coasts of Belize (Ellis 1997), Honduras and Guatemala; the 
Mayan community in the frontier areas between southern Belize and Guatemala; the 
Miskito communities along the southernmost margins of the MBRS; and the Ladino 
populations who have recently moved to coastal areas and tourism destinations in 
search of employment, who may be in conflict with more traditional MBRS resource 
users. Other minorities such as women and youth may be included in projects that 
provide opportunities in becoming involved in tourism - either cultural or nature-based 
- in association with marine-protected areas and in educational programs that integrate 
youth communities. Thus, training in alternative livelihood schemes is to be both 
gender and culturally oriented. 
5.5.5 Local affected people 
People that either directly or indirectly depend on the coral reefs for their day-to-day 
life, that affect their management and who are not included in the rest of the groups 
may be informed of existing initiatives to best manage coral reefs. These communities 
that see their livelihood style affected by projects to manage coral reefs need to be 
involved in participatory processes. Fishing cooperatives such as the Belize Fishermen 
Cooperative Association, the National Fishermen Cooperative, the Placencia 
Cooperative, and Asociacion de Pescadores de Manabique, may benefit from improved 
information on the state of resources and on non-destructive fishing methods, 
consistency in the timing and enforcement of closed seasons and no-take reserves in 
transboundary areas of the MBRS. 
                                                 
64 Personal interview with a Belize Audubon Society member of staff, March 2005. 
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5.5.6 Research institutions 
Research institutions are important as knowledge on the transboundary effects of the 
causes of coral reef decline is largely missing. Studies on how coral reefs may be restored 
to alleviate the damage of coral bleaching and pollution and adaptation measures for 
coral reefs in reference to climate change are thus necessary. Scientific communities and 
policy makers alike portray the worldwide degradation of coral reefs as a global issue 
that requires a policy response. Yet, an international legal regime on coral reefs is not on 
the global agenda, and states so far do not consider it necessary. As Dimitrov argues, the 
missing knowledge about the transboundary effects of the problem impedes the 
formation of common interests and does not easily justify the need for a binding 
international agreement (2002). Thus, the scientific community may benefit from the 
information knowledge base created through project implementation. 
5.5.7 Donor community 
The donor community may gain from international organization’s orchestration 
through the strategic programming of resources and improved coordination in project 
and program implementation to achieve greater regional influence. 
5.5.8 International organizations and regional institutions  
Other international or regional organizations such as Comisión Centroamericana de 
Ambiente y Desarrollo (CCAD) play a role through increased synergy among projects 
implemented under the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor umbrella; they provide 
decentralized project coordination units, and improved information access and 
outreach for orchestrators. 
5.5.9 The regional and global environment 
Orchestration for coral reef governance attempts to protect biodiversity and their 
related vital environmental goods and services. 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the coral reef governance issue, the relevance of coral reefs 
and the causes for their decline in general, and particularly for the Mesoamerican 
Barrier Reef. Coral reefs are one of the most complex ecosystems on Earth and a 
storehouse of immense biological wealth. Even if coral reefs represent an environment 
that cover less than one percent of the Earth’s surface, they provide goods and services 
worth $375 billion a year. In developing countries, coral reefs contribute to one quarter 
of the total fish catch. Corals contribute to several key economic sectors through fish 
157 
 
catch and tourism revenues; they also provide shoreline protection from ocean forces. 
Specifically, forty-three million people depend on Caribbean reefs. 
Corals are sensitive to human influence and to a lower extent to natural disasters. 
Sixty percent of earth’s coral reefs are threatened by human activity. In addition, they 
are the least monitored and protected natural habitats in the world. One-sixth of the 
original coral reef, predominantly the Caribbean reef, may disappear in few years from 
now. Specifically, the greatest threats to the Mesoamerican barrier reef result from 
diverse human activities. On top of the acidification of oceans, sea level rise and ocean 
warming from climate change that affect reefs worldwide, land-based pollution from 
agricultural and urban run-off and sedimentation, nutrients and river-borne pollutants 
are paramount threats to the reef. Destructive and unregulated fishing practices and the 
overfishing of key commercial species contribute to the growing demand associated 
with growing tourism markets. The Mesoamerican barrier reef context presents some 
opportunities and threats for coral reef governance. First, states in the region are 
members of international environmental agreements that take into account, even if not 
exclusively, coral reef protection. Second, some areas of the MBRS have been designated 
World Heritage sites for their outstanding ecological and cultural significance. Finally, 
studies on the economic valuation of the ecosystem services provided by the reef 
provide solid arguments that support the need for their protection as coral reefs provide 
resources to different industries (fishing and tourism), contribute to the stabilization 
and protection of the coastline, maintain water quality, and are sites for the 
reproduction and breeding of marine mammals. 
However, important threats also exist. First, there are gaps in the national 
environmental legislation that do not address the decline of traditional economic 
activities such as agriculture and fishing and there is a lack of policies to manage the 
increase of urbanization and tourism development. Second, there is a lack of knowledge 
generation on the transboundary effects of human activities on the ecosystem, on the 
sources and sites of development that impact downstream and a lack of information on 
the need for uniform standards. Other challenges include the search for a balance of 
competing industry interests and finally, the cooperation between states needs to 
overcome several variables, such as the socioeconomic, cultural and sociopolitical 
weaknesses of states. 
The next chapters, six and seven, center the empirical analysis on the two 
orchestration approaches. The empirical research focuses on the World Bank −as the 
delegated orchestrator− and UNEP −as the entrepreneurial orchestrator− implementing 
coral reef governance. 
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6. Orchestrating through persuasion: The Mesoamerican 
Barrier Reef System Project 
This chapter characterizes the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System Project as an 
orchestration process delegated from the states to the MPO World Bank and analyzes 
the influence of its persuasive approach in coral reef sustainability politics. The first 
section briefly introduces the World Bank as the orchestrator for the Mesoamerican 
Barrier Reef System Project, an orchestration process led by four neighboring countries 
that share a transboundary environmental resource. The next section applies the five 
criteria introduced in chapter 2 in order to identify the MBRS project as a case of formal 
orchestration, namely, membership, franchise, decision-making, mandate and 
orchestrator’s autonomy. The following two sections assess, in line with the framework 
developed in chapter 3, the outputs reached and the procedural resources generated by 
the persuader – the World Bank. The last section discusses the influence of the World 
Bank as a persuader for orchestrating coral reef sustainability politics. Finally, the 
argument is made that the influence exerted is the result of who initiates the 
orchestration process and how membership affects the selection of intermediaries and 
the orchestration process. 
6.1 World Bank as persuader 
Despite the World Bank being the orchestrator of GEF’s financed MBRS project, the idea 
of the MBRS project was first formulated between 1994 and 1996 by a civil servant. This 
person was working at the Ecology National Institute of Mexico (INE) and she was 
concerned that the Mexican reef was more affected by the coastline, and thus less 
developed than the exuberant Belizean reef, and the Guatemalan, and the Honduran 
reef that is more or less developed. For this reason, she convinced the director at INE to 
set a consultative round agenda travelling to the neighboring stakeholder countries, 
Belize, Guatemala and Honduras65. The Central American Integration System 
department of the Central American Commission on Environment and Development 
(CCAD-SICA) took the idea further together with Guatemala and Belize that has the 
most developed part of the reef in its coast and all partners applied and achieved the 
World Bank’s B block for the project. 
The consultation process started in 1994 in the Mexican city of Chetumal where the 
first workshops were held. The by then Mexican Secretary of the Environment and 
Fishing (SEMARNAP), Julia Carabias, was able to get the Mexican President Zedillo into 
this effort as the president travelled frequently to Cancun for scuba diving. The Heads of 
State of the four Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System countries bordering the MBRS 
                                                 
65 Personal interview with the advisor to the Ecology National Institute’s (INE), April 2005. 
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convened in Tulum, Mexico in June 1997 - as recognition to Mexico in their starting 
effort (1997)66 - to pledge their commitment to jointly conserve and manage the MBRS 
and its environmental resources for current and future generations. The Tulum 
declaration called on the four littoral states of the MBRS and its partners in the region 
to join in developing an Action Plan for its Conservation and Sustainable Use (WB 2001: 
6). The Central American Commission on Environment and Development (CCAD) 
constituted by the Ministers of Environment of the seven Central American countries 
and Mexico - as an observer - requested support from the GEF through the World Bank 
for the design and implementation of an Action Plan. The World Bank has led the 
process, with the GEF serving as the financing mechanism for the MBRS project, with 
the “one-stop shopping” mandate to finance action on an indefinite set of global 
commons problems (Fairman 1996: 83). 
With Project Development Fund (PDF) Block A and Block B funds from the GEF and 
technical support from the World Bank, IUCN, and WWF, CCAD convened a multi-
stakeholder workshop and subsequent working groups of scientists, managers, 
governmental and non-governmental representatives from the four participating 
countries to draft an action plan for management of the MBRS. Besides, the GEF 
through the World Bank has undertaken three regional workshops with the 
participation of GOs, NGOs, researchers and consultants67. Members from the 
international and NGO communities, as well as the private sector are targeted to form a 
consultative group to liaise with other donors and to secure and consolidate 
investments in the MBRS that address priority needs and resource gaps over the course 
of a first-designed 15 year program (Hatziolos 2001: 19). The action plan, adopted in June 
1999, provided the basis for a comprehensive phased approach of a fifteen-year program 
of regional and national level activities (WB 2001: 6). This, in turn, attracts more 
resources from partners and other potential donors, and a better integration of 
investments in the region, reinforcing the success of the long-term effort (WB 2001: 20). 
The Mesoamerican Barrier Reef project officially started in 2001 with a disbursement 
of a total amount of US$ 24.20 million. Yet, the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef project took 
several years to be designed. Two years of time and resources were spent on holding 
workshops and meetings with the four countries involved and, with no documents 
signed in all this time68. It took four years, from the Tulum Declaration in 1997 for the 
actual agreement to be signed with the World Bank. To elaborate the proposal and the 
                                                 
66 Personal interview with the Director at the Comisión Nacional de Areas Naturales Protegidas 
(CONANP) of Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (SEMARNAT), February 2005. 
67 Personal interview with World Bank’s marine ecologist supervisor of MBRS, September 2005. 
68 Personal interview with the Director at the Comisión Nacional de Areas Naturales Protegidas 
(CONANP) of SEMARNAT, February 2005. 
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plan of action, meetings took place approximately three times a year69. The process, 
already complex as it involved four different countries, was delayed by the fact that 
during those years, governments in those countries changed, and so did the country 
representatives for the project. In 2001, country representatives travelled to Washington 
with the World Bank’s officer to sign project protocols70. The next step was for the 
World Bank’s officer to get the matching funds for the project from other foundations 
(MBRS 2003f). 
Once the remaining funds were matched, the consultant that had developed the 
proposal drafted the action plan. Once the action plan was approved, then he became 
the project leader. The action plan was validated with the organization of workshops 
with a variety of actors coming from the four countries involved71. Each country 
compromised to set up a group with the stakeholder representatives of the initiative. 
During the stakeholders meetings it was discussed what to be financed, where, how and 
what was the process72. In light of complexity and the longer-term periods required to 
achieve the goals related to environmental quality and policy reform, a gradualist 
approach and a geographic focus were incorporated into the project design (World Bank 
2001: 15). The project, declared effective in November 2001, consisted of a first phase of 
an initial five-year project that shifted to a proposed fifteen-year program. The original 
project represented the first phase of a three-phase program and would depend in part 
on the influence of the initial five-year effort. Phase one focused on institutional 
coordination and strategic interventions in capacity building, public awareness and 
policy reform to lay the groundwork for future interventions. In addition, with the 
exception of the thematic focal area of public awareness and environmental education, 
the rest, promoting the sustainable use of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef, regional 
environmental information systems and marine protected areas, were designed 
incrementally. Besides, support for pilot activities in marine protected areas monitoring, 
tourism and alternative livelihoods was designed to test the feasibility of specific 
enterprises and policies. In light of anticipated increases in demographic pressure in the 
watersheds and coastal plains of the Mesoamerican Reef over the coming years, a 
strategic shift in focus landward, such as the conservation of terrestrial and aquatic 
systems upstream in watersheds emptying into the Mesoamerican Reef, was required in 
the subsequent phases of the project. 
                                                 
69 Personal interview with World Bank’s marine ecologist supervisor of MBRS, September 2005. 
70 Personal interview with the advisor to the Ecology National Institute’s (INE), April 2005. 
71 Personal interview with the advisor to the Ecology National Institute’s (INE), April 2005. 
72 Personal interview with the Director at the Comisión Nacional de Areas Naturales Protegidas 
(CONANP) of SEMARNAT, February 2005. 
161 
 
Finally, although maritime pollution and habitat degradation related to shipping- 
including effects from cruise ships and inadequate port reception facilities were 
identified as significant transboundary threats, the project would not address these 
issues (FAO 2000: 18). The decision was based on the arguments that those issues were 
addressed by other donors, such as WWF and USAID, and would form the basis for a 
complementary regional project, prepared in the Gulf of Honduras, to be executed by 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) with GEF support, the so-called Gulf of 
Honduras Maritime Transport Pollution Control Project (WB 2001: 18). A GEF Block B 
proposal was being prepared by the IDB, with the Bank as implementing agency (GEF 
2003), in conformity with the objectives of GEF Operational Program 10 while 
simultaneously reducing threats to the globally significant Mesoamerican Barrier Reef 
System (MBRS) (IW:Learn 2015). For instance, the Big Creek Port in Belize is operated 
by the Banana Growers Association where environmental problems include the lack of 
wastewater treatment and improper application and disposal of pesticides by the 
banana growers industry (GEF 2003: 55-56). Thus, the MBRS is not the only project with 
GEF guidance in the area. However, the two projects are not connected for 
implementation. 
6.2 Characterizing World Bank’s formal orchestration 
This section describes World Bank’s formal orchestration approach along five 
dimensions, namely membership, franchise, decision-making, mandate and 
international organization’s autonomy. 
6.2.1 Membership 
The MBRS project is implemented by the World Bank and executed by four littoral 
states of the MBRS through the Central American Commission on Environment and 
Development (CCAD) of the System for Central American Integration (SICA). National 
governments have led the MBRS project from the start, which explains why these actors 
are the principals that delegate to the World Bank the task of implementing 
coordinated action for coral reef management. Government officials from key ministries 
act as national coordinators for the MBRS, and provide access to top decision-making 
members of the government. In turn, the World Bank as orchestrator provides material 
resources and experience on environmental policy implementation to intermediaries. 
Institutional and implementation arrangements of the World Bank’s MBRS project 
are organized in the following manner (World Bank 2001: 14): The Central American 
Commission on Environment and Development (CCAD) of the regional organization 
System for Central American Integration (SICA) oversees project execution as the main 
intermediary. CCAD oversees the execution of the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) for 
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the five-year project proposed during Phase one (see Figure 6)73. The Project 
Coordination Unit (PCU) with headquarters in Belize City is the executive arm of the 
World Bank that orchestrates the Mesoamerican Region in the Program and is 
responsible for direct implementation74. The executing agencies of the project are the 
Council of Ministers of the Environment in Central America (CCAD), with Mexico as an 
observer, that serves as an implementing agency, operating through its secretariat, the 
Directorate General for Environment (DGMA) of the System for Central American 
Integration (SICA) (World Bank 2001: 11-12). 
 
Figure 6.1 MBRS project organizational structure 
The World Bank, as the orchestrator of the MBRS project, has designated a Project 
Coordination Unit (PCU). The World Bank’s PCU is housed in the same building where 
both the Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute and Caribbean Fisheries 
Resource Assessment and Management Project (CFRAMP) are located, that is, on the 
grounds of the Department of Fisheries in Belize City. In fact, the World Bank has 
appointed the PCU director that executes under CCAD supervision75. Program activities 
under each of the four proposed components: Marine Protected Areas; regional 
Environmental Information System (EIS); promoting sustainable use of the 
Mesoamerican barrier reef; and public awareness and environmental education, are 
executed by a mix of local and regional entities.  
                                                 
73 Based on World Bank’s project appraisal (WB 2001: 23). 
74 Additional resources have been allocated toward strengthening the technical and supervisory 
capacity of the CCAD headquarters, in San Salvador, in the administration of this project. 
75 Personal interview with MBRS’ project coordinator, March 2005. 
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The project benefits at the policy level from the intermediary role of the Regional 
Steering Committee (RSC), made up of the Executive Secretary of CCAD or his delegate 
and the national coordinator for the MBRS project in each country. The organigram 
relies on a handful of advisory and technical consultative groups to which the main 
executing agencies turn for project implementation. To the mediating role of CCAD, 
World Bank’s PCU adds a range of advisory and consultative groups for technical advice 
appointed directly by the national governments (World Bank 2001: 23). To the National 
Barrier Reef Committee (NBRC) representatives adds the Regional Technical Working 
Groups (TWG) made up of selected representatives from the National Barrier Reef 
Committees and supporting local institutions that provide technical support to the 
implementing agencies. In addition, a Technical Advisory Commission and a 
Consultative Group contribute to project implementation. Finally, 
regional/international consultants are contracted on an “as-needed” basis76. The World 
Bank also orchestrates administrative support to the PCU provided by UNDP in the 
form of international procurement and management disbursement of project funds and 
by the FAO, which contributes with studies on the impacts of activities related to food 
supply, such as fishing and agriculture. To sum up, the World Bank’s MBRS project 
includes an exclusive type of membership that mainly involves governmental actors and 
regional civil servants. 
6.2.2 Franchise 
With the first so-called B block reimbursement funds amounting to fifty thousand 
dollars, the World Bank designated a project official, Marea Hatziolos, and contracted a 
local consultant, Noel Jacobs, to elaborate the project proposal77. Mr. Jacobs was the 
regional project director. Trained biologist in Mexico and with experience as a 
consultant at the Belizean administration, Caribbean Community (CARICOM), 
knowledgeable expert in fisheries and with contacts to Belizean public administration. 
Furthermore, the MBRS project involving the CCAD representatives of the four 
countries and members of the National Reef Committees, is supported by a Technical 
Advisory Committee (TAC) composed of internationally recognized experts. Members 
provide technical input for the design and review of annual work programs and serve as 
information gateways to up-to-date management, good practice, and professional 
networks in the areas of MPA management, sustainable coastal tourism, regional 
fisheries management, coral reef ecosystem monitoring and environmental information 
systems (EIS), and environmental education and outreach. Above all, project experts 
                                                 
76 Personal interview with MBRS’ project coordinator, March 2005. 
77 Personal interview with MBRS’ project coordinator, March 2005. 
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identify two main challenges related to project implementation. First, the project has 
detected the lack of precedents for regional collaboration in addressing environmental 
issues. Second, there are inconsistencies and gaps in national legislation related to 
coastal and marine resource use among the four countries. 
Despite the recognition of the degradation symptoms by the experts and 
contributors to the MBRS project, they do not necessarily agree on the diagnosis. On 
that account, the World Bank commissioned the Threat and Root Cause Analysis 
(TRCA) report delivered by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). This report 
underlined the conditions regarded as the root causes or constraints that prevent 
governments from adequately addressing the immediate threats to the health of the 
MBRS. Those are namely, coastal and island development and rapidly expanding 
tourism, inappropriate upstream land and resource use, and industrial development, 
overfishing and unregulated aquaculture development, uncontrolled port, shipping and 
navigation practices and finally, climatic-meteorological phenomena associated with 
changes in ocean currents, sea surface temperatures, storm intensity, precipitation, and 
vulnerability to disease, linked to climate change. 
However, this contrasts with the World Bank’s analysis expressed through its PCU, 
which includes the following (WB 2001: 4-5). First, the lack of public awareness of the 
value of the MBRS combined with the shortage of information on the status of the 
MBRS and on economic, environmental and social trade-offs associated with various use 
regimes (WB 2001: 5). Second, the deficit of the legislative capacity, particularly at the 
regional level, refers to the absence of a system-wide mechanism or legal frameworks to 
manage the ecosystem as a whole. At the sub-national and local levels, there is sectoral 
fragmentation in the management of the habitats and resources of the MBRS. Therefore, 
policy development and the harmonization of rules across states for managing a shared 
environmental resource are necessary. This applies to land use planning and zoning, 
water quality as well as the application of the polluter pays principle. Finally, all this is 
exacerbated by the need of trained personnel at the respective administrations. 
A lack of public awareness of the intrinsic value of the MBRS and of the costs of 
inadequate protection in terms of loss of goods and services contributes to 
unsustainable use practices and to the fragmented approach to coastal resource 
management (WB 2001: 6). According to the Bank, creating this awareness is essential 
to building and maintaining a constituency of support for national and regional level 
actions in order to ensure the sustainability of the MBRS. The Bank points to a serious 
constraint, which is the absence of water quality data for the principal coastal drainages 
of the MBRS. The production of citrus fruit and bananas in the Rio Hondo watershed, 
between Mexico and Belize, is thought to be a major source of non-point pollution in 
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the Bay of Chetumal78. This, along with point sources from the industry and expanding 
human settlements, have made Chetumal a major pollution hot spot in the 
transboundary area between Mexico and Belize. The quantification of this pollution is 
considered essential to identifying its source and mitigating its influence (WB 2001: 5). 
Consequently, the World Bank advocates for a synoptic view of the system as a whole in 
order to determine both the origin and scope of common threats, and to gain a basis for 
regional cooperation in the management of a shared resource. According to the World 
Bank, a prime example of this information gap exists with regard to fisheries. 
Inadequate information on commercially important stocks has led to the issuing of 
quotas and user permits on a fragmented basis, without regard to the total system yields 
or allowable harvest. The World Bank thus promotes a general ecosystemic view, 
relating and displaying conditions of the ecosystem, as a way to generate knowledge 
consensus on the diagnosis. For this, it proposes taking advantage of monitoring efforts 
that are underway in selected areas. Coordination between countries in the 
management of adjacent or transboundary habitats is ad hoc or non-existent, 
exacerbated by the scarce availability of trained personnel in coral reef monitoring and 
in the essential tools of marine protected area management. This hinders coordination 
across countries and severely limits management influence within several MBRS 
countries. Consequently, the inadequate protection of marine biodiversity at the 
regional level is evident (WB 2001: 6). 
Hence, the World Bank through the PCU justifies its role as an expert authority by 
identifying the government weaknesses of the MBRS country participants. The World 
Bank’s efforts to build consensus around the building of a shared project diagnosis 
address two issues. It provides a solution to overcome the opposing views of the main 
shortcomings to be addressed – mostly by promoting consensual scientific knowledge 
for the informing policy. In addition, it sets itself up as a qualified authority to 
orchestrate the provision of such expertise for key issues – fisheries and commercially 
important stocks, water quality data for coastal drainages, raising public awareness on 
the value of the MBRS, adequate protection of marine reserves, and providing capacity 
building to train personnel in coral reef monitoring. Specifically, the last, namely the 
shortage of trained personnel justifies the qualified authority of the World Bank 
through the PCU to orchestrate the project. 
6.2.3 Decision-making rules 
Decision-making in the MBRS project relies on the consensus rule reached based on two 
strategies: first, setting clear and impartial criteria to decide on project targets and 
                                                 
78 Personal interview with MBRS’ environmental monitoring specialist, March 2005. 
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actions; second, relying on a formal, hierarchized and well-defined project structure and 
the use of expert authorities for solving controversial issues. An illustration of the first is 
the election of one of the core issues and key objectives of the MBRS project, which 
could be sensitive to politization. The designation of the transboundary marine 
protected areas (MPAs) that are going to be protected and strengthened under project 
activities relied on expert authoritative information drawn from the orchestrator and 
intermediary expertise. Many MPAs in the MBRs existed only on paper and had little or 
no on-site management. The MBRS project then decides to support fifteen MPAs in 
total. Eleven of these were already legally established in the MBRS region, while four of 
the proposed MPA sites remained to be designated. The criteria for the selection of the 
fifteen sites to receive project support were based on impartial information. The 
selected criteria included transboundary cooperation (see page 127 for map of these 
sites). Those MPAs expanding across more than one country justifies the regional 
approach demanded for the applicability of GEF funds that defrays the incremental 
costs incurred by dealing with international environmental management. Besides, it 
provides a common ground from where to start the harmonization of policies across the 
region. Concretely, the majority of the MPAs – nine – are located in two transboundary 
areas of the MBRS, the Bay of Chetumal, between Mexico and Belize, and the Gulf of 
Honduras with the neighboring countries Belize, Guatemala and Honduras. 
Second, the MBRS program is coordinated under a hierarchized organizational 
framework that balances regional and national representation across the four 
participating countries (WB 2001: 11) in order to assure coherence and consensus across 
several administrations. The MBRS project benefits from the following institutional 
arrangements (WB 2001: 28): at the national level, reference may be made to the 
National Barrier Reef Committees (NBRC), which are national committees consisting of 
the representatives of the concerned ministries, the NGO community, research 
institutions and the private sector set up by the corresponding national authorities. 
At the regional level, the Technical Working Groups (TWG) set up during project 
implementation, allied with particular themes to be addressed under the project. These 
technical groups are structured in order to ensure the participation of specialized 
sectors and affected groups in the design of annual work programs. Finally, reference 
may be made to the Regional Steering Committee (RSC) constituted by the executive 
secretary of CCAD or his delegate, and the national coordinators of each of the four 
National Barrier Reef Committees, and also a panel of ex-officio members representing 
donor organizations and partner institutions working in the region on issues related to 
MBRS program objectives. The RSC provides overall policy guidance on the objectives of 
the program and coordinates the participation of national, regional, and international 
government and NGO counterpart organizations in its implementation. In addition, the 
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RSC liaises with other potential partners within and outside the region to attract 
additional co-financing and approves annual work plans and resolves potential 
coordination issues that may arise between countries. The Technical Advisory 
Committee (TAC) serves as an honest broker to World Bank’s PCU with respect to the 
resolution of technical issues under the project that may be particularly contentious. 
In brief, the World Bank as an orchestrator searches for the consensus rule for 
decision-making when it comes to conflictual or politicized issues. The World Bank 
resorts to unbiased information from the technical TAC or employs the recognized 
expertise of other international organizations that act as intermediary arbitrators for 
consensual deliberation among country representatives. 
6.2.4 Mandate 
The aim of the World Bank’s MBRS project is to improve the protection of the marine 
ecosystem, by assisting the littoral states of Belize, Guatemala, Mexico and Honduras in 
strengthening and coordinating their national policy, regulations and institutional 
arrangements directed to the conservation and the environmentally sustainable use of 
the barrier reef system. The lack of legislative capacity, such as policy gaps and 
fragmentation, is highlighted by the World Bank as an important constraint (WB 2001: 
5-6). At the national level, fragmentation in coastal resource management is manifested 
in the lack of an integrated approach to economic development within coastal areas for 
tourism, fisheries, agriculture, infrastructure, and the failure to incorporate 
environmental and social costs into economic decision-making. The MBRS project seeks 
to improve the provision of information, negotiation, deliberation and, to put forward 
policies and regulation through four areas of regional activities outlined in the action 
plan: first, capacity building and public awareness; second, regional coordination; third, 
research and monitoring; and last but not least, legislation. Key objectives have included 
the improvement of regional information systems for decision-making and the 
harmonization of policy frameworks across the four countries in line with the principles 
of environmental and social sustainability (WB 2001: 3). The project aims to facilitate 
regional cooperation and coordination, such as harmonizing regulations related to the 
harvesting and protection of monitored species and regulations to minimize the loss of 
critical breeding and nursery habitats. 
The first thematic area of the project focuses on capacity building to improve 
information and public awareness with the investment of US$1.5 million through an 
environmental awareness campaign and, formal and informal education. Regional 
coordination and project management represent US$2.4 million (WB 2001: 11). By 
promoting an ecosystem approach to the conservation and management of a 
transboundary aquatic ecosystem of global importance (WB 2001: 3-4), the project seeks 
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to reduce fragmentation at the national and regional levels in the governance of the 
MBRS. At the national level, the project aims at the implementation of international 
conventions relating to biodiversity and sustainable use of natural resources. To 
promote these activities and facilitate coordination in the implementation of the 
regional elements of the action plan, National Barrier Reef Committees have been 
established in each country as the main intermediaries to attract the attention of the 
key decision-makers of government cabinets in the different countries. 
In conclusion, the World Bank’s MBRS project focuses on fostering transboundary 
cooperation directed to both the harmonization of policies and regulation among the 
four countries as well as reinforcing policy capacity nationally. 
6.2.5 International organizations’ autonomy 
The World Bank as a delegated orchestrator and, thus with ex-ante oversight from 
states, enjoys medium autonomy from states for the MBRS project due to its authority 
as a long-standing capacity-building and financing institution. Even if the World Bank is 
dependent on major donor countries for its funds, the staff nevertheless have wide 
discretion in planning and executing projects (Porter and Welsh Brown 1996a: 41). Most 
project activities of the World Bank acting through the PCU are directed towards 
bringing the CCAD and the Regional Steering Commission in line with the project goals, 
through discussions with National Reef Commissions, TWC and TAC to harmonize 
policies and laws across the four states. Besides, the World Bank draws from objective 
scientific data delivered by experts contracted on an as needed basis by the World Bank 
and coordinated by the PCU. Yet, some limited autonomy is illustrated with the World 
Bank’s need to postpone to a second phase of the project controversial topics related to 
land-based pollution and shipping. Even if regarded as critical by FAO’s Threat and 
Cause Analysis, these project activities would target land-based sources of the 
degradation of the MBRS and bring relevant legislation and enforcement in each of the 
four countries in line with agreed regional norms (WB 2001: 8). Instead, the project 
promotes measures to reduce environmental non-sustainable patterns of resource use in 
the MBRS, focusing initially on two more – in principle – affordable areas, the fisheries 
and tourism sectors (WB 2001: 7)79. Later on, World Bank’s persuasion would deal with 
more controversial issues once it has secured outputs in those two areas and thus 
reinforced its position as an influential orchestrator. 
                                                 
79 A strategic choice was made to design the initiative within the context of a long-term regional 




 6.3 Identifying World Bank’s outputs as a persuader 
Following the framework developed in chapter 3, this section investigates the project 
outputs brought about by World Bank’s MBRS project. First, the framework analyzes 
different types of outputs – organizational, policy-based, discursive, and voluntary-
based. In a second analytical step, those outputs are scrutinized in light of their capacity 
to bring about trust-, neutrality-, respect-, and participative-based procedural resources. 
The two analytical steps are part of the analysis on orchestration influence defined as 
the competence to involve new actors and the capacity to delegate new roles to actors. 
6.3.1 Organizational 
During project implementation, the World Bank has set up three organizational 
structures that did not exist before the project start. The World Bank has set up a 
leading local team for implementing the MBRS project, it has pioneered a bi-national 
commission for coral reef management at the regional level, and promoted the renewal 
of the commitment by the governments of Mexico, Belize, Guatemala and Honduras for 
the sustainable management of MBRS (Cox et al. 2007). 
First, the World Bank has orchestrated the setup of its Project Coordination (PCU) 
Unit. The World Bank’s MBRS has persuaded policies at a high political level through 
the PCU, which is housed in the Coastal Zone Authority, in charge of the fishing policy 
of Belize – in Belize City – where other relevant ministries are also based. This has 
allowed liaising horizontally from the same working place with the environment and 
agriculture ministries and fishing authority, and it thus favored a more integrated 
approach for mediating implementation issues with different ministries in Belize80. 
Second, the PCU has fostered new structures for coordination and multistakeholder 
representation for each of the countries involved. National Barrier Reef Committees 
(NBRCs) have become intermediaries for project operationalization and, have served as 
a platform for dialog among the four MBRS countries. This has proved instrumental for 
developing the organization of the MBRS project. 
Second, the World Bank has orchestrated the setup of the bi-national commission 
BEMAMCCOR (Belize Mexico Alliance for the Management of Common Coastal 
Resources) in the Chetumal area during the MBRS orchestration activities. 
BEMAMCCOR did not exist before the start of the project. This network groups 
different NGOs that advocate for the environment from a transboundary perspective 
with a consultative role for the MBRS project (PCU 2004). During a meeting in San 
Pedro Sula, Honduras, the groups in Belize and Mexico expressed their interest to start a 
                                                 




group between NGOs and the academia from both countries, emulating the model from 
the Tri-national Organization for the Golf of Honduras (TRIGOH)81(SAM 2002). In fact, 
an open and wide membership is a characteristic of the successful coalitions for the 
integrated management of coastal resources (Monge 2001: 20).  
The BEMAMCCOR membership is constituted by civil-society organizations and 
research institutions registered in either Mexico or Belize, whose governing body is the 
general assembly. The assembly counts with the representation of five members by 
country – ten members with vote – and participation of observers without voting 
rights82. It counts with a secretariat that rotates every two years on a country basis and a 
focal point. BEMAMCCOR is a bi-national actor that groups different NGOs – Green 
Reef, Amigos de Sian Ka’an and Amigos del Manatí, A.C., business association – San 
Pedro Tourist guide association, research institutions – Sur, Cobiotec-Colegio de 
Biólogos y Ecólogos, y la Universidad de Quintana Roo, and the Belizean governmental 
organizations – Coastal Zone Management, Hol Chan Marine Reserve and Bacalar Chico 
National Park Marine Reserve, that advocate for the environment from a transboundary 
perspective (BEMAMCCOR 2000). The first meeting of the binational alliance Mexico-
Belize referred to as BEMAMCCOR took place in Belize City and sought to solve the 
environmental problems that exist at the boundary between these two countries with 
respect to the reef system, fisheries, environmental protected areas management, and 
pollution near river Hondo. The issues discussed by the transboundary commissions 
may be grouped into three categories: fisheries, monitoring and regulation; 
development of sustainable tourism in the marine parks and, park management for 
threatened species (López Santos et al. 2002: 7). 
Last, the World Bank’s MBRS project has persuaded influential political actors to 
renew the commitment to conservation and sustainable use of the Mesoamerican 
Barrier Reef System agreed in the Tulum Declaration. The four Heads of State have 
signed the Tulum+8 Declaration and Action Plan in which they reaffirm their 
commitment to protect the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System and coordinate efforts 
for its sustainable use. A revised action plan has been prepared and endorsed by the four 
ministers of environment. 
6.3.2 Policy-based 
One main objective as stated in the project’s final evaluation is “to improve the 
protection of marine ecosystems ecologically unique and vulnerable that are part of the 
                                                 
81 Personal interview with the grassroot NGO staff of BELPO, member organization of the bi-national 
alliance BEMMAMCOR, March 2005. 
82 Personal interview with researchers at Colegio de Biólogos de Sistema Tecnológico A.C. 
(COBIOTEC), March 2005. 
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Mesoamerican Barrier Reef, through the assistance to coastal states to strengthen and 
coordinate policies, regulations and institutional arrangements at a national level for 
the conservation and sustainable use of this global public good” (Alderman, Lechner, 
and Richardson 2007: 9). Three main outputs have been achieved in this respect (Cox et 
al. 2007). First, several regulations have been enacted by ministerial decree that 
emanate from an agreed policy framework for MPA enforcement (MBRS 2007c), 
fisheries and tourism (MBRS 2004i). Second, a draft regional cruise ship policy has been 
formulated to be incorporated into national and regional development plans and 
ultimately, a baseline report on the MPA management influence, based on the tracking 
tool indicators has been prepared for twenty MPAs (MBRS 2003b). 
First, at the project start no harmonization in policies regarding the use of shared 
MBRS marine resources existed. The objective has been the harmonization of policies 
on the use of shared MBRS resources regarding Marine Protected Areas Management in 
transboundary areas, sustainable fisheries (MBRS 2003e) and sustainable tourism83. 
Specifically, three out of four MBRS countries have agreed to harmonize policies at a 
national level consistent with a common policy framework adopted at a ministerial 
conference (MBRS 2004i). From here, the Third Meeting of the Southern Commission of 
MBRS Transboundary Parks (TRIGOH) has discussed law harmonization in several 
areas84. One focus has been the establishment, management and enforcement of Marine 
Protected Areas with special attention to standards and maintenance of coastal water 
quality and a region-wide reporting system. Another core issue has been fishing rules in 
relation to sustainable harvesting of commercially valuable species of shellfish and 
finfish and protection of threatened and endangered species, such as sea turtles, 
manatees and black coral85. Finally, the attention is on norms for environmental 
sustainable tourism and construction, consistency in scope and application of 
environmental impact assessment, land use planning and zoning in coastal areas, 
particularly as they relate to tourism, and adoption of best practice and a regional 
environmental certification system for the tourism industry86 (MBRS 2005a). 
The base line of the project has been that the ministers of fisheries, environment, 
and tourism of Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras have signed a common policy 
framework governing issues, such as close seasons for fisheries, MPA management and 
dive tourism (MBRS 2004a). Concretely, the project has dealt with the harmonization of 
                                                 
83 Personal interview with the MPA manager of Banco Chinchorro, March 2005. 
84 Personal interview with the director of the NGO and TRIGOH member organization TIDE, March 
2005. 
85 Personal interview with a Honduran BICA-Utila NGO member of staff, February 2007. 
86 Personal interview with the Guatemalan national coordinator for MBRS, July 2006. 
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legislation and the management of natural resources in transboundary areas for the 
establishment of environmental standards for monitoring coastal water quality and 
other indicators of coral reef ecosystem health (Sale et al. 2000) and harmonizing 
regulations governing the harvest and conservation of shared fish stocks (CCAD 2004, 
MBRS 2007e). However, no agreement has been reached in relation to the protection of 
regional spawning aggregation sites (MBRS 2002a). 
By contrast, a bilateral agreement on a common policy framework for the use of 
shared resources in these sectors – MPA enforcement, close season, dive tourism 
between countries involving the Chetumal Bay, Belize and Mexico - is pending. 
Negotiations between Belize and Mexico for a bilateral agreement in the Northern 
transboundary area have stalled indefinitely, possibly due to federal or state 
jurisdictional contentious issues87. The Mexican government has proved to be rather 
impervious to the harmonization of laws. The type of domestic structures (Risse-Kappen 
1995) plays a role in formal orchestration. The domestic structure of Mexico 
characterized by a weak organization of society around environmental concerns 
together with the centralization of its political institutions heavily impairs the influence 
of the policy networks created during project implementation. International 
institutions, such as multilateral development banks, do not seem to put pressure on 
the government to change this situation (Fernández de Villegas and Adelson 2000: 488-
489). The Mexican focal point for the MBRS project has served as an orchestration 
intermediary in the harmonization for laws. However, it has not received a response 
from the Mexican ministry SEMARNAT (Secretariat for Environment and Natural 
Resources)88. As Young points, it is clear that the growth of coastal state jurisdiction 
over marine resources and the subsequent emergence of (sub) national systems of sea 
use have triggered new forms of institutional interplay (2002b: 276). Regulatory rigidity 
is less efficient and effective, politically less likely to build support and more likely to 
invite attack, and environmentally less likely to solve public problems (Durant, Fiorino, 
and O'Leary 2004: 18). 
Second, a proposal for a policy framework and good practices for sustainable 
tourism in relation to cruise ships has also been put forward (MBRS 2007d, a). A draft 
regional cruise ship policy has been formulated. A series of recommendations serve as a 
proposal to be integrated into national and regional development plans. The best 
practices and codes of conduct proposed in this section are recommended for three 
large groups: first, government, second, cruise lines, and tourists, and third, cruise 
                                                 
87 Personal interview with an NGO member staff at Green Reef, March 2005. 
88 Personal interview with the Mexican MBRS national coordinator, March 2005. The interviewee 
mentioned that the civil servant in representation of the MBRS for Mexico was “cutting his veins”, as it 
proved very difficult for him to engage government representatives in such efforts. 
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industry operators and communities. With the purpose of recommending practical 
examples, the manuals, guides, and guidelines suggested by Conservation International, 
PROARCA, United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), University of Rhode 
Island, Rain Forest Alliance, MBRS Project, Galapagos National Park, Belize EcoTourism 
Association (BETA), the Cruise Ship Policy Consultation Forum of Mexico, have been 
assessed and selected from those aspects compatible with cruise ship tourism and the 
characteristics of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System. The best practices proposed – 
collected in a thirty-page document – include both the inputs from the actors consulted 
during the four field visits made to Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras and the 
observations made by the researchers. Yet, the project has had a rather limited impact 
on the tourism-related policy. Many states in Mexico and Belize are very much oriented 
towards income coming from tourism that contributes to dominant concerns, such as 
economic growth, employment and overcoming poverty. Instead, biodiversity loss and 
climate change relating to coral reef governance are regarded as a “Northern agenda” 
(Porter and Welsh Brown 1996c: 111-112). 
Finally, before the start of the project, paper parks had been established without 
management plans or trained personnel and enforcement has been sporadic. The World 
Bank’s MBRS project has aimed at incorporating an ecoregional approach into 
conservation planning to the MPA management. The objective stated in the project 
outline has been to establish a fully representative network of MPAs functioning in the 
MBRS ecoregion. At the end of the project, MPA master management and operations 
plans have been drafted or updated for seventeen representative MPAs (MBRS 2003d). 
Furthermore, the project pursues that all MPAs in the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef 
System region introduce a tracking tool to be in use by MPA managers to assess impact 
over time and report on progress. At the end of the project, an agreed baseline report on 
the MPA management impact, based on the tracking tool indicators, has been prepared 
for twenty MPAs and posted on the web89. 
6.3.3 Discursive 
The orchestration process by the World Bank has increased the public awareness of the 
value of the MBRS. According to the project outline, there was little appreciation among 
citizens of the value of MBRS as a world-class resource. A new discourse on the 
appreciation of this natural resource for environmental services has been produced and 
disseminated (Cox et al. 2007) due to the inclusion in the school curriculum of material 
emphasizing its importance, media spots and other project publicity (MBRS 2004d, c). 
Besides, a discourse on the need to monitor with sophisticated technology MPAs is 
                                                 
89 Personal interview with MBRS’ environmental monitoring specialist, March 2005. 
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given support through World Bank’s orchestration. World Bank’s focus on synoptic 
monitoring in transboundary parks has opened a discussion on the need to protect this 
natural resource from a regional perspective. 
6.3.4 Voluntary-based 
The MBRS has produced institutional, normative, reporting and fund-raising voluntary 
outputs. Most of those have concentrated in strengthening MPA management90 and 
sustainable fisheries. 
6.3.4.1 Institutional outputs 
Institutional outputs have contributed to strengthening especially MPA management 
and sustainable fisheries and reduce pressure on fish catch91. World Bank’s PCU has 
organized workshops in order to strengthen the institutional capacity for sustainable 
MPAs and fisheries and developed pilot projects on integrated coastal zone 
management (ICZM) (WB 2001: 10). The project has enrolled fishermen in trainings for 
alternative livelihoods. These actions have promoted a change in their work orientation 
to cover the increasing demand of employees for the nature-based tourism sector 
(Murillo 2004, WB 2001: 10). Last, World Bank’s MBRS has co-financed, with UNEP’s 
ICRAN/MAR alliance, administered and presented the first Mesoamerican Fishermen 
Congress in Quintana Roo, Mexico. As a result of this meeting, participants have 
founded the non-governmental Mesoamerican Alliance for Traditional Fishing. 
6.3.4.2 Normative outputs 
The orchestration approach of the World Bank has targeted normative outputs 
particularly in the economic sector of coastal and marine areas with mixed results. The 
MBRS project through the organization of the first fishermen’s congress – with four 
countries represented – has actively promoted the harmonization of rules governing the 
use of marine resources (Cox et al. 2007). Similarly, World Bank’s MBRS actions have 
aimed at delivering best practice models for sustainable coastal and marine tourism in 
order to eventually influence the adoption of industry codes of conduct inspired from 
regionally recognized certification schemes (WB 2001: 11). Activities under this 
subcomponent intended a Regional Policy Dialogue and Cooperative Action Forum; a 
Catalogue of Exemplary Practices; a Regional Environmental Certification Program; and 
a Marine Tourism Exemplary Practices Tour (Eco-Index 2003). Yet, the project has not 
been successful in its attempts to manage tourism impacts and promote environmental 
sustainability in tourism. Efforts have been invested by developing a series of handbooks 
                                                 
90 Personal interview with the Honduran NGO director at PROLANSATE, February 2007. 
91 Personal interview with the director of NGO TASTE, March 2005. 
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on interpreting nature and MPAs (MBRS 2005f, e), developing microenterprises (MBRS 
2005c), marine recreational tourism (MBRS 2005b: , 2005d). Yet, one of the project 
shortcomings has been its inability to bring the tourism sector into strategic discussions 
and engagement for the implementation of tourism-related activities and alternative 
livelihoods92. Two key aspects have not been addressed by the project, namely, the 
identification of what the existing different sustainable tourism certification standards 
in the region have in common and, the lack of information and financial resources to 
join such schemes by many small and medium-sized entrepreneurs (Goodstein 2004). 
The Instituto Hondureño de Turismo, which has been implementing Sustainable 
Coastal Tourism in the Honduras project, has chosen not to become involved in the 
regional tourism forum with the result that this component of the MBRS project had 
little technical support and thus suffered from institutional buy-in (WB 2007: 8-9). 
6.3.4.3 Reporting outputs 
Reporting outputs have received a special emphasis in the project (WB 2001: 7). First, the 
project has designed and implemented a regional program to monitor the health of the 
MBRS, namely the creation and development of a distributed, web-based regional 
environmental information system (REIS) and the establishment of an MBRS synoptic 
monitoring program, consisting of an extensive monitoring program that assesses the 
status of the marine resources in the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef Area. The World Bank’s 
PCU has planned a reliable database for the MBRS eco-region and an information 
system, a web-based regional environmental information system (REIS) with over 
twenty institutions contributing, which can be used in order to support more informed 
management decisions (WB 2001: 10). The objective of the REIS is to provide the basic 
framework to guide the collection, processing, distribution and utilization of data, both 
biophysical and socio-economic93. The synoptic monitoring program (SMP) has allowed 
at a regional level, the mapping of coastal environments using geographic information 
systems (GIS), the monitoring of MBRS indicator species establishing a uniform 
protocol for monitoring water quality along the coast, improving regional data 
collection in order to assess the productivity of commercially important stocks and the 
status of threatened species, and the design and establishment of a regional database on 
MBRS resources. Besides, the program has allowed the identification, control and 
monitoring of the sources of pollution of the MBRS, and, it has facilitated the 
dissemination of its outputs throughout the region. Despite the solid achievements, 
some outputs are however not sustained in the absence of continued external support. 
                                                 
92 Personal interview with FUNDAECO’s NGO, Guatemalan NGO and TRIGOH members, February 
2007. 
93 Personal interview with MBRS’ environmental information systems specialist, March 2005. 
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In fact, the SMP and the REIS have not secured its funding sustainability beyond phase 
one (García-Salgado et al. 2006). A second phase has been regarded as essential to 
creating a market demand for data (World Bank 2007: 11). 
6.3.4.4 Fund-raising outputs 
The World Bank has orchestrated positive fund-raising outputs. For many MPAs, the 
project turned from marginally operating efforts into functional MPAs able to obtain 
funding from donor institutions, implementing visitors’ entrance fees, and similar 
financing strategies. Besides, the project has attracted more financing in the area94. The 
World Bank has persuaded foundations and non-state organizations working on similar 
issues (Gorrez 2005), such as the Summit Foundation and Conservation International 
(WB 2007: 10). The Mesoamerican Barrier Reef (MBRS) has attracted numerous ongoing 
international and regional programs providing technical assistance in coastal resource 
assessment, monitoring and capacity building, such as the Caribbean Coastal Marine 
Productivity Program (CARICOMP), the UNEP-coordinated Caribbean Environment 
Program (CEP) and the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network (GCRMN). 
                                                 





6.3.5 Summary: World Bank’s MBRS outputs 
World Bank’s MBRS has generated a diverse set of outputs. From all types, 
organizational- and voluntary-based outputs are the more numerous types generated by 
World Bank’s MBRS persuasion. In addition, a major qualitative contribution has been 
the policy-based output of harmonization on close seasons for fisheries, MPA 
management and dive tourism for three out of the four cooperating countries. This 
policy output fosters South-south regional cooperation at the Southern transboundary 
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region of the MBRS. The convening power of the World Bank has proved crucial in 
facilitating the meeting of different governmental actors for the consecution of law 
harmonization, as well as the renewal of the commitment of the four project countries 
with the Tulum+8 Declaration and Plan of Action. Moreover, voluntary-based outputs 
count among the most significant contributions that have brought governmental actors 
to discuss the management of a major natural resource from a regional point of view. 
Normative voluntary-based outputs include a rule harmonization agreement among 
fishermen in the first regional fishermen congress with participants coming from the 
four countries involved (MBRS 2004b), the voluntary reporting implementation of the 
synoptic monitoring program and the fund-raising output of attracting other projects to 
complement the efforts of the MBRS project. 
Nonetheless, formal orchestration through the MBRS project has not proved 
infallible for the successful delivery of outputs. One of the main challenges found during 
project orchestration has been the different political clout of project participating 
countries when it has come to negotiating new policies and programs. In fact, Mexico is 
pending from signing accords with Belize for the harmonization of the MPA 
management rules for Chetumal Bay. Instead, the remaining cooperating countries in 
the Golf of Honduras have signed those management rules. The persuasion strategy has 
also proved the difficulty to generate synergies between countries with different 
characteristics such as size and population and even cultural characteristics, as it is the 
case between a Spanish-speaking country such as Mexico and the English-speaking 
Belize. Moreover, the MBRS project has not benefited from coalitions with non-state 
actors in order to exert pressure on states from below. In sharp contrast to the EU 
common practice (Risse 2002), orchestration through persuasion in this context does 
not contemplate the exercise of political clout through public demands by non-states. 
6.4 Identifying World Bank’s procedural resources 
This section discusses what procedural resources the World Bank has obtained through 
the MBRS project. This section centers the discussion on how far World Bank’s MBRS 
project outputs have contributed to generate trust-, neutrality-, respect- and 
participation-based resources, while orchestrating coral reef governance. 
6.4.1 Legitimizing new roles 
This section considers trust-based procedural resources as legitimizing social 




6.4.1.1 Trust as legitimizing social accountability 
This section assesses the extent to which World Bank’s MBRS project produces trust-
based resources by, legitimizing the setup of measurable targets and deadlines under 
the auspices of the project; commissioning reports and follow up activities, designating 
functions for a post-orchestration scenario so that monitoring results are published and, 
feed fora for public consultation; getting decision-makers to draw on reports, studies, 
databases and scientific publications or personal contacts produced by the orchestrator; 
drawing intermediaries and targets to exchange information on the environment; 
increasing media coverage on environmental issues or producing an impact on public 
awareness of environmental issues. 
Major efforts related to developing trust-based resources are focused on developing 
a set of indicators and monitoring that depends only on highly specialized staff 
contracted through the project. The assessment of indicator results in public fora is only 
foreseen for MPA management. 
First, the World Bank’s PCU has obtained trust-based resources by focusing on 
providing timely and reliable data during project implementation. The web-based 
Regional Environmental Information System (REIS) and the establishment of a Synoptic 
MBRS Monitoring Program represent the first such standardized information gathering 
and dissemination on the status of MBRS indicators in the region. For instance, the use 
of evidence collected from fish spawning aggregation has fed technical reports and 
constitutes a major input to the biannual report on the state of MBRS Health (World 
Bank 2007: 7). The setup of a baseline report on MPA management, based on tracking 
tool indicators, was prepared for twenty MPAs and posted on the web. The publicizing 
of this tool on the Internet, promotes the participation of other actors and more 
transparency, which can facilitate further monitoring, support immediate 
improvements in MPA protection and management while increasing the sustainability 
of management efforts. The World Bank obtains trust-based resources from not only 
intermediaries and MPA managers in particular, but anybody that can report on 
management and data and these can be used in order to generate comparative data over 
time. However, the PCU has not obtained such recognition from the general public or 
potential targets other than governments. 
Second, qualitative rather than measurable objectives have been spelled out 
throughout the project, which difficults the monitoring and the assessment. In fact, the 
completion report acknowledges rather ambiguously that the key performance 
indicators are “robust enough to track progress” toward reaching the project’s goals. 
Only the environmental indicators from the synoptic monitoring have been measured 
quantitatively. Yet, such indicators have not provided the necessary information to 
foresee (World Bank 2007: 7) that the economic sustainability of all the monitoring 
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mechanisms at the end of the first project phase has been compromised. In addition, 
whereas orchestration initiators - country representatives and the orchestrator - have 
set main project goals, stakeholders other than country representatives have not been 
included in the process (MBRS 2004g). 
Third, World Bank’s MBRS capacity to obtain trust-based resources from envisaging 
the post-orchestration scenario has not materialized. Therefore, the project does not 
contemplate self-sustained monitoring after the project ends or at least the resources for 
it have not been secured for subsequent project phases. In fact, some project 
components referred to as the environmental information system, sustainable resource 
management, and the MPA are designed incrementally (MBRS 2003g). At the same 
time, no agreement or document has been produced as a future commitment on the 
engagement of more sustainable practices and no evaluation is undertaken to monitor 
the change to alternative livelihoods. 
Besides, some concerns have been raised in relation to the generation of trust during 
the orchestration process. World Bank’s PCU for the MBRS is not considered by 
intermediaries and targets as a reference for the exchange of information on the 
environment. In fact, the World Bank as a GEF implementing agency generates 
accountability “upwards” by producing reports to funders needing paper evidence of 
money spent efficiently, rather than “downwards” to beneficiaries and others seeking 
fair as well as effective conservation (Young 2002c: 173). Additionally, the tourism policy 
is a clear example of the existing limitations experienced by the World Bank. Authorities 
attempt to modify important environmental criteria and facilitate the construction of 
golf courses with real-estate development (Carrera 2006). Private interests endorsed by 
government representatives overrun thus the management of coral reefs and the marine 
coastline as a public good. Members of the transboundary commission actually inquire 
where the money generated through tourism in MPAs and administered elsewhere goes, 
as not enough arrives to those areas (López Santos et al. 2002: 14). Relatively few local 
communities have benefited from nature tourism on their own lands or in nearby 
protected areas. Their participation is constrained not only by lack of experience and 
access to capital for investment but also by the inability to compete with well-
established commercial operations and simply lacks ownership rights over the tourism 
destinations (Burke et al. 2001: 67). 
6.4.1.2 Neutrality as legitimizing new frames and interlinkages 
International organizations obtain neutrality-based procedural resources in 
orchestration by implementing bioregional frameworks for action instead of political-
territorial frames of reference. Besides, orchestrators gain neutrality-based resources by 
defining sustainability challenges through geographical rather than political maps. For 
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this reason, this section examines whether the project’s framework for action is 
bioregional and uses ecological units or, on the other hand, uses a political-territorial 
frame of reference. The environmental framing of issues provided may contribute to 
political neutrality. The analysis of neutrality-based resources analyses if IOs are 
recognized as orchestrators for the generation, identification or clearinghouse 
mechanism for domestic new environmental information and if the orchestrator relies 
on epistemic communities and legitimated sources of scientific expertise when 
orchestrating. Neutrality-based resources are reinforced through synergies between the 
environmental protection, economic welfare and social equity issues. The orchestrator 
provides similar prominence to social, environmental and trade and economy concerns 
and connects intermediaries and targets previously not related and envisages 
mechanisms for correction when an issue area overruns other areas. Finally, the 
orchestrator contributes to neutrality-based resources when generating relevant 
discussions and information in the media. 
First, transboundary areas have been prioritized so that all countries and different 
government levels - even those with less protected areas in its territory - have an equal 
right to get project resources. In the first phase, many of the field-based interventions 
have concentrated in the two transboundary areas of the Mesoamerican Reef System: 
Chetumal Bay to the north, involving Mexico and Belize, and the Gulf of Honduras to 
the South, where the frontier areas between Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras overlap. 
The project has decided to work on transboundary-protected areas, even if key areas for 
the reef are left out, for instance Sian Ka’an reserve in the case of Mexico. At the same 
time, at least one protected area that has federal state ownership and state level 
(Quintana Roo) ownership95 needs to be selected (Alderman, Lechner, and Richardson 
2007: 10). The decision to include four countries Mexico, Belize, Honduras and 
Guatemala in this initial phase has been the result of the high level of political 
commitment manifested in the Tulum declaration and subsequent agreements among 
the four countries, and their common stake in a shared resource (WB 2001: 16). The 
World Bank’s project support, funded by GEF, is based on two premises, that material 
resources cover the incremental costs of dealing with the environmental risk on a 
regional level and that recipients are countries. The World Bank refers to the reef 
project as a transboundary challenge as opposed to an ecoregional frame of reference. 
Therefore, the working premises and project decisions are subject to the political map of 
states and not centered in ecological arguments. 
Second, in addition to its transboundary perspective, the project attempts to pursue 
a regional approach, which has proven to build capacity for effective MPA networks 
                                                 
95 Personal interview with CONANP’s manager, February 2005. 
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(Bustamante and Vanzella-Khouri 2011). It is the first time that the four countries 
commit to the joint development of an action plan for the management of the MBRS. 
From all different project components, the ones referring to regional information 
sharing and transboundary management of MPAs are the ones that have concentrated 
the activities of the highest portion of the budget (MBRS 2004h). During the five years 
of implementation, the project has invested $3,611,185 in the Regional Environmental 
Information System (REIS) and $2,957,230 in improving transboundary MPAs. This is 
nearly the double of the amount invested in project administration ($1,883,937), 
sustainable tourism and fishing ($1,848,170) and more than three times the awareness-
raising budget ($810,760) (MBRS 2001, 2002b, 2003a, 2004i, 2005i). The project has set 
the bases for regional monitoring (MBRS 2005h). World Bank’s orchestration opens to a 
broader regional perspective by seeking synergistic linkages with ongoing and future 
local, national and, regional initiatives dealing with conservation and the sustainable 
use of the MBRS (Gorrez 2005, WB 2001: 25). A regional approach that goes further than 
the transboundary approach and the single map of states has reinforced the renewal of 
the commitment to conservation and sustainable use of the MBRS. Yet, overall, the 
project does more to legitimate a transboundary resource than a regional and ecosystem 
approach to the management of reefs. World Bank’s orchestration reveals its 
transboundary approach through three specific outputs: the strengthened management 
of transboundary MPAs through training tools, infrastructure and tracking tools to 
report on management influence; the establishment of bi-national and tri-national 
transboundary commissions to facilitate policy dialogue and, finally those 
transboundary park commissions have been consulted for the development of a 
common policy framework for the sustainable management of resources in the areas of 
fisheries, tourism, and MPAs. Therefore, the reef is not treated as a whole. 
Third, the World Bank, as orchestrator, has not been able to act as a clear house for 
domestic information on new environmental issues. Even if this information system has 
been only partially delivered, it has served as the seed to bring a GIS-based repository of 
information by the Healthy Reefs Initiative whose founding members are the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF), the Meso-American Barrier Reef System Project (MBRS), the 
World Bank, the Summit Foundation and Perigee Environmental. The transboundary 
and regional approach fits well the management of MPAs. However, it does not seem so 
appropriate for managing ecosystems or dealing with business sectors. The project 
regional’s approach to address tourism issues has shown limited results. From the 
original idea of developing a regional Environmental Certification Program for tourism 
in the MBRS, the project has lowered the profile and has published a review of 
recommendations including suggestions from concerned agents for the government, 
international conventions and cruise ship tourists and operators on control and 
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monitoring mechanisms for implementation. World Bank’s MBRS conducts a synoptic 
monitoring of species treated in isolation. The ecosystem-based approach instead refers 
to the cost-effective monitoring of key species that serve as indicators of the health for 
the overall specific marine environment. The premise is that if the indicator species can 
assure the health of the overall marine environment there is no need to monitor the 
endless list of species that are part of the reef ecosystem. 
Fourth, the World Bank’s MBRS persuasion supports the objectives of several 
international agreements on ecosystems, such as the GEF Operational Strategy and the 
Operational Program for Biodiversity for Coastal, Marine, and Freshwater Ecosystems. 
The project also endorses a number of Articles of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and its provision for the conservation of marine biodiversity under the Jakarta Mandate. 
At the regional level, the project deals with legislation gaps through the support of the 
GEF’s Integrated Land and Water Multiple Focal Area Operational Program for 
International Waters that addresses resource management issues through an integrated 
ecosystem approach Yet, members of transboundary park commissions state that on 
many occasions, the decision-maker gives more importance or priority to socio-
economic issues over the environmental impacts (López Santos et al. 2002: 14) because 
they are subject to their voters and may want to avoid decision-making on unpopular 
environmental measures. 
Fifth, at the same time, World Bank’s orchestration has established interlinkages 
between different pillars of sustainable development. This IO has influenced the 
harmonization of primary and secondary school curriculums on the value of the MBRS 
to the people of the region in all four countries. The interlinkage between the social 
benefits of education is matched here with the need to reinforce the idea of the 
Mesoamerican Barrier Reef as a valuable economic resource. Besides, efforts to create 
horizontal coordination among the different ministries affected by the MBRS project 
have been deployed. By housing its headquarters in the facilities of Belize City, the PCU 
has coordinated with both the Ministry of Environment, as a member of CCAD, and the 
Ministry of Agriculture, whose Director of Fisheries has served as the Belizean MBRS 
National Coordinator (WB 2007: 6). However, this structure is only adopted in Belize 
and not reproduced in the rest of the countries. Another handicap that the project 
encounters is that CCAD is an orchestration intermediary with limited clout. CCAD as a 
regional umbrella organization constituted by representatives of the ministries of 
environment have a constrained political weight to influence their counterparts in other 
ministries. The World Bank has contributed to establishing interlinkages between the 
environment and the economy by developing new mechanisms of financing for MPAs, 
such as tourist visitor’s fees and writing of project proposals. However, the direct 
linkage between the mutual benefits of conservation and the environmental fees for 
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visiting protected parks is not made explicit to local communities, which limits the full 
potential benefits. 
Sixth, during the program’s initial phase, regional Technical Working Groups 
(TWGs) composed of experts of National Barrier Reef Committees (NBRCs) in 
environmental law and natural resources management policy from the region have 
identified institutional and policy objectives that have been later approved nationally. 
Therefore, the World Bank obtains neutrality-based resources by creating such 
functional groups with expert NBRC members from the different countries involved. 
Seventh, World Bank’s orchestration approach has prioritized the links between the 
environment and the economic issues in front of social interlinkages. Connections with 
the social equity pillar have been more of an exception rather than the rule. When 
established, for instance for capacity-building training into alternative livelihoods, it is 
implied that the affected targets – artisanal fishers, in this case - are treated as the main 
threat to the barrier reef due to overfishing. Yet, there are at least similar or even more 
threatening risks, such as industrial fishing, mass tourism or agribusiness in the region. 
In addition, from the possible links drawn between the environment and the key 
economic issues that affect the barrier reef, the World Bank has centered in some 
specific businesses. World Bank’s MBRS project has identified several inappropriate land 
use and industrial practices, port activities, overfishing, tourism development. From 
those several interactions, the World Bank’s MBRS project has focused on the effects of 
fishing and tourism economic activities on MPAs, while maritime pollution and 
watershed management are only considered for future phases of the project. Therefore, 
World Bank’s orchestration and their intermediaries have seen their persuasion 
strategies fall short of legitimating interlinkages between the environmental, economic 
and social issues. 
Eighth, there are no quantifiable objectives that monitor connections between 
economic and environmental interlinkages. For instance, the socially beneficial impact 
that best practices and codes of conduct for cruise tourism in the Mesoamerican Barrier 
Reef System can have, cannot be learnt since no explicit compromise for specific 
objectives with specific deadlines are set by businesses to subscribe to this initiative. 
Therefore, no mechanisms to monitor social areas of concern are devised either. Since 
no tools are devised in order to monitor policy effects on the social population, or how 
different policy options affect the environment and the social and economic situation in 
the region, no mechanisms to correct those undesired outcomes are in place. Not even 
from the environmental perspective is there a study that foresees the implications and 
effects of the lack of consensus in the Northern transboundary region for the common 
policy framework for sustainable management of resources in the areas of fisheries, 
tourism, and MPAs.  
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Last, the World Bank as orchestrator is not mentioned to contribute to discussions 
on media coverage or public debate related to environmental issues. Nonetheless, the 
World Bank has contributed to the environmental policy agenda, through the Policy 
Working Group. These have included standards for coastal water quality, application of 
the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), zoning requirements for coastal tourism 
development, waste management in tourist facilities, construction and setbacks along 
the coast, permitting for recreational use of MBRS resources, regulations governing the 
seasonality, minimum size, gender and maximum harvest of commercial fish stocks, and 
the establishment of port state control in the major ports of the MBRS. 
6.4.2 Involving new actors 
This section examines respect-based procedural resources as involving South science 
and traditional knowledge as well as affected actors and, participation-based resources 
as involving non-states. 
6.4.2.1 Respect as involving South science, traditional knowledge and affected actors 
This section assesses the extent to which the World Bank’s MBRS generates respect-
based resources. Respect-based resources are understood as the capacity to use 
traditional and local knowledge for the implementation of analysis and orchestration 
activities; engage anthropologists and not only hard scientists in the project; include 
issues considered important by southern experts; managing natural resources 
sustainably for the benefit of the people affected; create a forum where affected people 
can communicate and are those involved in orchestration activities; and, prevent that 
particular interests take over the public interest with the claim of abiding the principle 
of sovereignty over the natural resources of states. 
First, in a few instances Southern experts or traditional or local knowledge have 
enjoyed a distinctive role that has complemented the expert and scientific knowledge 
from the North. They generally contribute to the management of marine areas only. The 
consulted experts do not come from local universities and do not gather knowledge 
from local communities. As a matter of fact, a handbook with the methodology used for 
elaborating programs for the public uses of AMPs developed by the project does not 
count with public participation (MBRS 2005g). Local experts and local communities in 
general have not been persuaded in project consultation. Past experience in 
community-level work for the establishment of natural parks in the area, such as the 
Xcalak Natural Park (López Santos et al. 1997) has not served the purpose of co-
management and monitoring by the local population. Therefore, they have not had the 
opportunity to provide traditional knowledge of the area for the project implementation 
design. Besides, local communities have not been involved in ecosystem monitoring and 
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were only targeted as workshop recipients. In fact, sources of the expertise chosen by 
the World Bank’s PCU are not coming from the region but mainly from overseas and are 
included because they are recognized experts in the specific field of expertise dealt with. 
Therefore, the project puts top expertise before the inclusion of local experts to develop 
best practices for park rangers in MPAs (MBRS 2004f) or recommendations for 
managing MBRS spawning aggregations (MBRS 2004e).  
Only in some instances is the Southern expertise enrolled in order to provide 
additional information to reports. That is the case of southern experts that have been 
involved in some of MBRS’s activities. Interestingly, those are cases of North-South and 
South-South cooperation. In the case of the North-South cooperation, the international 
NGO WWF, the governmental Integrated Coastal Zone Management Authority in 
Belize, the Mexican NGO Amigos de Sian Ka’an and the University of Miami, Rosenstiel 
School of Marine and Atmospheric Studies have consolidated data into a regional GIS 
for the production of digitized maps and contributed to the proposed regional REIS96. 
Besides, four agencies have been selected to become hubs to collect and share 
information for the synoptic monitoring program and the REIS, namely Universidad de 
Quintana Roo (Chetumal, México), la Universidad del Valle de Guatemala (Ciudad de 
Guatemala, Guatemala), Red de Desarrollo Sostenible (Tegucigalpa, Honduras) and the 
Coastal Zone Management Authority and Institute (Belize City, Belize) (MBRS 2003a). 
Second, even if there are local communities, such as the Mayan and Garifuna that 
have harvested fish in the area for generations and have plenty of knowledge on 
endemic species and breeding places, which could contribute to monitoring of the reef, 
the MBRS’s World Bank has not engaged an anthropologist that mediates with them to 
draw from traditional knowledge. Instead, a social assessment has been conducted 
during project preparation involving consultations by a social scientist – sociologist – of 
the World Bank’s PCU team that has implemented a course on community relations – 
from a theoretical standpoint – for the management of MPAs in the MBRS97 (MBRS 
2004j). The results and recommendations have been incorporated into an Indigenous 
People’s Participation and Development Plan with no direct practical application (WB 
2007: 7).  
Third, many of the considered root causes reflect what is according to analysts a lack 
of knowledge and awareness (Hatziolos 2001: 4-5). Thus, such diagnosis indirectly 
discredits locals for their contribution on traditional knowledge and local professional 
knowledge. Explicitly, reference is made to the lack of education and information about 
environmental issues, cultural values and history of the region’s ethnic that leads to low 
                                                 
96 Personal interview with an NGO Amigos de Sian Ka’an member staff, March 2005. 
97 Personal interview with the sociologist for the MBRS project, March 2005. 
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awareness about the importance of the environment (MBRS 2003c). With this 
statement, the international organization underestimates and neglects the work from 
the social environmental grassroots and peasant small movements to local NGOs, plus 
the so-called environmentalism of the poor (Martínez-Alier 2014). For instance, el Grupo 
Ecologista del Mayab has long worked to preserve the touristy areas of the Yucatan area 
in Mexico from economic speculation long before the MBRS started. 
A wider buy-in to the project from local stakeholders could have been made possible 
by establishing connections with a network of local universities dedicated to biology 
and environmental sciences and would have created a benefit for the network. At the 
exception of the consultation with transboundary NGO commissions for norm 
harmonization, the people affected by the MBRS project have been fundamentally 
engaged as targeted recipients for capacity-building efforts in MPAs. Those include 
training MPA managers in best practices. While local populations in the four countries, 
including women and indigenous groups, such as the Garifuna, Ladino, Mayan and 
Miskito (World Bank 2007: 3) are mentioned in the project design, they are hardly 
involved in project decision-making. 
Fourth, not all threats to the Mesoamerican reef identified by World Bank’s MBRS 
are being addressed in the project. In addition, there is no survey on the issues 
considered important by Southern experts, so project inclusion is severely hampered. 
Several issues are threats to the MBRS (Hatziolos 2001: 4)98. Yet, based on those five 
main risks of the threat and root cause analysis (TRCA), the World Bank has focused on 
overfishing and expanding tourism as the main priority areas without a wide 
consultation to local experts on which topics to address first and how99. 
Yet, this strategy leaves out at least as many pressing issues as the selected priority 
areas, namely inappropriate land use and industrial development, uncontrolled port and 
climate phenomena that affect the coral reef decline. Nevertheless, other than 
transboundary areas and MPAs issues that receive most project attention, remarkably, 
NOAA and USGS (US Geological Survey) studies on vulnerability mapping related to 
climate change have been obtained for inclusion in the REIS100. In this way, other 
relevant threats analyzed in the TRCA that may concern local experts are also 
monitored and included in the MBRS project monitoring protocol system. Additional 
root causes mentioned in the analysis refer to the lack of a regional system wide 
                                                 
98 The Environmental Assessment (EA) was largely based on the Threat and Root Cause Analysis and 
Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis (TBDA) prepared in the early stages of the project design. […]. 
99 Personal interview with a scientific researcher at Centro de Estudios Ambientales del Valle de 
Guatemala. 
100 Currently, this database is housed on the healthy reefs for healthy people website, which is a spin 
off initiative of the MBRS among other funders and projects. 
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mechanism or legal frameworks to manage the ecosystem as a whole. For this reason, 
the World Bank’s PCU has appointed “accredited experts” as intermediaries to influence 
state representatives to recommend policies and guide MBRS countries. 
Fifth, strengthening the non-governmental TRIGOH organization in the area of the 
Gulf of Honduras has taken place by convening them for the consultation on the 
harmonization of norms. Yet, the project’s mid-term review issued by a World Bank 
mission provided several recommendations that confirm the need for a better 
representation of the orchestration targets (WB/FMAM/CCAD 2004). Those refer to 
directly engaging coastal communities in project planning and execution, as well as, 
coordinating socioeconomic studies in order to identify alternative livelihood 
opportunities. To justify the high representativeness of local interests World Bank’s PCU 
emphasizes that their coordination team is drawn from the four participating countries 
and reflects gender and ethnic diversity (WB 2007: 5). In the end, as the project 
completion supports, the recommendations for the local communities affected have 
turned out to be far too many, which have not been supported by a systematic detailed 
plan for implementing each one or a follow-up process to secure its appropriation by 
those targeted (WB 2007: 12). 
Sixth, the recognition of the so-called Belize-Mexico Alliance for the Management of 
Common Coastal Resources (BEMAMCCOR) by governmental actors strengthens the 
role of civil society as active members for the conservation of the MBRS system. The set 
up BEMAMCCOR has facilitated that local actors from the transboundary area between 
Belize and Mexico have been involved and organized as one voice in regional fora. In 
particular, national state interests have taken explicitly over the public interest of the 
population in the Mesoamerican region. Mexico puts the principle of sovereignty ahead 
of the sustainable management of the shared natural resources of the states. Thus, non-
state commission BEMAMCCOR has not acted as an effective intermediary. In addition, 
as a document resulting from the project acknowledges, transboundary commissions 
have not been able to tackle the resource conflicts by fishers and tourism providers. 
While recommendations from the World Bank’s PCU refer to those stakeholders’ 
conflicts, it does not engage in the actual mediation process (MBRS 2007b). 
Nonetheless, fishers have been involved in some of the outputs of World Bank’s MBRS 
orchestration, especially those that refer to the sustainable management of marine 
resources. 
In retrospective, the World Bank could have gained more respect-based resources if 
one compares the conclusions of the agreements in transboundary commissions with 
the suggestions made during those commission meetings. For instance, a workshop 
claimed that it needs to take into account local people when it comes to conducting the 
diagnosis and not rely on external consultants (López Santos et al. 2002: 11). Yet, this has 
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not been included in the conclusions section (López Santos et al. 2002: 17), as well as the 
idea of mainstreaming the concept of certified lobster, the suggestion to promote 
participatory monitoring and co-management with the fishers of MPAs or the statement 
that roads that are being built along the Mayan coast are clear threats to sustainable 
tourism (López Santos et al. 2002: 12-13). 
6.4.2.2 Participation as involving non-states 
This section explores to what extent the World Bank has contributed to building 
participation-based resources. Precisely, it is analyzed to what extent during the 
orchestration process the World Bank has recognized the environmental expertise from 
NGOs and businesses and its inclusion in project design and development; the 
participation of NGOs and businesses as partners for setting objectives, assessment and 
monitoring; and the promotion of the dialogue between non-states and governmental 
actors for policy-making and the evolution of non-state actors’ participation. 
First, attempts to involve the knowledge of the private sector into the initiative 
include NGOs’ participation as observers in the National Barrier Reef Committees and 
inclusion of transboundary NGO alliances as a consultative commission for rule 
development. Government-appointed NGOs have been included in MBRS activities 
through National Barrier Reef Committees or NGO transboundary alliances, the Belize-
Mexico Alliance for the Management of the Common Coastal Resources 
(BEMAMCCOR) and the Tri-National Alliance for the Gulf of Honduras (TRIGOH). 
However, their expertise and monitoring role have not been fully exploited. In NBRC, 
local stakeholders have the chance to provide input to the project’s annual work plans 
when selected as members of one of the Regional Technical Working Groups. Those 
meet regularly on a semester basis and contribute to their accredited technical area of 
expertise. They are not involved in the project design, as it has already been approved 
when NBRCs are created. Therefore, chances to shape the process are rather restricted 
even for insider NGOs. Additionally, non-profits such as outsider local NGOs do not 
have representation, and industrial fishers have not taken part in such project activities, 
in detriment of World Bank’s orchestration effects. 
Second, delegation to the World Bank has implied that regional workshops to 
develop project objectives are government-driven with little input from non-state actors 
for setting objectives, providing assessments or delivering monitoring or third party 
evaluations. In general, monitoring activities are reserved to PCU members or scientists 
contracted on an ad hoc basis with no involvement of the private sector. 
Third, the dialog between the private and the public sector is limited to the 
harmonization of fishing activities, tourism best practices and MPA management 
through the NGO consultative organs BEMAMCCOR and TRIGOH. Yet, no implication 
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from key private actors, such as industrial fishers, agribusiness or big tourism businesses 
has been achieved. BEMAMCCOR has emphasized the need for cooperation between 
fishers and authorities as well as the need to raise awareness among the fish sector in 
order to strengthen fishing organizations and review the rules for sport fishing (López 
Santos et al. 2002: 9).  
Fourth, World Bank’s PCU has generally failed to engage for profits in project 
development and thus non-binding commitments have not been achieved. From the 
several economic sectors that affect the reef, the World Bank’s PCU has focused on 
fishing and tourism as target sectors. On the one hand, World Bank’s MBRS has taken 
advantage of the expertise from profits in the case of artisanal fishers and from fishing 
cooperatives. Those have been involved in World Bank’s orchestration through a 
regional congress for promoting harmonization of norms. The first regional fishermen 
congress ever celebrated in the region involved the four countries represented actively 
promoting the harmonization of policy and norms. According to the final evaluation 
report, the component on alternative livelihoods has been too ambitious and not 
enough resources have been invested (Alderman, Lechner, and Richardson 2007: 9). 
On the other hand, even if targeted, tourism businesses such as hotels or cruise 
ships and the fishing industry have not actively participated in World Bank’s activities. 
Neither private business nor associations related to tourism activities participate in 
BEMAMCCOR workshops, even if certifying the tourism companies working within 
MPAs constitutes a priority (López Santos et al. 2002: 10). As stated in the final 
evaluation report, a shortcoming in the project design has been not to include some 
public actors responsible for tourism and fishing for the project implementation. Those 
are areas that heavily impact the MBRS and their participation would have provided 
greater political clout and improved the project’s capacity to increase the quality of its 
results (Alderman, Lechner, and Richardson 2007: 9-10). Interestingly enough, the fact 
that the Mesoamerican Reef Tourism Initiative (MARTI) begins just before the MBRS is 
close to its end, points that the MBRS project to some extent has spurred private 
initiative at the shadow of hierarchy, as transgovernmental networks with the World 
Bank’s PCU have attempted to set norms, for dive tour operators and cruise ship and 
live-boards in the region, without success (MBRS 2003b). It is plausible to assume that 
the project has indirectly spurred, with collaboration from both the public and private 
sector the introduction and adoption of best practices among hotels, marine recreation 
and cruise tourism. 
To sum up, there is a general lack of private participation – with few exceptions – 
that spans both for profits and nonprofits. Economic areas that have been left aside 
include agribusiness, industrial fishing and shipping, as a strategic option, and tourism 
and recreational businesses by lack of orchestration success. 
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6.5 The influence of World Bank’s persuasion: Summary conclusions 
This section provides an overall picture of the influence exerted by the state-initiated 
World Bank orchestration. It is discussed how influential the World Bank has been as 
formal orchestration from the assessment of outputs and procedural resources. 
6.5.1 Legitimizing new roles: World Bank as knowledge broker and accountability 
facilitator 
Knowledge broker Neutrality-based resources have been fostered with local 
universities and “insider” NGOs for the exchange of knowledge in workshops and 
meetings that have bolstered the signature of binding agreements for the transboundary 
area of Belize, Guatemala and Honduras. Yet, at the same time, this unparalleled 
process for Chetumal Bay leaves unprotected the important area shared between Mexico 
and Belize. Trust-based resources for setting objectives and monitoring are based on 
state-based intermediaries and appointed experts carry out monitoring activities. Only 
external experts appointed by the same World Bank’s PCU carry out project evaluation. 
Accountability facilitator Trust-based resources have been produced to some 
extent through community-based reporting and monitoring functions in MPAs 
following the MBRS methodology. However, this has not been enough to create a public 
forum to make targets’ behavior visible. In fact, the persuasion approach has not favored 
that World Bank’s MBRS consult critical NGOs that could put in the limelight those 
governments that apply the brakes to cooperation. Instead, the activities have been 
characterized by avoiding any type of confrontations with target states, which are at the 
same time the principals of the international organization orchestrating the process. In 
fact, no pressure has been exerted on Mexico and Belize negotiations when they have 
remained pending to sign the harmonization of norms regulating artisanal fishing. 
6.5.2 Involving new actors: World Bank as norm entrepreneur and discourse-
coalition builder 
Norm entrepreneur The creation of and consultation to the non-state BEMAMCCOR 
alliance has not bolstered enough trust-based resources among project members. It is 
rather difficult to harmonize policies between countries that differ considerably, 
especially in size. Neither the persuasion work of the World Bank nor the advocacy 
work of the BEMMAMCOR have proved sufficient. The negative response of the 
Mexican federal government to recognize and adopt the resulting normative outputs 
has curtailed the benefits of the trust-based resources obtained in the cooperation for 
the Gulf of Honduras. There is a lack of identification of Mexico with the rest of the 
partners. The fact that Mexico – the country with more political clout in the region– is 
only an observer to the CCAD, the organization that acts as the main intermediary of 
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the orchestration process is a clear handicap. In fact, while the states in the Gulf of 
Honduras have signed a framework for policy development, the cooperation at 
Chetumal Bay has not culminated with a signed agreement between Mexican and 
Belizean authorities, which puts into question the regional view that the project 
pursues. In addition, World Bank’s MBRS has not been able to accrue enough 
participation-based resources with key stakeholders of tourism and recreative activities, 
which have not engaged in the development of a regional code of conduct for 
sustainable tourism. The participation-based resources gained from a transboundary 
approach applied to the management of MPAs have resulted in successful norm 
harmonization only partially. The process has taken place through Barrier Reef 
Committees and Technical Working Groups with representatives of the four involved 
countries, organized in working areas.  
Discourse-coaliation builder  Dialogue-building for sharing best practices for 
managing marine ecosystems among fishers coming from all the countries of the region 
has generated respect-based resources with the materialization of the first regional-wide 
fishermen congress with like-minded stakeholders dealing with common marine 
ecosystem resources. However, this process has not been sufficient to harmonize the 
norms regulating artisanal fishing for the whole region. 
Barrier Reef committees have built participation-based resources by legitimating a 
mixed group of experts as counterparts to discuss coral reef policy and enlisted as 
members of the MBRS project. Consequently, their members are provided with the 
opportunity to share their expertise with partners from the region. The creation of such 
committees is the result of World Bank’s persuasion, which has triggered the willingness 
from project partners to prove their commitment to the rest of the MBRS members and 
influence project implementation. 
Transboundary park commissions There is a new transboundary park commission 
created in the area of Chetumal Bay with NGOs and academia involved providing the 
World Bank with participation-based resources. This new actor BEMAMCCOR did not 
exist before the start of the MBRS project and the World Bank has effectively persuaded 
the actors in the region to organize and become an agent that discusses the 
harmonization of the rules for the management of the Chetumal area. The actors of this 
bi-national park have identified themselves with the existing TRIGOH tri-national NGO 
alliance of Belize, Guatemala and Honduras, which has served as a benchmark for social 
mobilization. 
Fisher communities have had a distinct participation in the project through its 
involvement in a regional congress to discuss norm harmonization for sustainable 
fishing. The project has benefited from generating an identification process among 
peers. Nonetheless, influential commercial fishing representatives have not joined such 
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a congress. Neither identification, nor authority, social proof or voluntary membership, 
have proved enough to enroll such targets. Besides, the affected communities have been 
involved as recipients of capacity-building project activities only, but not in a 
participative forum where concerns could be expressed to inform project design. 
 Belizean, Guatemalan and Honduran ministries of fisheries and environment have 
become new cooperating actors for regional environmental policy in the Gulf of 
Honduras. By contrast, the setup of the BEMAMCCOR by the MBRS project has not 
culminated with an agreement between Mexican and Belizean authorities. Thus, it 
represents a lost opportunity not only to gain the Mexican federal state as a participative 
actor in the environmental reef policy but also to foster the work of non-governmental 
organizations cooperating within the framework of BEMAMCCOR. 
Marine biologists, biochemists, and zoologists are part of the conception of World 
Bank’s ecoregional approach. This approach has provided these actors a new monitoring 
role on the methodology of Integrated Coastal Zone Management. Yet, the restricted 
ecosystem approach that centers on the marine environment has left out the activities 
of land-based actors such as agribusiness whose responsibility in the health of the reef is 
at least as important. Thus, the MBRS approach proves too narrow to involve actors 
with legitimated sources of expertise on land-based activities that interfere with the 
coral reef ecosystem. Among those missing participants, reference may be made to the 
tourism industry, cruise ships, the agribusiness community that is responsible for the 
deforestation and run-off of toxic pollutions down the rivers that discharge of reef 
waters, the port companies that ship agriculture commodities on the harbors close to 
the barrier reef. Lastly, the commercial fishing industry is not involved either. In 
addition, World Bank’s conception of Southern expertise has been restricted to 
pollution analyses by local universities, yet it has omitted the traditional knowledge 
from local communities in order to exploit their capacity to monitor marine protected 
areas and coastal areas. Furthermore, leaving maritime pollution and watershed 
management for future project phases has curtailed the respect-based resources for 
orchestration as it bears social implications on the local communities that rely on 
fishing and that see their environments degrade. Finally, the World Bank as a state-
initiated orchestrator has not been able to persuade actors to cooperate for coastal 
management and it has not been able to build up participation-based resources coming 
from well-established grass-root NGOs such as the Grupo Ecologista del Mayab based in 
Cancún, Yucatán, Mexico, active in supporting sustainable tourism, presumably due to 
their critical position with governmental policy. 
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Table 6.2 World Bank’s MBRS project procedural resources 
 
 
6.5.3 World Bank’s persuasion strengths: Respect and neutrality-based resources 
The World Bank builds its persuasion approach for the MBRS project on two premises, 
on the one hand, the identification of similar interests between the actors cooperating 
and, on the other, its authoritative technical and policy advice. The areas with more 
influence on behalf of the World Bank have been MPAs management, fishing and 
tourism recreation activities. Institutional reforms include the creation of a mechanism 
for regional dialogue and coordination in the management and monitoring of the MBRS 
as a shared, transboundary public good to identify common interests of different 
countries. The authority of the World Bank has left an imprint in the project’s design. 
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The World Bank brings to this project its considerable capacity to address marine-
related environmental issues and its ability to convene governments. Because the World 
Bank has extensive experience in the design and implementation of regional seas 
programs around the world, and has been a long-standing member and active supporter 
of the International Coral Reef Initiative, with a growing portfolio of a coral reef related 
operations currently valued at nearly US$100 million. World Bank’s orchestration, in the 
short term, has influenced what issue areas center project implementation, for instance, 
the World Bank has authoritatively orchestrated a standardized regional synoptic 
monitoring program, and; in which areas the project focuses, what areas are postponed 
and implemented later gradually. 
The World Bank’s persuasion approach to orchestration has been to coordinate 
intergovernmental institutions as the main intermediaries to influence target states. 
Through the MBRS project, the World Bank orchestrates primarily with the Central 
American Commission of Environment and Development (CCAD) as a 
transgovernmental network mediator and other international organizations such as 
FAO or UNEP to target the agenda of the regional organization Central American 
Integration System (SICA) and its member states. Thus, areas of convergence between 
high impact scenarios and CCAD’s environmental agenda have been identified as 
synergies, which the project promotes over the medium to longer term. 
The persuasion approach relies on changing beliefs through processes of 
identification and authority, social proof and voluntary membership. World Bank’s 
MBRS has concentrated its efforts into persuasion with intermediary transgovernmental 
actors for norms and rules harmonization. The World Bank has persuaded at the 
highest levels of decision-making with the purpose of formulating policy 
recommendations. World Bank’s orchestration has focused on the set up of regional 
fora for policy dialogues with government officials so that they can later influence 
government top-echelons. The World Bank has created National Barrier Reef 
Committees (NBRCs) that include national experts that coordinate the fishing and 
tourism policy frameworks within and between the four countries. These activities 
provide the World Bank’s with neutrality-based resources coming from expert-based 
recommendations. Multidisciplinary groups deal with the management of sustainable 
reefs, where southern experts hold a consultative role. These committees and working 
groups have ensured that recommendations are raised through the intergovernmental 
Mesoamerican Commission for Environment and Development (CCAD) for 
consideration to targets, that is, top-level civil servants. Belize, Guatemala and 
Honduras representatives as newcomers to this MBRS effort are eager to show their 
commitment to the CCAD and the World Bank and have signed a common 
environmental legal framework to develop common policies. By contrast, publicizing 
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monitoring results as part of the MBRS strategy is neither used to exert pressure in 
public fora nor to pressure Mexican civil servants. 
Besides, the World Bank has legitimized interlinkages between socioeconomic and 
environmental issues through the coordination of studies to identify alternative 
livelihood opportunities for artisanal fishers that are trained in workshops by local 
NGOs that act as persuasive intermediaries. In addition, a participatory integrated 
management of resources associated with adjacent MPAs by local communities aims at 
persuading targets that identify with each other to follow World Bank’s policy 
recommendations. This way, in addition to the neutrality-based resources, the World 
Bank has obtained respect-based resources. 
Furthermore, the World Bank has used its authority for institutional arrangements, 
such as the creation of regional fora for technical and policy dialogue, dispute 
resolution, and particularly the setup of intermediaries such as the expert policy-
working group. This expert policy-working group has been orchestrated by the World 
Bank and has liaised closely with the CCAD and its legal office, as allies that ensure that 
the policy objectives are raised in the agenda for consideration within the SICA. This 
group, with representatives chosen by the governmental actors, has supported reforms 
in key areas by persuading regional intermediaries such as the Technical Working 
Groups (TWGs), which have formulated policy recommendations. Persuasion plays a 
role with the setup of consultative fora for introducing information on technically based 
best practices. The aim of these activities has been changing beliefs on state institutions, 
without obliging or exerting pressure, towards sustainability thinking. The cooperation 
built between newcomers for the harmonization of sustainability policy-making such as 
Guatemala, Belize and Honduras for developing a common framework on fishing rules 
exemplifies how several states identify similar objectives through the MBRS project. 
World Bank’s orchestration has managed to enroll local leaders, newcomers to the 
processes of policy-making for sustainability, so that the rest of fishers follow their 
leaders and join the meeting, designed to be a South-South cooperation dialogue. 
Besides, the World Bank has contributed to legitimizing the management of the MBRS 
as a relevant global resource to work on its sustainable development with the signature 
of the Tulum Declaration, which is later ratified with the Tulum+8 as a means of social 
proof by the four countries involved. Last, World Bank’s MBRS project has persuaded 






6.5.4 World Bank’s persuasion weaknesses: Trust- and participation-based 
resources 
The project-coordinating unit, PCU, as the World Bank’s arm to implement the MBRS 
project on the ground has not been as successful to fully involve the CCAD as a main 
intermediary to orchestrate. In fact, the CCAD’s executive secretary has cancelled its 
participation at the relevant World Bank mid-term evaluation and it has delegated its 
functions for this to the PCU leader (BM, FMAM, and CCAD 2004: 1). World Bank’s 
project orchestration has included a formal process of consultation and ownership in 
the design and implementation of a long-term program with the regional organization 
SICA through the Central American commission CCAD. In order to guide the direction 
of the overall program in the medium to long term, an analysis of various development 
scenarios for the MBRS region has been conducted (WB 2001: 15-16). Yet, the CCAD as a 
central intermediary for orchestrating a strategy for sustainable tourism in the region 
has not been able to raise this item to the top-levels of SICA to be included in the 
political agenda. 
Similarly, the World Bank and the PCU have not managed to involve a key local 
partner, such as the local government of the Quintana Roo state as a fully-engaged 
stakeholder especially for tourism, fishing and ecosystem monitoring (BM, FMAM, and 
CCAD 2004:10), which denotes a lack of participation-based resources. It is plausible 
that the targeted ministries and administrations of participating governments may see 
that their economic interests in the short-term could be constrained if participating. In 
fact, the mid-term review has indicated that the ministers of environment and national 
coordinators of the MBRS project recognized the need to develop closer links with 
ministries, such as tourism, agriculture and fishing and maritime authorities to foster 
the harmonization of policies that would positively revert on the environment (BM, 
FMAM, and CCAD 2004: 7). The orchestration efforts deployed by the PCU and the 
World Bank have proved insufficient to create the synergistic environments to generate 
identification among orchestration intermediaries, and bringing together similar actors 
so that they identify with each other. Yet, persuasion has not been sufficient for Mexico 
to agree on a common framework for the harmonization of rules for marine and coastal 
resources management. Conflicts between different governmental authorities have 
played a negative role especially in the case of Mexico (MBRS 2004k: 26). Moreover, 
Mexico is only an observer to the SICA and exhibits less social proof when it comes to 
negotiating norm harmonization. Persuasion, close to the practices of multilateralism 
that coordinates behavior among three or more states on the basis of generalized 
principles of conduct (Ruggie 1992: 574), cannot overcome the inability or unwillingness 
of key actors to move from entrenched identities (Bernstein 2013). 
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SICA has not taken leadership to follow up on MBRS activities. This implies that the 
future continuity of the monitoring programs REIS and SMP is not assured and points 
to a deficit of World Bank’s trust-based resources. The project has formulated a draft for 
the regional cruise ship policy. However, the World Bank has not gained participation-
based resources from tourism businesses to develop those guidelines that are mainly a 
compilation of work done elsewhere. The involved countries have shown a lack of 
appropriation and of agreement on the common focus to develop tourism-related 
activities. This has impaired the consecution of outputs in this area (MBRS 2003h: 28). 
The Mexican environmental policy remains highly centralized with states and 
municipalities. Quintana Roo’s government in the Yucatan peninsula, involved in the 
Mesoamerican Barrier Reef Committees, still strongly depends on federal policy 
guidance and resources, as decentralization has not been accompanied by substantial 
downward transfers of fiscal resources or responsibilities (Mumme and Lybecker 2002: 
319). In fact, several issues complicate the implementation of outstanding policy-related 
outputs. For instance, the demand by the PCU of certain profiles as participants to 
technical meetings and workshops, especially in the case of fisherfolk and tour 
operators, are not matched with the stakeholder finally recommended and accepted by 
MBRS national coordinators (MBRS 2005j: 25). Moreover, the fragmentation of agency 
responsibilities that include unclear or ignored agency mandates, and overlapping 
jurisdictions combined with the need for staff training, slow response from MBRS 
national coordinators to PCU calls to action - especially for investments and 
implementation actions (MBRS 2006a: 24) government inadequate resources, 
equipment and staffing to execute functions, as well as difficulty with staff retention are 
some of the issues emphasized (GEF 2003: 117, MBRS 2006b). 
6.5.5 Persuasion as an orchestration approach: Reflections 
The scant outputs obtained through World Bank’s orchestration combined with the low 
level of trust and participation resources account for the limited impact of the 
persuasion approach. Most notably, chapter 2 has justified that trust-based resources 
are especially relevant and the expert survey results in chapter 4 has confirmed it. 
Coastal and inland development, such as watershed management, inappropriate 
upstream land and resources, industrial development, port and shipping practices such 
as maritime pollution and climato-metereological phenomena are not directly 
addressed and it has reduced the World Bank’s capacity to generate trust-based 
resources. The changing beliefs of project participants underlies much of the rationale 
of World Bank’s orchestration in this project. 
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Table 6.3 World Bank’s MBRS project new orchestration actor and roles (*) 
 
The four MBRS countries and regional organizations appear recurrently as main 
addressees of intermediary implementation activities. World Bank’s implementation 
relies on the intermediation by governmental elites, small and exclusive group of 
intermediary actors acting as key focal points in the environmental departments. The 
World Bank as a delegated orchestrator seeks to build the necessary public support to 
catalyze change and develop the political will and policies required for the MBRS to be 
managed sustainably. One objective is to create a constituency for the conservation of 
the MBRS in the region. The World Bank persuades newcomers to a new issue area by 
increasing their awareness of the value of the MBRS and fostering an understanding 
among the general public of the influence of the development on this world-class 
resource. The World Bank orchestrates the brokering of information through 
networking and discussion fora to introduce new environmental and social 
sustainability criteria into decision-making. Through a regional approach, the World 
Bank attempts to change previous national frameworks for action into new cooperative 
mindsets with a regional focus so that state representatives identify as a group with a 
common objective that of preserving a shared ecological ecosystem. Mexico is not a 
newcomer to sustainability politics, concretely, in the case of marine resource 
management. In fact, past experiences with GATT/WTO litigation on the tuna-dolphin 
case has made this country particularly cautious of international environmental 
regulation. Instead, Guatemala, Honduras and Belize lack similar past experiences and 
presumably are more receptive to persuasion. The World Bank’s persuasiveness relies on 
enlisting local focal points from national environmental ministries. The project attempts 
to shortcut top-echelons in state and federal government when policy recommendations 
are put forward. Yet, this is harder in the case of Mexico, a country with a much bigger 
administration and thus a much more complex governance structure. 
To cope with intricate and complex long-term goals, World Bank’s orchestration 
focuses on technical aspects as a knowledge broker and negotiation arbitrator. First, the 
World Bank orchestrates the setup of a project implementation organigram with 
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advisory and technical consultative groups. Second, the project focuses on the 
implementation of concrete protocols and on the standardization of best practices for 
monitoring in transboundary areas as a starting point for later rule harmonization. 
Orchestration by the World Bank concentrates on developing and implementing a 
standardized regional monitoring and environmental information system for 
transboundary marine protected areas at the MBRS (WB 2001: 7). Table 6.4 below shows 
how marine protected areas and the regional environmental information system takes 
up more than sixty percent of the total project costs. 
Table 6.4 World Bank’s project summary with percentage of costs for each project 
component 
Third, through capacity building activities such as education, information and training, 
the World Bank’s plan is to involve target actors, such as local communities in marine 
protected areas. For the public awareness campaign, the World Bank has enrolled 
community leaders who exert influence on MBRS stakeholders and participation by 
local communities and ethnic groups in issues related to the management of MBRS 
resources, and strengthening the system of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) (Barber and 
Pratt 1998). Fourth, the World Bank advocates the value of the MBRS and accordingly it 
promotes adequate technical skills across the four countries to support the 
implementation of agreed conservation and management interventions whose 
application affect coral reefs such as the Cartagena Convention and its protocols SPAW 
(Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife) and LBSP (Land Based Sources of Marine 
Pollution), MARPOL, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the 
201 
 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Those agreements serve as a common platform for 
dialogue for rule development and harmonization for countries as members of the 
aforementioned international agreements. 
Now, the main project shortcomings are summarized in the next five items. 
First, the World Bank has not secured top echelon participation from both the 
CCAD and SICA. Besides, in the start-up negotiations some economic incentives are 
necessary to set the basis for the MBRS project. This is because it is not deemed possible 
to orchestrate activities equally across an area as large as the MBRS. The Global 
Environment Facility’s grant (GEF) focuses on transboundary areas because targets – 
governments –  are also at the same time the main recipients of the GEF grant. The 
decision to only include the transboundary areas of Mexico, Belize, Honduras and 
Guatemala is a direct result of the high level of political commitment manifested in the 
Tulum declaration. The economic incentive for regional cooperation fits well with the 
common purpose of the different countries sharing the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef. 
Thus, although not central to the project, an economic incentive has also played a role 
in project orchestration. Thus, conditionality has a role in World Bank’s strategy 
primarily during project proposal preparation, when pilot sites and MPAs have been 
chosen according to country and government level – federal, state (WB 2001: 21). 
Besides, the fact that Mexico has not participated in policy harmonization may account 
for the cancellation of GEF finance for later phases of the project originally envisaged. 
Second, the framework for action taken by the World Bank for orchestrating coral 
reef governance is narrow in the sense that it centers in law harmonization when 
institutional structures are weak. The project has relied on persuasion as the central 
mechanism for World Bank’s MBRS project orchestration. Data and information drawn 
from monitoring programs, such as the Synoptic Monitoring Program (SMP) that 
assesses marine resources in the area, are taken as foundations for future discussions on 
cooperation towards rule harmonization. Another case in point is the Baseline Report 
on MPA management developed for the project, which is not used to exert social 
pressure for improving report influence.  
Third, the project has underestimated that Mexico is only a CCAD observer, and as 
such not legally bound to follow CCAD recommendations or even fully recognize its 
authoritativeness. Mexico has not engaged in some of the more outstanding MBRS 
outputs, different from the rest of states in the MBRS framework. Mexico is not a 
newcomer to international environmental politics and it shares the ingrained view that 
environmental concerns constrain its development policies. The Mexican government in 
office is considered “developmentalist” and the few years left in office before elections 
do not provide a favorable context to bind themselves to regional or international 
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commitments such as the sign up of the SPAW protocol101. From the four countries, 
Mexico is the largest both in terms of area and population, which provides a higher 
political clout and status to this country in the region that in practice translates in 
undervaluing cooperation with smaller states, such as Belize, Guatemala and Honduras. 
Fourth, persuasion by the World Bank has not benefited from orchestrating 
different government levels. The centralized governance system from Mexico has not 
allowed the delegation to lower government levels such as the state of Quintana Roo, 
which is the central state affected by coral reef governance. Therefore, when much of 
the MBRS project focuses law harmonization and there is one main country that is 
reluctant to engage in binding policy then the whole project is jeopardized. 
Last, another flaw has been not openly expressing the possible links existing 
between the MBRS project and economic interests in relation to the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA), which may have affected the acquisition of neutrality-based 
resources. The mid-term report recognizes that “an FTAA including Honduras and 
Guatemala will definitely increase the economic and agricultural activities in the region, 
which would lead to an increased pressure on environmental resources” (BM, FMAM, 
and CCAD 2004: 7). With FTAA negotiations indefinitely stalled, it is not surprising that 
positive project reviews have not led to the approval and finance for subsequent MBRS 
project phases. Even if assessed to successfully deliver its objectives, the MBRS has not 
secured the economic resources to re-edit a second phase of the project. This 
presumably indicates that the environmental motivation of the project is subordinate to 
economic interests. Under such circumstances, support for the MBRS would be 
dependent on its capacity to serve as an instrument for regional policy harmonization, 
and the stalled negotiations between the two bordering countries Mexico and Belize 
have definitely not helped in terms of deciding on project extension. 
                                                 
101 Personal interview with ICRAN/MAR’s manager, March 2005. 
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7. Orchestrating through social leverage: The Mesoamerican 
Barrier Reef Alliance 
This chapter analyzes the influence in coral reef sustainability politics launched by 
UNEP International Coral Reef Action Network Alliance for the Mesoamerican Barrier 
Reef (ICRAN/MAR). The first section briefly introduces the multipurpose organization 
(MPO) UNEP as the orchestrator for the ICRAN/MAR initiative, which is an IO-led 
partnership whose purpose is to halt and reverse the decline of coral reefs (Ivanova 
2002: 26-27). To introduce the case study on informal orchestration, the following 
section applies the five criteria of chapter 2 in order to identify the orchestration 
approach, namely, membership, franchise, decision-making, mandate and orchestrator’s 
autonomy. In line with the framework for assessment developed in chapter 3, the latter 
two sections assess, the outputs reached through informal orchestration and evaluates 
the procedural resources generated by the social leverager – UNEP. The last section 
assesses UNEP as a social leverager and discusses its influence on coral reef 
sustainability politics. It argues how UNEP has managed to involve new actors and 
legitimized new roles for actors based on the analyses of the outputs delivered. Finally, 
the argument is made that the influence exerted is the result of who initiates the 
orchestration process and how membership affects the selection of intermediaries and 
the orchestration process. 
7.1 UNEP as social leverager 
The International Coral Reef Action Network for the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef 
(ICRAN/MAR) is a strategic voluntary initiative between UNEP and coral reef science 
and conservation organizations such as the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network 
(GCRMN), Reef Check, Coral Reef Alliance (CORAL), World Resources Institute (WRI), 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) (UNEP 2002b). ICRAN is an informal global 
partnership and ICRAN/MAR is the regional action network for the Mesoamerican 
Barrier Reef area, a Type II partnership of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (UNCSD 2002, DSD 2005). Talks on the creation of ICRAN/MAR started 
in an International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI) regular meeting in Cancún, Mexico, yet 
the initiative was officially launched two years later, consisting of a one-year start-up 
phase and a four-year action phase102. Field activities in UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR project 
have been implemented through the Caribbean Environment Programme (CEP) that is 
one of the UNEP administered Regional Seas Programmes. 
In 1976, UNEP was urged to launch the Caribbean Environment Programme (CEP), 
an unparalleled joint endeavor, which embraces the region's diversity in its efforts to 
                                                 
102Because some of delay in the project start it finalized at the end of 2007. 
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advance economic prosperity and a healthy environment. In relation to this, the 
Caribbean Regional Coordinating Unit (CAR/RCU) located in Kingston, Jamaica was 
created in 1986 and serves as secretariat to the CEP. The Wider Caribbean Region 
(WCR) includes the insular and coastal states and territories with coasts on the 
Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico as well as waters of the Atlantic Ocean adjacent to 
these states and territories and includes twenty-eight island and continental countries. 
The Action Plan led to the 1983 adoption of the Convention for the Protection and 
Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region - Cartagena 
Convention - which provides the legal framework. The Convention has been 
supplemented by three protocols addressing specific environmental issues namely, Oil 
Spills Protocol, Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW) and Land-based Sources 
and activities of the Marine Pollution Protocol (LBS). 
The UNEP in ICRAN/MAR draws on CEP partners’ investments in reef monitoring 
and management to create strategically linked actions across local, national and global 
scales. Yet, funding by the non-state organization United Nations Foundation (UNF) 
has been crucial. The origin of the UNF is the donation of one billion US dollars by 
media mogul and philanthropist Ted Turner. Influenced by the strong interest in the 
Mesoamerican Reef by the United Sates’ government, UNF has given 1,5 million dollars 
to ICRAN that has served to spin off ICRAN/MAR. Before the start of ICRAN/MAR, 
some related projects were already running in the area. Reference may thus be made to 
the USAID New Opportunity Alliance, The Nature Conservancy’s Mesoamerican Reef 
Initiative103 or the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor, a huge project that after loads of 
money and many years of cooperation with governments and NGOs has not been able 
to go beyond their planning phase. Instead, the World Bank’s Mesoamerican Barrier 
Reef Systems (MBRS) project, the so-called Mesoamerican Biological Corridor’s smaller 
brother, is achieving according to commentators important successes104. This alliance 
favors USAID Guatemala/Central American Programs to bring new partners and 
international expertise into the region to promote the sound management of the reef 
both economically and environmentally, and to strategically engage major components 
of the private sector (ICRAN 2003). While USAID, UNF and ICRAN have agreed to 
jointly plan the specific program activities under the Mesoamerican Reef Alliance 
(ICRAN 2005d), a lead organization within ICRAN, the Caribbean Environment 
Programme (CEP) of the United Nations Environment Programme’s, orchestrates the 
project execution105. 
                                                 
103 Personal interview with the manager to the Mesoamerican Reef Project at The Nature Conservancy, 
March 2005. 
104 Personal interview with the ICRAN/MAR secretary, February 2005. 
105 Personal interview with the ICRAN director, September 2005. 
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The board of directors of ICRAN/MAR consists of UNEP’s Caribbean Regional 
Coordinating Unit (CAR/RCU), and the donors, USAID, UNF, and the secretary (ICRAN 
2003). The ICRAN/MAR secretary had been previously working in Sian’ Kan reserve, a 
Mexican biosphere reserve. Just before joining ICRAN/MAR, he was director and 
coordinator for the national office. The Technical Committee consists of the partners 
and MBRS106, namely the World Resources Institute (WRI), based in Washington and 
whose representatives visit periodically, Reef Check in California and the Caribbean 
with a person contracted, CORAL, NGO, alliance for coral reefs, World Wild Fund 
(WWF), the UNEP-supported NGO107, World Conservation Monitoring Center (WCMC) 
based in Cambridge that provides expertise in watershed management and the UNEP-
DTIE Division of Technology, Industry and Economics based in Paris108. The United 
Nations Environment Programme - Regional Coordination Unit/Caribbean Region 
(UNEP-RCU/CAR) and the ICRAN/MAR secretariat on the same premises as the World 
Bank’s MBRS PCU at the Belizean Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Cooperatives109 
oversee the alliance. 
The UN Environment Programme employs 456 professional officers – supported by 
other 405 members of staff in general service posts (Bauer 2009c: 172) – with an annual 
budget that relies on voluntary contributions110. The fact that the UNEP’s work 
increasingly relates with the work of other organizations dealing with socioeconomic 
development, education for implementing international commitments such as the 
Millennium Development Goals (Bauer 2009c: 182) compensates the decrease in weight 
of UNEP in the climate and desertification implementation areas as their conventions 
have been endowed with two independent secretariats. The lack of own capacities to 
engage in national capacity building activities has been overcome by UNEP via three 
strategies, namely; first, joint programs with other organizations that do have such 
capacities such as UN-HABITAT; second, engagement as leaders of public-private 
partnerships as Type II partnerships; and third, collaborative approaches for 
environmental monitoring and assessment, such as, the Global Environmental Outlook, 
a tool that examines a wealth of data, information and knowledge about the global 
environment; identifies potential policy responses; and provides an outlook for the 
future by turning the best available scientific knowledge into information relevant for 
decision makers (Bauer 2009c: 178-179). 
                                                 
106 Personal interview with the ICRAN/MAR secretary, February 2005. 
107 They are not highly participatory at the beginning of the project. 
108 Similar to WCMC, they are not very active at the start of the project. 
109 Personal interview with UNEP’s CAR/RCU official, September 2005. 
110 That amounts on average to around 105 million USD. 
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More specifically, the UNEP has collaborated with WorldFish, the World 
Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC) in the production of the first global 
assessment of coral reefs by the World Resources Institute (WRI) to determine areas at 
risk from overfishing, coastal development, and other human activity. Particularly, 
UNEP-WCMC maintains the global database of marine protected areas (MPAs), 
including World Heritage Sites, for the World Commission on Protected Areas (WCPA). 
Besides, the UNEP, the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network (GCRMN), and the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) have delivered the report Status 
and Trends of Caribbean Coral Reefs: 1970-2012, the most detailed and comprehensive 
study published to date (Jackson et al. 2014). In 2000, UNEP’s executive director created 
the Coral Reef Unit (CRU) to coordinate UNEP’s work on coral reefs. The CRU was 
initially based Geneva, Switzerland, and was then relocated at the UNEP Regional Office 
for Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok, Thailand, and operates under the Freshwater and 
Marine Ecosystems Branch of the Division of Environmental Policy Implementation 
(DEPI). The Coral Reef Unit works in partnership with Regional Seas programs and 
other institutions on the joint development of tools and methods that enable ecosystem 
based approaches to coral reef management; regional and national level policy support 
and demonstration projects to facilitate adoption and uptake; as well as capacity 
building and networking to promote exchange of best practice. The CRU also represents 
UNEP in the International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI). In addition, in 2014, UNEP has 
started the Regional Seas Coral Reef Partnership that capitalizes on experiences from 
ICRAN and assumes some of its key functions. 
The partnership has a light institutional structure, formed around the Regional Seas; 
it takes corals as an ecosystemic unit for governance. States are not the only members 
and a Partnership Steering Committee meets annually to set the partnership work 
program. Participating partner organizations include the International Coral Reef 
Initiative (ICRI), the Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network (GCRMN); NOAA Coral 
Reef Conservation Program; The Reef-World Foundation, international coordinators of 
the Green Fins initiative; Blue Finance, as well as the UNEP-World Conservation 
Monitoring Centre and GRID-Arendal. 
The ICRAN board is the principal fund-raising body for ICRAN. It provides oversight 
and accountability for ICRAN funds, endorses and promotes the ICRAN strategic plan, 
and approves the program and budget recommended by the steering committee. The 
composition of the board is made out of two representatives from the ICRI Coordination 
and Planning Committee (CPC) and seven positions appointed by the steering 
committee. The steering committee is the operational unit of ICRAN, with its members 
carrying out decision-making functions. The responsibilities of the steering committee 
are to approve work plans and budgets, prepare and update the ICRAN strategic plan, 
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decide on priority actions to implement the strategic plan, approve the principal 
outputs of ICRAN, approve the project directors, select some members of the ICRAN 
board, select the executing agencies for implementing ICRAN activities, ensure that 
appropriate financial management processes are in place within the various executing 
agencies and, ensure effective communication of the results of ICRAN to the 
constituencies that individual committees represent. Non-governmental organizations 
related to coral reef and UN organizations and bodies are mainly represented on the 
steering committee: WorldFish Centre, Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network 
(GCRMN), International Coral Reef Information Network (ICRIN)/CORAL, ICRI 
secretariat, UNEP, UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC), 
World Resources Institute (WRI), Reef Check, World Wildlife Fund-United States 
(WWF-US), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), Marine Aquarium Council (MAC), ICRAN 
coordinating unit, Regional Seas Programme - South Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme (SPREP), UNEP Caribbean, UNEP East African Seas and UNEP East Asian 
Seas. 
 
Figure 7.1 ICRAN structure 
The ICRAN Coordinating Unit (ICU) is hosted by UNEP-WCMC and consists of a 
director, assistant director, program assistant and the supporting staff in the UNEP 
Coral Reef Unit. The ICU has the responsibility for the management of the operations of 
ICRAN as well as being the day-to-day contact for the partners, assisting the board and 
steering committee. The director reports to the executive committee, which consists of a 
representative of UNEP, the steering committee chair, the board chair and the steering 
committee. ICRAN meets biannually and makes time for specific ICRAN/MAR 
coordination (ICRAN 2003: 31). ICRAN has a quarterly financial and semi-annual 
progress reporting, which is required by UNEP, and thus de facto the UNEP Regional 
Coordinating Unit for the Caribbean (UNEP-RCU/CAR). The ICU, with director 
Christian Teleki, has maintained regular contact between the ICRAN/MAR project 
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coordination office in Belize and the UNEP-RCU/CAR. Part of ICU’s responsibility is to 
ensure that the participating ICRAN partners are making the most of the partnership 
and that there is complete transparency in the execution of activities and any 
duplication is minimized. For flexible fund reimbursement, the ICRAN/MAR secretary 
talks to the administration, which liaises with UNEP-CAR/RCU in Jamaica111. 
7.2 Characterizing UNEP’s informal orchestration 
This section presents how UNEP’s informal approach can be best described as 
orchestration through social leverage by analyzing the five orchestration dimensions 
introduced in chapter 2, namely, membership, franchise, decision-making, mandate and 
international organization autonomy. 
7.2.1 Membership 
UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR is a fairly inclusive membership as it involves an extensive and 
mixed team of professionals. Partners are namely the board of the International Coral 
Reef Action Network board (ICRAN), The United Nations Foundation (UNF), the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID); the Central American 
Environment and Development Commission (CCAD), PROARCA/APM112, the WRI, the 
UNEP-WCMC, WWF, the GCRMN, World Fish, Reef Check, the United Nations 
Environment Programme Division of Technology, Industry and Economics 
(UNEP/DTIE) and the CORAL Reef Alliance. Besides, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR project 
involves an extensive and mixed team of NGOs, such as those from the initiative’s 
board, businesses, local communities, consumers, governmental agencies such as 
USAID, trade associations such as CropLife, and philanthropic organizations such as the 
United Nations Foundation (UNF). Some provide material resources to ICRAN/MAR, 
such as an administrative or institutional structure, while others bring ideational or 
expert resources. UNEP, as orchestrator, supplies ideational resources as a well-
established core UN organization for environmental issues. 
The absence of governments as main partners in UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR – although 
involved indirectly through ICRI – facilitates the approaching of the orchestrator – an 
MPO - to private actors, which may feel freer to cooperate in an informal environment, 
less subject to punitive measures by government institutions113. UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR 
                                                 
111 Personal interview with ICRAN/MAR secretary, February 2005. 
112 The Green markets and protected areas component of the Central American Environment 
Programme (PROARCA/APM, Spanish acronym) represent the efforts to consolidate the 
Mesoamerican Biological Corridor managed by the CCAD, financed by USAID and implemented by 
The Nature Conservancy, WWF and Rainforest Alliance. 
113 Personal interview with the ICRAN/MAR secretary, February 2005. 
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has maintained an office in Belize responsible for the overall project management and 
implementation at the field level. Thus UNEP has maintained a physical presence in the 
region with the appointment of a project coordinator and a program administrative 
officer (ICRAN 2003: 30). The management of local activities has been decentralized and 
managed by the respective technical advisors of UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR’s implementing 
partners. Besides, in Jamaica, the UNEP-CAR/RCU office has been responsible for the 
administrative support for the project and overall implementation of activities. 
7.2.2 Franchise 
UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR project expert authority is shared among different project 
partners. UNEP liaises with several specialized partners to orchestrate their expertise 
and cooperate as a decentralized network. UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR strategic document has 
been written in collaboration with partners. The strategic plan identifies the priorities of 
the action phase, the specific activities to be undertaken, the partners involved, the 
outputs and timing expected and the specific costs. UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR secretary and 
coordinator, Mr. Álvarez, provides the regional perspective and contextualizes the 
project proposal. UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR secretary has pointed anecdotally that one NGO 
member from the alliance pushed forward to work in the area of Cancún and Cozumel. 
Despite the big publicity this alliance component would have brought, according to the 
secretary it was not realistic to have a relevant impact with the material resources and 
time available. 
In addition, the alliance has discussed how the catalytic effort of ICRAN/MAR can 
relate to other similar coral reef conservation initiatives in the region (ICRAN 2003). 
Consequently, orchestrating with other projects has been the focus of UNEP’s 
ICRAN/MAR. UNEP has maintained contacts with donors such as the World 
Bank/Global Environmental Facility (GEF) MBRS, the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), and international conservation organizations such as the Nature 
Conservancy (TNC), World Wild Fund (WWF) – ICRAN partners that have other 
activities running independently, the Summit Foundation, Wildlife Conservation 
Society (WCS), local NGOs, business, academia,  PROARCA, and USAID. Yet not only 
donors and non-profit NGOs are involved in the alliance. Croplife, an association 
founded by agribusiness such as Montsanto, Bayer, Dow, and Syngenta has been 
targeted to cooperate and develop good practices114. 
 
 
                                                 
114 Personal interview with the ICRAN/MAR secretary, March 2005. 
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7.2.3 Decision-making rules 
The ICRAN/MAR alliance is a volunteer membership organization with a semi-
hierarchical structure. The membership alliance is divided along three levels. First, the 
Strategic Objective Steering Committee (SOSC) is the main governing body for the 
project, involving representatives from the UNEP-RCU/CAR, ICRAN, UNF and USAID. 
Second, the Technical Oversight Committee (TOC) with ICRAN, UNEP, MBRS (CCAD), 
the Protected Areas and Environmental Trade unit of the Regional Environmental 
Program for Central America (PROARCA/APM), and USAID project coordinator and 
project administrative officer as representative members. Third, reference may be made 
to the eight implementing partners that take part in UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR project, the 
WRI, the UNEP-WCMC, WWF, Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network (GCRMN), 
WorldFish, Reef Check, UNEP/DTIE and CORAL Reef Alliance. Nearly none of them has 
worked in that area before, but are experts in at least one of the three topics: watershed 
management, sustainable fishing and sustainable tourism. The eight implementing 
partners are the intermediaries of the third level that contribute to the development of 
the project proposal, although final decisions are taken at the SOSC level115. Besides, the 
partnership has envisioned new partners to join UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR efforts during the 
project implementation. 
Whereas in this alliance the use of the rule of consensus is being applied, semi-
hierarchical decision-making at the top-level prevails. In addition, balloting processes 
have been conducted after discussions have taken place to approve best practices in the 
area of environmental sustainable tourism. Specifically, the adoption of best practices 
for sustainable tourism has taken place through workshops with the guidance of 
consultants that have defined performance-based objectives. A taskforce committee of 
more than one hundred and sixty local stakeholders has unanimously approved by a 
balloting process the performance objectives. Later on, project partners have initiated a 
standard testing process that has dictated the potential for replication in the region and 
elsewhere (ICRAN 2007a: 7). Besides, the logic of UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR is that a majority 
of consumers may decide not to buy a specific product if it is not certified as fish caught 
in environmentally sustainable ways or as an environmentally certified tourist 
destination. This is de facto a “dollar voting” that may penalize targets through a drop in 
sales because of the information provided by orchestrators. Due to decreases in sales, 
targets may change their behavior if they want to avoid the results of social punishment 
derived from bad reputation. At the same time, with the aim of signing a memorandum 
of understanding in relation to best practices for watershed management, NGOs and 
                                                 
115 Personal interview with the ICRAN/MAR secretary, February 2005. 
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business discussions have taken place in the shadow of hierarchy (Héritier and 
Lehmkuhl 2011). 
7.2.4 Mandate 
The wider Caribbean regional seas have been selected as one of the focus areas for 
ICRAN116. It is undeniable that the US-based, UN Foundation and USAID have been 
instrumental in materializing ICRAN/MAR. Both US interests in the Caribbean region 
together with the existing capacity as well as the concern for a range of biophysical 
effects have played a role in financing and fostering UNEP’s action for ICRI and the 
selection of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef. Project leaders and the donor community 
have identified places within the already ongoing GEF/MBRS and PROARCA projects 
where the ICRAN can add some much needed technical expertise (ICRAN 2003: 5-6). 
More particularly, the selection criteria for demonstration sites have been based on 
social, economic, environmental, competitiveness and cultural terms, as opposed to the 
criteria relying on the political map. The topics identified as requiring immediate 
attention are watershed management and the reduction of land-based sources of marine 
pollution, sustainable fisheries practices and empowerment of resource users, 
sustainable tourism and the need to connect the supply and demand aspects of the 
rapidly growing tourism sector. The approach is to couple the idea of creating new 
partnerships with the private sector and leverage new resources and talents to find long-
term solutions (ICRAN 2003: 6). UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR project focuses on providing 
information and contributing to the development of best practices in collaboration with 
other partners and special interest is placed on involving the private sector in three 
main areas, watershed management, sustainable fisheries and sustainable tourism. 
Through each theme, there are threads of commonality, which bind the fabric of the 
overall project together (ICRAN 2003: 6). From here, the three main components of 
UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR strategic plan consist in management action, communication and 
assessment and information dissemination (ICRAN 2001). 
First, the ICRAN/MAR project contributes to management action. UNEP has a 
coordinating role for thirteen Regional Seas Action Plans and nine conventions on the 
Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal threats. A key concern for the 
alliance is to spread central tools, namely, not only integrated coastal management 
(ICM) but also community-based development. Consequently, ICM and marine 
protected areas (MPAs) are the main priority areas for action. 
Second, the ICRI has recognized that many individuals and groups do not have 
sufficient information to make good decisions about coral reefs. Related to this, the ICRI 
                                                 
116 It has been chosen together with the Eastern Africa regional seas. 
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Secretariat has developed a comprehensive database of coral reef projects to improve 
the understanding of activities and where gaps exist and have reviewed their progress. 
In 1999, under the leadership of the ICRI, members of the ICRI Coordinating and 
Planning Committee (CPC) resolved to create an International Coral Reef Information 
Network (ICRIN) coordinated by the Coral Reef Alliance (CORAL), an NGO that has led 
public awareness efforts. The primary activities of the ICRIN have been outreach 
coordination, communications hubs, media relations and capacity building. CORAL is a 
central partner of the ICRAN/MAR alliance for communication activities. Efforts have 
included requesting public awareness materials worldwide and cataloguing them in a 
public accessible database, drawing a list of journalists likely to cover coral reef stories, 
and generating a coral image database. The generation of messages and outreach 
focused initially on the tourism sector, fishing, and key decision-makers in the public 
and private sectors including coastal communities, resource users, government leaders, 
hoteliers, tourists, regional policy-makers, farmers, bi- and multilateral funding 
agencies, international conservation organizations and food exporters constitutes an 
important project objective. 
Third, in terms of assessment and information dissemination, the Global Coral Reef 
Monitoring Network (GCRMN), which operates under the umbrella of the ICRI, has a 
baseline network of people monitoring coral reefs in most countries around the world, 
in association with Reef Check. Furthermore, the Reefbase of WorldFish is a global 
database on coral reefs, also with a GIS-based version, that serves as a repository for 
data from many sources, including the GCRMN. Established in 1993, this widely 
disseminated system involves a team of coral reef experts that extract quantitative data 
from articles and reports, and convert data from computer fields to complete both 
biophysical and socioeconomic data tables. The system also provides a range of graphic 
products including aerial photos, space shuttle and satellite imagery and maps of coral 
reefs provided by the WCMC (Luijten 2006a, 2006b, Luijten, Miles, and Cherrington 
2006). The database has played a key role in many studies, including the State of the 
Reefs Report, on behalf of the ICRI (Jameson, McManus, and Spalding 1995), the Reefs 
at Risk Report (Burke et al. 1998, Burke and Maidens 2004, Burke et al. 2011), and the 
report on the acidification of the world’s oceans as a result of climate change (Hoegh-
Guldberg 1999, 2012). 
7.2.5 International organizations’ autonomy 
UNEP relies on orchestration with public and non-state intermediaries to pursue its 
objectives. UNEP compared to other organizations, such as the World Bank, has twenty-
five times less staff and a thousand times fewer resources. Yet, it must take their cues 
from their governing councils on setting agendas, sponsoring negotiations, and 
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implementing development and environment programs (Porter and Welsh Brown 
1996a: 41). Coral reef governance crosscuts areas of many different ministries and 
business sectors, which all hold key information and expertise for social leveraging. 
Thus, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR partnership serves as an interaction platform that connects 
different types of intermediary actors, namely prescribers of behavior with target actors. 
UNEP’s role is to provide information and develop best practices to then be diffused. 
UNEP grants social rewards and, on some occasions, social punishments as a high status 
actor in social leverage. Therefore, it needs a forum or institution that makes acting in a 
particular way public and observable – such as voluntary reporting – to orchestrate 
social pressure for exerting change of the target behavior. The more numerous the 
audience for the forum, the more benefits social leverage accrues, as the desire of targets 
to maximize status and avoid humiliation grows. UNEP, in informal orchestration, 
counts on a constrained autonomy. It can borrow autonomy though from its non-state 
intermediary partners. Whereas UNEP focuses on the management action component 
as an orchestrator through the Regional Seas Programmes (RSP), non-profits founding 
partners are responsible for the assessment and information dissemination and 
communication (ICRAN 2003). 
7.3 Identifying UNEP’s outputs as social leverager 
The following sections apply the analytical framework developed in chapter 3 in order to 
assess the influence of UNEP’s social leverage. First, the framework of analysis for 
different types of outputs, namely, organizational, policy-based, discursive, and 
voluntary-based, is applied to the empirical context. In the following sections, the 
procedural resources of UNEP and the overall influence understood as UNEP’s 
competence to involve new actors and its capacity to legitimize new roles for actors is 
analyzed. 
7.3.1 Organizational 
Through the ICRAN/MAR alliance, the UNEP Regional Seas Programme has 
coordinated the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) New 
Opportunity Alliance, ICRI and UNF to create the operational unit for the project at the 
Belizean ministry of fisheries. The ICRAN/MAR secretary from this office coordinates 
not only with all UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR implementing partners but also with other 
projects in the region. In that sense, the ICRAN/MAR benefits from its location on the 
same premises as the World Bank’s PCU of MBRS. In fact, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has 
orchestrated one of the most important risk issues for the reefs by developing 
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hydrographic models of identified watersheds through the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)117. 
7.3.2 Policy-based 
UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has obtained policy outputs in the areas of watershed 
management and also in the area of marine and coastal resources. On the policy side, 
the project has been successful in adopting monitoring protocols for bioaccumulation 
studies among different agencies that have become official standards that are being 
used not only locally but also beyond the Caribbean. In addition, the Alliance between 
UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR with the regional organization OSPESCA has yielded results in 
terms of generating policy recommendations to the Honduras government on 
environmental sustainability for fisheries. Finally, guidelines for sustainable tourism 
have been developed in cooperation with the local Mexican government of Quintana 
Roo. 
The development of a monitoring protocol to conduct toxic bioaccumulation studies 
and testing for watershed areas management in the region has been completed by 
UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR through WWF in four rounds of testing in Chetumal Bay Mexico, 
Belize, and Honduras (Agudelo 2007). This protocol has been adapted by the US 
Environment Protection Agency (EPA) and the NOAA for water quality monitoring in 
hurricane affected areas (ICRAN 2007a: 13). In addition, the Government of New 
Zealand has adopted the protocol as the official standard for bioaccumulation sampling 
and lab analysis for the country. Besides, WWF is extending the use of this protocol for 
bioaccumulation assessments in the Coral Triangle118, the Amazon, the Gulf of 
California, East Africa Marine and the Mekong. 
On the marine areas and fishing component, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR through WWF 
has developed efforts in alliance with the Fishing and Aquiculture Organization of the 
Central-American Isthmus (OSPESCA) – the regional organization in charge of fisheries 
– to make recommendations to the Honduran government. This contributes to both its 
institutional arrangement for fisheries management and overcoming the hurdle of 
changes in fishery policies with every change in the governmental period of four years in 
Honduras (ICRAN 2007a: 13). 
UNEP has extensive experience in sustainable tourism through demonstration 
projects, training, education and awareness activities and support to voluntary 
initiatives, such as those for tour operators and cruise lines (UNEP 2002c). Yet, there are 
                                                 
117 NASA is in charge of outer space and NOAA is in charge of water and oceans. 
118 It comprises the tropical marine waters of Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, 
Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste. 
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hardly policy outputs for the coastal and tourism management area. The sustainable 
tourism initiative of UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR project has attempted to build policy–level 
support in local and national governments for private sector sustainable tourism 
initiatives (ICRAN 2003: 28-29). Although, the ICRAN/MAR outputs for sustainable 
tourism have been indirect. The work done for this project has galvanized the creation 
of a network with its main founding member, namely the Coral Reef Alliance (CORAL), 
collaborating in regional projects, such as the Mexican NGO Amigos de Sian Ka’an, 
Riviera Maya Hotel Association, Rainforest Alliance, Grupo Intersectorial de Cozumel, 
the Quintana Roo State Tourism Ministry and the travel foundation known as the 
Mesoamerican Reef Tourism Initiative (MARTI). From the several results, it is worth 
noting that the MARTI Guide for sustainable Planning, Design and Construction in the 
Mexican Caribbean was developed in cooperation with the local government of 
Quintana Roo in Mexico and with the Quintana Roo State Ministry of Tourism, 
SEDETUR. 
7.3.3 Discursive 
Five discourse-related results are identified for UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR. UNEP has spread 
the discourse on the need to take care of land-based pollution sources as the main 
threats to coral reefs in the MAR region and, thus popularizing a ridge to reef approach 
for reef protection. In fact, even if investing the same efforts in the three main project 
areas119, UNEP’s social leverage has more discursive influence on the management of 
watersheds120 − with three outputs − than on marine or coastal ecosystems − with one 
output each (ICRAN 2003: 4).  
First, the integration of trends in land use with spatial, hydrological and 
oceanographic modeling by the UNEP project has generated a new discourse that links 
land-based sources of threat to the MAR with the changing patterns of pollution 
distribution along sea currents (WRI 2006a) highlighting the interdependency between 
land and marine ecosystems. Hydrologic and oceanographic models show how pollution 
travels through the water table or by the sea. In fact, ocean currents contribute to the 
higher pollution levels of marine protected areas, such as the Sian Ka’an reserve in the 
Yucatan Peninsula compared to the waters of more populated and touristy areas further 
south in Cancún. This monitoring approach is close to integrated coastal management 
and based on principles regarding productivity and ecosystem health in line with 
marine ecosystem-based management (Appeldoorn 2011). In collaboration with the 
                                                 
119 Those areas are the ones considered the most important in the in-depth study by the FAO-World 
Bank on risks and threats in the area. 
120 Personal interview with the ICRAN/MAR secretary, February 2005. 
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USAID and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), data has 
analyzed historic patterns in the rate, distribution and nature of land cover change in 
the region that have been related to different environmental and socio-economic 
variables (ICRAN 2003: 13, Burke 2006). This discourse has helped identifying areas in 
need of better agricultural management. 
Second, a discourse on business accountability for watershed management has taken 
center stage. The combination of bioaccumulation testing with actual fieldwork in 
promoting sound and cost effective better management practices has allowed UNEP’s 
ICRAN/MAR through WWF to raise the profile of the project in the region. Aiming to 
identify agricultural threats, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has managed to set up a 
bioaccumulation monitoring program by leveraging significant resources from the 
private sector such as Croplife − a nonprofit trade association that groups the main 
corporations from the plant science industry − and other donors in the region such as 
the Summit Foundation (ICRAN 2007a: 5). 
Third, scientific information and modeling results for the development of future 
scenarios contribute to visualizing the consequences of different land-use policies on 
the coral reefs of the MAR (ICRAN 2003: 14). The models have been refined and 
validated through a collaborative network, including local stakeholders. Once the 
models have been developed and applied to the MAR region, they have produced a 
series of scenarios, which are used to inform and influence policy development. This 
analysis has generated the first comprehensive database on watersheds for the region, 
and has provided a basis for subsequent analyses, including the development of 
appropriate policy-relevant indicators. The collaboration between WRI and WCMC 
under the UNEP’s social leverage has provided the basis for an innovative and 
comprehensive watershed analysis for the Mesoamerican Reef (ICRAN 2007a: 5). This 
has been released by WRI for the public, data CD and analysis (ICRAN 2005a). The 
results have helped identify vulnerable areas where conversion to an erosive land use 
should be avoided. In addition, it has indicated where converted conservation practices 
should be implemented, as well as areas where better agricultural management 
practices need to be targeted. 
Fourth, discourse outputs in sustainable fishing brings the supply chain together 
with the increasing demand of captured lobster, respecting best fishing practices. The 
UNEP’s social leverage has proved influential in assisting the alliance between WWF, 
Honduran fishing organizations and the Darden restaurants for the provision of lobster 
that respects best fishing practices.  
Last, UNEP’s orchestration through its sustainable tourism initiative has stressed 
conservation awareness and has made more evident the influence of the tourism 
industry on the MAR, along the marine recreation supply chain (ICRAN 2003: 28-29). 
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This new discourse to involve the supply chain has resulted, among other things, in the 
creation of an alliance that responds to the increasing demand on tourism services that 
respect environmental standards where UNEP’s social leverage has been instrumental. 
 
7.3.4 Voluntary-based 
A high number of voluntary outputs have been reaped through the ICRAN/MAR 
initiative. They are introduced following the classification outlined in chapter 3, namely 
institutional, normative, reporting, and finance. 
7.3.4.1 Institutional outputs 
UNEP has orchestrated the launching of voluntary initiatives – which are not a direct 
formal mandate by states – and that have influenced three areas of work – watershed, 
marine and coastal ecosystems (WRI 2006a). First, in the case of the watershed 
component two are the voluntary-based institutional outputs. The project – by 
promoting the voluntary institutionalization of best practices in the private sector – has 
favored the development of a constituency composed of local government, private and 
public sector stakeholders to discuss scenarios and implement best-practices for 
watershed management (ICRAN 2003: 15, Sugg 2006, WRI 2006b, c) as well as the 
cooperation between competing bureaucracies. UNEP’s alliance has identified polluted 
watersheds of the region and the agribusinesses that operate in them, among those, 
banana, coffee, and pineapple plantations, which use pesticides and fertilizers, which 
are more dangerous than the more organic waste coming from cities121. The cooperation 
of agribusiness that have disclaimed information, has been necessary to make progress 
in this area. Related to this, UNEP has favored the cooperation of two competing 
bureaucracies, namely NASA and NOAA, through the combination of WWF and NASA’s 
study on watershed pollution and NOAA’s on pollution dispersal. 
Second, for the marine ecosystem four institutional outcomes have been reaped. 
UNEP’s alliance has co-financed, administered and presented the first Mesoamerican 
Fishermen Congress in Quintana Roo, Mexico122. As a result of this meeting, participants 
have founded the Mesoamerican Alliance for Traditional Fishing. Besides, UNEP’s 
intermediary WWF has facilitated the process of giving technical support for 
partnerships with major seafood buyers between industry, public and private fisher 
organizations and environmental NGOs123. In fact, a public-private partnership between 
                                                 
121 Personal interview with the ICRAN/MAR secretary, February 2005. 
122 The congress has been co-organized with the World Bank’s MBRS. 
123 Personal interview with the research director at DIGEPESCA, February 2007. 
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a major international seafood buyer that owns 1,800 restaurants and employs 
approximately 180,000 people – DARDEN – has been established in collaboration with 
the Association of Caribbean fishers (APESCA) and the Fishing Directorate General of 
Honduras, depending on the Secretary of State for Agriculture and Livestock 
(DIGEPESCA). Related to this, community-based fishery management has been 
improved through the development of appropriate partnerships (ICRAN 2003: 17, 
2006b). To advance capacity building in the Caribbean for the management of marine 
resources, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR alliance has carefully selected demonstration sites 
(ICRAN 2003: 5-6). The identification of sites has been a priority as there are over 300 
marine and coastal protected areas declared or established in the Wider Caribbean, 
from which about 70% are only partially managed or not managed at all. UNEP has 
orchestrated so that both areas in the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve in Mexico and the 
Hol Chan Marine Reserve in Belize receive assistance (ICRAN 2005d) to better serve as 
demonstration and learning sites (ICRAN 2003: 6). The demonstration sites of the MAR 
have fulfilled the following items; limiting the access and fishing effort, developing 
MPAs with no-take zones, introducing co-management governance of fishery resources, 
and initiating community monitoring of the socio-economic and natural resource 
parameters (ICRAN 2003: 19-20). Last, peer-to-peer exchanges of best practice co-
management and economy diversification have enhanced fisheries’ management 
capacity. Successful demonstration sites have met with target communities (ICRAN 
2003: 22). At least four exchanges among community based organizations (CBO) leaders 
from Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, plus Nicaragua have been conducted 
(ICRAN 2003: 20). 
Third, for the coastal ecosystem, there are three institutional voluntary outputs. 
UNEP’s orchestration has pushed for the signing of a letter of agreement by forty 
companies to test the standards on sustainable tourism and their replication in other 
sites plus endorsement. Marine recreation providers and suppliers have been trained in 
best practices, through national learning workshops. Networks of suppliers and 
purchasers of marine recreation activities have also been developed (ICRAN 2005d)124. 
Pilot testing, training and a technical and financial assistance program have been 
implemented to improve the adoption and compliance with the codes of conduct. The 
pilot projects have been discussed and presented at a workshop series and MPA and 
stakeholder support has been obtained. Criteria have been determined and contact 
information has been compiled on marine recreation providers and bulk purchasers to 
participate in pilot projects. Only three pilot sites have been selected, due to 
implementation costs. Placencia in Belize, Roatan in Honduras and Playa del Carmen in 
                                                 
124 Over 3oo stakeholders in the region have benefited from these activities (ICRAN 2007a: 7). 
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Mexico have been used for the implementation of the regional, voluntary codes of 
conduct for marine recreation providers and the handbook for bulk purchasers of 
marine recreation (ICRAN 2003: 27-28). UNEP’s initiative has planned an increased 
collaboration among park management and private sector interests in maintaining the 
long-term ecological and financial security of selected MPAs (ICRAN 2006h). Besides, 
the partnership with Conservation International (CI) has enabled the replication of the 
strategy on good practices for marine recreation in other pilot sites in the region 
(ICRAN 2006k). Yet, the results of the project have not translated into a regional 
adoption of best practices. Instead, they have contributed to the setup of an initiative by 
a UNEP’s orchestration intermediary, CORAL125. This is the Mesoamerican Tourism 
Initiative (MARTI) with CORAL as the main founding member. One hundred and thirty 
hotels in the Mexican Caribbean with over thirty-two thousand rooms have 
implemented MARTI’s environmental best practices and around one-hundred have 
established a MARTI environmental management system. 
7.3.4.2 Normative outputs 
UNEP’s informal orchestration has reaped normative outputs in all field areas. 
7.3.4.2.1 Watershed areas 
Related to watershed areas, UNEP has produced three normative outputs. First, UNEP 
with the public agencies USAID and NASA and ICRAN/MAR intermediaries has 
generated scientific and modeling information that has served to train staff (ICRAN 
2003: 14-15) in order to later develop new networks through workshops for policy-
oriented scenario building. WRI and UNEP-WCMC have produced information and GIS 
tools for examining the potential influence of different land use and development 
options in the region and the associated impact on water quality in the MAR. Results 
have been used to influence land-use policy-making in order to decrease threats to the 
coral reefs of the MAR region (ICRAN 2005d). External experts and local consultants 
have convened a workshop including presentations and the development of scenarios 
and spatial illustration of scenarios, requiring key stakeholders to be identified. Tools 
and influence have been disseminated and some local institutions continue follow up 
actions – further validation of models – beyond the life of the project (ICRAN 2007a: 4). 
Second, the influence of the models and diagnostic tools has helped educate and 
encourage local government, large agro-industrial companies and independent farming 
communities to adopt a suite of best practices developed for several key agro-industries. 
The agroindustries identified are, namely, oil palm, citrus, pineapple and melon that 
need to reduce pesticide use by commercial agriculture (ICRAN 2003: 11, Burke and Sugg 
                                                 
125 Personal interview with the CORAL Reef Alliance team leader, July 2006. 
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2006). The endorsed best practice guidelines resulting from the workshop have been 
developed into appropriate informational materials, such as brochures, not only to 
educate but also serve to build trust for partnerships. Ultimately, best practices also 
highlight case studies of successful industrial analyzes that are promoting and achieving 
pollution reduction through best practices (ICRAN 2003: 10, 2005c). This work 
continues beyond the life of the UNEP’s orchestration with leveraged support from 
various sources (ICRAN 2007a: 4, 2005b). The signing of the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoUs) between agribusiness and ICRAN/MAR for the adoption of 
Pesticide Environmental Assessment System (PEAS) is the result of UNEP’s informal 
orchestration. An experienced agronomist from the WWF partner at UNEP’s alliance 
with established connections to the agricultural industry has been enrolled to carefully 
develop alliances with the private sector (WWF 2005, ICRAN 2005c). 
Last, UNEP’s alliance has established MoUs with agribusiness. This leads to the 
sustainable management and viability of the Mesoamerican Reef (ICRAN 2003: 7, WWF 
2006b, c). This project has relied on working with those companies and industries that 
are also benefiting from and will ensure the longevity of their businesses (WRI 2006g). 
As a direct result of project activities, Dole, Chiquita, and Azucarera del Norte SA 
(AZUNOSA), the key sugarcane producer in Central America of SabMiller, The Coca-
Cola Company, have signed MoUs implementing PEAS to reduce pesticide exposure 
levels. The execution of PEAS is an important step in the standardization of 
measurements, control practices, and the reduction of the negative influence pesticides 
might have on either production or consumption (ICRAN 2007a: 4). UNEP increases its 
experience in bringing together private actors for issues on environmental 
sustainability, as it is the case of the insurance industry for climate change (Jagers and 
Stripple 2003). 
7.3.4.2.2 Marine ecosystem 
For the marine ecosystem, UNEP’s orchestration has accomplished three voluntary 
normative outputs. First, UNEP’s informal orchestration has garnered guidelines for 
best fishing practices. A major voluntary output of the marine areas has been the 
development of best practice guidelines for the sustainable harvesting of principal MAR 
coral reef fisheries. Early in the project, UNEP and WWF have conducted an analysis of 
the fisheries sector in order to successfully promote community-based fisheries 
management. Two main types of fishing have been identified, lobster fisheries and 
finfish fisheries (ICRAN 2007a: 6, RC 2007). Much work has concentrated on lobster 
fisheries in collaboration with the PROARCA/APM project, and through consultation 
with fishermen, fish intermediaries and U.S. importers and restaurants that buy lobsters 
from the region. A lobster manual called “How to profit by practicing sustainable 
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fishing: Lobster Fishing Practices Guidelines for the Mesoamerican Reef” has been 
developed (WWF 2006a). This work has developed a spawning aggregations database, 
used regionally by the World Bank’s MBRS project, to help develop best practices for 
grouper fisheries and to support legislation passed in Belize concerning the protection 
of spawning aggregations (ICRAN 2003: 17, WWF 2006b). Besides, ICRAN has also 
developed a cost and benefit analysis to demonstrate the benefits obtained by shrimp 
farmers through the adoption of best practices. 
Second, another output is the development of MoUs signed between private 
industry and fishing cooperatives and community associations that serve as a catalyst 
for pursuing certification schemes of sustainable fishing. As a result of this, the private 
association of fishers APESCA, the regional Fishing Association as well as the public 
organization DIGEPESCA both in Honduras, are using and promoting better fisheries 
practices with the environmental friendly trap for lobster (ICRAN 2007a: 10, WWF 
2006a). The standards have been adapted in consultation with companies such as 
Darden Restaurants, the owners of Red Lobster in an attempt to gain their support in 
adopting best practices and financially supporting the conservation of the MAR. Last, in 
connection with this, the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) fishing certification 
schemes for lobster in Mexico have also been encouraged. UNEP through WWF has 
supported practice improvement to attain sustainable lobster fisheries126 consistent with 
MSC and similar certification schemes. Building on similar works by PROARCA in 
Central America, and by the WWF in Mexico, the WWF has supported an analysis of 
the chain of custody for spiny lobster in three MAR countries, namely, Mexico, Belize 
and Honduras. While certification mechanisms are effective in developing countries due 
to their export orientation, those are only affordable to large fishing companies (Kern 
2004: 20). 
7.3.4.2.3 Coastal ecosystem 
For the coastal ecosystem, three normative voluntary outputs have been introduced. 
Orchestration intermediaries CORAL, UNEP’s Division of Technology, Industry and 
Economics (UNEP-DTIE) and WWF have promoted sustainable tourism in the region 
towards the development of standards and a voluntary code of conduct. This has 
initially involved the compilation of contact information, coordinating the workshops, 
completing the workshop evaluations and following up with all participants. 
Specifically, UNEP’s social leverage has aimed at agreeing, supporting, and 
implementing a regional sustainable tourism code-of-conduct, by the marine recreation 
sector (ICRAN 2003: 28-29, 2006j). The alliance has identified the need to develop and 
                                                 
126 Because of the importance of the spiny lobster fishery and shrimp aquaculture, these two species 
are the primary focus of this activity; grouper fisheries are another focus. 
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implement regional codes of conduct for marine recreation providers, as well as the 
need to work with purchasers of marine recreation, in coordination with UNEP’s Tour 
Operators Initiative for Sustainable Tourism Development (www.gstcouncil.org) 
(ICRAN 2003: 25, 2007c). As a result, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has created a handbook with 
a compilation of guidelines, best practices and an environmental assessment checklist 
that serve as the basis for the discussion of the codes of conduct in regional workshops 
organized where performance-based objectives are developed and revised. UNEP’s 
informal orchestration has led to forty businesses becoming involved in the testing of 
the standards of best sustainable practices for marine recreation providers and the 
endorsement of guidelines for tourists by private organizations Professional Association 
of Diving Instructors (PADI) and non-profit Ocean Conservancy (ICRAN 2007), for 
instance, diving, snorkeling, underwater cleanups, whale and dolphin watching and 
turtle watching (CORAL 2002a, 2002b). 
Guidelines for sustainable tourism have been compiled in a handbook divided into 
three parts: a selection of guidelines, codes of conduct, certification programs and other 
good practices in marine recreation sustainable tourism; issue-specific briefs on topics 
such as sunscreen products; and an environmental assessment checklist and questions 
for bulk purchasers. Conservation International and CORAL have provided partial 
funding for this work. UNEP/DTIE has been in charge of printing the handbooks and 
CORAL of translating the tourist guidelines in both English and Spanish (ICRAN 2007a: 
7, CORAL 2007). The aims were to set up a region-wide independent certification 
program for coastal and marine tourism operations for hotel resort facilities, diving 
operations, ecolodges, cruise ship tours on land (ICRAN 2003: 24-25). Instead, UNEP’s 
orchestration has supported the creation of local initiatives, as a first step in the 
direction of creating regional codes of conduct and certification.  
Utilizing UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR standards as the primary assessment and training 
tool for the application of better business practices, the Mesoamerican Reef Tourism 
Initiative (MARTI) project has aimed at minimizing the impact to Cozumel’s reef 
resulting from the rapid growth of cruise tourism on the island working with marine 
recreation providers. The MARTI initiative predominantly centered in the Mayan 
Riviera and the Mesoamerican Ecotourism Alliance (www.travelwithmea.org) has been 
put forward through UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR contacts and workshops127. Besides, an 
agreement has been reached between MARTI and the Tourism National Committee 
(CNT) from Mexico to promote those hotels and tourism service providers that have 
successfully implemented MARTI’s programs and tools. 
                                                 
127 In collaboration with CELB and World Bank’s MBRS. 
223 
 
7.3.4.3 Reporting outputs 
First, through transport modeling and the acquisition of water chemistry data, the 
project has estimated sediment and pollution dispersion plumes from river mouths. 
This has facilitated the identification of the degrees of threat faced by particular coastal 
ecosystems (ICRAN 2003: 11-12). Most of the sediment and nutrients delivered to the 
MAR from watersheds in the region come from agricultural land in Honduras and 
Guatemala (Burke and Sugg 2006). This output on voluntary reporting from targets that 
affect watershed indicators predominantly depends on the pressure that the 
ICRAN/MAR partnership exerts on private actors, such as agribusiness companies. 
Second, UNEP’s alliance generates two voluntary reporting outputs in marine 
ecosystems. It has advanced manuals, protocols and guidelines for the ecological and 
socio-economic monitoring by community members in marine protected areas (MPAs) 
that have been developed innovatively by demonstration and target sites128 (ICRAN 
2003: 22, WWF 2006b). Ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) links 
community-based management with ecological monitoring of finfish fisheries (ICRAN 
2007a: 6, Hodgson et al. 2007). A trained community-level team responsible for 
monitoring the ecological and socio-economic variables has been established. UNEP’s 
ICRAN/MAR best practice protocol includes the socioeconomic parameters developed 
by the US NOAA socio-economic assessment protocol called “SOCMON” in cooperation 
with the Reef Check/Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network (RC/GCRMN) (ICRAN 
2003: 19). Exchanges conducted among fishers from the MAR region to discuss best 
practices have led to the spread of community-based monitoring (WWF 2006b, ICRAN 
2003: 22-23). In this way, local communities have been empowered to be part of the 
management actions designed for the region (ICRAN 2007a: 13). The Reef Check (RC) 
monitoring survey has been used successfully throughout the Caribbean to train local 
fishermen to monitor their own fisheries resources (Hodgson et al. 2007). The data 
generated has been used in ongoing MPA management and provided to other projects 
in the region. 
Last, for the coastal ecosystem, UNEP, together with CORAL, have produced three 
voluntary reporting outputs. They have orchestrated the maintenance of standard 
development groupware and the establishment of an on-line forum in coordination with 
a regional on-line bulletin board. After the standards have been approved, a standard 
testing process has dictated the potential for replication in the region and elsewhere 
(ICRAN 2006g, 2007a: 7). Over forty companies from across the region have signed a 
                                                 




letter of agreement to work with CORAL to participate in this process129. In addition, the 
alliance has set up the evaluation of the impact of training workshops on regional codes 
of conduct and standards for dive and snorkel by marine park managers to marine 
recreation providers and marine recreation bulk purchasers. The maintenance of 
standards has been assessed and published in an on-line forum. For example, the 
assessment shows a seventy percent increase in environmentally sound business 
practices, such as waste disposal, boat operation, wildlife interaction etc. and, boat 
anchor damage has measurably decreased or disappeared at three pilot sites. This is 
confirmed by the before and after study done in collaboration with Reef Check. 
7.3.4.4 Fund-raising outputs  
Three voluntary fund-raising outputs have been adopted through UNEP in each of the 
ecosystems managed. First, the outputs identified include the investment by the private 
sector in watershed management conservation and the investment in in-kind services 
from UNEP to link regional and global scale scenarios to the Mesoamerican region. On 
the one hand, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR alliance has attracted the investment from the 
private sector in watershed conservation and pollution-prevention practices (ICRAN 
2003: 15, WRI 2006d, f, e). Thirty thousand dollars from CropLife130, a global trade 
association representing the plant science industry, have been negotiated by 
UNEP/RCU-Car and assigned to WWF for activities to measure the influence and the 
bioaccumulation of agricultural effluents on targeted marine species within the 
Mesoamerican Reef (ICRAN 2007a: 12). Besides, to identify agricultural threats to the 
MAR, the project has leveraged support from the Summit Foundation: $450,000 
($150,000/year throughout the life of the project) to WWF also for bioaccumulation 
monitoring and for the preparation of a monitoring protocol (ICRAN 2005c). UNEP’s in-
kind resources have been invested in UNEP-WCMC to work on the GEO4 scenarios, 
leveraging this way a considerable investment in the regional to global scale scenarios 
process and models (ICRAN 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2006f). 
Second, the project has raised the interest from both public and private 
organizations to deal with the fisheries component (ICRAN 2007a: 12), which has 
translated into the direct funding of activities (ICRAN 2003: 7). Funding support has 
come from the Sustainable Fisheries Fund to the WWF in support of the MSC lobster 
certification activities with US$51,150; Kukulcán Plaza Shopping mall in Cancún with 
US$45,000 to the WWF in support of ecosystem-based fisheries management and 
alternative livelihoods. This funding has been complemented by US$36,000 from the 
                                                 
129 Personal interview with a Belize Tourism Board staff member, March 2005. 
130 Members of CropLife are BASF, Bayer CropScience, Dow Agrosciences, DuPont, FMC, Montsanto, 
Sumitomo and Syngenta, see www.croplife.org. 
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French Global Environment Facility (FFEM) to WWF in support of ecosystem based 
fishery management (EBFM), alternative livelihoods, and lobster best fishing practices 
(BFP). Furthermore, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has sought the support from Belizean banks 
for financing the development of shrimp aquaculture. 
Last, UNEP’s alliance has raised funds from non-for profits to facilitate 
environmental performance assessments in coastal ecosystems. The evaluation of the 
impact of training workshops by marine park managers to marine recreation providers 
and marine recreation bulk purchasers has benefited from matching funds from the 
National Fish and Wildlife Foundation and the Oak Foundation to intermediary 
CORAL. CORAL and WWF have provided financial assistance for some changes, such as 
the installation of mooring buoys (ICRAN 2007b), and the identification of targets in 
pilot sites for each relevant actor (ICRAN 2003: 29-30), namely tour operators, 
recreation providers, and bulk purchasers to adopt the guidelines and codes and 
collaborate with MPAs. For instance, local dive centers have started to acquire the 
necessary tools to get involved in local reef conservation efforts while their gain entails 
financial incentives from offering an added value service to their clients. The private 
philanthropic organization Summit Foundation has provided US$57,000 to UNEP’s 
intermediary CORAL to facilitate the execution of environmental performance 
assessments, training, and technical assistance with marine recreation providers on the 











7.3.5 Summary: UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR outputs 
Social leverage has produced different types of outputs. Voluntary-based have been 
largely the types of outputs more harvested by UNEP’s orchestration. The informal 
approach to orchestration by UNEP is characterized by generating a high number of 
voluntary-based normative, institutional and fund-raising outputs. Outputs are based 
on best management practices, exchange of information, reports, enhancement of 
capacity in developing countries and appropriate changes in policy and practice. 
Outputs delivered by UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR partners have not come without initial 
roadblocks that have included (ICRAN 2007a: 3): the unavailability of tools to undertake 
their activities; the need for coordination with other partners in the region; the 
difficulties in timely coordination with other component counterparts – each 
organization carrying out other parallel activities and schedules not always coinciding; 
the receptiveness of local institutions and their willingness to provide information; the 
level of response from local partners or their capacity to become involved is different in 
every country; the lack of relevant or available information or data; the insufficient 
project staff at any given time; the budget constraints – as the original budget 
envisioned the organization of just one regional workshop, responses from regional 
stakeholders show that the project could have benefited from more resources for the 
on-the-ground consultation and further capacity building; and finally, overcoming 
confidentiality issues, such as in the case of agribusinesses providing details about their 
industrial processes. 
Since all outputs are important, the major influence promoted by UNEP’s 
orchestration includes the expansion of alliances and private-public partnerships and, 
cooperation agreements with major agribusinesses, tourism operators and sea food 
service industries (ICRAN 2007a: 10). Furthermore, at least three formal alliances with 
cooperatives and governmental agencies have been signed and implemented. This 
project has increased both the interest and enthusiasm of stakeholders throughout the 
region to develop partnerships and build capacity within their own destinations to 
promote sustainable business practices, support local MPAs, and conserve their coral 
reef resources. Moreover, this project has facilitated information exchanges between 
public and private stakeholders. A case in point is the lobster fishery industry and the 
Honduras government that cooperated to make the first lobster stock assessment to 
define future regulations to prevent this fishery over-exploitation131. Project partners are 
in a good position to continue developing the efforts in agriculture, fisheries and to a 
lower degree in tourism (ICRAN 2007a: 15). USAID is funding a watershed conservation 
                                                 
131 Other examples include the tourism standards validation or the biological control of the froghopper 
between three countries. 
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initiative that includes several of the information and initiatives started in UNEP’s 
orchestration. Many of the local partners have continued working in alliance with WWF 
for similar activities in the same areas132. A proof of the general success of the UNEP’s 
social leverage is that WWF International replicates the structure and holistic approach 
of the UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR in other parts of the world (ICRAN 2007a: 13). In addition, 
the Healthy Reefs Initiative (HRI) has taken many of the partners to continue with the 
legacy of this and other projects (www.healthyreefs.org) 133. As stated in the project, 
UNEP’s credibility and support has been crucial to orchestrate the activities committed 
by this project (ICRAN 2007a: 9). Funding from CropLife Latin America to implement 
UNEP’s social leverage activities in sugarcane fields in Chetumal Bay, Mexico, would 
have been impossible without UNEP’s participation134. In addition to this, UNEP’s 
personnel has been key in providing ideas for the implementation activities on the field 
as well as getting partners on track when deviating from long-term targets135. UNEP 
support has been vital on more than one occasion in relation to the clarification of 
budgets, budget-reallocation requests, and reporting requirements. UNEP has favored 
the informal orchestration of non-profit organizations such as the WWF, CORAL, Reef 
Check, governmental agencies such as NASA, NOAA, USAID, for-profit organizations 
such as Darden restaurants, hotels or retail shops in the Yucatan region and for-profit 
associations such as CropLife. Those organizations are very different from UNEP and 
some of their objectives may not seem to relate to UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR. Nonetheless, 
UNEP orchestrates with those distinct organizations and manages to get their trust and 
their cooperation through the alliance. 
7.4 Identifying UNEP’s procedural resources 
After the previous section has discussed the orchestration outputs, this section centers 
on how UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR outputs contribute generate trust-, neutrality-, respect- 
and participation-based procedural resources for coral reef governance. 
7.4.1 Legitimizing new roles 
This subsection discusses procedural resources in relation to output development: trust-
based as legitimizing social accountability and neutrality-based resources as 
legitimizing new frames and interlinkages. 
                                                 
132 Personal interview with the WWF MAR program director, March 2005. 
133 Personal interview with WWF staff and the ICRAN/MAR partner, March 2005. 
134 Personal interview with the ICRAN/MAR secretary, March 2005. 
135 Personal interview with WWF staff and the ICRAN/MAR partner, March 2005. 
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7.4.1.1 Trust as legitimizing social accountability 
This section assesses the extent to which UNEP’s informal orchestration produces trust-
based procedural resources by delegating on intermediaries and targets the setup of 
measurable targets and deadlines under the auspices of the partnership; entrusting the 
issuing of reporting and follow up activities to intermediaries and targets, assigning 
functions so that a post-orchestration project scenario allows reporting that is published 
and that feeds fora for public consultation; getting decision-makers to draw on reports, 
studies, databases and scientific publications or personal contacts produced by the 
orchestrator; drawing intermediaries and targets to exchange information on the 
environment; increasing media coverage on environmental issues or producing an 
impact on public awareness on environmental issues. 
First, UNEP’s alliance has orchestrated the setup of measurable objectives with 
intermediaries and targets, yet specific deadlines for delivery are absent, which casts 
doubts on the possibility to generate trust-based resources. A case in point is 
represented by the watershed management bioaccumulation studies and MoUs with 
agribusiness that imply monitoring and the compromise of reducing the use of 
pesticides. Yet no implementation and time plan is devised with the target actors. The 
results are mixed, as shown by the following evidence. UNEP’s orchestration has favored 
the adoption of monitoring protocols for bioaccumulation studies by governmental 
agencies EPA, NOAA and also the New Zealand government, which guarantees the 
quality of bioaccumulation studies and comparability across time. However, a similar 
adoption and ownership process has not directly materialized with Mesoamerican local 
partners. At the same time, MoUs agreed with sugar cane companies to conduct 
pesticide environmental assessment systems have been signed by the ICRAN/MAR 
alliance through partner intermediaries that continue working on the area after project 
completion. It is the first time a voluntary agreement between private organizations for 
sustainable agriculture management is developed in this region. We will have to see if 
such assessments are conducted regularly after the project alliance concludes. This is 
even more evident, as those do not work to a deadline. 
With regard to the management of marine areas, UNEP’s social leverage has 
contributed to training non-scientists in monitoring and setting the basis for future 
monitoring in other projects beyond the life of the project. The alliance has developed 
guidelines through collaboration in peer-to-peer exchanges between demonstration and 
target sites and further cooperation has been established between private and public 
organizations for monitoring. More specifically, the implementation of Reef Check (RC) 
activities under UNEP’s alliance has provided continuous presence on the ground of RC 
trainers and trained divers in the monitoring of ecological and socio economic aspects 
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of coral reef health. Nonetheless, the objectives linked to a time plan are not among the 
projects’ achievements. 
On the coastal management areas, baselines and objectives, have been identified for 
each relevant actor in sustainable tourism, in the performance-monitoring plan 
designed in collaboration with USAID (ICRAN 2003: 29). Although some steps are 
devised in order to pursue the stated objectives in the case of coastal management, no 
time frameworks for the consecution of milestones are provided. Those objectives spell 
out mechanisms for actors participating in in-country trainings to pursue goals, namely, 
eighty percent of all MPAs with marine recreation in the MAR region post, and be 
routinely handed out, educational materials, which are designed to minimize tourism 
influence on the reefs; sixty percent tour/dive operators have active support of their 
local parks, either through donations of equipment, facilities, or staff, or through the 
collection of user fees, assistance in law enforcement activities, local underwater 
cleanups, maintenance and installation of mooring buoys; sixty percent of marine 
recreation providers provide customers with low-impact diving/snorkeling orientations; 
sixty percent of all purchasers of marine recreation use supply chain guidelines; eighty 
percent of the bulk purchasers participating in the CORAL/CELB/TOI supply-chain 
guideline project use the handbook to guide them in their purchasing decisions; and 
eighty percent of all cruise ships participating in the CORAL/CELB/TOI supply-chain 
guideline project distribute the tourism guidelines to their passengers. Consequently, 
while concrete goals have been provided, yet trust-based resources are not produced in 
the form of devised deadlines that guide and frame objectives. 
Second, in general, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR alliance generates more trust-based 
resources by organizing monitoring mechanisms than defining public forums for the 
discussion and consultation of monitoring results. In watershed management, some 
monitoring activities spread beyond the life of the project, namely, MoUs with 
agribusiness, non-scientist reef monitoring, performance monitoring plans in 
sustainable tourism with baselines and targets for each relevant actor. For marine 
resource management, the strategy of developing community-level monitoring has 
guaranteed that the habits learnt during the ICRAN/MAR implementation can continue 
after the alliance ends. Specifically, non-scientists have collected valuable data, in areas 
where highly expensive and isolated scientific expeditions are lacking or had limited 
capacity, through Reef Check (RC) activities. Besides, demonstration and target sites 
together have developed guidelines for monitoring, which can be continued after the 
project ends since it is the community-level monitoring of MPAs. By contrast, peer-to-
peer exchanges strongly depend on material resources, normally available only through 
international projects; therefore, its future is contingent upon resources. 
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In spite of the limited trust-based resources generated, the fact that this initiative 
coordinates with other projects in the area to avoid duplication, has favored that this 
initiative is known and that other projects build and capitalize on this, particularly in 
the case of marine and coastal area management. This is the case of APESCA that 
monitors the use of best practices in the fishing of lobster. Concretely, for coastal 
ecosystem management, monitoring of the forty businesses that have agreed to test the 
standards of best practices for tourism is done through other private initiatives like the 
MARTI as a follow up project to UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR or can be hardly conducted 
otherwise. Therefore, the MARTI initiative builds on the trust-based resources 
generated through UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR. 
Third, the alliance has forged neither a common forum for delivering systematic 
monitoring data after the project ends nor a public forum devised to assess monitoring 
results after project termination with the exception of the community-level monitoring 
of marine resources available online through a database. Nonetheless, the mosaic of 
partnerships and alliances has positioned the ICRAN/MAR project at a strategic point. 
Multiple efforts for orchestrating different stakeholders of the MAR region have been 
undertaken, particularly with other regional projects such as the Mesoamerican Barrier 
Reef System (MBRS), the Nature Conservancy (TNC), The Mesoamerican Reef Fund 
(MAR Fund), Rainforest Alliance, the Eco regional Program of the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) and the Conservation of the Mesoamerican Reef Program from Summit 
Foundation; and with private industries representatives as CropLife Latin America. The 
level of collaboration and communication with these institutions has varied and in some 
cases has materialized into further collaboration in the region beyond the life of UNEP’s 
ICRAN/MAR project expanding UNEP’s impact with the alliance of CORAL and TNC 
supporting sustainable tourism activities and USAID supporting watershed 
management beyond the life of UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR alliance. 
Fourth, the vast amount of data collected on marine resources over the time span of 
the project is available online free of charge through the Reef Check database, which 
feeds with information targets, such as local managers, general public and to the Global 
Coral Reef Monitoring Network -http://data.reefcheck.us136. 
Fifth, the Reef Check Data collected on the status of coral reefs has served to raise 
awareness of the coral reef crisis at a local level, reporting bleaching events, and 
emphasizing that this crisis also occurs at the global level. 
Lastly, the frequency that characterizes the target exchange of information on the 
environment with UNEP’s alliance and the influence of UNEP on the public awareness 
                                                 




of environmental issues is not specifically analyzed by the alliance therefore it can be 
concluded that these areas need to be at least monitored in order to learn the impact of 
orchestration in the generation of trust-based resources. 
7.4.1.2 Neutrality as legitimizing new frames and interlinkages 
This section assesses the extent to which UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR alliance generates 
neutrality-based procedural resources. It analyzes whether the orchestrator defines 
environmental sustainability challenges through political or geographical maps. It 
examines whether the framework for action is bioregional and uses ecological units or, 
on the other hand, it uses a political-territorial frame of reference. Further questions 
refer to the environmental framing of the issues provided, whether they are perceived as 
politically neutral. Besides, this section evaluates if international organizations are 
recognized as orchestrators for the generation, identification or clearinghouse 
mechanism for domestic information on newly defined environmental challenges and if 
the orchestrator relies on recognized science-based sources of expertise. Related to the 
above, this assessment examines whether the project observes, deals and justifies the 
three pillars of environmental sustainability through international or regional treaties; 
whether the orchestrator establishes synergies between the environmental degradation, 
economic welfare and social equity issues in the project analysis; if the orchestrator 
provides similar prominence to social, environmental and, trade and economy concerns 
and connects intermediaries and targets previously not related; whether orchestration 
actions envisage mechanisms for correction should one issue-area overrun other areas 
for environmental discourse balance; if the orchestrator establishes success indicators 
for those three areas; and finally, whether the orchestrator contributes to discussions on 
media coverage and provides relevant information on environmental sustainability. 
First, in several of UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR outputs, environmental frames of reference 
have a distinctive role that override the political map of states that normally dictate and 
prioritize project activities. The alliance activities have centered on three ecosystem 
environments related to three main economic activities that affect and/or are affected 
by the reef system. The project’s focus on ecological units, namely, watershed, marine 
and coastal areas reflects the need to intertwine mainly environmental and economic 
concerns; it thus remains to be analyzed how social issues are involved in such 
frameworks. Those main focal areas not only respond to three differentiated ecological 
environments but also to three distinct socio-economic realities: agricultural business in 
the watershed areas, fishing in the marine areas and tourism activities in coastal areas. 
The project links therefore the lack of reef management and monitoring to the impact 
on the economic and social spheres. 
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The framework for action of UNEP is bioregional and not strictly political-territorial. 
This project has pioneered the linking of watershed management with the diminishing 
of coral reefs (Rivas 2006). UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR is the first alliance that considers 
watershed areas as central environmental units in the design and management of 
environmental initiatives. The adoption of the watershed as a unit of analysis for the 
development of comprehensive maps to identify pollution sources is a key resource for 
the alliance. Watershed areas have become the main object for assessment in the 
development of monitoring standards for bioaccumulation studies. Such ecological 
units contain the pollution focal points that reach the marine system and later affect the 
reef in a negative manner. Consequently, analyzing which watershed units exert more 
negative influence on the reef is crucial in order to prioritize actions to cope with 
agribusiness pollution. An analysis based on watershed units and water pollution 
dispersion helps decide which type of agribusiness and area is tackled first so that more 
positive influence on reef conservation is achieved. 
Besides, coral reefs are used as a flagship ecosystem in catalyzing, enabling and 
supporting an ecosystem approach to the management of coastal and marine areas for 
food security, livelihoods and biodiversity. The formalization of ICRAN’s International 
Coral Unit and the establishment of UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR as the first implementation 
project of ICRAN, UNEP CAR/RCU - as UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR coordinator - recognizes 
reefs, the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef in this case, as an environmental unit and as a new 
environmental frame, as opposed to isolated coral colonies. The Mesoamerican Barrier 
Reef has enough entity so that coherent and systematic orchestration initiatives revolve 
around this environmental unit. Not only local but also regional and global strategies 
for reef conservation are designed and different governance levels are taken into 
consideration. In fact, public resources from UNEP-WCMC have been raised to link 
global to regional processes and models. In practice, a mixed constituency involving 
different stakeholders, such as local governments and private organizations, discussed 
policy scenarios, while civil servants are trained in Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS) in order to monitor the environmental state of the reef. By contrast, other 
ecological entities, such as ecological boundaries of endemism for coral reefs, help 
classify reefs or the analysis of topography (assessment of biodiversity) that help in 
prioritizing actions have been underused. 
Second, UNEP ICRAN/MAR acts as a clearinghouse for domestic information on new 
environmental issues mainly for the watershed ecosystems. The integration of the 
delineation of land-use maps with the modeling of agribusiness pollution-flows has 
proved to be crucial when it comes to determining which specific watershed had more 
or less influence on the reef. The information generated is based on the analysis of 
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watershed areas for which best management practices have been developed and 
discussed. 
Third, an important driver for neutrality-based resources is the adoption of GIS 
models –that generate objective data, to be interpreted in government departments, 
dealing with coastal environmental protection, such as the Coastal Zone Management 
Unit in Belize. It has been proven that decision-making can be modeled and influenced 
through scientific assessments based on the physical and geographical data given off 
maps. In fact, the integration of land-use maps with ocean-based modeling has 
generated awareness of what is being done many miles away from the reef still affects it 
to a great extent. Monitoring the influence of pollution from watershed units has 
allowed establishing different scenarios when specific variables are tackled. Besides, 
material resources from UNEP have been raised for the development of GEO4 with 
objective and relevant data in order to describe the state of ecosystems through graphic 
information, such as maps, and with the use of GIS that inform public debates and 
contribute to discussions on media coverage. 
Fourth, no treaties have been substantially recalled in an explicit manner for the 
design of the alliance activities. Therefore, no neutrality-based resources are gained 
from connecting local activities to international environmental treaties that may have 
helped in exerting some social pressure on the orchestration targets. 
Fifth, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR alliance has legitimized new synergies between 
intermediaries and targets previously not connected. In the case of watershed 
management, the connections are made between the agribusiness companies and the 
NGOs that work for protecting coral reefs. Yet, it has not generated synergies with local 
governments and the like. 
For the marine ecosystems, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has facilitated a partnership 
between Darden restaurants, which represents the market, and the Caribbean 
Association of Fishers APESCA, which embodies the market providers, or in this case 
lobster sustainably caught. Besides, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has attracted private finance 
from actors that had not previously contributed to coral reef conservation such as a 
shopping mall in Mexico, and it has established a relationship between the 
philanthropic organization, Sustainable Fisheries Fund, for the MSC certification of 
lobster fishing and training in ecosystem-based fishing management that benefits 
fishing communities. Similarly, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has obtained the support from 
Belizean banks to foster sustainable shrimp aquaculture, which represents an 




On the coastal areas, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has proposed to facilitate the move 
toward certification, by focusing on both the supply and demand aspects of sustainable 
marine recreation activities. This is the first private initiative that brings together MPAs 
and their communities with tourism providers. UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has contributed to 
both supply chain guidelines for sustainable tourism and codes of conduct for 
recreation providers, which will contribute to future certification for sustainable 
tourism. As a result, UNEP has leveraged relationships in coral reef tourism purchasers, 
such as tour operators, inbound tour operators, hotels, cruise lines, the NGO 
community, and MPAs, and suppliers, such as marine recreation providers: snorkel, 
dive, glass bottom boat, boat rentals, fishing expedition operators.  
Sixth, overall, the prevailing discourse generated through UNEP’s alliance has mainly 
drawn from ecological and economic concerns. While the project has invested efforts in 
establishing connections between the three components of sustainable development 
social, economic and environmental areas, the economic and environmental 
interlinkages have been the object of more project activity. For watershed areas, a 
balance of discourses that link economic welfare, environmental degradation and social 
equity aspects for sustainable development have translated into policy-oriented 
workshops with integration of scientific data to discuss different future scenarios of 
agribusiness activities, their impact on the coral reef, the protection from pesticide 
poisoning and, related decision-making. 
Because of those initiatives, memorandums of understanding have served to 
institutionalize the compromise of sugarcane agribusiness to conduct pesticide 
environmental assessment systems (PEAS). The change of perception in front of those 
challenges has also translated into economic support for conserving the reef and 
protecting their employees from chemical exposure that have come from both CropLife, 
the non-profit organization that defends the interests of multinational agribusinesses 
and other philanthropy organizations, such as the Summit Foundation. Linked to this, 
the argument on combining monitoring studies and cost-effective business best 
management practices highlights the relationship between the need to provide 
economically viable solutions to environmental concerns in line with the ecological 
modernization discourse. Consequently, the sustainable development discourse in this 
area is centered in economic and environmental issues and less in social issues. 
Similarly, for the marine ecosystems, private support has been raised for sustainable 
fishing that benefits local communities, at least from some of those that can afford the 
label certification. However, industrial fishing actors are not part of the alliance, which 
limits the effects of the ICRAN/MAR actions. In the case of coastal areas, a discourse on 
the need for tourism practices that respect the environment has settled and 
materialized through private initiatives, such as the Mesoamerican Ecotourism Alliance 
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and the MARTI project in cooperation with marine protected areas and their 
communities. 
Overall, areas where connections between the three pillars have been established -
including social implications - comprise MoUs on PEAS protecting employees from 
chemical exposure, ecosystem-based fishing management and MSC certification; also 
aquaculture as opportunity for the alternative livelihood of fishers; the compromise by 
the fishing organization APESCA to preserve social living standards; and the 
Mesoamerican Ecotourism Alliance Initiative that brings MPAs together with local 
communities and tourism providers. Topics of national workshops in the plan of action 
have included establishing the economic value of coral reefs, the sustainability of and 
threats to coral reefs, and cooperation needed from businesses, local communities, 
tourists, governments and resource managers for reefs to remain vibrant and healthy 
ecosystems. 
However, mechanisms for correction in case of overrun from the economic or 
environmental on social equity issues are not in place. There is generally a lack of 
consistent monitoring and general assessment of discourse imbalances, particularly 
when the economic and environmental areas of concern overrun social areas. In fact, 
while environmental and economic areas are intertwined in the alliance activities, the 
inclusion of social linkages is more irregular. There is hardly any mention in project 
outputs to cultural minorities, such as the Garífuna, a cultural group whose history is 
intimately linked to the coasts of Central America. Social aspects are not systematically 
revised. Specifically, for watershed management, the introduction of bioaccumulation 
studies for drainage basins to study pollution levels derived from agricultural activities 
does not involve studies on how this affects local communities beyond the agribusiness 
employees. For marine resource management, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has facilitated a 
partnership between Darden restaurants – demand side - and the Caribbean Association 
of Fishers APESCA – offer side - for the provision of lobster sustainably caught. Yet, not 
all fisherfolk are able to benefit from such an agreement, as some do not have access to 
the capacities that best practices require. Likewise, only lobster fishing has been tackled 
and the overexploitation of other fishing species that would entail dealing with 
industrial fishers has been left out of the project to the disadvantage of the artisanal 
fisherfolk communities. For the management of coastal areas, forty businesses are 
involved in the testing of standards of sustainable best practices for marine recreation 
providers. Yet, social indicators that monitor the living quality standards of local coastal 





7.4.2 Involving new actors 
This section discusses procedural resources in relation to respect-based resources, 
namely, involving South science, traditional knowledge as well as affected actors and on 
the other hand, participation-based resources that address non-state involvement. 
7.4.2.1 Respect as involving South science, traditional knowledge and affected actors 
This section assesses to what extent UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR generates respect-based 
resources understood as the capacity to use local (South) science or traditional 
knowledge for analysis and implementation; engage anthropologists and not only hard 
scientists in the project; include issues considered important by southern experts; 
managing natural resources sustainably for the benefit of the people affected; create a 
forum where affected people can communicate and are those involved in alliance 
activities; and, prevent that particular interests take over the public interest with the 
claim of abiding the principle of sovereignty over natural resources of states. 
First, except for the area of marine resource management, local South science or 
traditional knowledge have occasionally enjoyed in UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR a distinctive 
role that complements the expert and scientific knowledge from the North. 
Notwithstanding active grassroots organizations critical with the government, there is a 
lack of participation of many organizations and institutions involved in the conservation 
of natural resources in Mexico, for instance, which have indeed been identified and 
compiled in the comprehensive yearbook by the Fondo Mexicano para la Conservación 
de la Naturaleza, A.C. (Hermanson Zuelow 2004). Fisherfolk have been involved not so 
much in project analysis but in implementation and monitoring activities. The project 
has benefited from past experiences in the region of community-based monitoring, a 
broad-brush early warning system (Álvarez 2004), which has complemented the highly 
detailed monitoring projects by increasing the number of sites 10-fold (ICRAN 2003: 
2)137. All data has contributed not only to the ReefBase global repository but also to the 
World Bank’s MBRS, PROARCA and WWF project databases in the region138. Therefore, 
for the management of marine resources, ICRAN/MAR has responded to conservation 
needs at the global scale by recognizing both traditional and scientific perspectives of 
coral reef dynamics and its social dependency (Solares-Leal and Álvarez-Gil 2003). 
The exchange between community-leaders of marine protected areas across the 
Yucatan Peninsula has provided a platform for the exchange of best practices with 
traditional fishers. The objective is to ameliorate fishing techniques and prevent the 
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overexploitation of fishing banks that adversely affect reef systems and put the 
sustainability of fisher communities at risk. Fisher communities have been involved in 
the development of guidelines for sustainable fishing and community-based 
monitoring. Learning takes place among peers so that southern expertise is exchanged 
among equals. A lobster manual has been developed. The brochure has been distributed 
to fisheries cooperatives, private industry such as seafood markets; target fishing 
communities, government departments, local NGOs and international projects139. In 
addition, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR alliance and the World Bank’s MBRS have co-financed, 
administered and presented the first Mesoamerican congress on fishing for artisanal 
fishermen with sixty social organizations of fishermen from four countries. Traditional 
fishers of the four countries have been consulted as experts and contribute so that they 
become organized to speak with one voice to defend their interests. In sum, traditional 
knowledge has been considered for monitoring and implementation in marine 
ecosystems, yet it has not been present in project analysis. 
In contrast, the watershed management area has not addressed the participation of 
local farmers and therefore has not benefited from their knowledge. Only so-called big 
science is used for the watershed analysis. The coupling of the hydrologic model and 
Geographic Information System (GIS) techniques is used to explore the dynamics of 
water and sediment transport within the Mesoamerican region in order to estimate the 
extent and location of sediment and pollution dispersion plumes from river mouths140. 
On model calibration, the outputs of hydrological modeling and watershed assessments 
have been evaluated and calibrated against compiled sources of data from satellite 
imagery. Data on water chemistry has been obtained from an electronic database of 
riverine chemistry, UNEP/WHO-GEMS Global River Inputs to the Oceans (GEMS-
GLORI), which focuses on selected ions and organic carbon – dissolved and particulate. 
Second, no social scientists have been involved in the alliance, particularly in the 
case of coastal environments. Even if the implication of experienced NGO members in 
the project might have compensated for the lack of anthropologists, expertise and 
traditional knowledge from local communities such as the Garifuna, Miskito that live in 
coastal areas and that depend on marine resources have not been involved. The 
knowledge and views of traditional cultures of the region have not been collected, and 
those are communities to which social scientists such as sociologists or anthropologists 
would have been more sensitive. Yet, as an attempt to approach young people from local 
communities using didactic material in local languages has been developed in the form 
of tales for children (Diaz de Cossio 2003). 
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Third, local universities and southern experts are not involved in UNEP’s 
ICRAN/MAR activities. In short, Northern scientific institutions have been in charge of 
assessing the management of watersheds and marine ecosystems. Southern experts are 
not regularly consulted for the inclusion of their agenda with the exception of fisherfolk 
whose participation has updated the fishery management plans. For marine resources, 
UNEP has orchestrated with PROARCA, which has completed a similar pre-feasibility 
study for the MSC certification of lobster in Central America, and supported community 
efforts toward certification. The University of Washington has conducted PROARCA’s 
ongoing study of the ecology of the lobster population and has thus complemented a 
stock assessment to provide recommendations in order to improve fishery management 
plans. Therefore, the information gained through previous work, such as PROARCA, 
World Bank’s MBRS and GCRMN/Reef Check and industry contacts, has informed the 
efforts for this sub-component. Additionally, evaluations of the changes in erosion, 
sediment and nutrient delivery141 for all watersheds discharging along the MAR have 
been undertaken by the University of South Carolina and the Land-Ocean Interaction in 
the Coastal Zone (LOICZ) project of the International Geosphere-Biosphere Program 
(IGBP) in coordination with NOAA and NASA. 
Fourth, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR alliance has influenced the involvement of affected 
people especially in the management of marine areas. Fishing communities have been at 
the center of alliance activities to diversify their livelihoods. These communities are the 
first affected in the new practices for the sustainable management of fisheries. Those 
communities have experienced a reduction in available fishing areas by the creation of 
MPAs and/or other reductions related to the implementation of best practices in the 
management of fisheries. The focus on pilot and target sites for best practices in MPAs 
has also favored training in economic diversification, such as sustainable tourism and 
the aquaculture industry. On the contrary, even if contributing to the depletion of 
fishing resources, the industrial fishing industry has not been an object of the alliance 
actions to reduce the impact of their activities on the reef. 
UNEP has orchestrated, in close collaboration with existing projects - World Bank’s 
MBRS, PROARCA, WWF - that specific communities and fishers are selected for 
training as fishing tour guides. Thus, capacity has been built for local community 
members to engage in community-based tourism and marine resource protection 
(Zenteno L. 2007). UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has helped in building bridges between ecotour 
operators and local fisher communities, identifying ways in which the private sector can 
invest in building capacity in the communities for tourism development. WWF regional 
staff have overseen and helped in collaboration with GEF and PROARCA develop the 
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tourism training agendas. It has helped target community fishers to not only develop 
new skills such as tour guiding, dive mastery, guiding for recreational fishing, birding, 
kayaking, scuba diving, fly-fishing and public speaking but has also assisted them in 
small business management (finances, market assessment skills for small businesses)142. 
Additionally, a ‘Guide to Good Practices handbook’ has been completed and comments 
have been organized, then translated into Spanish, printed in English and Spanish, 
marketed through the workshops and regional network, and used at all the pilot sites. 
However, it has not been done in indigenous languages. Besides, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR 
alliance has also acknowledged that some fishers are not interested or able to fully 
participate in tourism and are more interested in potential opportunities in the growing 
aquaculture industry143. Thus, the promotion of small-scale farming of native seaweed in 
appropriate environments, particularly areas that will benefit from the removal of 
ambient nutrients through the growth process, has provided another alternative to 
tourism-based economic development. 
Although ‘there is considerable focus given to community-level work’ and ‘the 
ICRAN partners have a wealth of experience working at this level and pride themselves 
in being engaged at the field level’ (ICRAN 2003: 7), this has not transpired in all 
working areas. In the watershed area management component, the lack of participation 
of the affected people is evident. Quite opposite to the marine environment component, 
only big agribusinesses have been engaged and not rural communities or the local 
government. Furthermore, the alliance has not managed to engage affected resource 
users in coastal ecosystems for their management and monitoring. In the coastal area 
management component, the lack of participation of affected people is similar to the 
watershed area, where mainly MPAs and marine recreation providers have been 
involved and, to a lesser extent, cruise ship companies. Thereby, the major affected 
group involved in the ICRAN/MAR alliance is constituted by traditional fishers, with 
fishing being the main activity of local resource users. 
Fifth, effective forums for affected resource users have not been set up consistently 
for the different ecosystems. By contrast, only for the case of marine resource 
management there are peer-to-peer exchanges highlighting best practice examples of 
co-management for the selected communities and fishermen from Guatemala and 
Honduras to visit fishing communities in Mexico and Northern Belize (ICRAN 2005d). 
Fisherfolk have also benefited from activities that allow them to group and organize as a 
political actor. Traditional fishermen did not normally collaborate to defend their 
interests. UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR project has provided an alliance for traditional fishing, a 
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space for traditional fishers to exchange experiences and to defend their interests on a 
regional scale. The Mesoamerican Alliance for Traditional Fishing, outcome of the first 
Mesoamerican Fishermen Congress, becomes an actor in front of governments and the 
industrial fishing industry144 and it contributes to the diffusion of best fishing practices. 
Conversely, a platform forum for affected resource users such as indigenous 
communities living on the coastal areas to discuss on agriculture activities and tourism 
and to express their views on the alliance activities and to argue for alternatives has not 
been set up. 
Last, mechanisms that oversee whether particular interests do not take over the 
public interest are not in place especially for the coastal and watershed managements. 
An example is how UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has not been successful in involving actors for 
sustainable tourism as hotels and other relevant stakeholders that have stayed out of the 
initiative. In fact, the outsider NGO Grupo Ecologista del Mayab (GEMA) has not been 
involved in any of the activities of the alliance. Araceli Dominguez as the GEMA 
representative has reported that the plan of building a macro hotel complex in Puerto 
Cancún, a coastal area that affects the Mesoamerican reef, will destroy mangroves, 
which is the habitat necessary to support biodiversity and fish stocks in the marine 
environment. Instead, the macro hotel will bring a shore, a golf course, a residential 
area, a hotel area and a business and public area. The governmental Instituto Nacional 
the Ecología (INE) has renewed the license that has authorized the environmental 
impact assessment in Puerto Cancún that had expired, without revising neither the 
project nor the studies of the environmental impact (Martínez 2005). Economic 
development and particular interests run over the public interest of environmental 
sustainability. This lack of interest for the environmental state of the area goes in 
detriment of local communities such as Garifuna, Miskito, which depend on the reef 
and its environmental resources for their development. 
While marine ecosystems management is the area that has accrued more respect-
based resources, yet UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR social leverage strategy has not involved 
affected people for watershed management, such as small farmers or indigenous 
communities for coastal management. Therefore, the alliance misses the views of 
affected people that continue suffering the damage of the business as usual. 
7.4.2.2 Participation as involving non-states 
This section assesses the extent to which UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR alliance has contributed 
to building participation-based resources by involving private actors for sustainability 
politics in the Mesoamerican barrier reef region. Specifically, according to the analytical 
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framework of chapter three, it is analyzed to what extent the plan of action of UNEP’s 
ICRAN/MAR has involved the inclusion of environmental NGOs and businesses as 
partners for setting project objectives and developing mechanisms for monitoring, the 
promotion of dialogue between non-states and governmental actors for policy-making 
and the evolution of actor participation. 
UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR influence has spread along different functional areas. UNEP’s 
ICRAN/MAR has made it possible for private actors to get involved in the marine, 
coastal and watershed areas of reef management. This collaboration has allowed 
building awareness and share tools that develop effective conservation strategies with 
the purpose of minimizing the land-based sources of pollution to the MAR and 
minimizing unsustainable fishing and tourism activities (ICRAN 2003: 10). Therefore, in 
several of UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR outputs, private actors have become proactive actors in 
the conservation of the Mesoamerican Reef. 
First, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR terminal report shows a relatively higher participation 
from private sector and local communities in comparison to governmental agencies, 
local and regional NGOs and national institutions (ICRAN 2007a: 3-8). The program has 
established and strengthened important alliances with partner organizations and 
projects, such as Conservation International, TNC and FFEM - French global 
environment facility, major international corporations, such as Chiquita, Dole, Fyffes, 
etc., local industries and local community groups including fishermen’s cooperatives145. 
Yet, interactions between public and non-public organizations have been indirect and 
scant. Subsequently, new links between private and public actors are, with the exception 
of some cases, such as marine resources management, rather limited. Instead, 
collaboration has been orchestrated by UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR through non-profits to 
reach for-profits. 
On the watershed areas, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR’s focus has been to engage for profits 
in the development of the initiative and create new synergies with private actors. The 
project has benefited from the close collaboration of NGOs as key intermediaries in the 
alliance. The expertise from public and private actors has been key to the project’s 
development. The orchestration of UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR with NASA through the WRI is 
a clear example of how the project has benefited from different actors’ cooperation to 
implement project initiatives146. In particular, the integration of land-uses information 
and ocean-currents modeling has set the basis for business accountability. Specifically, 
the initiative has entailed conducting research into the latest agricultural techniques for 
reducing erosion and minimizing water and agrochemical use, etc., analysis of the 
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locations and ownership of the primary agricultural land holdings. In order to 
implement and adopt best practices, action has been taken to identify key stakeholders, 
formalize key partnerships, establish market linkages, introduce government officials to 
BMP-based policies, develop positive relationships with influential producers and 
provide communications and outreach through a website to include information, 
analysis and key links. Yet, while the private sector has reacted, the public one has been 
rather inactive. In fact, UNEP has liaised with very different partners for watershed 
management. Nonetheless, only the government of New Zealand is interested in the 
outputs achieved for watershed management. 
For marine resource management, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has liaised with fisher 
organizations, food and catering businesses. ICRAN/MAR’s partner, WWF, has 
developed efforts in alliance with the Fishing and Aquiculture Organization of the 
Central-American Isthmus (OSPESCA), the regional organization in charge of fisheries, 
to make recommendations to the Honduras government on its institutional 
arrangement for fisheries management. This makes it possible to overcome the changes 
in fishery policies with every change in governmental periods. It is the first time that a 
non-profit and a professional group cooperate to give advice on fisheries policy to a 
government in the region. Besides, a monitoring system of best fishing practices (BFP) 
that allows fishermen to guarantee that their lobsters have been caught using BFP147 has 
been established through private and public sector partnerships from the community to 
the international level (ICRAN 2003: 22). ICRAN/MAR’s partner WWF, in collaboration 
with the regional project PROARCA/APM, has encouraged private companies to provide 
a guaranteed market for sustainability-harvested products. The US seafood market 
represents a major source of external demand on the coral reef and associated fisheries 
of Mexico, Belize and Honduras. For instance, APESCA, the Caribbean Fishing 
Association, has become accountable for sustainable fishing with the launch of MoUs to 
use and promote better fisheries practices with the ecofriendly trap for lobster. 
Fishermen can thus offer their lobsters to buyers that have expressed interest in buying 
this lobster at a preferential price. However, even if contributing to the depletion of 
fishing resources, the industrial fishing industry has not been the focus of the alliance 
actions to reduce the impact of their activities on the reef. 
For coastal management, private companies such as hotels, providers and 
purchasers of recreation activities for sustainable tourism have been contacted. Yet, only 
marine recreation providers contribute material resources for reef conservation, as well 
as NGOs or foundations that draw on ICRAN/MAR for ideational resources or providing 
funds. The WWF has engaged cruise line and inbound operators as well as local and 
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national government authorities to obtain policy support for private sector initiatives. 
Nonetheless, hotels and other tourism facilities as well as local governments have not 
been sufficiently attracted to project activities. In fact, no major initiative to develop 
rules for monitoring or dialogue with the state have emerged. The extensive networks 
have been used to incorporate other regional partners, such as the Conservation 
International’s Center for Environmental Leadership and Business (CELB) and many 
local and regional NGOs, tourism boards, and governmental agencies (ICRAN 2003: 25, 
2007a: 7). Instead, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR orchestration has contributed to the 
establishment of private initiatives with local government (Quintana Roo government in 
Mexico) involvement such as the MARTI initiative148. 
Second, some private actors have engaged in setting objectives, providing 
assessments and contributing monitoring and development of best practices. In the case 
of watershed management, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has urged the private sector, the non-
profit trade association CropLife and philanthropy organizations, such as the Summit 
Foundation, to engage in voluntary-based fund-raising outputs for monitoring the level 
of substances deployed by the agribusiness. In the same vein, agribusinesses through 
CropLife have engaged in studies on the bioaccumulation of agricultural effluents on 
targeted species within the Mesoamerican Reef. UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has joined forces 
with WRI and WWF to engage targets - agribusiness and trade associations - to share 
tools to develop effective conservation strategies to minimize land-based sources of 
pollution to the MAR. Thus agribusinesses have not only been involved as funders of 
activities but also their participation has been sought in stakeholder fora for scenario 
building and decision-making in the case of bioaccumulation monitoring studies. 
Besides, a workshop on watershed management has been instrumental to 
discussing partnership concerns to draft best practices guidelines. WRI, UNEP’s WCMC 
and WWF as ICRAN/MAR partners have joined efforts to link their particular 
experiences, interests and capacities in this field. The development of crop-specific best 
practices guidelines has been modeled on and closely coordinated with another project 
of the region, the USAID PROARCA (ICRAN 2003: 12). Given PROARCAs focus on 
bananas and coffee, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has focused on oil palm, citrus, pineapple and 
melon, the other major crops in the area149. The development of specific best practices 
has been achieved in consultation with industry leaders, community groups, other 
agricultural projects and governmental agencies. Above all partners, the efforts of 
UNEP’s Caribbean Environment Programme (UNEP-RCU/CEP) have greatly 
contributed - in collaboration with USAID - to developing a project to reduce pesticide 
                                                 
148 Personal interview with a Belize Tourism Board staff member, March 2005. 
149 Personal interview with the scientific researcher at WRI, July 2005. 
246 
 
use and contamination in coastal waters as well as to slow down the environmental 
effects of the cooling water intake of the hydropower interests (ICRAN 2003: 10). UNEP’s 
ICRAN/MAR has achieved the signature of the memorandums of understanding with 
three major sugar cane agribusinesses to conduct pesticide environmental assessments 
systems150 and better practices have been developed (ICRAN 2005d) and ICRAN/MAR’s 
partner WWF has consolidated a very strong relationship with the industry (ICRAN 
2007a: 16). 
For the marine ecosystem, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has contributed to create a 
partnership between the WWF, Darden and APESCA to link private companies buying 
fish from sustainable fisheries, as well as the MoUs with APESCA to hold fishers 
accountable. The knowledge of such groups has contributed to advising governments, 
becoming accountable for sustainable fishing, assisting in the development of best 
fishing practices and funding sustainable fishing-related activities. Demand for best 
practices for fishing has been growing. UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has orchestrated the 
partnership between the demand side and providers, namely between the WWF, 
APESCA and Darden chain of restaurants. By gaining the cooperation of companies that 
control market share in the USA to promote sustainable fisheries, a positive influence 
has been exerted on the long-term sustainability of fisheries in the region. 
Related to the coastal-areas management, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has put forward the 
testing process of best practices for marine recreation providers, and the steps for the 
setup of the Mesoamerican ecotourism alliance with MPAs and business collaboration151. 
Each ICRAN partner has focused on specific stakeholder groups in regional policy 
dialogues and multi-sectoral fora for sustainable tourism (ICRAN 2003: 25-26). CORAL 
has engaged marine recreation providers and MPA managers to support and adopt best 
practices. The alliance has obtained in-kind services152 from the R. B. Toth Associates to 
CORAL to provide guidance for the standard development process (ICRAN 2007a: 12). 
CORAL and R. B. Toth and Associates have engaged representative groups of materially 
affected tourism stakeholders in a regional process. CORAL in cooperation with the 
Center for Environmental Leadership in Business (CELB) and Tour Operators Initiative 
(TOI) has fostered both the adaptation of existing codes of conduct and the 
development of consensus standards for marine recreation providers. Best sustainable 
tourism practices have been identified and leveraged within the MAR in a process of 
refinement (ICRAN 2005d). Marine recreation providers have not only contributed to 
conservation through testing and implementing best practices. They have also invested 
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material resources –similar to the philanthropic organization summit that has funded 
environmental performance assessments through CORAL in Cozumel - and that has 
acted as a diffuser of UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR best practices. In turn, the UNEP Division of 
Technology, Industry and Economics (UNEP DTIE) has engaged bulk purchasers, 
inbound operators and hoteliers on minimum standard and best practices for 
contracting shore-based service providers and creating service agreements.  
Third and last, the evolution of private participation in coral reef governance has 
been clearly affected by the activities of UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR. Scenarios on the possible 
and probable influence of land use practice in MAR watersheds on coral reefs have been 
developed by holding a regional workshop, contracted to local consultants, to which 
stakeholders have been invited, such as companies involved in tourism, industrial 
development, agriculture, local, regional and national government, local planners and 
NGOs. The aim has been to develop narratives describing potential future change in 
coral reef ecosystems within the region and to relate these directly to different policy 
options, especially agricultural land use, and global or regional trends. The models 
adapted have been used in order to illustrate the potential influence of environmental 
change on the MAR, according to these different scenarios153. For the management of 
marine resources, the evolution of the private participation has translated into funding 
when retail companies such as the Kukulcan Plaza shopping mall in Cancún, Mexico, 
brought in money for the training in ecosystem-based fishing management and 
alternative livelihoods for fishers and the support by Sustainable Fishing Foundation for 
MSC lobster certification. However, industrial fishing companies have not been involved 
in the development of best practices. 
On the coastal areas component, private actors have actively participated in the 
sustainable tourism initiative such as marine recreation providers and NGOs. Those 
have fulfilled different roles, such as promoting and training tourists in best practices, 
by testing and endorsing new practices for recreation providers developed by CORAL, 
and creating an alliance to offer sustainable tourism services. The international 
professional organization PADI and the non-profit Conservation International and 
UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR have guaranteed that best practices are observed widely even after 
project termination. Therefore, UNEP’s orchestration has made it possible to endorse 
for-profits of the issue area that did not have any experience in sustainable practices. 
While a common regional initiative for sustainable development of standards or 
certification in all areas has not been possible to develop, some private initiatives have 
emerged. A case in point is the setup of the Mesoamerican Ecotourism Alliance, where 
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actors in marine protected areas and marine recreation providers have taken a step 
forward to reach customers that demand sustainable tourism experiences; or, the 
MARTI initiative that engages private actors as a first step to develop regional 
sustainable standards for the tourism industry in the region. 
7.5 The influence of UNEP through social leverage 
This section provides an overview of the influence exerted by UNEP’s orchestration. It 
discusses the extent to which the participation-, respect-, neutrality- and trust-based 
resources obtained through social leverage have served the competence to engage new 
actors and the capacity to legitimize new roles and functions to the actors involved. 
7.5.1  Legitimizing new roles: UNEP as knowledge broker and accountability 
facilitator 
In particular, neutrality-based and to a much lower extent trust-based resources have 
contributed to the capacity of UNEP to legitimize that new roles as knowledge providers 
and accountability holders are assigned to intermediaries and targets. 
Knowledge broker UNEP has obtained neutrality-based resources by adopting a 
framework for action that is bioregional and not strictly political-territorial. The 
adoption of new environmental frames has had more influence yet on watershed and 
less on marine and coastal areas. Watershed areas are used as units of management. The 
analysis based on watershed units and water pollution dispersion has helped in 
prioritizing which agribusinesses and areas are tackled first so that more positive 
influence on reef conservation is accrued sooner. UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has managed to 
enroll actors providing relevant data, such as NOAA and NASA, in orchestration with 
the University of South Carolina, the Land-Ocean Interaction in the Coastal Zone 
(LOICZ) project of the International Geosphere-Biosphere Program (IGBP) that have 
evaluated changes in all watersheds discharging along the MAR154 . Yet such neutrality-
based resources have a limited impact as the alliance has generally focused on the 
interlinkages between the economic and environmental pillars of sustainability only. 
Besides, UNEP has raised resources for the development of GEO4 to describe the state 
of ecosystems with the use of GIS in the Mesoamerican region. Yet, ecological entities 
such as ecological boundaries of endemism for coral reefs or the analysis of topography 
for the assessment of biodiversity have been underused. UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR 
orchestrates by taking coral reefs as a flagship ecosystem in catalyzing, enabling and 
supporting an ecosystem approach to the management of coastal and marine areas for 
food security, livelihoods and biodiversity. For instance, certification schemes for 
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sustainable marine recreation activities do not include social standards as indicators for 
sustainability, which curtails UNEP’s capacity to generate neutrality-based resources. 
Neither monitoring nor correcting mechanisms are in place to adjust the neglect of 
social issues, which are not under scrutiny primarily in the orchestration outputs 
referring to fishing and tourism economic activities. 
Accountability facilitator UNEP in the ICRAN/MAR alliance has managed to 
connect intermediaries and targets to get trust from each other to cooperate and share 
information that contributes to the accountability that affects the Mesoamerican Reef. 
In setting objectives and developing mechanisms for monitoring, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR 
obtains trust-based resources for watershed management. UNEP has joined forces with 
WRI and WWF to engage agribusinesses and trade associations to develop effective 
conservation strategies in order to minimize land-based sources of pollution to the 
MAR. Agribusinesses have thus been not only involved as funders of activities but their 
participation has also been sought in stakeholder fora for scenario building and 
decision-making in the case of bioaccumulation monitoring studies. Trust-based 
resources have made it possible to involve intermediaries and targets for the setup of 
measurable monitoring objectives that link economic, environmental and social aspects. 
Areas where connections between the three pillars have been established are MoUs on 
PEAS to protect both the reefs and agribusiness employees from chemical exposure 
through CropLife and Summit155. Besides, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR orchestration has 
introduced bioaccumulation studies for drainage basins in order to study the pollution 
levels derived from agricultural activities. In the case of the marine environment, UNEP 
has involved fisherfolk in implementation and monitoring, such as collecting data and 
acting as a broad-brush early warning system.  
Yet, not enough trust-based resources have been developed for setting clear goals 
and systematically publishing info to follow up on them. This would contribute to 
exerting pressure on resource users for the marine environment. Similarly, monitoring 
mechanisms to observe how signed or ratified protocols are implemented on 
biodiversity are not in place. Finally, trust-based resources appear wanting since there is 
still no common forum for delivering monitoring data after the project ends. Some 
monitoring activities spread beyond the life of the project, such as MoUs with 
agribusiness, non-scientist reef monitoring, performance monitoring plan in sustainable 
tourism with baselines and targets for each relevant actor. However, no general public 
fora to assess monitoring results after project termination is devised with the exception 
of community-level monitoring available online through the database. 
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7.5.2 Involving new actors: UNEP as norm entrepreneur and discourse-coalition 
builder 
UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has particularly benefited from participation-based resources 
since private actors get involved in project activities for all areas of reef management. In 
comparison, the impact of respect-based resources is more restricted. For instance, 
mechanisms that oversee whether particular interests − with the claim of abiding the 
principle of sovereignty over the natural resources of states − take over the public 
interest are not in place. 
Norm entrepreneurs Participation-based resources have made it possible that a 
partnership between the mediator non-profit WWF, and business targets, namely, 
restaurants in the Darden chain, buy sustainably harvested fish from the fishing 
association APESCA. In addition, participation-based resources have been built by 
putting forward MoUs through the ICRAN/MAR alliance and actors moved by their 
economic interest to continue fishing. MoUs between the fishing association APESCA 
and ICRAN/MAR contribute to holding Honduran fishers accountable in reference to 
the best fishing practices set. In this way, traditional fishers have not only engaged in 
workshops as recipients for the provision of sustainable fishing and alternative 
livelihoods; they have also been involved in the development of best practices as agents 
of coral reef governance. The alliance has assisted community-based fisheries, put 
forward cost-benefit analysis to develop MoUs and BFPs for a manual developed in 
collaboration with local fishermen. In addition, for the management of watersheds, 
particularly, for the reduction of the use of pesticides, common objectives between 
normally opposed private actors, such as for-profit and non-profit organizations, have 
been developed only after building mutual trust. 
Discourse-coalition builder UNEP would have benefited from more participation-
based and respect-based resources, which have not been sufficiently exploited on 
account of the lack of both, the participation of local farmers in the project’s watershed 
analysis and, the inclusion of more traditional forms of knowledge from cultural 
minorities living in coastal areas for generations. Overall, the area in which UNEP’s 
ICRAN/MAR has benefited from more respect-based resources is the marine 
component. It has involved affected actors for sustainable reef management and for 
southern expertise. Nonetheless, not all resource users in the marine component have 
participated, industrial fishers, for instance, have not engaged even if they have been 
involved in marine resources’ depletion that negatively affect the status of the reef. 
Marine recreation providers UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has obtained participation-based 
resources by engaging marine recreation providers in coastal management. They 
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provide material resources for reef conservation and forty marine recreation providers 
have been involved in the testing of standards of sustainable best practices. 
Non-governmental organizations (WWF, CropLife) Participation-based resources 
have benefited UNEP in the ICRAN/MAR alliance with the involvement and dialogue 
between non-states. In addition, this has fostered that governmental actors in other 
regions such as the New Zealand government adopt the outputs achieved put forward 
by the WWF and the agribusiness foundation CropLife for watershed management. 
Fisherfolk and national fishing associations (Mesoamerican Fishers Assoc., APESCA 
OSPESCA) UNEP’s orchestration has allowed the WWF and the Central America 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Organization (OSPESCA) to provide advice to the Honduras 
government for marine management. Participation-based resources of UNEP’s 
orchestration have allowed several private actors to engage through fund-raising for 
ecosystem-based fishing and MSC certification; exploring alternative livelihood of 
fishers, such as sustainable shrimp aquaculture, training in small-scale farming of native 
seaweed, and the compromise by fishing organization APESCA to preserve social living 
standards.  
Association of Mesoamerican Fishermen UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has built respect-
based resources by creating a forum to communicate and contribute to alliance 
activities in the marine ecosystem and a regional fishermen congress for traditional 
fishers to defend their interests. UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR orchestration has obtained 
respect-based resources by bolstering the previously inexistent Association of 
Mesoamerican Fishermen after co-organizing the first Mesoamerican Fishermen 
Congress in Mexico, which has fostered peer-to-peer exchanges of community members 
for the development of guidelines in the marine protected areas of the Yucatan 
Peninsula. Yet, traditional knowledge from local communities such as the Garifuna, 
Miskito that live in coastal areas and that depend on marine resources has not been 
considered. The alliance has included the views of affected people only in the 
management of marine areas, benefiting local communities in terms of the 
environmental and sustainable management of natural resources by training fishers on 
alternative livelihoods. 
Agribusinesses  UNEP does not obtain respect-based resources in reference to 
local communities as studies on the agribusiness pollution levels monitor effects on 
business employees only. Similarly, UNEP’s ICRAN-MAR orchestration has not involved 
affected people for the watershed ecosystems management, such as small farmers or 
indigenous communities.  
Restaurant and hotel business  Similarly, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR obtains 
participation-based resources by facilitating a partnership between the Darden chain of 
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restaurants and the Caribbean Association of Fishers APESCA for the provision of 
lobster sustainably caught. In addition, setting the basis for the creation of the 
Mesoamerican Ecotourism Alliance Initiative that brings MPAs together with local 
communities and tourism providers (hotels and outdoor recreation providers) for the 
testing of good practices has been made possible through UNEP’s orchestration, which 
has generated participation-based resources. Nonetheless, more respect-based resources 
for orchestration need to be pursued as some actors, such as some fisherfolk, do not 
benefit from such partnership agreements on lobster and publications on sustainable 
tourism even if translated and printed into Spanish; however, they are not available in 
any of the different indigenous languages that are present in the region (Mayan 
languages, English creole, Miskito and Garifuna). 







7.5.3 UNEP’s social leverage strengths: Neutrality- and participation-based 
resources 
UNEP builds its social leverage approach for the ICRAN/MAR alliance on the basis of 
two premises: firstly, the good reputation from the international organization acting as 
orchestrator (UNEP) and intermediaries to exert social pressure, and; second, the 
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capacity of exerting leverage that prompts targets to cooperate with the alliance. Instead 
of changing the beliefs of the orchestration targets, it is avoiding opprobrium and 
obtaining recognition, which underlies much of UNEP’s rationale to mobilize targets in 
this project. The enlisting of NGOs that monitor the activities of private businesses and 
the exchange of experiences between pilot and target sites (winners and laggards) for 
the spread of best practices are relevant examples of this. Some contextual aspects have 
contributed to UNEP’s social leverage. The actors engaged by UNEP in the ICRAN/MAR 
project already have prior ingrained interests. While NGOs aim at protecting the reef, 
businesses, on the other hand, aim at not damaging their reputation by environmental 
campaigns and ensuring that environmental measures do not put their business 
profitability at risk. At the same time, UNEP appears as a credible arbitrator for 
managing cooperation across the public and private interests. In addition, UNEP’s 
orchestration has attracted the material support from intermediaries and target actors 
that contribute to achieving the alliance governance goals. 
The project copes with the lack of previous regional cooperation across state and 
non-state actors. The areas with more orchestration influence have been watershed and 
marine ecosystems. Nonetheless, all issue areas including sustainable coastal 
management have taken advantage mostly from the neutrality- and participation-based 
resources generated by UNEP. UNEP as the orchestrator in ICRAN/MAR has advanced 
coral reef management by particularly intertwining ecological and economic issues and 
bringing to dialogue both for-profit and non-for-profit organizations. Innovative 
outputs include the signature of memorandums of understanding with agribusinesses in 
order to control the use of pesticides and commercial agreements with the purpose of 
facilitating the access of sustainably caught fish to the market. The ICRAN/MAR 
alliance has benefited from the high-status that UNEP and its intermediaries enjoy as 
the strength to distribute social rewards and punishments for social leverage. Effective 
social leverage depends on both, which group the target identified with as a high-status 
actor, as this is the reference group to which the target actor likes to show behavior 
conformity, and who grants social rewards and punishments. 
Clearly, in the watershed management area, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR orchestration has 
been key to ensuring that large agro-industrial companies recognize ICRAN/MAR 
partners as part of a reference group that aims at adopting a suite of best business 
practices. UNEP has been decisive in obtaining the necessary satellite information to 
understand pollution plumes behavior in the marine system that originate many miles 
away due to land-based activities. UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has considered the watershed 
component from the project start and has needed the cooperation of both NOAA and 
NASA for data. In order to obtain the cooperation of both North American 
administrations, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has exerted pressure on World Bank’s MBRS 
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through informal talks to give more prominence to watersheds156. Finally, the World 
Bank has interceded in favor of UNEP in front of NOAA and NASA. Enrolling the WWF 
as a mediator has been critical to engaging agribusinesses as targets. In this case, the 
agribusiness targets have identified and care about the opinions of the ICRAN/MAR 
alliance group. UNEP and its mediating partners are high-status actors recognized by 
the targets as legitimate behavior observers. The brokering of knowledge that links 
patterns of land use with sediment deposition, transport and pollutant delivery at coral 
reefs, in order to support better practices has been decisive. The private funding raised 
for conducting environmental performance assessments has contributed to exerting 
pressure on targets. 
Choosing water basins as the main analytical unit has contributed to a perspective 
that predominantly integrates environmental economic variables for coral reef 
protection, as well as some social issues. Land-use data that maps economic activities 
has been integrated with the ocean-based modeling of pollution transport. This has 
bolstered agribusiness accountability. Such tools have been adapted to make forecasts, 
models and scenarios to help focus implementation efforts by determining which 
watersheds contain the most polluting agro-industries, that is, bananas, juice oranges, 
sugar, oil palm, melon and pineapple. The project has put forward the constitution of a 
platform of different stakeholders to discuss future development scenarios where 
different actors have assessed and made public assessments on the performance of 
agribusiness. UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR alliance has then been able to model and make 
predictions about effluents discharged by watershed basins information to put pressure 
on businesses for accountability. The scientific data, GIS and bioaccumulation studies 
provided by the ICRAN alliance have served to contrast views with businesses that were 
reluctant to cooperate at first. The adoption of monitoring tools developed in the 
project, such as bioaccumulation protocols by US agencies acting as orchestration 
intermediaries − EPA and NOAA − have provided increased social recognition to the 
alliance when it comes to exerting pressure on US-owned big agribusinesses operating 
in the area. Higher pressure on multinationals for action, contested at the beginning, 
has spread with both cost-effective assessments and the discourse on the need for 
discussing future development scenarios. 
In the area of marine resources environmental sustainability, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR 
has fostered the development of best practice guidelines for key fisheries. It has 
positively influenced their long-term sustainability by cooperating with the companies 
that control market share to promote sustainable fisheries. Companies are aware of 
growing consumer pressure by demanding products that are environmentally 
                                                 
156 Personal interview with the scientific researcher at WRI, September 2005. 
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sustainable. First, the alliance has worked with lobster fisheries, which has guided 
efforts for best practices, and the creation of specific environmental guidelines for 
sustainable lobster fishing, as well as grouper and conch fisheries. In addition, the 
alliance between the WWF, APESCA and Darden has provided the WWF with the role 
of arbitrator to imprint pressure on target fishers to deliver the offer of a preferential 
rate for sustainable lobster to Darden, a leading chain of restaurants. At the same time, 
mediator APESCA is in charge of verifying the provision of lobster fished following best 
practices. The general public, with its purchasing power grants that businesses, become 
orchestration targets that accommodate the increasing demand for sustainably 
produced goods. In order to channel those demands, funding from private retailers and 
non-profits, as well as support from banks for sustainable fishing businesses have 
contributed to the discourse on the demand for sustainable products. Equivalently, the 
orchestrated initiative to develop MSC certification for lobster in Mexico has responded 
to a social growing demand and market pressure to be able to offer such products. 
Additionally, the exercise of comparing demonstration Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) 
versus target MPAs sites exerts some pressure on the latter. MPA staff in target sites 
visit their peers in demonstration sites in order to gain knowledge in best practices. 
Consequently, planned community exchanges have promoted the transfer of skills and 
lessons from demonstration areas to target communities. MPA targets sites are inspired 
to change their status of environmental “laggards” to become champions. Moreover, 
trainings for fishers in alternative income generation have been delivered.  
Finally, for the coastal management area, businesses and other stakeholders that 
have participated actively in UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR project have confirmed or gained 
good reputation, which turns into a social reward and represents an advantage in front 
of the competition. In turn, those who have gained good reputation become examples of 
good behavior for other businesses. Those businesses not recognized as part of the 
“environmentally sustainable” reference group are under pressure to follow best 
practices when the public limelight compares the environmental practices of “leaders 
and laggards” businesses. CORAL and WRI, acting as partners of UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR, 
have engaged regional tour operators in the testing of best practices. By organizing 
regional workshops on sustainable tourism and gathering relevant stakeholders, the 
project succeeded in creating a network where different stakeholders have got to 
introduce to each other, that is, for profits and not-for-profit organizations. UNEP’s 
ICRAN/MAR has worked with cruise ships and the main tour operators in order to 
develop good practices. Those businesses as targets have worked on board side by side 
with project intermediaries on the cruise with hundreds of tourists in order to test what 
should or should not be done. This project has been possible because it is supported by 
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UNEP157 and organized through ICRAN, with good standing in effectively brokering 
knowledge. People are knowledgeable and have congratulated ICRAN for what they 
were doing in other regions and their publications are well received “as they turn the 
ordinary to extraordinary”158. 
7.5.4 UNEP’s social leverage weaknesses: Trust-based resources 
UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has been less successful in generating trust -based resources. For 
one thing, UNEP is not securing the public consultation of environmental assessments 
agreed in the memorandums of understanding between for-profit and non-profit 
organizations. In addition, the cooperation between state and non-state organizations, 
with the exception of the area of marine resources has been scarce. Moreover, in that 
case outputs are not regional but restricted to a single country. 
Overall, the issue area with the lowest number of outputs in UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR 
orchestration has been coastal management and sustainable tourism. This theme has 
aimed at identifying key actors for regional and national workshops with the objective 
of building consensus around supply chain guidelines, leveraging relationships in coral 
reef tourism purchasers, and creating draft regional codes of conduct for marine 
recreation. 
The alliance has exerted pressure on businesses by asking them to sign and 
compromise themselves to cooperate with the testing of standards for sustainable 
tourism. Generally speaking, intermediaries and targets like the idea that their own 
organization’s logo appears printed out in public documents next to the logos of well-
respected organizations such as UN or USAID159. In this way, intermediaries and target 
organizations are publicly endorsed by well-reputed international organizations. 
Nonetheless, social leverage has had limited impact in the case of fostering sustainable 
tourism. UNEP’s social leverage for coastal management has generated a debate and it 
has contributed to creating a public discourse that has interlinked market demand with 
tourism sustainable products. Visitors expect reefs to be in good condition in coastal 
areas that are not overcrowded. In this case, UNEP’s social leverage has only achieved 
local government involvement. Yet, government participation at a ministerial level has 
been extremely limited. The ministries of tourism of the countries involved have not 
participated actively in the alliance activities. Tourism is probably seen by governmental 
structures as an extremely sensitive national issue – due to its contribution to the 
country’s GDP - to be left to the external interference of international organizations. In 
                                                 
157 Personal interview with the ICRAN/MAR secretary, February 2005. 
158 Personal interview with UNEP’s Caribbean regional coordination unit official, September 2005. 
159 Personal interview with the ICRAN/MAR secretary, February 2005. 
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this case, economic interests clearly overrun the social and environmental concerns of 
general interest. In any case, UNEP has orchestrated different stakeholders with similar 
objectives during project orchestration and has put the foundations for the first 
Mesoamerican Ecotourism Alliance. 
The success that UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has obtained in sustainable watershed and 
marine management can be explained through the capacity to generate well-being from 
back patting and the punishment of psychological anxiety from disgrace, which guides 
targets of social leverage to abide by intermediaries and orchestrators’ will. In watershed 
management issues, the alliance has approached businesses through NGO orchestration 
intermediaries with integrated land-use maps showing effluent discharge models on the 
marine system to pressure. Accordingly, some agribusinesses have accepted to sign 
memorandums of understanding to conduct pesticide assessments. This provides them 
with the opportunity to avoid increasing binding regulations from policy-makers and at 
the same time be congratulated by the public opinion when certifying their ecologically-
friendly production. Yet, some flaws are to be addressed. Pesticide assessments are only 
a first step in the right direction, as still some harmful chemicals are left out of the 
discussion, such as some fertilizers that also pollute the marine environment and 
contribute to global warming, which ultimately affects the bleaching of reefs. In 
addition, there is no public statement on how follow up processes for such 
memorandums of understanding will be carried out after the alliance has ended. 
In the case of the management of marine resources, social leverage activities have 
been directed to pressure governments for the development of environmental 
regulation, pressure on business for increasing environmental accountability and, 
introducing a discourse on market demand for sustainable products. UNEP’s 
ICRAN/MAR project together with the association APESCA of Caribbean fisheries’ 
organizations, as intermediary, has advocated best fishing practices and has imprinted 
pressure to the Honduras government, recipient of projects by other IOs concerning 
sustainable fishing. The MoU signed between the General Directorate for fisheries and 
aquaculture in Honduras (DIGEPESCA) and the ICRAN/MAR alliance has responded to 
the aspiration of Honduran fishers to secure sustainable fisheries in the long run and to 
be recognized as an exemplifying professional group with best practices to be exchanged 
with other neighboring fishing communities. However, this has only been possible at a 
national level in Honduras and not based on a regional framework that would have been 
more effective for accountability purposes. 
7.5.5 Social leverage as an orchestration approach: Reflections 
The UNEP as orchestrator in the ICRAN/MAR case study has especially obtained more 
neutrality- and participation-based orchestration resources and to a lesser extent 
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respect-based compared to trust-based resources. Despite such limitations, the outputs 
obtained through UNEP’s social leverage suggest that the combination of resources 
obtained has been productive and influential. 
Participation-based resources have been achieved by introducing partners that did 
not engage in norm-setting debates or that did not cooperate with other stakeholders 
before. A case in point is the meeting that has served to set up the regional Alliance of 
Traditional Fishers. Participants affected by decisions made on reef management have 
identified with each other and realized that their voice and interests can be 
strengthened if they organize themselves as a collective actor with a shared agenda. This 
group may eventually defend their interests in front of government policy-making and 
powerful industrial fishing interests. 
Table 7.3 UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR new orchestration actors and roles (*) 
Overall, trust-based resources have been the least harvested by UNEP’s 
ICRAN/MAR. UNEP’s efforts to generate participation-based resources by cooperating 
with private actors appears to have limited its capacity to orchestrate with public and 
local community groups, also not to step, perhaps, on the work of the World Bank. 
Besides, UNEP’s success is based in generating neutrality-based resources. Yet, not 
enough effort has been invested to create trust-based resources so that actors, other 
than the alliance partners, can publicly assess all work done on the several issue areas. 
Nonetheless, UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR has succeeded in terms of leaving a good basis for 
future work on coral reef governance, such as the case of the Healthy reefs project, 
which continues the work initiated by UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR with the participation of 
some of its partners. 
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As a general remark, the case study shows that social leverage is compatible with 
processes more akin to persuasion. On some occasions, UNEP as orchestrator has 
combined strategies, which respond more to persuasion. For instance, UNEP 
ICRAN/MAR has conducted training activities in the use of geographic information 
systems with the Coastal Zone Management of Belize, as intermediary. It has decided to 
take on this methodology as an instrument for government officials to monitor and 
track the consequences of activities taking place in the area on their environmental 
resources. 
With peer-to-peer community exchanges, MPA target sites have learnt from the best 
practices of demonstration sites, acting as intermediaries of orchestration. MPA target 
sites are labelled as “laggards” and demonstration sites as “champions” so that an 
implicit competition or social leverage is established between them. Differently, with 
the training by non-profit intermediary Reef Check to local communities, the project 
has assumed that the communities will be persuaded at changing their behavior 
through social proof. UNEP has also benefited from training private businesses in 
standards for monitoring coastal areas or when professional associations and non-profit 
organizations have endorsed the best practices for tourists of UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR 
project. Similarly, other international organizations working in the area have taken best 
tourism practices developed within UNEP’s ICRAN/MAR framework to inform their 
own projects and contribute to the diffusion of best practices. Yet, the successful 
ICRAN/MAR project on sustainable marine tourism in Mexico, Belize and Honduras 
(Wilkinson 2008) has to compete for “rule adaptors”. The reason is that there are 
multiple sets of rules targeting a single issue, so that different private actors compete for 
rule adaptors (Green 2014: 14). In sustainable tourism certification, multiple sets of 
norms co-exist for the same issue area. 
This study has also evaluated to what extent the influence from UNEP’s 
ICRAN/MAR project has been backed by conditionality. That is, when the orchestration 
agents have pointed to direct positive or negative material incentives as motivations for 
behavior change. ICRAN/MAR’s project coordinator has pointed that in isolated cases, 
coordination has required the use of the carrot-and-stick method with intermediaries, 
as sometimes “want to do only what they know better or prefer to do”160. According to 
the information gathered, motivations of target actors have not responded to the 
conditionality logic of action. 
                                                 
160 Personal interview with the ICRAN/MAR secretary, February 2005. 
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8. Orchestration approaches: Conclusions 
This thesis set out to explore the approaches, the influence and the strengthening of IO 
orchestration in global environmental governance (GEG). This work is meant to 
contribute to these areas by suggesting the different pathways to get voluntary 
compliance from target actors in IO orchestration, by introducing insights from 
different strands of literature in order to learn what it means to be influential in IO 
orchestration, and by suggesting a framework to assess orchestration influence in the 
case of GEG. This framework is applied empirically in a survey that compares treaty 
secretariats and multipurpose organizations in GEG and, in two case studies on coral 
reef governance in Mesoamerica. The following sections summarize the main findings. 
8.1 Key findings 
8.1.1 Orchestration approaches by IOs 
Depending on how IOs reach target actors, this work has classified IO orchestration 
processes into two different approaches. The classification of the orchestration 
approaches in formal – delegation by states – and informal – entrepreneurial by IOs – 
proves helpful in accounting for the different results obtained by IOs. The orchestration 
theory looks at different variables including the orchestration initiator to be able to 
predict orchestration emergence. This study centers in orchestration processes that 
already exist and uses the orchestration initiator among other variables to analyze the 
“quality” of orchestration. The initial assumption is that the orchestration initiator 
shapes the orchestration process and its results. In the case that orchestration is 
formally delegated to IOs, those will enlist public intermediaries and use persuasion to 
reach target actors and influence them to voluntarily abide by IO norms. In the case 
that orchestration is entrepreneurially initiated by IOs, those will enlist private 
intermediaries and use social leverage to reach target actors and influence them to 
voluntarily abide by IO norms. 
Orchestration theory expects orchestration by IOs to emerge when there is high 
goal divergence and weak oversight by states (Abbott et al. 2015c). Nonetheless, this 
study provides evidence that IO orchestration emerges even with low goal divergence 
and weak oversight by states. This can be plausibly explained by the fact that, when 
states “put the brakes” to formal orchestration, this opens the door for informal 
orchestration to emerge. Therefore, IOs may engage in orchestration even if states agree 
on common objectives for the same issue and do not tightly oversee IOs actions. In light 
of this evidence, what started as low goal divergence has developed to a higher goal 
divergence meaning that one of the countries opts out of a common regional regime 
framework. This fact combined with low state oversight has facilitated informal 
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entrepreneurship. Empirical chapters 6 and 7 reconstruct the sequence of facts that 
point to such plausible explanation. Chapter 6 shows how the states involved have 
delegated to the World Bank and its intermediary organization – Comisión 
Centroamericana de Ambiente y Desarrollo (CCAD) – through the Tulum Declaration 
the implementation of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System (MBRS) project for 
preserving the reefs’ environmental sustainability. Chapter 7 illustrates how just some 
time after World Bank’s orchestration started, the UNEP ICRAN/MAR initiated its 
informal orchestration in the same area and with similar objectives. Thus, it is 
important to distinguish different orchestration approaches primarily because they 
account for different processes that may co-exist, reinforce or even undermine each 
other161. While formal orchestration receives a stronger oversight and approval by states, 
informal orchestration benefits from its lower profile and it can initiate more informal 
agreements. In this research, UNEP initiates informal orchestration and engages NGOs 
and businesses to carry out the ICRAN/MAR project. As Chapter 7 illustrates, soft 
regulation benefits businesses in avoiding binding regulation. It also provides them with 
the good reputation they borrow from the cooperation with well-respected NGOs and 
IOs. Besides, the case study that centers Chapter 6 shows how the World Bank in formal 
orchestration incurs in conditionalities to reach target actors – instead of exclusively 
sticking to persuasion, and deviates from the final purposes of orchestration. 
Governments are principals of IOs in line with the Principal-Agent model. Yet, in the 
orchestration model states act as target actors. Then, in the case that the main incentive 
to join orchestration processes for states is to gain material resources, consequently it is 
not considered orchestration strictly. If such resources as recipients of implementation 
activities become ends in themselves then this casts serious doubts on the capacity by 
public intermediaries to influentially persuade through orchestration. 
8.1.2 IO orchestration influence 
According to the empirical research, informal orchestration has been more influential 
than formal orchestration. Through social leverage UNEP’s International Coral Reef 
Action Network/Mesoamerican Reef (ICRAN/MAR) has involved more new actors and 
has legitimized more new roles for coral reef governance than persuasion by the World 
Bank’s Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System project (MBRS). The evidence that points to 
social leveragers for sustainability politics as more influential orchestrators than 
persuaders – not without weaknesses – is summarized next. Overall, the higher rate of 
                                                 
161 The existence of two different approaches, may contribute to solving the issue pointed by Cronin 
that refers to the tension between the two faces of the United Nations, one that relies on 
intergovernmentalism and the other on transnationalism (Cronin 2002). 
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outputs162 by social leveragers in informal orchestration (forty-two outputs compared to 
the twenty of formal orchestration) combined with neutrality-based163 and 
participation-based procedural resources have characterized the more influential 
approach to coral reef governance. UNEP’s informal orchestration has facilitated the 
involvement of new actors, specifically, of participation- and to a lesser extent the 
creation of respect-based resources as well as the legitimation of new roles through 
neutrality-based resources, which has provided UNEP with strong clout. Instead, a 
lower number of outputs and the association of neutrality- together with respect-based 
resources of persuasion have produced less involvement of new actors and less 
legitimation of roles for actors. Thus, one of the competitive advantages of social 
leveragers’ over persuaders is the earning of participation-based procedural resources. 
Regardless of states exhibiting a willingness to cooperate, from the case study on 
formal orchestration we learn that it is difficult to fully engage and persuade national 
governments for regional coral reef governance. Therefore, social leverage appears 
necessary to, at least reach private organizations and, bypass stagnant state structures. 
Both orchestration approaches differ especially in the number and also type of outputs 
generated. Social leverage has yielded more outputs than persuasion. UNEP’s social 
leverage has generated especially discursive and voluntary-based outputs164 in all 
targeted working ecosystems –namely watersheds, marine and coastal areas. More 
specifically, informal orchestration obtains more voluntary-based outputs than 
discursive outputs. For instance, major achievements in watershed management are 
related to the pressure established between NGO representatives and leading employees 
at a major sugarcane producing company. Instead, World Bank’s persuasion has 
produced limited organizational – and policy-based outputs, a regional framework for 
policy-making and public monitoring on sustainability fishing and Marine Protected 
Areas (MPA) management, and voluntary-based outputs, especially institutional– and 
finance-related165. In fact, the Mexican denial to adopt regionally agreed rules 
undermines the World Bank’s achievement and illustrates the limited influence of rule 
                                                 
162 This assertion remains to be confirmed in the case of treaty secretariats, at least, for policy results. 
In fact, the expert survey pointed at treaty secretariats’ higher capacity to exert outputs when 
compared to multipurpose organizations. 
163 International organizations as orchestrators are good at generating procedural neutrality-based 
resources, indistinctively from the approach used. 
164 In the case of the expert survey results pointed that MPOs stand out in discourse – and policy–
based outputs and occasionally in voluntary-based outputs. 




harmonization in the region166. Since goal divergence has a detrimental effect on 
orchestration delegated by states (Abbott et al. 2015a), it is plausible to account that 
Mexico’s diversion from the specific objectives of the MBRS project has seriously 
hampered the development of binding policy-frameworks167. It has not helped either 
that the regional organization CCAD, World Bank’s persuasion intermediary, has 
Mexico as an observer and not as a full member of CCAD. 
Both formal and informal orchestration approaches have invested in gaining 
neutrality-based resources. In social leverage, the IO has gained procedural resources 
mainly from the participation of private actors and the acknowledgement of new 
environmental issue frames and sustainability interlinkages. In persuasion, the IO has 
gained neutrality- and respect- based resources by legitimizing the role of local 
administrators in resource management for transboundary marine ecosystems including 
monitoring. 
Table 8.1 Comparison of output results for both orchestration approaches 
 
Indeed, this research validates that the social leverage approach of informal 
orchestration has yielded the highest number of outputs for sustainability governance. 
Yet, formal orchestration through persuasion generates a few different types of outputs 
compared to social leverage. In addition, formal orchestration through persuasion also 
generates some voluntary outputs that complement those from social leverage. This 
study has also found that World Bank’s orchestration acts as a type of magnet that calls 
                                                 
166 Notwithstanding the policy framework does contribute to halt the decline of the Mesoamerican 
barrier reef. Erosion and sediment flow – that heavily damage the reef because of the ocean currents – 
come mainly from Guatemala and Honduras – countries that have signed the policy framework. 
167 More concretely, negotiations between Belize and Mexico for a bilateral agreement in the Northern 




the attention of other actors, such as foundations, NGOs or private businesses that 
decide to work on that same issue and region and bring more material and ideational 
resources and activities into the region. Interestingly, IOs attract other donors that 
identify with the World Bank in search of trustworthy and reliable country recipients 
where to invest their philanthropic efforts and IOs serve as quasi-guarantees for other 
donor organizations. Overall, this study concludes that softer types of outputs 
outnumber those ‘harder’ related to organizational– and policy–based outputs in IO 
orchestration. 
The table below shows the weaker and stronger points for both approaches to reach 
target actors. UNEP’s social leverage has not taken full profit of social “punishments”. A 
case in point is the performance assessment plan for sustainable tourism with baselines 
and objectives for each relevant actor put forward as a first attempt in taking informal 
pledges to coral reef management by targets (see Chapter 7). However, this is not used 
to provide social rewards or punishments. In detriment of respect-based procedural 
resources there is no supply from southern expertise and local and traditional 
knowledge holders such as small farmers; there is a lack of social scientists’ participation 
and the publication of sustainability tourism guidelines only in Spanish and not in the 
main indigenous languages is a missed opportunity to engage such groups. In favor of 
informal orchestration is that informal alliances by IOs empower weaker actors such as 
NGOs that in general do not have much access to governments in developing countries. 
This way, informal orchestration provides incentives for the implementation of 
environmentally friendly policies (Compagnon 2012) in areas that otherwise rely on 
capacity-building only and approaches close to formal orchestration. By contrast, World 
Bank’s persuasion has not benefited from identification processes when approaching 
target actors (specially between Mexican representatives and the rest of country 
representatives) and lacks procedural resources corresponding to the participation from 
private actors. In addition, formal orchestration by the World Bank has not favored the 
setup of measurable targets and deadlines to be monitored that could have contributed 
to gain some trust-based resources. 
The orchestration process led by UNEP is able to gain broad membership and 
knowledge in the various related fields that benefits from the ecosystem-based 
management approach to managing coral reefs (Mahon 2011: 325). Participation-, 
neutrality- as well as respect-based resources contribute to the involvement of new 
actors and roles in orchestration, which enhances UNEP’s capacity as norm 
entrepreneur, knowledge broker and discourse-coalition builder. Nonetheless, informal 
orchestration lacks acknowledgement of traditional knowledge for project development, 
which is detrimental to the participation of local communities. Thus, the overlooking of 
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southern expertise diminishes its capacity to draw on respect-based resources of 
influence and become a more influential discourse-coalition builder. 
On the other hand, the World Bank has attracted the participation of a new 
transboundary park commission and traditional fishers. At the same time, the World 
Bank has made it possible to involve NGOs, yet no concessions have been granted to 
grass-root NGO and indigenous communities. In this case the World Bank has 
generated neutrality- and respect-based resources, which contribute with the 
involvement of new actors and roles increasing World Bank’s capacity as knowledge 
broker and discourse-coalition builder. 
Generally speaking, orchestrators must improve the acquisition of trust-based 
resources, indistinctively from the orchestration approach taken, which reaffirms the 
generally accepted concern about the need for more accountability and abuses of power 
in world politics (Grant and Keohane 2005). Orchestrators that bring in trust-based 
resources contribute to the generation of new roles for orchestrating actors and increase 
the capacity of the IO in facilitating accountability by providing a public forum for 
sharing and disclosing information. Ideally, all four types of procedural resources must 
be present to take full profit of orchestration. What it appears to be most wanting in the 
case of coral reef governance for the two orchestration approaches is the capacity to 





Table 8.2 Comparison of procedural resources for both orchestration approaches 
 
8.1.3 Strengthening IO orchestration in GEG 
Experts’ answers from the survey presented in Chapter 4 confirm that both 
orchestration approaches – formal and informal – matter. In particular, according to 
survey results, IOs considered more influential in GEG are those that generate trust– 
and neutrality–based resources, which correspond to the procedural resources of the 
analytical framework developed here that legitimize new roles for actors. Similarly, 
survey results point that what determines that an IO is more influential is not 
exclusively determined by its orchestration approach. The institutional setup 
determines what type(s) of orchestration that agency could engage in. A multipurpose 
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organization (MPO) – UNEP – and a treaty secretariat (TSC) – climate change 
secretariat – are the most relevant agencies in GEG according to surveyed experts. Thus, 
the survey does not signal a clear competitive advantage of MPOs that engage in formal 
and informal orchestration over TSCs that can only engage in the formal version. UNEP 
can engage in either persuasion (formal) or social leverage (informal), while by contrast, 
the climate secretariat will mainly engage in persuasive orchestration approaches. 
Ultimately, the World Bank is an MPO with more material resources than the climate 
secretariat and UNEP together. Yet, more procedural resources – neutrality, trust, and 
respect – back the outputs from the latter two. 
In general, in-depth case studies confirm and delve deeper into the survey results of 
Chapter 4. Best-assessed orchestrators are those that have more capacity to legitimize 
new roles and functions for other actors. In the case studies, UNEP’s social leverage 
generates more outputs that are legitimizing new roles for many of the different actors 
involved. The contribution of this research is mainly in reference to orchestration 
approaches and more specifically, it claims the relevance of the informal orchestration 
approach. The orchestration approach taken by an IO shapes the type of intermediaries 
addressed. While formal orchestration relies on public actors for persuasion, IOs in 
informal orchestration rely on non-state actors as intermediaries for social leverage. 
Besides, the specific chosen intermediary for informal orchestration also matters. For 
instance, UNEP’s informal orchestration obtains good results in watershed management 
with the WWF as intermediary. Yet, in other areas, the orchestration influence is 
poorer. 
In addition, the orchestration approach affects the type of results obtained. Whereas 
World Bank’s persuasion centers in managing fishing and transboundary MPAs, UNEP’s 
social leverage focuses on dealing with different ecosystems, namely, watershed, coastal 
and marine across levels, actors, roles and issues. Variability at the level of the concrete 
typology of outputs can be expected for both persuasion and social leverage approaches 
from one environmental issue to another. Coral reef touches upon several policy 
environmental areas. Results by areas are unequal. Marine results are better than coastal 
environments but worse than watershed areas. Overall though, UNEP through social 
leverage has influenced not only more policy areas within the broad coral reef 
governance area but also more systematically. Social leverage has intensely influenced 
watershed and marine ecosystems while persuasion has influenced only MPA 
management and monitoring activities. The empirical case of informal orchestration has 
shown how UNEP as social leverager and its intermediaries have contributed to 
international governance characterized for being multiactor, multilevel, multirole and 
multi-issue. The participation of several public and private authorities includes IOs, 
NGOs and businesses. Interaction has taken place across the international, local and 
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transnational levels. For instance, international foundations have worked with local 
resource users, and, national and international NGOs with transnational businesses. 
Orchestration has entailed the interplay of different actor roles. For example, the 
agenda-setting role by IOs has interplayed with standard setting with retailers, 
implementation with businesses and the locals affected, and monitoring through NGOs. 
Finally, orchestration has dealt with crosscutting sustainability issues such as the 
environment, economic issues and social equity, leading agribusinesses to cooperate 
with environmental NGOs and unions. 
Finally, the surveyed experts in Chapter 4 acknowledge the competence to generate 
respect-based resources by IOs. This exceptionally deviates to some extent from in-
depth case study results. Due to a plausible bias from experts that come from an 
international elite, an emphasis on reinforcing the development of respect-based 
resources as a resource for influential orchestration is confirmed. Besides, survey 
answers on global sustainability politics are not fully comparable to the realities of 
regional/local environmental sustainability politics studied in the case studies. At the 
level of orchestration outputs, there are some slight differences between the survey 
results on IOs for environmental politics in general, and case study results on coral reef 
governance in Mesoamerica. According to the survey, orchestration generates especially 
discursive and policy-based outputs. By contrast, in the detailed case studies, policy 
outputs are only relevant for formal orchestration and to a limited extent. In addition, 
voluntary-based outputs are more relevant than expected according to survey results. 
Therefore, this proves that the specific type of outputs is probably much more 
dependent on the empirical context of a given policy issue and thus different for each 
environmental area. Yet, it seems presumable that voluntary non-binding agreements 
are the trend in orchestration and GEG more generally. Specifically, those 
environmental areas that are not highly legalized will be influenced most plausibly at 
the level of discursive and voluntary-based outputs. Differently, those areas that are 
more institutionalized at the international level may possibly be influenced at the level 
of organizational and policy outputs. This is an empirical question subject to future 
research. 
8.2 Theoretical and methodological contributions 
This thesis contributes to a timely debate in light of developments such as the creation 
of the High Level Policy Forum (HLPF) (Halle, Najam, and Wolfe 2014, Abbott and 
Bernstein 2015), an institution that faces the challenge of coordinating different UN 
organizations in the field of sustainability politics. In such a framework, informal 
orchestration needs to be taken into account when assessing the work of IOs such as the 
UN to fully acknowledge IOs’ capacities. In this sense, only a few of the plethora of IOs 
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are highly legalized and can thus exert coercion (Abbott et al. 2000). Most IOs’ 
leadership and ability to affect world politics is associated with its capacity to perform – 
not only a central function –  which is coordinating activities by other agencies like the 
UNEP coordinates the politics of ozone depletion for instance (Jeong 2001: 21) but also 
to orchestrate (Abbott et al. 2015a). An underlying assumption of Chapter 1 stipulates 
that IOs lacking legal enforcement mechanisms increasingly use orchestration to 
influence. It is consequently relevant to learn in how far orchestration affects world 
politics, also specifying what different orchestration approaches exist and, if applicable, 
which from the different approaches identified is most influential.  
Informal orchestration is something overlooked. As it demonstrates the fact that the 
orchestration theory does not contemplate orchestration when goal divergence is 
“medium to low” and state oversight is weak (Abbott et al. 2015c). My empirical research 
shows that informal orchestration by IOs emerges even when states have agreed to 
cooperate. By and large, when the literature refers to the agency of IOs it assumes the 
tenets of formal orchestration. This reductionism leads to the fact that many IO effects 
remain underresearched. Besides, it obviates the synergies that can be set up between 
informal and formal orchestration. When formal orchestration is blocked by states, it is 
necessary to look at informal orchestration. Informal orchestration may involve norm-
setting processes at the shadow of hierarchy. 
Besides, the underlying assumption in Chapter 2 is that studying what makes policy-
takers voluntarily observe norms to comply with is fundamental for improving the 
influence of orchestrators. In this sense, several sources of voluntary compliance are 
identified with a special emphasis on the fairness of procedures, related to assets such as 
trust, respect, neutrality and participation. According to civil regulation studies, trust 
and respect followed by neutrality and participation, by this order, determine a higher 
level of voluntary compliance (Tyler 1997). Yet, according to the case studies, 
participation–based procedural resources are central and appear more influential than 
respect–based resources. Thus, the importance of each procedural resource is plausibly 
an empirical question. 
Chapter 3 has systematically differentiated the orchestration initiated by states and 
formally delegated to IOs from the informal orchestration initiated by IOs. To get 
voluntary compliance from target actors, IOs follow different approaches, namely 
persuasion and social leverage. Such causal pathways that account for voluntary 
compliance have been overlooked so far. By definition, in formal orchestration IOs 
engage public intermediaries to influence through persuasion. By contrast, informal 
orchestrators engage private intermediaries to exert social leverage and get targets to 
abide by the orchestrators’ objectives. Formal orchestration follows a persuasion 
approach that includes micro processes of identification, authority, and social proof 
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while states, as their principals, exert ex-ante oversight. By contrast, IOs in informal 
orchestration are monitored through ex-post state oversight and develop functions not 
focal to their legal mandates, which provides them with political maneuver. The 
processes used in social leverage by IOs encompass social rewards, group pressure and 
social punishments to influence target actors. 
Chapter 3 also develops the framework to assess influence, made up of orchestration 
outputs and procedural resources that provide the information necessary to assess the 
overall orchestration influence by IOs. In-depth case studies inform a comparative study 
of the influence yielded by each of the two orchestration approaches. This research has 
hypothesized that IOs’ influence is a dependent variable of the two identified 
orchestration approaches. Orchestration initiators shape the orchestration approach – 
persuasion versus social leverage – that in turn shape the influence exerted by IOs on 
target actors. Thus, this study notes that membership, franchise and mandate – more 
than decision-making and IOs’ autonomy – are variables that need to be taken into 
account as may qualify the variables goal divergence, state oversight and focality, pointed 
by the orchestration theory. Chapter 4 presents a survey by experts on nine relevant 
environmental IOs, multipurpose organizations (MPOs) and treaty secretariats (TSCs) 
among them. TSCs that orchestrate through persuasion mainly and MPOs that can 
engage in either two of the orchestration approaches. From there it is inferred that there 
is no a priori superiority of one orchestration approach over the other (see results for 
MPO UNEP vs. TSC climate sec.). The survey data provided inconclusive results on the 
competitive advantage of one orchestration approach over the other. This justifies the 
in-depth case studies carried out in Chapters 6 and 7. 
From the case studies, it can be concluded that informal orchestration is more 
influential than formal orchestration. States are both principals and recipients of formal 
orchestration and persuasion appears wanting when IOs attempt to orchestrate them 
but states put the brakes on the process. States are both agents that have a stake on the 
issue dealt through formal orchestration and they are at the same time recipients of 
persuasion approaches by IOs. Informal orchestration is an alternative to formal 
processes. May formal orchestration be blocked informal orchestration may serve as a 
way to unblock formal negotiations. States are cautious of giving sovereignty power 
away to IOs. By and large, states tend to delegate functions with lower sovereignty costs, 
such as implementation and monitoring, but rarely delegate rule making and 
enforcement (Green and Colgan 2013). Yet, states concentrated on overseeing formal 
delegation may at the same time benefit IOs, which engage in soft rule making through 
informal orchestration with ex-post oversight by states. 
Formal orchestration serves as social pressure from the background and acts as an 
incentive for profit organizations to participate in orchestration processes in the 
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“shadow of hierarchy” with more flexible pledges – in contrast to binding regulation. 
Formal orchestration with ex-ante state oversight presumably explains the emergence of 
the informal orchestration by UNEP. This highlights the paradoxical centrality of states 
rather than civil society in informal approaches (Tallberg et al. 2013). To illustrate, Type 
II outcomes of WSSD were created to strengthen multilateralism, where IOs emerged as 
a forum for initiating, negotiating and brokering partnerships (Bäckstrand 2008). 
Orchestration studies show that if states are not able to agree on common norms for 
issues that affect their territories, other agents such as non-states are ready to take the 
initiative in cooperation with orchestrators. In this line, studies support that the private 
sector is more likely to be involved in rule generation and implementation with NGOs 
that are prominent in agenda-setting, norm-development, and monitoring compliance, 
which require governmental legitimacy from IOs (Haufler 2009, 2016). This may 
account for why the two orchestration approaches coexist and complement each other. 
Whether the informal approach is dependent on the existence of a formal orchestration 
process that gets all the public attention in the first place, attracts donors and generates 
the “shadow of hierarchy” necessary for generating social leverage for voluntary norm-
setting to emerge is a matter of further empirical research. 
8.3 Policy implications 
There is controversy on whether more multilateral intergovernmental politics are 
necessary for corals (Kim 2012) or not (Goodwin 2011). It is debated whether a global 
treaty is needed because most coral reefs are under the jurisdiction of only few 
countries, mostly in the Indo-Pacific and the Caribbean region. Yet, others argue that 
there are about 100 countries that have corals and the current problem of acidification 
of oceans – the main threat to coral reefs - is global (Dimitrov 2006). In this sense, the 
findings of this research serve as a critical standpoint for the current efforts to cope with 
coral reef governance. The “Partnership for Ecosystem-based Coral reefs management in 
the World’s Regional Seas” 2015-2017, which is a partnership for SDGs - as part of the 
multistakeholder partnerships for Small Island developing states - responds to the 
model of formal orchestration with ex-ante oversight and national agencies as partners. 
The argument is to strive for more informal orchestration, while supporting formal 
orchestration. At the same time, some voices alert about the risk of diverting the 
international community’s attention to cooperation for climate goals if concentrating in 
issues such as coral reef governance. In fact, the IPCC warns that the negotiation costs 
of coral reef governance may not be used to distract from or dilute the performance of 
international cooperation toward climate goals as chapter 13 of the IPCC report on 
climate mitigation points out (IPCC 2014a: 1012-1028). For this reason, applying the 
concept influence understood as outputs and procedural resources to assess 
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orchestration processes are more necessary than ever. To overcome forum shopping and 
support sustainability interlinkages, IOs can exploit its clearly demonstrated capacity to 
generate neutrality-based resources through the framing of issues and interlinkages that 
support the sustainable development of coral reefs as well as mitigate climate change. 
According to the empirical data, some procedural resources are achieved more easily 
than others. In informal orchestration both participative- and neutrality resources are 
more easily obtained and respect-based to a lesser extent. In the case of formal 
orchestration neutrality and to a lesser extent respect-based resources are obtained. 
Both orchestration approaches encounter difficulties to achieve trust-based resources. 
The survey in Chapter 4 shows how IOs considered more relevant by experts are those 
that assign new roles to their intermediaries and target actors – related to neutrality– 
and trust–based resources. Based on the two best-evaluated organizations, the 
legitimization of new roles rather than involving new actors is more valued according to 
surveyed experts. Then, non-state actors and state representatives will prefer to engage 
in orchestration with IOs that can empower them with the delegation of new functions. 
Consequently, it is plausible that IOs, in their aim to gain more visibility and relevance 
vis-à-vis potential intermediaries, strive for procedural resources that catch the eye of 
prominent NGOs and public officials (Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998: 34-35)168. 
At the same time, research evidence tells us that IOs in orchestration are not 
particularly capable of obtaining trust-based resrouces. Then, relying mainly on 
neutrality–based procedural resources, IOs disregard respect- and participation-based 
resources in the case of formal orchestration or respect-based only in the case of 
informal orchestration. This can obviously produce negative consequences. Less 
organized and less visible actors, for instance, weak states or local communities will be 
at a disadvantage compared to well-organized international NGOs or stronger states. 
Consequently, just focusing on informal orchestration approaches can generate a bias 
towards well-organized non-state actors and leave affected actors out of the decision-
making processes. 
Informal orchestration engages in non-binding normative processes, which lack, 
according to the empirical research, respect- and particularly trust-based resources to 
be influential. This implies a negative competitive advantage of traditional and local 
knowledge holders, Southern expertise as well as the citizens asking for accountability 
and monitoring compared to better linked international NGOs and business 
foundations. Thus, IOs when engaging in social leverage need to be aware and 
compensate for the higher concentration on international intermediaries that are 
                                                 
168 Notwithstanding responsiveness by governments and business actors, NGO mobilization however 
does not always necessarily mean acceptance of NGO perspectives. 
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detrimental to local intermediaries. Otherwise, we run the risk of falling into “global 
corporatism”, so that the claims about the benefits of partnership are not exceeded by 
the costs of global corporatism, as put by Ottaway (2001). For this author, the risks of 
global corporatism are that partners are not equal, such as the World Bank or networks 
of global NGOs, which renders tripartite arrangements disparities more evident and not 
representative. This is due to the price of bureaucratization, the disproportionate 
influence of well-organized, tactically astute NGOs freely interpreting the interests of 
silent populations, which mirrors the same distortions of power and same rigidities at 
the global level as they do nationally (2001: 284-287). Similarly, this analysis puts into 
question the existence of a so-called global civil society (Lipschutz 2001: 273) that can 
ensure equity in global environmental politics. Not obtaining especially respect-based 
procedural resources reduces the overall influence of orchestration processes and most 
importantly, contributes to turning them into politically biased processes. 
As it has been argued in the previous section, the two IOs studied have influenced 
coral reef governance in Mesoamerica as knowledge brokers and discourse-coalition 
builders, and only in the case of informal orchestration as a norm entrepreneur. 
Therefore, coral reef governance for the Mesoamerican region requires strengthening 
particularly the role of accountability facilitators. According to Porter and Welsh Brown, 
no IO influences global environmental politics by performing all of the possible 
functions they may carry out – agenda setting, convening and influencing international 
negotiations, developing soft law normative codes of conduct or influence state policies 
that are out of international negotiation (1996a: 41-42). Overall, to increase IO 
orchestration influence it is important that IOs generate both a higher level of trust–
based and also respect-based procedural resources. Engaging Southern experts, 
traditional knowledge holders and the indigenous population, whose participation may 
be mediated through social scientists will contribute to the provision of information, 
monitoring for improved decision-making and norm development. Importantly, from 
the expert survey in Chapter 4 we have learnt that TSCs rely on formal orchestration, 
which is better equipped to facilitate the involvement of new governmental actors. 
Therefore, TSCs’ work should be abandoned just because only MPOs can engage in 
informal orchestration. Another argument for focused and well-planned formal 
orchestration is that its existence may facilitate the emergence of informal orchestration 
running in parallel and complementing the other approach. This issue is linked with the 
fragmentation debate and the overlap of public private partnerships (Biermann and 
Pattberg 2012). 
Similar to informal orchestration, there is room for improvement in the case of 
formal orchestration. Persuasion processes must instill the ecosystem approach more 
deeply in the design of activities and rely less on political boundaries to get quick buy in 
275 
 
to the project and neutrality-based resources. In this line, some new projects in the 
region have taken up a focus ranging from the watershed to the barrier reef (CCAD 
2016)169. In addition, two strategies are available to increase trust-based resources. First, 
social leveragers may strengthen their orchestration position by extending a wider 
cooperation network with focal IOs dealing with the issues that cut across, coral reef 
governance in this case. For instance, UNEP could establish Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoU) with the World Tourism Organization – tourism, IMO – fish, sea 
pollution and FAO – agriculture. Second, social leveragers can exploit more market 
mechanisms as social rewards and punishments for sustainable supply chains. Finally, 
designating third-party actors to monitor the development of soft regulation should be 
pursued in order to increase the trust-based resources of informal orchestration. 
8.4 Directions for future research 
Three lines of future research that relate to the main research questions that have 
driven this thesis can be outlined: first, delving deeper into the study and emergence of 
different orchestration approaches and their synergistic relations; second, 
understanding how to enhance the specific IO roles in orchestration, in particular 
taking special care of those procedural resources generally neglected; and last, the 
strengthening of IO orchestration in GEG depending of the type of IO: MPOs or TSCs. 
First, the question of why different orchestration approaches co-exist is relevant. Is 
formal orchestration a decisive factor, when goal divergence is low, in explaining the 
emergence of informal orchestration? Or can informal orchestration also emerge when 
state oversight is weak and goal divergence is low without previous formal 
orchestration? Can informal orchestration always emerge next to stalled formal 
orchestration? Does informal orchestration always matter more than formal 
orchestration or do they exchange their relevance according to changing contexts? 
Addtionallly, it is necessary to study the synergies between formal and informal 
orchestration. How do orchestration approaches enable and/or constrain each other? 
Second, more research on how to bridge the gap of procedural resources, especially 
that of trust- and to a lesser extent respect-based resources, to strengthen orchestration 
approaches by IOs is needed. Concretely, the role of accountability facilitators has been 
especially wanting. Alternative orchestrators to undertake those roles should be 
explored. In relation to this, it would be interesting to study whether these thesis results 
can be generalized to other agents acting as orchestrators. A question to address would 
                                                 
169 In the specific case of the MBRS, it never followed up an MBRS II (GEF 2011, Álvarez 2015). 
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be whether it is possible to put on the same level the informal orchestration carried out 
by IOs to that of other agents in world politics, such as NGOs170. 
Last, IOs are in a privileged position to orchestrate, as they possess qualities to 
manage areas that lack a central governance mechanism and may become a fragmented 
field of governance. A hypothesis to be tested is whether IOs can become orchestrators 
that contribute to the management of fragmentation. Public-private partnerships in 
particular reveal the reciprocal support relationship between public and private 
governance activities (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 99). If we agree that MPOs through 
informal orchestration contribute to competition for rule-takers and fragmentation, can 
TSCs through formal orchestration contribute to the convergence of different initiatives 
and to integration? 
                                                 
170 In fact, a private management capacity assessment of the selected coral reef marine protected areas 
in the Caribbean (Gombos et al. 2011) continues the work by NOAA and UNEP with a regional vision 
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IOs such as the United Nations (UN) have been traditionally assessed as government-
led and not very autonomous institutions. Yet, IOs are currently undergoing a 
breakthrough transformation at a slow but determined pace. IOs are engaging multiple 
actors acting at different policy levels and across issues, undertaking and delegating new 
roles. Paradoxically, even if IOs have been there for a long time – the inception of the 
UN dates more than seventy years ago – there are many unanswered questions about 
them. Maybe because it seems as if “they have been always there” it is more difficult 
raise questions and to have a fresh look on them. It is curious how underresearched the 
diplomatic mechanisms to get other actors do what IOs pretend without the use of force 
are. The underlying assumption here is that IOs evolve and we should not cease in our 
attempts to assess them to suggest ways to improve them. This thesis studies different 
IOs orchestration approaches – understood as the causal pathways that allow IOs to 
reach their target actors so that they voluntarily abide by the IO policy prescriptions. 
This study defines what orchestration influence is and assesses the influence of different 
IO orchestation approaches for global environmental governance (GEG). The focus of 
this thesis is on assessing IO performance when engaging mainly public intermediaries 
as allies to persuade orchestration targets in contrast to private intermediaries and thus 
engaging in social leverage. 
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I explores the sources of influence 
available to IOs and distinguishes two main approaches to influence target actors 
through orchestration. Part II specifies that orchestration intermediated by private 
actors is informal orchestration and that needs to be taken into account when studying 
the performance of IOs. In addition, it develops a conceptual framework to assess the 
IO influence of formal and informal approaches to orchestration in GEG. Part III 
assesses through an expert survey and two in-depth case studies IO orchestration 
influence in GEG in general and coral reef governance in particular. 
11.1 Part I: Orchestration approaches 
Part I argues that the sources of influence attributed to IOs and how are they used and 
assessed are underresearched and that a systematic study of the ways IOs influence 
world politics is needed. Chapter 2 conducts several reviews, namely, on IO sources of 
influence in International Relations, on assessments of IO influence and finally on 
causal pathways to orchestration influence and distinguishes two main approaches to 
reach target actors, involving in both cases the enlistment of intermediaries. This 
chapter examines current approaches in assessing IO influence and introduces studies 
on sources of legitimacy for voluntary compliance; later, it presents two existing causal 
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pathways to orchestration influence, persuasion and social leverage. The first section 
defines and briefly reviews the different sources of influence attributed to IOs from 
coercive power to orchestration, including soft power resources and the Principal-Agent 
model. This section concludes that the orchestration theory with its Orchestrator-
Intermediary-Target model is helpful in accounting for current GEG. The second section 
introduces the different strands of literature that have addressed the assessment of IO 
influence. Scholars have traced the influence of IOs by searching how beliefs change, 
how interests change and, how rational legal-authority of international bureaucracies 
and fairness in procedures affect the behavior of target actors in favor of IO objectives. 
Besides, this chapter introduces the idea that IOs’ target actors need not be states. The 
last section introduces the two causal pathways that account for how IOs affect world 
politics; namely, persuasion – changing minds with the use of arguments – and social 
leverage – changing the public behavior of others without convincing privately. Those 
two causal pathways build on reviewed sources of influence and are influential upon 
target actors because function following two main logics – that include “doing X is doing 
the right thing” and “if I do X then Y”. 
11.2 Part II: Orchestration influence 
Part II claims that orchestration intermediated by private actors ought to be 
distinguished from orchestration intermediated by public actors. Chapter 3 
distinguishes between informal orchestration intermediated by private actors and the 
use of social leverage to influence targets from the formal orchestration intermediated 
by public actors influencing through persuasion. The underlying assumption is that 
these two orchestration approaches exert different types of orchestration results. Yet, 
since both approaches are conflated with the concept of orchestration, we lack scientific 
evidence of the effects generated by each one. In addition, Chapter 3 develops a 
conceptual framework to assess the IO influence of orchestration in GEG to apply it to 
each orchestration approach for comparability purposes. A definition of orchestration 
influence is developed, which refers to the IO ability to involve new actors and 
legitimize new roles for orchestration actors. This conceptualization is then 
operationalized through so-called orchestration outputs and procedural resources. 
Outputs include observable effects including organizational – creation of new 
organizations, policy-based – development of new policies or rules, discursive – 
generation of new discourses and voluntary – setup of non-binding agreements. 
Procedural resources are made up of indicators that reflect sources of fairness that 
facilitate the production of previous outputs in GEG, such as legitimation of social 
accountability, environmental framing, sustainability interlinkages and involvement of 
South science and traditional knowledge, affected actors and private actors. 
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11.3 Part III: Strengthening orchestration in GEG 
The main question of Part III is: to what extent are formal and informal orchestration 
approaches influential? The underlying assumption is that who initiates the 
orchestration process shapes the orchestration approach, which in turn affects the 
orchestration results. Orchestration initiated by states and delegated to IOs relies on 
public intermediaries – it refers to formal orchestration. Conversely, orchestration 
initiated under IO entrepreneurship relies on private intermediaries. The main question 
is: to what extent are those orchestration approaches influential? The main objective is 
to assess through an expert survey and two in-depth case studies IO orchestration 
influence in GEG in general and, coral reef governance in particular. This part comprises 
chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
Chapter 4 presents the results of an expert survey on the IO influence of several 
international agencies orchestrating in GEG. The survey sample includes both 
multipurpose organizations (MPOs) and treaty secretariats (TSCs). The study assumes 
that due to the institutional setup, TSCs such as the climate secretariat engage primarily 
in persuasion through public intermediaries as they are highly overseen by states, and 
MPOs such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) may in addition 
engage also in social leverage through private actors. Against conventional wisdom, 
survey results note that MPOs are not necessarily in a privileged position to be 
considered more relevant because they engage in both formal and informal 
orchestration. According to the surveyed experts in fact, the climate secretariat is 
perceived as relevant as some of the MPOs surveyed. Therefore, the survey does not 
answer which orchestration approach is more relevant per se. For this reason, this 
investigation engages in in-depth case study research. As expected, experts acknowledge 
the production of outputs and the generation of procedural resources for the IOs 
considered relevant. Nonetheless, results point to a very interesting issue. Top 
influential organizations are those that are able to legitimize new roles for actors. It 
appears to be more significant to be able to legitimize social accountability, new framing 
of issues and new interlinkages in sustainable issues rather than being able to involve 
new actors for GEG in orchestration. 
Chapter 5 introduces the topic of coral reef governance as a matter of study in GEG. 
This chapter justifies from a social, environmental and economic point of view the need 
to protect coral reefs. It raises awareness of the multiple ways that humans are 
contributing to reef biodiversity loss. Not only the acidification and warming up of 
oceans due to climate change, but also man-made effects such as pollution are 
deteriorating this important source of economic revenue for billions of people living in 
coastal areas. Coral reefs support industries such as fishing and nature tourism and 
provide ecological services such as the protection of the coastal frontline from sea 
334 
 
erosion. The international agreements and regional legal frameworks that affect the 
Mesoamerican Barrier Reef region – bordering four different countries – are also 
introduced. From here, the study moves to the case studies, one dealing with formal and 
the other with informal orchestration implemented in the same regional area, the 
Mesoamerican Barrier Reef region including Mexico, Belize, Guatemala and Honduras. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the assessment of formal orchestration through the study of 
the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef (MBRS) project delegated to the World Bank for its 
implementation. The World Bank enlists the Comisión Centro Americana de Desarrollo 
(CCAD) as its main public intermediary. The case study consistently applies the 
analytical framework and concludes that the influence exerted by the World Bank is 
limited. The World Bank has aimed at persuading the four regional bordering states to 
acquire more binding regulations that would harmonize different national rules. 
However, among the major drawbacks in furthering institutions reference may be made 
to a recalcitrant Mexico to engage in such endeavor. In that event, influence has 
translated into some organizational, policy-based and voluntary outputs combined with 
the generation of neutrality- and respect-based procedural resources. Such efforts turn 
the World Bank into a knowledge-broker and a discourse-coalition builder for coral reef 
governance orchestration. 
Chapter 7 critically assesses the informal orchestration approach taken by UNEP in 
its International Coral Reef Action Network /Mesoamerican Reef alliance 
(ICRAN/MAR). UNEP as orchestrator of an entrepreneurial effort to support coral reef 
protection has mostly engaged profit and non-profit organizations and has by-passed 
formal negotiations. The proactivity and the “shadow of hierarchy”, understood as the 
long shadow casted by potential binding regulation, has come to some fruition. 
Discourse- and voluntary-based outputs have been achieved through social leverage by 
orchestration. In addition, neutrality-, respect- and participation-based procedural 
resources have been produced which ensures the continuous improvement of activities. 
Such efforts turn the UNEP into a knowledge broker, discourse-coalition builder and a 
norm entrepreneur for coral reef governance orchestration. 
11.4 Future research 
Last, as it happens most of the times, this thesis raises more questions than it answers. 
First, this research is quite optimistic on the capacity to influence world politics through 
IO orchestration. Yet, what is the realistic number of organizations that are truly 
influential in GEG and in other issue areas? We have all heard of some international 
environmental regimes that are more successful than others. If only IO informal 
orchestration could turn around the situation of stalled negotiations! It needs to be 
confirmed that social leverage is more influential in other areas of GEG other than coral 
335 
 
reef governance. Second, what factors facilitate that informal orchestration emerges? Do 
we need that a previous formal orchestration process is in place for informal 
orchestration to emerge when goal divergence is low and there is weak state oversight? 
Third, how come that some procedural resources such as neutrality-, participation-
based resources and to a lesser extent respect-based are more easily developed but 
accountability-based resources are so hardly obtained? Are there any other agents in 
world politics that can provide those resources IOs are not bringing in? Why is the role 
of accountability facilitator poorly performed by IOs in orchestration? Empirical 
research in coral reef governance shows how voluntary non-binding agreements are the 
trend in orchestration and GEG more generally. This combined with the fact that IOs 
lack the resources to become accountability facilitators leads to a governance gap: who 
monitors the increasing voluntary non-binding agreements? Fourth, should an efficient 
and strengthened GEG encourage MPOs to engage mainly in social leverage as they 
have the chance to generate participation- and respect-based resources to become norm 
entrepreneurs and eventually accountability facilitators when they improve their trust-
based resources and let TSCs specialize in discourse-coalition building and knowledge 
brokering since through persuasion they obtain neutrality- and respect-based resources? 
Similarly, the different types of orchestration IOs could serve different purposes of GEG 
more generally such as that MPOs through informal orchestration contribute to 
competition for rule-takers and fragmentation and conversely TSCs through formal 
orchestration contribute to the convergence of different initiatives and to integration? 
An interesting avenue for future theoretical development and research is to 
conceptualize IOs as agents in a social system that is embedded in a “‘liquid modernity’, 
which is the growing conviction that change is the only permanence, and uncertainty 
the only certainty. A hundred years ago “to be modern” meant to chase the “final state 
of perfection” – now it means an infinity of improvement, with no “final state in sight 
and none desired” (Bauman 2000: Foreword to the 2012 ed.). Relations established with 
principals, intermediaries, stakeholders, affected actors, advocates and other agents are 
to some extent flexible, evolving, not static. The orchestration theory emphasizes the 
exchange of ideas and resources and alliances among connected actors that do not act in 
isolation. Governing implies the capacity to create more avenues where inclusion and 
democratization constitute “an infinity of improvement”. IOs are not central authorities 
but facilitators to generate public spaces where public and private actors can meet to 
entrepreneurially develop norms and where accountability is demanded. IOs will 
continue to be relevant agents for change in global governance and for research as long 
as they continue providing spaces for silenced issues and voices and facilitating visions 
for unforeseen transformation and cooperation. 
